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LEGITIMACYANDTHE  130ST-COMMUNIST  HUNGARIAN 
POLITICAL  CHANGE 
ABSTRACT 
Legitimacy  is  a  key  but  a-changing  concept  in  political  science.  It  has  evolved 
in  parallcl  with  the  changing  political  realities  throughout  history.  In  the  current 
political  environment.  legitimacy  of  a  political  order  depends  on  its  approval  by 
people  tit  the  LIOniestic  level.  However,  this  domestic  approval  has  to  be 
sustained  by  an  international  approval.  an  attribute  underlined  especially  during 
tile  Cold  War  era.  Latin  American  crises  of  legitimacy  and  tile  more  recent  East 
European  crises  ollegitimacy  provide  conacte  examples  for  this. 
I  lungary.  as  one  ol'the  East  European  countries  which  underwent  the  post- 
C0111111LIlliSt  systemic  transformation  faces  a  renewcd  crisis  of  legitimacy.  The 
grounds  ol'  legitimation  have  changed  in  comparison  with  the  grounds  or 
legitimation  01,  tile  ancien  I-egime.  especially  under  tile  Uddrist  rule.  This 
thesis  analyses  the  UdArist  attempts  at  legitimation,  and  then  focuses  on  tile 
post-coninlunist  system  in  I  lungary  to  compare  it  with  the  ancicn  regime  in 
search  ot'  the  answer  to  tile  question  what  has  ehanged  during  the 
transilormation.  This  study  flocuscs  on  legitimacy  with  its  domcstic  and 
intanational  dynamics.  taking  into  consideration  the  systemic,  institutional, 
and  social  changes  in  tile  post-communist  era.  It  concludes  that  a  conibination 
ol'political.  economic  and  social  improvements  will  ensure  the  new  system*s 
legitimate  status  in  both  donle%tic  and  international  arcnas. iii 
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284 CHAPTER  ONE 
ON  LEGITIMACY  AND  DEMOCRACY 
1.  ON  THE  SUBJECT  MATTER,  METHODOLOGY,  AND  TERMINOLOGY 
OF  THE  THESIS 
I  lie  lolliming  thesis  is  to  focus  on  Ific  subject  orlegitimacy  and  legifinuilloff 
in  Ilic  jvlitical  transrorniation  of  Ilic  llungarian  political  systcm  from  the 
I  Itingarian  Revolution  to  Ilic  post-communist  cm  I'lic  main  concepts  to  bc 
inwhed  in  Ilic  discussions  arc  legitimury.  legitimallon  and  denwrothation. 
Legitimacy  is  n  concept  uhich  has  a  broad  spcoruin  or  rucanings.  Basically.  it 
is  undmituid  in  the  social  scienccs  as  -Ilic  nonnativc  %mlidity  oran  ordcr.....  a 
matter  or  lx:  licr  by  the  prticipants  -  actors.  "I  and  thcrerorc  is  an  clement  or 
hiteractimi  bemccri  the  actors  ora  plitical  system  Ilic  concept  oriegia,  "t,  c). 
ol'an  order.  ho%%c%-cr.  is  not  txm-d  on  sanctions.  but  on  the  acceptancc  or  this 
pKilitical  order  1)),  the  actors.  that.  at  the  largcst.  includes  citi7cns.  According  to 
Max  WeN.  -r.  the  idea  or  iegitimac).  oran  order  dcivnds  on  virlue  of  irmlition. 
.f 
ht  legality.  new  rour  1)  jvs  t-114-t-tval,  laith.  vislue-rationalfii1th.  or  on  a  hvli,  - 
that  dclonc  it  ix)lilical  order  as  lcgilimatc  arc  also  to  tv  seen  as  Irmlitiallill. 
charimmale.  phil-rathmal.  and  legal-rational  methods  orgaining  legifintocy. 
I  lmw%  er.  these  rour  criteria  underlying  the  ieginmac).  or  a  ix)litical  order  may 
not  be  lotally  applicable  to  thc  FwAtern  l?  hw  for  thc  stpciall%l  syment  workcd 2 
under  differcm  principics  than  thc  capitalist-fiberal  splent.  As  ncCcSsilics 
arose.  the  Weberian  systcn,  or  classification  has  been  allcrcd  and  arrangcd  in 
accor&mcc  %%ith  the  jvculiarilics  of  ollicr  statc  sysicnis.  hfichacl  G.  Iludson 
motlified  it  in  his  rcscurch  on  the  Arab  statcs  and  on  the  clucstion  or  thcir 
It-gitimot-j-.  Jan  Ilakulski  argued  about  thc  hardships.  ir  not  the  impossibility  to 
apply  these  primipics  onto  the  Sovict-tyrv  socictics2.  David  Bectharn  11irst, 
mentiolled  the  illcompalibi  lily  bct%%ccn  the  two  ix)litical  orders  and  licncc  thc 
dill'crence  in  issues  or  iegitinwQ.  it,  these  1%,  03.  and  then  proposed  a  new 
approach  it)  Iegithnucy  in  order  to  explain  thc  de%clopincrits  in  the  Fast 
Furolvan  context  since  Ilic  rcvolutions;  or  19894.  Again.  John  Williams 
devOolvil  -in  international  upproach  to  the  issue  or  lcgitimacy  and  legitimation 
in  his  %%ork'.  This  study  will  rocus  on  the  line  rollo%%cd  by  the  llakulski- 
I  approach  to  the  matter  or  legitimacy  as  its  inctlimlological 
patlcrn. 
In  addition  to  dill1crcm  understandings  or  the  concept  or  legitimacy.  there  arc 
also  dilTercncv-s  in  the  ivrccption  or  the  concept  or  legitimacy.  A  political 
order  may  Iv  legitimate  in  the  qcs  or  either  the  rcginic's  sup1wiers.  or  a 
social  clas%.  or  the  majority  or  the  ivopic  %%ho  live  in  that  given  country.  The 
same  order  may  tv  thought  as  illegitimate  by  othcrs  such  as  the  underground  or 
vp%  IA  opl-nisition.  a  stvial  c4--s  or  thc  majority  or  the  Miple  or  the  gi%cn 
bII  I'Aukki.  *14wilinificy  and  Mass  Cutuphance:  Renectitmi  on  hfa%  Wcbcr  and  So%ict-Type 
%to%  ict  ic%*.  Its  un/s.  /t  oterstiol  #4  Piditictil.  441erkv.  v.  16.  pp.  35-56.  p.  35. 
J-111  Pakukki.  4,11.  CiL.  pp.  3843.  pa%,  im.. 
D.  1%id  11colwill.  'LON-rol  6/4-ostocnity  and  the  Limits  or  rx"wr3lint"i'.  Pedslica  Vedies.  v.  40. 
%Ivci.  il  iwsc.  pp.  40-S3. 
D.  IV  Id  I  ICCIII.  1111.7!  1"'  '00"  LIVIOM:  PJACITIMAn  1'rcs%.  199  1. 
. 1411111  William  .G  ýk  I  1  '90  nwal'UHavul  fiffif  P.  1  lite  RAe  tuhl  Fall  obf  I'vembnrAl.  Lonclon: 
N1.10101.111  11rcmi.  199X. 3 
country.  An  order  may  be  thought  as  legitimate  by  the  intellectuals  -e.  g. 
Khonicyni*s  Iran-,  or  by  tile  military  elite  -e.  g.  Greece  under  tile  junta  or 
1970s-.  or  by  parts  ofthe  domestic  and  foreign  elite  with  a  say  in  the  affairs  in 
that  given  state  -e.  g.  Chile  under  Pinocliet  administration  which  served  the 
interests  o  I'mul  ti  national  companies  as  well  as  part  ofthe  Chilean  elite-,  or  by 
a  social  class  or  racial segincrit  within  tile  society  -e.  g.  South  Africa  during 
Apartheid-  while  others  may  rind  it  illegitiniatc.  miuc  most  or  tiic  population 
cither  considcr  the  political  order  to  be  legitimate  or  impossible  to  change,  tile 
intc1lectuals  may  consider  it  as  illegitimate  -e.  g.  Czechoslovakia  from  nlid- 
1970s  to  1989-.  'rherefore.  there  are  different  approaches  to  the  issue  of  a 
political  order's  legitimacy.  'mis  study  will  focus  oil  many  dinlerent  laycrs  of 
society  and  their  views  oil  the  issue.  Therefore,  oil  the  one  hand,  tile  issue  of 
legilinmey  ol'  a  regime  may  be  seen  as  ambiguous.  On  the  other  hand,  tile 
general  principle  Nvill  be  a  judgmental  approach  based  on  the  principles  of 
nberai  (tentocrao,.  i  ictice,  ir  a  political  order  is  considered  as  illegitimate,  it 
Nvill  mean  it  is  illegitimate  not  in  flic  legal  sense  -as  all  political  systems  which 
tire  legally  accepted  are  legally  legitiniate-  but  in  terms  of  the  opinion  or  tiic 
people  ofthis  country  or  in  ternis  of  the  liberal  dernocratic  principles. 
Democracy  is  another  key  concept  dealt  with  in  this  study  as  it  focuses'on  tile 
issues  ol*  legitimacy  and  legitimation  during  the  democratic  trans  rormati  on 
period  in  the  East  European  countries  and  focuses  on  tile  case  study  of 
I  lunoitry.  Demoemlisuflon  and  the  trans  rormation  of  a  political  order  -or  LI 
reginic-  into  liberal  democi-acy  are  important  subjects  of  the  post-communist 
StUdiCS  SillCe  the  post-communist  societies  experience  a  transformation  1rom  a 4 
political  order  to  what  most  people  take  as  its  main  adversary  or  alternative.  if 
not  its  direct  opposite,  from  1989  to  date. 
Democralistition  can  be  described  as  tile  transtlormation  of  a  given  political 
OrdCr  From  an  either  authoritarian  or  totalitarian  regime  to  a  regime  which 
allows  citizens'  participation  in  decision  making.  Tile  main  aim  of  this 
transf'ortilation  is  to  create  a  system  in  which  the  general  public  have  a  say  in 
the  acts  or  tile  rUling  political  order  either  by  indirect  participation  -by 
choosing  to  vote  or  not  to  vote,  or,  by  working  in,  or  in  association  with,  civil 
socielY  organisations  capable  of  enforcing  policy  changes-,  or  by  direct 
participation  -by  working  within  the  ranks  of  a  political  party,  becoming  a 
candidate  in  elections  and  the  like-.  Such  transforniations  were  seen 
throughout  the  second  half  of'  flic  20th  Century,  following  experiences  of 
transl'ormation  first  in  the  former  colonies  gaining  independence,  tllcii  in  South 
Furopean  and  SOLIth  American  authoritarian  reginles  and  finally  in  the  East 
Furopean  totalitarian  political  orders. 
'rile  process  or(lemocralisation  and  incorporation  into  tile  world  economic  and 
political  systems  of  tlicsc  dcniocratising  countries  mentioncd  above  led  to  the 
development  ol*difTercnt  schools  of  political  theory.  The  first  of  these  was  the 
School  of'  Modernisation  which  incorporated  such  narnes  as  8amuel 
I  ILIntington,  Danicl  Bcll,  Dunkward  Rustow,  and  Lucien  Pye.  These  Figures 
claimed  that  industrialisation  was  the  key  concept  in  transforniation  and  ir  a 
certain  society  was  to  industrialise,  the  process  of  niodernisation  was  to  force 
traditional,  outmoded,  patriarchal,  rural,  clan-based,  corrupt  social  and  political 
structures  to  change,  giving  way  to  a  ncw,  modern,  cqualitarian,  urban, 
incorruptible  democratic  system. 5 
The  Modernisation  School  was  challenged  in  early  1970s  by  the  Dependency 
School  %%  hich  consisted  or suci,  writers  as  Immanuel  Wallcrstein  and  licnriquc 
Cardoso,  and  which  claimed  that  all  the  world economic  and  political  structure 
was  interlinked.  They  claimed  that  there  were  dirrerent  parts  such  as  the  core, 
semi-periphery  and  pcripliery  in  the  World  political  and  economic  system. 
I'liereflore.  dentoct-alisaflon  was  possible  only  wilen  tile  core  countries  were  to 
see  it  as  prolitable  to  themselves.  Neo-Realists  such  as  Joseph  Nye  have 
adopted  similar  approaches  in  defining  the  role  of  actors  in  world  politics. 
The  mic%val  or  the  Modernisation  School  took  place  in  mid-  I  980s  when  such 
authors  as  Lucien  11ye  canic  up  with  the  idea  that  the  Inforniatics  Revolution  of 
the  1980s,  the  introduction  of  such  telecommunication  deviccs  as  satcllite 
dishes.  personal  computers,  global  TV  broadcasts,  Internet,  and  the  like,  have 
challenged  oppressive  reginics.  The  claim  was  that  through  tile  Lisc  of  these 
means.  governments  becanic  unable  to  suppress  the  flow  of  ideas  and 
hillormation  to  its  subjects/citizens.  Thercrore,  the  rall  of  the  totalitarian  and 
-nucl  Huntington  further  argued  that  IlUthoritarian  reginics  was  inevitable.  Sai 
there  were  waves  oNlentoci-alisalion  and  that  we  were  living  within  one  such 
wave.  Following  the  work  of  Daniel  Bell  in  1961,  Francis  Fukuyarna  argued 
that  the  ideology  as  a  concept  had  lost  its  importance,  the  world  pblitical 
system  was  going  to  be  dominated  by  a  uniflorm  approach,  terminating 
idcology  as  a  relevant  concept  and  licnce  indicating  the  end  of  history  as  we 
know  it.  This  school  of  thought,  may  be  rd'erred  to  as  the  Neo-Modernist 
School. 
This  thesis  does  not  particularly  follow  any  of  the  al'orementioned  political 
schools.  but  makes  use  of  them  when  appropriate  with  tile  case  it  116cuscs  on. 6 
The  set  ol'ideas  describing  the  lVellanschwing  of  this  study  may  be  seen  as  a 
distant  relative  ofthe  Dependcncy  School  if  any  connection  needs  be  made. 
There  are  also  other  concepts  which  are  directly  or  indirectly  linked  with 
reginic  legitimacy  and  legiffinalion  that  are  used  in  this  work.  In  the  following 
work.  the  concept  or  civii  society  refers  to  the  realm  of  society  which  is  outside 
state  ownership  and/or  control.  Therefore,  civil  sociely  refers  to  the  parts  of 
social  mechanism  which  are  constructed  by  civilian,  non-statc  actors.  West  and 
Fh-s/  Ifodd  refler  to  those  countries  which  formed  an  alliance  in  tile  allermath 
or  tile  World  War  11  against  tile  USSR  and  its  allies  and  subordinates,  and 
NNhich  include  tile  European  states  which  had  multi-party  liberal  denlocratie 
political  orders  and  which  were  in  general  members  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  Alliance  (NATO).  Finally,  the  system  of  government  that  the  USSR  and 
its  Fast  Furopean  subordinates  were  governed  by  is  rellerrcd  to  within  the  text 
inict-changcably  as  socialism  and  sicile  socialism,  but  a  distinction  between 
communisin  and  soci(dism  is  made.  In  the  text,  the  terms  communisin  and 
communisl  are  used  to  describe  the  ideological/theoretical  bases  of  the  socialist 
system  ýNhile  the  ternis  socialismIstale  socialism  and  socialist  are  used  in 
rellerence  to  the  actual  practice  of  the  system  from  1917  to  present  day. 
Although  tiie  use  or  tiie  word  socialism  might  create  a  confusion  in  relation 
with  the  existence  of  the  term  as  part  of  the  libcral  democratic  system,  it  is 
prellerred  here  to  diffierentiate  the  Marxist  vision  from  the  actual  practice  or 
malpractice  ortiie  system. 
As  mentioned  before,  there  will  be  a  quest  in  the  idea  of  legitimacy  and  the 
methods  or gaining  legitimacy  in  Eastern  Europe  during  and  in  the  wake  or  the 
interim  to  democratic  systern.  To  have  a  clearer  discussion  of  the  sutýjcct  and 7 
l'or  clearer  application  of  the  arguments,  a  case  study  approach  is  adopted. 
I  hingary  Nvill  be  tile  focus  ofthis  thesis  because  of  its  specific  position.  One  of 
the  major  arguments  of  the  Neo-Modernist  School  is  that  there  is  a  uniform 
pattcrn  oNtemoci-alisalion  all  around  tile  globe  and  that  there  was  a  uniform 
socialist  state  strLICturc  from  which  a  uniform  transition  to  democracy  may  be 
achieved.  This  thesis  argue.  s  that  this  happens  not  to  be  the  case.  I  lungary,  with 
its  complex  political  balances  and  with  the  legacy  of  the  1956  uprising  and  the 
C.  Rlses  and  consequences  of  this  event  has  a  diffierent  structure  than  the 
propOSCLI  Soviet-type  state  structure. 
I  %Nill  examine  the  concept  of  legitimacy  and  its  place  in  the  democrtaisation 
and  liberalisation  processes  in  Hungary. 
11.  LEGITIMACY:  A  TRANSMUTING  CONCEPT 
A.  The  Need  for  Legitimacy: 
Fhe  concept  ol'Iegilintacy.  as  we  understand  it  presently,  may  be  defined  as  the 
Justification  of  the  existence  of  authority  and  of  the  ruling  classes  vis-A-vis  the 
ruled  masses,  According  to  tile  Wcberian  definition  of  the  concept  (a 
comprehensive  discussion  is  to  be  found  below),  as  long  as  the  ruling  classes 
manage  to  create  a  popular  belief  in  the  appropriateness  of  their  rule,  they 
become  leghimatc6.  Therdore,  the  concept  defines  the  urnits  or  a  regime's 
illIlLience  o%,  cr  its  sulýjccts  or  citimis.  If  popular  support  reachcs  a  point  where 
(lie  ruling  political  order  loses  its  claim  to  legitimacy.  it  loses  its  reason  of 
existence  -and  its  justification  to  rule.  To  ensure  its  domination  over  the 
political  system,  the  ruling  class  thercfore  has  to  seck  ano  find  methods  to 
justil'y  its  presence  as  the  ruler  in  an  existing  political  order.  If  this  is  no  more 8 
possible.  a  change  in  the  ruling  political  order  or  in  the  government  is 
inevitable.  The  form  of  change  may  vary  depending  on  the  administrative 
and/or  political  system  of  the  country  in  question.  The  change  may  be  made 
through  elections,  coups  d'6tat.  rebellions,  civil  wars,  or  revolutions, 
depending  on  the  rules  and  flexibility  of  the  political  system. 
The  above  definition  sunis  up  tile  most  generally  accepted  dermition  or  tile 
term  legitimacy'.  However,  it  is  subject  to  criticism  and  alteration  since  the 
concept  itselfis  subject  to  change  with  the  change  of  understanding  in  politics. 
I  his  matter  will  be  discussed  later  in  this  chapter.  The  concept  of  legitimacy 
has  been  a  source  of  interest  for  scholars  of  political  science  and  political 
philosophy  since  ancient  times  as  it  deals  with  the  justification  and 
preservation  of  political  power.  During  history,  the  concept  of  legitimacy 
changed  in  ternis  of  its  definition,  the  boundaries  of  its  definition  and  its  limits, 
and  therellore  at  times  had  difTercnt  meanings  and  different  amounts  of 
importance  were  cast  on  it  due  to  the  different  domestic  and  international 
political  conditions.  Thcsc  will  be  analysed  in  the  subsequent  parts  of  this 
chapter. 
Nevertheless.  despite  changes  in  definition  and  the  level  of  importance 
attributed  to  it,  legitimacy  had  been  and  still  remains  a  concept  that  links  the 
relationship  or  the  rulers  to  the  ruled,  creating  a  niýjor  motive  for  the  existence 
and  continuity  of  any  ruling  regime.  It  therefore  plays  an  important  role  in  the 
cstablishment  of'political  order.  Throughout  history,  the  authority  enjoyed  by 
the  rulers  or  a  given  state  and  the  rightfulness  of  a  reginic's  or  a  leader's  rule 
t'  Nla\  Weber.  Economy  and  Society,  University  or  California  Press,  Berkeley  and  Los  Angeles, 
Calirornia:  1978.  p.  213. 9 
over  the  citizens  or  subjects  in  a  state  have  always  been  a  matter  of  discussion, 
thus  making  legitimacy  a  continuously  present  issue  of  political  entity.  As  will 
be  demonstrated  in  this  thesis,  through  its  historical  evolution  the  concept 
conlinued  to  maintain  its  important  place  despite  changes  in  its  meaning  and 
perception.  This  chapter  aims  at  analysing  legitimacy  in  history,  in  its  modem 
guise.  and.  in  relation  to  its  different  appearances  in  national,  international, 
liberal.  and  socialist  environments. 
B.  Legitimacy  In  History: 
'rhe  concept  or  political  legitimacy  and  the  problem  of  legitimising  tile 
political  authority  may  first  be  seen  in  tile  works  or  Aristotle.  In  the  fourth 
century  BC.  Aristotle  argued  that  political  power  obtains  consent  by  tile  use  of 
coercive  force  (coercion),  by  the  distribution  of  rewards  (utilitarianism),  by 
7 
education  (normative  techniques)  or  by  sonic  combination  of  these  three  . 
hi 
time,  although  the  regimes  continued  to  employ  these  means  to  secure  their 
rules.  the  rules  or  tile  political  game  evolved  and  new  schemes  and  new 
grounds  to  base  tile  claims  to  power  have  appeared. 
1.  Changes  in  the  Concept  of  Authority: 
,I,  o  begin  with.  the  changes  that  took  place  relate  to  tile  concept  of  authority. 
The  definition  of  authority  gradually  changed  along  with  the  shifts  in  tile 
relationship  between  the  ruler  and  tile  ruled.  These  changes  cover  the  matter  of 
w1io  decides  upon  the  identity  of  the  ruler,  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  ruler 
ruling  class.  In  the  ancient  world,  where  people  were  living  in  a  communitarian 
system,  the  ability  of  a  ruler  to  rule  was  dependent  upon  his  ability  to  fight  and 10 
his  military  leadership  valucs8.  In  such  a  system,  those  who  Icgitimised,  or 
delegitimised  the  system  werc  thosc  capablc  or  clialicnging  his  merits  as  a 
leadcr  and  a  warrior.  In  the  later  stages  of  history,  tile  ability  to  orgailise  people 
in  politics  as  well  as  in  the  battlcfield  gained  importance,  and  therefore,  the 
importance  of  tile  courtiers,  the  people  with  influence  upon  the  sovereign, 
inucascd.  Willi  religion's  extended  importance  in  the  pre-capitalist  world,  tile 
consent  (if'  religiOLls  authoritics  was  also  sought  as  a  legitinlising  ractor.  The 
clergy  represented  the  link  between  flic  ruler  and  the  divinc  will,  and  thus, 
clerical  consent  was  to  be  sought9.  In  the  modern  era,  however,  tile  importance 
ol'the  'ordinary  people'l(l  and  their  perception  ortiie  government  have  become 
the  core  issue  in  the  political  legitimacy  sutýject.  Hence.  one  may  claim  that 
there  has  always  been  a  rclationship  between  reginle  Icgifirnacy  and  tile 
SOLII'CCS  that  limit.  control,  and  hold  political  authority  or  power,  although  the 
sources  ollimitation  vary  in  time. 
2.  Changes  in  the  Scope  of  Decision-Makers: 
Secondly.  in  accordance  with  the  changes  in  the  concept  or  authority 
mentioned  above.  the  scope  of  legitimacy  underwent  change.  The  grounds  for 
Icgifiniacy  changed  from  theological  to  legal  and  then  to  political  grounds  in 
time.  The  first  claims  to  hold  and  to  limit  power  were  theological  and,  quasi- 
historical:  A  divine  right  to  rule  due  to  descent  from  a  ruling  family  ordained 
by  (lie  gods  or  tile  God  was  tile  foundation  that  arranged  the  exercise, 
7joSeph  Rothschild.  'Political  Lcgitirnacy  in  Contemporary  Europe*  in  Bogdan  Dcnitch  (cd.  ), 
L-e.  gilimalitm  of'Reginics.  SagC  Publications,  London,  England:  1979.  p.  38. 
,4  Marcel  PrOol,  Ilistoire  des  Wes  Politiques  Dalloz,  Paris,  France:  1961,  pp.  16-20  passim. 
lbid..  pp.  129-130. 
1"  *1  lic  lerm  'ordinary  people'  will  be  used  throughout  this  thesis.  It  is  meant  to  rcrer  to  those  hurnan 
bein.  gs  %kho  do  not  hold  a  politically  significant  (or  gomrinicrital)  position,  who  are  not  members  of  the 
ruling  class.  or  the  intelligentsia.  and  nor  of  the  critmprencurial  class.  The  ordinariness  of  these  pcople restriction.  and  legitimacy  of  power.  In  this  understanding,  the  monarch  had  a 
divine  right  to  rule,  theoretically  given  to  him  by  a  deity  or  dcities,  and  hence 
he  would  only  be  responsible  11or  all  his  decisions  from  introducing  taxes  to 
declaring  war  to  God  or  tile  gods  that  granted  him  the  power  to  rule.  The 
responsibility  ol'the  ruler  was  to  himself  and  to  God' 
In  time.  the  responsibility  of  the  ruler  has  become  to  himself  and  to  hiS  Court, 
and  lie  was  to  secure  his  legitimaey  with  tile  approval  of  the  nobility  and  of  tile 
clergy  of'his  lands.  The  first  grounds  for  legitimacy  and  power  were  replaced 
by  more  rationalist,  moral,  and  philosophical  claims  to  limit  authority  and 
po%%cr.  During  (lie  Middle  Ages,  tile  legitimacy  of  a  ruler  or  one  of  Ilis  barons 
was  rclated  to  their  birth,  in  addition  to  the  ruler's  divine  right  to  rule. 
Legitimacy.  tlicn.  began  to  have  legality  as  a  ground  in  addition  to  theology. 
Law.  as  in  the  florm  of  common  law  /  law  of  the  land,  written  or  unwritten 
constitutions.  and  as  conventions  /  binding  rules,  has  bccome  the  mcans  to 
limit  the  use  of'  political  power,  and  tile  holding  of  power  shifted  from  the 
divine  ruler  to  tile  ruling  classes  in  the  form  of  the  aristocracy  and  the  clcrgy12. 
For  instance,  tile  ruler  and  any  member  or nobility  and  clergy  were  expected  to 
be  conceived  in  a  legally  binding  and  'respectable'  marriage  so  that  they  would 
13 
,  lie  legilimale 
. 
Flicy  were  also  bound  to  act  according  to  thý  rulcs 
comes  fi-om  their  lack  or  direct  affiliation  with  political  and  economic  decision-making  positions  or 
with  the  readily-broadcastable  rorms.  oropposition  to  these. 
II  Sce  ror  instance  Thornas  I  lobbes'  Leviathan  for  the  defence  of  the  idea  that  the  sovereign  has 
ropon%ibility  only  towards  God. 
12  Is.  1  1.  Partridge,  Consent  and  Consensus,  second  edition,  Pall  Mail  Press,  London:  1975,  pp.  13-14 
passim. 
"Possibly.  the  best-known  example  of  the  concept  of  legitimacy  with  regard  to  marital  ties  may  be 
seen  in  William  Shakespeare's  play  King  Lea  in  which  the  story  of  Edgar  and  Edmund,  the  two  sons  of 
61oucester.  is  told  as  a  secondary  theme.  In  the  play,  the  son  born  as  a  legitimate  child  is  represented  as 
an  elhical.  good-hearted,  and  generous  pFrson  while  the  illegitimate  son  is  represented  as  an  evil  figure 12 
implemented  by  the  ecclesiastical  authorities  (or  other  religious  authorities  as 
the  Calipliacy  or  the  office  of  Sheikll-ul  Islani).  Institutional  devices  such  as 
tile  mixed  constitution  which  enables  different  people  or  different  institutions 
to  control  different  parts  or  government,  a  cliccks-and-balatices  system,  and, 
division  of'11orces,  were  gradually  used  in  order  to  limit  the  ovcr-use  and  abuse 
ol'iiox%,  et-. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  the  nature  of  the  relationship  of  the  ruler  and  the  ruled 
began  to  change,  philosophical  and  moral  limitations  Nvere  introduced  in  tile 
major  Ilorms  ofnatural  law,  liuman  and  natural  rights,  and  contractualism.  The 
change  can  be  ascribed  to  the  evolution  in  the  scope  of  people  who  decide  on 
the  legitimacy  or  a  ruler  and  to  tile  change  in  their  expectations  frorn  the  ruler. 
While  once  the  rulers  had  to  legitimisc  tlicniscives  through  sclf-legitimation  or 
by  gaining  the  support  /justification  of  the  clergy,  that  began  to  change.  First 
the  landed  gentry,  then  tile  merchant  class,  then  those  above  a  poverty  litilit, 
then  those  below  it,  freed  slaves,  and  finally  women,  became  integrated  into 
the  voting  procedUre.  The  number  of  the  people  to  decide  on  the  legitimacy  of 
a  ruler  or  a  government  increased  with  the  enlargement  or  the  groups  able  to 
have  a  say  in  tile  issue  or  who  governs. 
3.  Tile  Contractual  Era: 
Fhe  evolution  of'  the  society,  then,  created  difilerent  sets  or  relationship 
between  the  ruler  /  rulers  and  the  ruled.  The  expansion  of  the  legitimising 
group  1rom  the  sovcreign  to  the  courtiers  and  the  c1crgy,  and,  finally,  to  tile 
gencral  publie  meant  changes  in  the  way  a  regime  is  perceived  as  legitimate. 
This  change  altered  gradually  the  grounds  or  legitimation  For  the  regime,  as 
%%ho  %vould  do  an)thin-  for  his  own  gain,  for  Shakespearc,  as  many  of  his  contcrnporarics.  thought  an 13 
%%ell.  Developments  in  the  domestic  and  international  scales  for  a  given  nation 
and  a  country  meant  different  expectations  from  the  rulers  and  thercfore 
created  dirf'ercnt  expectations  that  would  support  a  regime's  claims  of 
legitimacy. 
A  vital  step  in  the  development  of  limiting  elements  has  bccn  flic  introduction 
of'  contractual  Cactor  in  the  process  of  ruling.  While  preceding  practices  of 
COM111OLMI  approaches  like  tile  GoItlen  Bull  oJI-Imigaty  (1222)  and  tile  Magna 
Curia  (1215)  were  between  the  feudal  lords  and  the  king  who  was  all  but 
Owed  by  them,  the  contractual  theories  which  appeared  frorn  tile  17"'  century 
owwards  were  aimed  at  protecting  the  privileges  and  liberties  or  groups  and 
individuals  against  the  centralised  governments'  power.  Some  see  the 
constitutions  as  contracts  between  the  state  and  its  subjects.  Tile  importance  of 
tile  contractual  clements  lies  in  their  support  to  strcrigthen  the  hypothesis  that 
tile  state  is  a  part  or  a  two-sided  relationship  and  that  its  acts  need  to  be  backed 
14 
by  popular  consent.  a  previously  unthinkable  asSLI111ption 
Political  philosophers  like  John  Locke,  Jcan-Jacques  Rousseau,  David  Ilumc, 
and  Thomas  I  lobbes  developed  the  idea  of  contractual  relations  between  the 
rulers  and  the  ruled  and  ravourcd  the  idea  or  social  confracl  based  on  the 
natural  la%N,.  The  concept  or  natural  law  was  based  on  justirying  and  sancýtifying 
theslams  quo.  The  concept  follows  the  assumption  that  natural  principles  are 
to  be  taken  as  tile  rational  arrangnient,  of  tile  universe  including  tile  state.  In 
due  course  natural  law  was  used  to  fortiry  canon  law,  and,  thus  supported 
establishcd  rulers  by  claiming  that  there  were  laws  that  are  ahistorical, 
illegiiiniate  child*s  existence  is  unjustifiable  in  turns  of  law  and  religion. 
I  IAndrew  Vincent.  Theories  of  the  State,  Oxford:  Basil  Blackwell,  1987,  pp.  91-115  passim. 14 
unchangeable,  and  rational.  These  laws  provided  clear  norms  for  hurnan  will 
and  flor  gowmilient.  In  his  Leviathan  (1651),  Thomas  flobbes  claimed  that 
natural  law  was  a  set  of  rational  rules  for  self-preservation.  As  the  hurnan 
beings  were  irrational.  their  choices  would  lead  thern  to  war  and  destruction. 
I  lowever.  the  laws  or  nature  would  lead  human  beings  to  the  rational  solution 
of'  florming  settlements,  of  keeping  an  organised  statc  in  cxistence,  and  of 
voluntarily  obeying  to  this  state  they  formed  15 
. 
The  concepts  of'  natural  law  and  social  contract  are  linked  to  the  political 
environment  they  came  into  existence.  When  Hobbes  was  writing  his  work, 
1-n-land  was  in  a  social  turmoil,  tired  of  civil  war,  survived  the  beheading  of  tý 
the  country*s  Stuart  king,  and  the  dictatorship  or  Oliver  Cromwell.  The 
century-long  period  between  the  Reformation  and  the  Civil  War  had  seen  a 
slow  but  steady  expansion  of  cultivated  area  in  his  native  England  as  well  as  a 
16 
rise  in  commercial  activities  .  The  society  which  grew  to  be  more 
intcrLICpendent  has  also  become  more  prosperous  in  the  period  of  order  and 
peaccful  commercial  activity.  The  rise  of  Puritan  tradesmen  and  tlicir  new, 
secular  approach  to  science,  their  contribution  to  the  building  of  waterways 
across  the  county.  coincided  with  and  backed  the  increase  of  trade  as  weil as 
the  establishment  of  capitalism  in  England.  However.  when  the  peace  and 
prosperity  ol'the  pre-Civil  War  period  was  brcached,  and  chaos  replaced  it,  a 
need  to  legitimise  the  strict  Cromwellian  oppression  arose.  The  legitimation  of 
151).  D.  Raphael.  llobbes:  Morals  and  Politics,  (2nd  printing)  George  Allen  and  Unwin,  London, 
Fnl,  land:  1978  (first  printed  1977),  p.  21. 
1  'Chrisloplicr  I  lill.  C11111ge  ind  Continuity-  in  Seventeenth  Century  England,  Yale  University  Press, 
New  I  laven  and  London,  199  1.  p.  3.  Further  discussion  of  tile  structure  of  the  English  society  at  that 
period,  the  rise  and  impact  of  the  Puritans  on  English  life,  and  the  Cromwellian  cra  may  be  found  in 
wher  works  ol'Chrislopher  I  lill  as  well  as  this  book. 15 
(lie  Cromwellian  order  was  based  on  the  ideas  of  natural  law  and  of  the 
necessity  of  state  as  an  orderly  social  structure  that  human  beings  naturally 
need.  The  ideas  of  I  lobbes  were  in  a  way  the  messenger  of  the  popular  demand 
flor  order  at  all  cost.  As  the  regime  had  changed,  so  had  the  religious  structure 
and  the  monetary  relationships  and  transactions.  The  alterations  to  the  slalus 
qtio  wile  were  in  ravour  of  the  enicrging  merchant  bourgcois-capitalist  class. 
Therellore.  new  grounds  of  legitimacy  in  accordance  with  the  new  stalus  quo 
had  to  lie  sought. 
Following  the  same  paill  with  I  lobbcs,  but  writing  in  a  more  orderly  period  in 
which  the  bourgeoisie  was  powerful,  John  Locke  argued  against  Robert 
Filmer's  theory  or  absolute  monarchy  and  the  divine  right  or  the  kings  in  his 
First  Treatise  (1690).  Lockc  claimcd  that,  even  assurning  God  had  granted 
Adam  the  absolute  and  total  political  authority.  it  would  be  impossible  to 
prove  flor  any  monarch  that  lie  is  related  to  Adam17.  In  his  Second  Treatise,  he 
clainis  that  despite  the  fact  that  the  subjects  have  a  duty  to  God  to  obey  their 
rulcr.  (lie  rLIICI"S  power  is  neither  granted  directly  by  God  itself  nor  absolute 
18 
. 
His  claim  in  the  Second  Treatise  was  that  "the  actual  consent  of  each 
individual  generated  obligation,  while  the  hypothetical  choices  of  rational 
19 
gents  generate  legitimacy.  " 
I'his  idca  ol'  Locke  was  generally  adopted  by  all  social  contract  philosophers 
%ý,  Iio  argued  that  individual  human  beings  gathered  together  and  decided  to 
give  some  concessions  so  that  a  society  would  be  established  in  order  to  avoid 
17  Marcel  I'Mot.  II  istoire  des  Wes  Politigues,  Dal  loz,  Paris,  France:  1961,  p.  375. 
"Roger  Woolhouse.  Lin-ke.  John  in  'red  tionderich  (cd.  ),  The  Oxford  Companion  to  Philosoph 
()xf*ord  University  Press.  Oxl*ord.  England:  1995,  p.  493. 16 
chaos.  The  degree  ol'thc  chaos  in  the  prc-socicty  state  qf  nature  dcpciidcd  on 
the  degree  o('autiloritariailism  employed  by  tile  regimejustified  by  tile  author. 
In  the  case  ot"I'lionias  I  lobbes.  who  wrotc  in  derence  of  a  highly  authoritarian 
regime.  if'cliaos  was  widespread,  people  would  consent  to  tyranny  or  absolute 
rule  to  avoid  a  worse  alternative.  While  Hobbes'  ideas  were  used  to  legitimisc 
aUthoritarian  rule  ofTharles  It,  Locke's  and  his  followers'  ideas  created  claims 
or  legitimacy  for  three  revolutions  or  tiie  17111  and  18t"  centuries:  The  English 
GIOHOLIS  Revolution  of  1688,  the  American  Independence  of  1776,  and  the 
FI-C11CII  RCV01LItiOII  or  1789  all  took  their  roots  from  Locke's  pattern  of  natural 
I,  INV211. 
The  natural  law  concept  gradually  gave  way  to  tile  larger  concept  or  natural 
and  human  rights  and  duties.  These  were  seen  as  intrinsic  to  be  hunian  which 
are  inconceivable  to  deny,  such  as  liberty,  life,  and  property.  The  1689  Bill  of 
Rights  in  England  was  the  first  legal  document  to  provide  support  to  the 
existence  of*  such  rights.  The  Anicrican,  French,  and  the  Unitcd  Nations  (UN) 
(Icclarations  or  human  rights  set  further  examples. 
With  advancements  acilievcd  in  modes  of  production  and  with  tile  spread  of 
the  industrial  revolution  From  the  United  Kingdom  to  the  rest  of  the  planct,  the 
accessibility  of'  goods  changed  in  ravour  of  the  poor2l.  In  parallel  Nvith  this 
change  in  the  social  equilibrium  tile  degree  or  expansion  or  rights  also 
increased.  Natural  and  human  rights,  as  the  holding  of  power  was  being 
generalised  to  a  greater  section  of  tile  society  to  include  tile  trading  classes  and 
1'ýDon  I  lerzog.  Ila  py  Slaves:  A  Critique  of  Consent  Theory,  University  of  Chicago  Press,  Chicago, 
Illinois.  US:  1989.  p.  206. 
20  rvlarcel  PrOot.  II  istoire  des  ld&s  Politiqucs.,  p.  375. 17 
the  intelligentsia.  acted  as  definite  limitations  to  governmental  activity  by 
codil'ying  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  rulers  and  tile  ruled. 
Fhe  concept  of  civil  society  is  another  idea  that  is  linked  to  tile  concept  of 
political  legitimacy.  Thcrc  was  a  tradition  of  non-governmcntal  formation  in 
the  Furopean  merchant  classes.  In  time,  especially  with  the  impact  created  by 
the  Industrial  Revolution,  this  developed  to  be  a  distinct  part  of  the  societY  that 
decided  (in  (lie  prices.  trade,  wages,  and  the  quality  of  goods.  In  due  course,  as 
"the  nation-state  developed  not  just  as  a  boundary  creating  or  maintaining 
device.  but  as  a  systern  or  symbols  and  shared  identity,  "  22 
and,  as  the  nation- 
state  also  served  to  the  greater  participation  or  merchant  classes  and  gradually 
of'ordinary  people  to  the  state  administration,  civil  society  gained  importance. 
It  became  a  part  or  ti,  e  society  outside  the  state  bureaucratic  mechanism.  Civil 
socicty  remained  as  ail  entity  with  powers  of  influence  over  the  administrative 
decisions.  It  became  a  medium  through  which  social,  economic,  political  rights 
and  liberties  were  defciided,  and,  pressure  was  imposed  on  government  on 
such  issues  as  respect  to  individual  values  and  rights.  Thercfore,  with  the 
emergence  or  civil  socicty  as  a  pressurising  group  on  the  ruling  clite,  the 
definitions  of*  legitimacy  and  of  people  who  have  a  say  in  who  rules  and  how 
are  altered  to  suit  the  necessitics  brought  with  tile  changing  times. 
C.  Legitimacy  In  The  Modern  World: 
i.  Max  Weber's  Contribution: 
At  the  first  quarter  of  tile  twentieth  century,  the  concept  of  legitimacy  of  a 
rcgime  has  11OLInd  a  new  emphasis  with  Max  Weber's  contribution.  Weber's 
21  Spencer  M.  DiScala  and  Salvo  Mastelloile,  European  Political  Thought.  1815-1989,  Boulder, 
Colorado,  Wesiview  Press,  1998,  p.  30. 18 
voluminous  and  oftcn-citcd  work  Economy  and  Society  (1922)  created  new 
theoretical  grounds  and  brought  a  new  manner  of  perceiving  what  legitimacy 
is.  Wcber  argued  that  political  authority  is  based  on  a  public  belief  oil  its 
legitimacy.  Weber  claimed  that  social  action  "may  be  guided  by  the  belief  ill 
the  existence  ofa  legitimate  order.  "123  lie  accepts  legitimacy  as  tile  willingness 
off'ollowers  to  accept  orders  from  sources  of  authority. 
For  legitimate  dornination,  Weber  establishes  three  patterns  of  authority.  these 
being  (a)  rational  (legal)  grounds,  (b)  traditional  grounds,  and,  c)  charismatic 
grounds.  The  ruling  reginle  is  perceived  to  be  legitimate  by  the  ruled  based 
upon  cithcr  one  or  a  combination  of  these  grounds. 
Rational  grounds  or  legitimate  domination  base  oil  the  belief  ill  the  legality  of 
the  cnacted  rules.  Those  who  rule  arc  bound  by  the  rules  but  they  also  have  tile 
right  to  issue  commands  as  tile  rules  -tile  laws-  enable  them  to  issue 
commands. 
Traditional  grounds  are  based  on  established  belief  in  the  sanctity  of  long- 
standing  traditions.  Those  who  exercise  authority  based  on  these  traditions  are 
perceived  to  use  legitimate  powers. 
Finally.  charismatic  grounds  cover  devotion  to  the  exceptional  sanctity, 
heroism.  exemplary  character  or  charisma  of  an  individual  hurnan  being,  and 
orthe  order  revealed  or  ordained  by  him  or  her. 
Ill  the  case  or  legal  authority  based  oil  rational  grounds,  obedience  is  to  tile 
legally  established  impersonal  order.  In  the  traditional  authority  based  on  the 
traditional  grounds,  the  person  who  leads  the  traditional  order  and  whose  acts 
2213rigid  Laf  fan.  '7  -lie  Polilics  qfldenlity  and  Political  Order  in  Europe'in  Joumal  of  Common  Marke 
Studies.  v.  34.  p.  84. 19 
are  bOUnd  by  the  boundaries  of  the  tradition  receives  obedience  and 
legitimising  respcct.  In  charismatic  authority  based  on  charismatic  grounds,  the 
obedience  is  to  the  leader  whose  distinguishing  features  create  the  individual 
believer's  belief*  in  his  cl1ariSMa24.  In  Weber's  work,  the  relationships 
involving  the  ruling  class  and  institutions  such  as  bureaucracy  plays  an 
important  pail  while  lie  analyses  tile  outcome  of  legitimacy  gained  through  one 
ol'thcsc  ways,  especially  through  charisma 
25 
. 
Max  Weber  categorises  legitimacy  as  an  outside  force,  a  process  that  is 
partial  1),  linked  to  authority  and  not  a  direct  ingredient  of  it.  Ile  sees  legitimacy 
as  a  Itictor  helping  a  particular  political  order  to  strengthen  its  power.  On  the 
other  liand.  lie  believes  that  in  case  a  reginic  fails  to  legitimise  itself,  tile  lack 
of*  legi  ti  niacy  may  be  balanced  by  other  means  such  as  the  use  of  coercion. 
I  lowever.  since  Weber  represents  legitimacy  as  a  factor  related  to  perception,  a 
concept  that  is  based  on  the  belier  or  individuals  in  it,  he  underestimates  the 
pmker  alld  extent  of  the  process.  To  take  legitimacy  as  a  result  of  cognitive 
processcs  is  to  deny  it  the  vital  role  it  plays  for  a  regime.  If  the  subordinates  of 
a  given  regime.  its  subjects  or  citizens,  cease  co-operating  with  the  ruling 
regime  and  deny  any  sacrifices  to  that  regime  that  they  might  grant  any  other 
reginic  they  would  take  as  legitimate,  that  given  regime  would  lose  its  ability 
to  mobilise  people  into  constructive  channels.  As  a  result  of  it,  one  of  the  key 
OLItlIUtS  of*  a  legitimate  system,  the  system's  efficicticy,  would  be  lost  and  the 
regime  would  be  forced'to  use  coercion  as  the  only  means  orjustifying  its 
23  Weber,  Max,  Economy  and  Society,  p.  3  1. 
2-1  1  bi(ýI..  pp.  215-216. 
ZiDragan  klilovanovic,  Weberian  and  Marxian  Analysis  or  LaNy.  Avebury,  Aldershot,  Vcrmont,  US: 
1989.  pp.  14  1-  142. 20 
presence  in  govcrnment.  Such  a  situation  would  provide  the  rulers  with  the 
ability  to  control  the  population  in  the  meaning  of  preventing  them  from  what 
they  -xant  to  do,  but  would  not  provide  tile  abilitY  to  urge  the  people  to  co- 
operate  or  to  make  sacrifices  for  the  good  of  the  systern  even  in  the  end  the  co- 
operation  or  the  sacrifices  would  help  the  population  to  be  more  prosperous  or 
morc  advantagcous. 
In  that  respect,  David  Beetham  criticises  Weber.  Bectilam  argues  that  tile 
Weberian  dcl-mition  of  legitimacy  misreprcscnts  flic  relationship  betwcen 
legitimacy  and  people*s  beliefs.  Bectliam  argues  that 
"Jal  givcn  power  relationship  is  not  legitimate  because  people 
believe  in  its  legitimacy,  but  because  it  can  beJuslified  in 
lerms  oftheir  beliefs.  This  may  seem  a  fine  distinction,  but  it 
is  a  rundaniental  one.  When  we  seek  to  assess  the  legitimacy 
or  a  regime.  a  political  system,  or  sonic  other  power  relation, 
one  thing  we  are  doing  is  assessing  how  far  it  can  be  justified 
in  terms  of'  people's  beliefs,  how  far  it  conrornis  to  their 
values  or  standards,  how  far  it  satisfics  the  normative 
expectations  they  have  of  it.  We  are  making  an  assessment  or 
the  degree  of  congruence,  or  lack  of  it,  between  a  given 
systen,  or  power  and  the  beliers,  values  and  expectations  that 
provide  its  justification.  We  are  not  making  a  report  on 
people*s  'belief  in  its  legititiiacy'.  1126 
Therefore.  it  can  be  said  that  the  Weberian  definition  of  legitimacy  is  actually 
a  definition  of  public  belief  in  legitimacy  and  that  it  has  its  shortcomings.  For 
instance.  lk'ebcr's  concept  of  legitimacy  does  not  provide  an  explanation  for 
such  parts  orthe  concept  or  legitimacy  as  consent  or  legality.  David  Bcctharn 
argues  that  acts  or  consent  such  as  voting  conrer  and  contribute  to  making 
poNN,  er  legitimate.  Such  factors  as  legal  validity.  justifiability  of  the  set  or  rules 
that  govcrn  a  power  relationship,  and  consent  derived  from  the  actions 
2(1  David  l3ecthain.  Legitimation  of  Powcr.  MacMillan,  I  loundmills  and  London,  England:  1991,  p.  1  1. 21 
expressive  or  consent  ror  the  rulers  contribute  to  legitimacy  of  a  system  and 
create  grounds  for  obligation  to  power  and  not  for  belief  in  lcgitimaCy27. 
Further  criticism  on  the  Webcrian  dcrinition  or  legitimacy  includes  Sternberg's 
claim  that  Weber's  classification  of  the  types  or  legitimacy  leaves  no  place  for 
"civil  governincilt  in  its  proper  sense,  "  and  hence  Weber  would  consider  any 
sort  ol'  representative  government  as  "noil-legitiniatc.  "28  Jan  Pakulski  argues 
that  Max  Weber  neglects  a  further  definition  or  legitimacy,  that  based  on  a 
beliel'  that  the  rulers  have  superior  knowledge  of  social  proccsscs  than  tile 
ruIc(12".  Any  given  communist  party  in  a  state-socialist  society  would  base  its 
legitimacy  on  such  a  claim  that  the  party  has  a  vanguard  role  to  lead  the 
society.  A1111OLIgh  it  may  be  clainled  that  Weber  ignores  it  for  it  is  not  based  on 
autonomous  authority.  as  Rodney  Barker  clairnS30,  one  may  also  argue  that 
Webcr  ignored  any  sort  or  political  formation  that  would  not  fit  his  legitimate 
rule  model.  Also,  Rodney  Barker,  an  avid  supporter  of  Weber's  model  on 
legitinmey  argues  that  what  Weber  does  not  "examine  is  the  contribution  or 
legitimacy  to  domination,  nor  the  manner  in  which  it  is  cultivated,  maintained, 
or  croded.  -  and  that  lie  specifically  leaves  the  question  of  whether  legitimacy 
contributes  to  government  open3l. 
I  lowcver.  with  all  the  shortcomings,  the  Weberian  definition  of  lcgitiniacý  is  a 
key  definition.  Most.  if  not  all,  of  tile  twentieth  century  discussions  on 
legitimacy  and  state  authority  are  centred  upon  the  views  of  Weber.  The 
27.11)iO,.  pp.  12-13  pa-Win 
2,1  Da,  0d  Sternberg.  'Typologie  de  la  Lcgitimitd',  in  P.  Bastin  ct  al.,  L'Idde  de  Ldgitirnitd,  Paris,  Dalloz. 
1967.  p.  96. 
2"  Jan  Pakulski.  'Legitimacy  and  Mass  Compliance:  Reflections  on  Max  Weber  and  Soviet-type 
Societies,  '  BriiishAnawal  qlTolifictiIScience.  v.  16  (1),  1986.  p.  37. 
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discussions  upon  his  categories  of  legitimation  are  accompanied  by  the 
indistinct  shape  of  his  dcf"initions.  If  one  accepts  tile  view  that  "'Weber  doesn't 
use  Icgitimacy  as  an  cxplailatory  tool,  but,  as  ail  organising,  difTerentiating 
nie-ans  and  as  an  idcntif  icr  of  elements  in  particular  systems  or  rule,  "  32 
and  that 
Weber  uses  these  schemes,  for  instance,  to  prove  tile  superiority  of  the  political 
over  the  econoillic  and  the  bureaucratic,  one's  perception  of  Wcber*s  work 
becomes  clearer.  There  are  also  many  modern  political  scientists  who  argue 
Wcher's  legitimacy  principles  are  either  inapplicable  or  old-fashioned  or  both. 
2.  Approaches  to  Legitimacy  after  Weber: 
SCý'IIIOUr  Martin  Lipset,  following  a  quasi-Weberian  course,  developed  the 
claim  that  the  stability  and  hence  the  continuity  of  political  organisations 
depended  on  their  legitimacy  and  on  their  effectiveness.  Lipset's  claim  is  that  a 
system  ol'government  may  survive  as  its  effectiveness  may  compensate  for  its 
legitimacy  deficit  and  vice  versa.  For  instance,  a  traditionally  fully  legitimate 
system  may  be  delegitimised  in  case  it  loses  its  competitive  edge  or  becomes 
indflective.  Thus,  no  system  remains  legitimate  without  being  effective  in  tile 
long  run.  As  Joseph  Rotschild  argues; 
"...  some  contemporary  social-  scientists  have  even 
procceded  From  this  recognition  of  the  organic  nexus  between 
legitimaey  and  clTectiveness  to  argue  that  the  former  is 
merely  a  dependent  runction  of  the  latter,  and  that  the  task  of 
government  is  to  educate  public  opinion  to  accept  this 
sequence.  In  other  words,  technology  and  science,  translated 
into  effectiveness  and  affluence,  are  to  fill  the  void  left  by  the 
waning  of  traditional  ideologies  of  legitimation.  Not  only 
academic  theorists  .  but  also  ruling  regimes  sometimes 
subscribe  to  this  seemingly  attractive  solution  to  their 
dilemmas  of  eroding  legitimacy.  Hence  we  have  'goulash 
-'I  I  bid.,  p.  60. 
32David  licetham,  Max  Wcber  and  the  Thco[y  of  Modern  Politics,  Polity  Prcss,  Cambridgc,  England: 
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socialism'  (i.  e.  the  effort  to  buy  public  support  through 
improved  living  standards  and  relative  affluence)  in  East 
Central  Europe  and  the  sanctioned  cult  of  rampant 
consumerism  in  the  West.  But  for  political  regimes  this  is 
essentially  a  shallow  and  even  desperate  perspective  because 
such  a  pscudo-idcology,  which  holds  legitimacy  to  be  a  mere 
I'Linction  of  clTectiveness,  will  leave  them  naked  and  without 
principled  authority  if  their  efficiency  declines.  "  33 
The  events  that  took  place  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s  in  Eastern  Europe, 
especially  in  I  kingary  wlicre  a  seemingly  consumerist  version  of  state 
Socialism  -goulash  socialism-  was  expericilccd,  have  proven  Rotschild's 
argument.  When  the  rulers  of  a  country  decide  to  reduce  legitimacy  to 
erflectiveness  or  tiie  economic  system,  when  the  prosperity  declines  or 
disappears  aftcr  a  while.  the  rulers  have  no  other  means  to  legitimise  their 
presence  at  government.  The  Kdddr  administration  in  Hungary  in  its  last  years, 
the  11inochet  regime  whose  legitimacy  was  based  on  its  Chicago  school 
economic  policies  are  examples  of  regimes  and  the  Margaret  Thatcher 
government  in  tile  Unitcd  Kingdom  (UK),  tile  Ronald  Reagan  administration 
in  the  (IS.  and  the  Turgut  Ozal  government  in  Turkey  are  examples  of 
governments  which  tried  to  sustain  their  legitimacy  by  pseudo-ideology 
mainly  based  oil  the  rise  of  economic  prosperity.  and  they  all  suffered  firom  tile 
decline  or  economic  prosperity  at  the  end,  leaving  their  countries  in  an 
ideological  legitimacy  gap  for  differing  lengths  of  tinic. 
One  IIILlst  bear  in  mind  that.  although  the  inspiration  for  these  activities  may 
come  1rorn  abroad,  these  were  conducted  on  national  level.  However,  the  issue 
ol*  legitimacy,  especially  in  post-World  War  11  East  European  scene,  begins  to 
depend  on  international  as  well  as  national  political  relations  in  vertical  and 
"Joseph  Rotschild,  in  Denitch  (ed.  ),  Lcl,,  itiniation  of  Reginics,  p.  39. 24 
horizontal  scalcs.  The  changes  in  the  international  balance  of  power  from  the 
pre-war  environment  to  tile  Cold  War  environment  and  then  to  the  post-Cold 
War  cnvironnicnt  changed  the  rules  concerning  international  relations, 
intcrnational  prcssure  and  intervention  to  a  country's  affairs,  and  changed  the 
way  legitimacy  of  an  administration  is  perceived.  The  emergence  of 
supranational  organisations  such  as  the  European  Union  (EU)  or  such 
ideological  blocs  such  as  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation  (NATO)  and 
the  Warsaw  Pact  affected  the  degree  of  interference  to  political  affairs  in 
national  level.  'nic  international  intervention  decreased  or  increased  depending 
on  what  bloc  a  country  was  in  or what  sort  of  an  organisation  itwas  a  member 
ol*.  The  IJJ  at  the  moment  has  jurisdiction  over  many  political  and  economic 
iSSUes  which  were  under  the  close  control  or  national  governments  of  its 
members  a  decade  ago,  from  the  formation  of  agricultural  policy  to  the  rights 
of  fishing  in  rnember-states'  territorial  waters.  Similarly,  the  members  of  the 
so-called  I'lastern  Bloc  were  under  Soviet  control  on  their  international  and 
national  policy  decisions.  With  what  is  branded  the  New  Mot-ld  Oi-der  in  place, 
the  degree  of  intcrvcntion  and  the  rules  concerning  outside  intervention  to 
national  all'airs  have  changed  as  well.  The  studies  of  legitimacy,  therefore, 
have  to  include  an  international  element  which  may  or  may  not  havc.  'a  direct 
innuence  on  tiie  acts  or  an  administration  and  hence  its  perception  as 
legitimate  or  not.  A  further  discussion  of  this  subject  may  be  found  in 
flollowhig  parts  orthis'chapter  an  in  Chaptcr,  rwo. 
There  are  alternative  visions  to  the  legitimacy  -  efficiency  relationship.  For 
instance,  the  members  of  tile  positivist-syslemic  school  argue  that  legitimacy 
depends  on  longevity,  clarity,  econorny,  and  enforcement  capability  in 25 
administration.  This  enforcement  capability  excludes  the  normative  side  to 
legitimation  or  a  regime.  Tile  positivislic-sptendc  school  claims  that  a 
gowninicilt  creates  its  legitimacy  through  these  means  cited  above,  and  is 
autonomous  as  a  political  system.  This  approach  is  criticised  by  Marxists  and 
radical  ideologist  who  argue  that  a  regime  is  incapable  of  surviving  without 
being  based  oil  normative  values,  because  as  it  delegitimises  previous  regimes. 
it  will  bring  along  its  own  delcgitimation  since  they  all  function  under  similar 
I'LlIeS 
3.1 
Therd'orc.  one  may  state  that  legitimacy  as  a  concept  has  evolved  along  with 
the  changes  in  power  relations  and  social  responsibilities  of  the  ruling  classes. 
Legitimacy.  which  used  to  be  a  concept  connected  to  individual  relations, 
cspecially  blood  rclations  all'iliated  with  marriage  bond,  dcvcloped  to  become 
a  political-sociological  concept  which  identifics  tile  justifiability  of  a  regime 
vis-,  'i-vis  its  sulý)ects.  Currently  the  terrn  is  used  to  explain  that  a  regime 
acquires  and  holds  power  according  to  justifiable  rules  and  that  it  has  the 
consent  ol'  the  public,  of  the  ruled,  with  it.  However,  there  arc  different 
approaches  to  tile  concept  as  it  is  related  with  difTerent  branches  of  social 
sciences. 
In  terms  or  law.  legitimacy  means  that  tile  leader  or  leaders  of  a  given  land  -a 
political  party.  a  prcsident,  prime  minister,  king,  or  a  tribal  chief-  acquires 
power  to  rLIlC  in  accordance  with  legal  framework  that  regulates  the  life  of  the 
land.  Ir  the  acquisition  and  holding  or  power  is  in  accordance  with  the  laws 
that  govern  the  place.  than  the  regime  is  legally  legitimate. 
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In  ternis  or  philosophy,  however,  the  laws  that  justify  and  legitimisc  a  given 
reginic  are  questionable  in  relation  to  thcir  own  justiriability.  For  philosophers, 
(lie  existence  of  a  law  is  no  direct  proof  to  its  justness  and  rightfulness.  The 
political  system's  ethical  correctness,  moral  rightfulness,  its  concern  over  some 
key  issues  such  as  human  rights  make  the  system  legitimate. 
In  ternis  of'  political  science,  the  main  cognition  of  legitimacy  lies  in  Max 
Wcbcr*s  definition:  Weber  defines  legitimacy  of  a  regirne  in  its  subjects*  belief 
in  its  justifiabic  nature  on  the  part  of  the  relevant  social  agents.  Conscquently, 
Weber  deseribes  power  relations  to  bc  legitiniatc  whcn  both  those  who  hold 
positions  or  political  power  and  those  ruled  by  them  believe  these  relations  to 
be  j  usti  I  iable  /  legitimate. 
"For  a  social  scientist  to  say  that  a  given  power  relation  is 
legitimate.  Weber  argues,  is  not  to  make  a  moral  judgement 
about  it  in  the  manner  of  philosopher;  it  is  rather  to  make  a 
report  (which  may  be  empirically  true  or  false)  about  other 
people's  heliqft.  Power  is  legitimate  where  those  involved  in 
it  believe  it  to  be  so,  legitimacy  derives  from  people's  belief 
in  legitimacy.  So,  lie  writes,  legitimacy  is  equivalent  to 
'Legitimit5tsglaube'  (a  belief  in  legitimacy)-,  and  legitimate 
po-,  ver  is  power  'als  legitim  angeschcn'  (that  is  regarded  as 
legitimate).  "  33 
I  lowever.  that  a  regime  isjustified  in  the  minds  of  tile  people  governed  by  it,  is 
not  in  itself'  enough  to  make  a  regime,  a  government  or  a  leader  legitimate. 
There  are  different  factors  which  contribute  to  a  political  system's  legitimacy 
as  well  as  its  perception  as  justiriablc  by  tile  people.  The  legal  validity  of  tile 
appropriation  and  exercise  of  power,  the  issue  of  justifiability  of  the  rules 
governing  a  power  relationship  connected  to  the  sets  of  beliefs  and  values  in  a 
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given  society.  and  the  evidence  of  public  consent  derived  from  tile  practices  of 
the  rulers  are  all  parts  that  make  up  the  grounds  of  legitimacy  for  a  given 
reginle  or  a  group  of  power-holders.  In  that  case,  David  Beetham  argues  that 
the  main  concept  is  not  the  belief  in  legitimacy,  but  the  underlying  principles 
of'obcdience  to  the  political  power,  among  both  those  who  rule  and  those  who 
30 
are  ruled  .  Seymour  Martin  Lipset  defines  legitimacy  as  a  conccpt  that 
-involvcs  the  capacity  of  the  system  to  engender  and  maintain  the  belief  that 
the  existing  political  institutions  are  the  most  appropriate  ones  for  the  society" 
while  Richard  M.  Mcrelman's  definition  of  political  legitimacy  is  "the  quality 
oi"oughtness"  that  is  perceived  by  tile  public  to  inhere  in  a  political  regime. 
That  government  is  Icgitimate  which  is  vicwed  as  morally  propcr  for  a 
society.  " 
37 
.  I'alcott  Parsons  describes  legitimacy  as  the  factor  which 
con-csponds,  in  political  power  systems,  to  the  confidence  in  tile  mutual 
acceptability  and  stability  of  the  monetary  unit  in  monetary  systerns.  This 
I 
power.  Parsons  argues,  is  exchanged  in  compliance  with  an  obligation  that 
leaves  (lie  performer  of  that  obligation  with  nothing  but  a  set  of  expectations 
that  lic  can  invoke  certain  obligations  on  sonic  other  individuals  in  other 
occasions  and  in  other  contexts 
38 
. 
I 
The  Weberian  dermitioWs  degree  orsuitability  may  be  discussed,  however  it  is 
also  accepted  that  it  is  the  main  framework  of  analysis  for  the  twentieth 
century  social  scientists  on  the  issue  of  legitimacy.  Those  who.  do  not  make  use 
of'  the  Weberian  approach.  at  Icast  reller  to  it  and  describc  tlicir  rcasons  of 
36ibid..  pp.  12-1  3 ). 
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discord.  I  fence,  the  Weberian  approach  is  tile  mainstream  approach  in  terms  of 
confemporary  sociology  and  political  science. 
David  Beethani,  in  Ilis  Legitimation  or  Power  (1991)  suggcsts  that 
effectiveness.  order  and  stability  are  the  outcomes  of  legitimacy  and  not  the 
grounds  or  it.  I  le  establishes  his  conception  of  legitimacy  on  the  principles  of  a 
reginiCs  validity,.  iLlStiriability,  and  the  consent  it  gathers  from  its  sulýjccts.  fie 
argues  that  when  these  are  established,  a  reginic  is  legitimate,  and,  on  that 
aCCOUIIt.  the  situation  generates  moral  grounds  for  consent  by  the  ruled. 
Consequently.  il'that  reginic  is  taken  as  legitiniatc,  through  a  particular  quality 
ol'consent  shown  by  the  ruled  towards  the  rulers,  the  end-products  orcnllanced 
order.  stability.  and  effectiveness  of  the  system  may  be  achieved.  This 
relationship  between  the  ruler  and  tile  ruled  affiects  tile  rulers*  behaviour 
patterns  as  well.  As  a  consequence,  as  the  power-holders  would  be  bound  by 
tile  rule.  -,  and  paradigms  upon  which  the  legitimacy  or  their  power  is  based, 
legitimate  power  becomes  limited  power  and  the  powerful  lose  their  legitimacy 
Nklien  they  flail  to  respect  their  power's  essential  limits  39 
This  thesis  will  pursue  tile  framework  put  forward  by  David  Bectliarn  in  his 
Lcgitiniation  of'  Power,  but  will  also  make  reference  to  Weber's  schemes  of 
I  legitimation  techniques  with  an  attempt  to  reconcile  tile  structural  diflerenccs 
,  between  the  Weberian  cra  and  the  current  post-Bipolar  world  structurc. 
D.  Three  Layers  Of  Legitimacy: 
At  this  point,  before  going  any  further,  a  distinction  should  be  made  between 
the  legitimacy  orthe  state  itself  and  the  legitimacy  or  a  ruling  regime.  In  the 
3-41'alcolt  Parwivi.  Politics  and  Social  Structure.  The  Frce  Prcss,  Ncw  York,  New  York,  US:  1969,  p. 29 
current  global  political  system,  one  may  see  that,  despite  all  its  opponents,  tile 
nation-state  is  the  primary  agency  of  international  politics.  That  a  group  or 
masses  ofpcople  qLICStion  the  merits  or  the  legitimacy  of  a  regime  that  govems 
them  does  not  nican  that  these  people  question  the  grounds  of  existence  of  a 
given  nation-state.  There  are,  of  course  cases  that  show  the  opposite,  as  can  be 
seen  in  the  attcmpts  ofindepcndcnce  of  such  regional  nationalist  movernents 
in  Kurdish-populated  territories,  Chechnia,  Scotland,  Quebec.  Corsica  and  the 
MIS(ILIC  Country  against  tile  nation-states  or  Turkey-Iraci-Iran,  Russian 
Federation.  United  Kingdom,  Canada,  France  and  Spain,  respectively.  In  these 
cases.  the  legitimacy  or  a  state  structure  which  is believed  to  give  less  than  it 
takes  1'rom  tile  regions  (bearing  in  mind  that  Scotland  is  an  equal  partner  as  tile 
second  kingdom  of  the  UK  unlike  the  other  territories  which  may  be  seen  in  a 
way  as  'invaded  territories').  irnot  exploit  them,  is  questioned.  The  legitimacy 
of  a  given  state,  therellore.  is  in  doubt.  However,  the  alternative  these 
nationalist  movements  propose  is  not  a  challenge  to  the  concept  of  nation-state 
or  a  challenge  to  the  international  political  structure.  What  these  groups  seek  is 
the  creation  or  flurther  nation-states  to  the  expcnsc  of  sorne  greater  ones.  The 
case  provided  by  the  Scottish  National  Party,  for  instance,  foresees  an 
independent  state  or  Scotland  which  will  be  a  part  or  tile  European  Union  and 
which  will  therclIbre  not  dirlIcr  from  tile  greater  Unitcd  Kingdom  in  ternis  of 
international  involvement.  Tile  concept  of  nation-state  therefore  remains 
Unchallenged  and  its  Iýgitirnacy  is  still  sound. 
I  lowever,  while  people  may  wish  to  keep  tile  nation-state  they  have,  they  may 
(hink  that  the  political  system  that  their  state  embraces  is  undesirable.  The 
I'lbvid  Bectliam.  op.  cil..  p.  34-35  passim. 30 
rulcd  masses  may  think  that  absolute  monarchy  or  liberal  democracy  is  not 
suitable  anymore  for  the  social  structure  their  country  has  at  a  given  moment  in 
time  and  may  feel  the  urge  to  change  it  to  parliamentary  monarchy  or  Islamic 
fundamentalism.  In  such  a  case,  as  clearly  seen  in  tile  late  1980s  and  early 
1990s  in  E-astern  Europe,  the  political  systern  may  be  challenged  while  tile 
citizens  ol'  that  given  coqntry  may  insist  on  keeping  the  name,  boundaries, 
symbols.  capital  city,  flag  and  other  conccpts  relatcd  to  and  identificd  with  -or 
m,  orking  as  identifiers  of-  their  nation-state.  While  the  govermimital  structures 
Nvere  challenged  and  altered  in  that  part  of  the  world  in  the  last  decade, 
I  lungary.  Poland.  Bulgaria,  Romania  remained  intact  as  nation-states.  The 
boundaries  ol'  tile  concept  of  nationalism  varied  in  all  these  countries. 
I  lowever.  the  nation-state  which  existed  was  not  cliallengcd  by  any  separatist 
movement.  nor  there  were  any  major  ethnic  groups  in  these  countries  that 
NVOUld  constitute  a  structure  with  two  or  more  nations  living  in  one  state.  In 
other  instances  such  as  the  Former  Yugoslav  Fedcration  or  Czcclioslovakia. 
where  more  than  one  nation  flormed  a  state,  the  state  structure  was  challenged, 
andli  inally.  altered. 
A  third  layer  of  legitimacy  concerins  the  governments,  the  administrative 
system  dominating  a  given  political  system.  A  government  may  be  considered 
-is  illegitimate  or  may  become  delegitimiscd  by  dill'crent  reasons.  In  that  case 
the  people  of  a  given  country  may  be  content  with  their  nation-state  and 
political  systcm  as  a  whole,  however,  thcy  may  rather  have  a  different 
governnicilt.  This  may  be  carried  out  through  elections  which  would  change 
the  government,  by  mass  demonstrations  and  industrial  action  or  by  other 
incans  which  would  force  the  unwanted  government  to  resign  from  office.  in 31 
accordance  with  the  conditions  guiding  the  country's  political  and  legal 
systems.  In  some  extreme  cases,  the  change  of  government,  or  the  reginic  may 
be  associated  with  the  change  of  political  system  in  a  given  country  or  the  two 
11111),  Coincide. 
A  dwil  crisis  in  ternis  of  legitirnacy  problems  may  also  take  place  in  a  country 
at  a  certain  point  in  history.  Such  a  dual  problem  or  legitimacy  was  the  core  of 
the  events  experienced  in  the  USSR.  As  the  USSR  was  a  federation  or  states, 
the  centrillugal  florces  had  two  foci,  namely  nationalist  separatism  and  anti- 
communism.  In  the  Yugoslav  Fcderation  which  was  a  collection  of  statcs 
brought  together  by  the  charismatic  Icadcrship  of  Joseph  B.  Tito,  the  division 
aniong  flederal  states  became  apparent  after  Tito's  death.  On  the  other  hand, 
Czechoslovakia  which  was  a  combination  of  two  nations  dividcd  into  two 
dilTercilt  countries  in  a  peaceful  separation  in  1998.  In  these  states,  the 
legitimacy  of'  the  state  itself  was  based  upon  a  legitimation  frorn  above 
principle.  florccd  by  international  political  circumstances,  by  socio-cconomic 
necessities.  and  other  factors.  When  tile  factors  which  bound  the  smaller  states 
together  within  the  larger  state's  boundaries  were  eliminated.  when  these 
I'actors  became  obsolete,  the  break-u'p  took  place.  Oil  tile  other  hand,  these 
states  were  expericticing  doniestic  legitimacy  problems  as  flic  rulers  6f  these 
states  %%ere  unsuccessful  in  establishing  a  political  system  perceived  as 
legitimate  by  the  people.  Hence,  both  a  political  system  change  -and  a 
government  change  due  to  communist  system's  peculiarities-  and  a  nation- 
state  level  break-up  took  placc  in  thcse. 
Modern  studies  of  legitimacy,  while  focusing  on  these  three  layers  of 
lcgilinlaey,  appear  to  have  a  tendency  to  underestimate  the  outside  or  the 32 
international  dimension  of  a  given  regime's  grounds  of  legitimacy.  The  main 
emphasis  seems  to  be  based  on  the  relations  concerning  legitimacy  in  one  state 
as  a  structure,  rather  than  a  state  as  an  agent.  As  the  rulers'  international 
connections  may  dictate  development  at  the  national  level  -such  as  the  East 
F.  uropean  and  Latin  American  examples  during  the  Cold  War-  rather  than  the 
developments  in  the  domestic  polities,  to  study  a  given  state  as  a  closed  system 
may  lead  to  wrong  conclusions  in  tile  study  of  a  political  order's  legitimacy. 
The  second  and  tile  third  types  of  legitimacy  described  above  form  the  basis  of 
this  thesis.  That  is,  this  thesis  concentrates  on  the  legitimacy  deficit  for  a 
given  regime  ruling  in  a  given  country  within  a  prc-defincd  political  system, 
and  not  that  or  a  nation-state  per  se.  Thus,  the  focus  will  be  on  tile  domestic 
caLISCS  ol'delegitimation.  As  a  case  study,  the  case  of  Hungary  and  the  period 
of'chang  that  took  place  in  the  I  lungarian  State  frorn  mid-  I  980s  onwards  will 
be  analysed.  Nonetheless,  as  the  Hungarian  regime  from  the  end  orthc  World 
War  2  until  tile  cild  or  1980s  was  definable  as  a  component  of  a  greater  system 
ol*  bi-polar  international  systcm,  tile  international  dimension  to  legitimacy  and 
legitimation  should  be  emphasised. 
Ill.  LEGITIMACY  AND  DEMOCRATISATION:  PERCEPTIONS  AND 
MISPERCEPTIONS 
A.  A  New  Dawn  For  Democracy?: 
With  file  I'Mentc  process  which  emerged  from  early  1970s  onwards,  followed 
by  tile  creation  of  a  new  world  order  after  tile  dissolution  oe  the  Communist 
bloc  fi-orn  late  I  980s  to  early  1990s,  many  social  scientists  began  to  clairn  that  a 
general  inclination  towards  democratisation  is  present  in  the  world.  The 
process  of'  denlocratisation  which  began  in  Southern  Europe  in  mid-1970s 33 
appeared  to  some  to  expand  to  include  similar  developments  in  Latin  America 
and  in  Fastern  Europe  as  wc1l  as  in  some  parts  of  Arrica.  Some  scholars  claim 
that  all  these  devclopnicnts  are  related  to  a  general  wave  of  democracy,  or,  a 
Ihir(I  irave  qf(lemociwq  as  Samuel  Huntington  describes  WO,  and  that  it  was 
to  he  expected  as  a  result  of  long-term  cycles  or  dennocratisation  and  anti- 
deniocratisation  in  the  World  history. 
From  the  early  1990s  onwards,  the  idea  that  that  the  transformation  is  uniform 
in  all  transitory  societies  became  widespread.  This  idea  arose  1rom  the  tradition 
N%hich  saw  the  Socialist  Bloc  a  union  of  clone  states,  all  socialist  therefore  all 
giving  the  same  response  to  the  same  stimulus.  As  they  were  seen  as  sharing 
the  common  legacy  or  being  part  or  the  Socialist  political  order  in  their  near 
history.  it  was  assumed  that  they  would  have  similar  periods  of  transition  to 
(Icniocracy"'.  The  main  components  of  a  liberal  democratic  political  system,  as 
Car  as  these  theories  arc  concerned,  may  be  reduced  to  the  basic  constituents  or 
the  rule  or  law:  state  and  regime  legitimacy;  liberal  economy;  and,  fair  and 
compoitive  elections.  Of  these,  the  rule  of  law  and  system  legitimacy  elements 
%%ould  ensure  that  the  regime  does  not  malfunction  and  prevent  it  from  losing 
its  Public  approval.  Meanwhile,  a  well-functioning  electoral  system  guarantees 
(lie  eligibility  or  several  candidates  to  fulfil  positions  in  legislative  and 
exccutive  fields.  Market  economy  sustains  the  political  system  by  creating  the 
suitable  economic  environment  for  the  political  system.  The  existence  of  basic 
Freedonis  such  as  the  freedom  of  thought  and  expression  including  the  freedom 
41'  Samuel  1.1  ILInfington,  argues  in  his  The  Third  Wave:  Democratization  in  the  Late  Twentieth 
Celli 
.. 
LqU'  JUniversity  of  Oklahoma  Press,  London,  1991)  that  after  the  first  wave  of  democratisation 
between  1828  and  1926.  a  second  wave  was  experienced  during  the  1943-1962  period.  Huntington 
argues  that  1rom  1974  onwards,  the  world  is  living  through  a  third  wave  of  democrat  i  sat  ion. 34 
of"  expression  of  tile  printed  and  audio-visual  media,  of  free  and  unbiased 
representation  or  all  political  rractions  in  the  country,  or  whether  the  legislative 
bodies  and  the  cmer  exeeutive  -as  the  president  or  the  prime  minister-  are 
publicly  c1ccted  or  appointed  by  the  parliament  or  another  agency  nlay  be 
added  to  the  above-mentioned  list.  However,  as  there  would  be  no  fair  and 
competitive  elections  witliout  an  equal  possibility  to  compete  for  political 
power  positions  for  a  variety  or political  fractions,  they  may  be  seen  as  already 
being  parts  ol'the  proccss. 
This  list  ol'requirements  for  democracy's  establishment  and  preservation  helps 
to  create  a  mould  for  democracy  and  democratisation  and  licncc  to  draw 
generalised  conclusions.  The  fact  that  a  scries  or  dcmocratising  movements  in 
Mrica.  Latin  America  and  in  Europe  followed  one  another,  and  that  most  of 
tile  regime  changes  rated  to  tile  above-mentioned  mould  of  systemic 
requirements  flor  liberal  dernocracy's  establishment  has  strengthened  the 
gencralisation.  Nowadays.  as  the  Latin  American  authoritarian  reginles  were 
likened  to  their  South  East  Asian  counterparts,  the  East  European 
deniocratisation  movements  are  compared  with  the  Latin  American 
dc  ni  oc  rati  SIti  01,42. 
On  the  one  hand.  there  are  similar  situations  which  enable  an  observer  to 
compare  and  contrast  tile  developments  in  Latin  American  and  Eastern 
1-m-opean  political  transitions.  The  constitutional  transformation  that  took 
41  Tile  I*ollowers  ol'such  a  view  may  be  exemplified  by  the  works  of  J.  F.  Brown,  II.  B.  Feigenbaum  and 
J-R.  I  lenig.  I 
.. 
I  lohnes.  13.  (;  cddes,  E.  A.  Tiryakian,  A.  Leftwich  among  others.  Z7 
42  Amongst  tile  political  scientists  who  argue  in  favour  of  a  comparison  and  compare  Latin  American 
and  Eastern  E.  uropean  transrorniation,  A.  Bcrgesen,  J.  11.  Cox,  D.  Bartlct,  W.  Hunter,  R.  Espindola,  V. 
Bolet,  D.  W.  Powers  may  be  referred  to  in  the  recent  years.  in  addition  to  tile  members  of  the  Nco- 
Modernist  school.  A  recent  and  detailed  comparison  may  be  found  in  Sharon  Werning  Rivera's  article 35 
place  in  Brazil  from  1984  till  1988  under  tile  leadcrship  of  president  Tancredo 
Neves  11611ows  a  similar  path  to  tile  Hungarian  transition  to  democracy.  Thcre 
is  a  scrics  of'  multi-party,  niulti-ideology  talks,  consensus  arnong  different 
OpilliOIIS  iS  SOLIght,  many  different  layers  of  tile  social  structure  are  involved  in 
the  process.  and  tile  parliament  as  an  institution  plays  a  central  role  in  the 
dex  clopmentS.  13  (see  Chapter  4  for  the  Hungarian  political  change  and  the  role 
ol'the  parliament  in  it).  On  the  other  hand,  the  Cact  that  both  democratisation 
processes  l'ollo%v  similar  patterns  does  not  prove  that  there  is  a  superstructure 
combining  both  processes.  This  sort  of  a  comparison  is  to  result  in  tile  rise  of  a 
tendcncy  to  gencralise  political  development  all  over  tile  World  as  tile  sub- 
categories  or  a  ubiquitous  nlovcnient  of  dcmocratisatioil.  I  lowever.  such  a 
movement  oNcinocratisation  does  not  exist. 
B.  The  Discussion  of  the  Uniformity  of  Transitions: 
In  due  course.  those  who  argue  that  democracy  is  and  should  be  uniform  and 
universal  avoid  the  differences  and  focus  on  the  institutional  necessities  so  that 
they  have  an  argument.  Such  an  approach  is  a  course  based  on  a  lincar 
I 
pcrception  or  democracy  and  its  components  in  tile  shape  or  institutions  and 
the  acts  or  these  institutions  and  of  their  controllers.  The  idea  may  be  traced 
back  to  thc  Modernist  school  of  thought  which  was  popular  in  1950s  and 
1960s.  According  to  such  Modernists  as  Daniel  Bell,  Dunkwart.  Rustow  or 
Lucien  11ye,  modernisation  was  a  linear  process  and  liencc  all  countries  would 
1"olloxv  similar  processes  to  those  which  managed  to  industrialise  and  establish 
a  democratic  system  in  their  Modernisation  path  of  development.  Therefore, 
tilled  'I  listorical  Cleavages  orTransition  Mode?:  Influences  on  the  Emerging  Party  Systems  in  Poland, 
I  fun-ary  and  Czechoslovakia,  '  in  ParlY  Nlifics.  vol.  2(2),  1996,  pp.  177-208. 36 
the  Modernist  argument  claims  that  if,  say,  United  Kingdom  or  Netherlands 
managed  to  carry  out  industrialisation  and  administrative  democratisation, 
then  SO  Could  such  countries  like  Greece  or  Ghana.  The  paradigm  of 
Modcrnisation  therefore  assumes  that  transitions  from  pre-capital  i  sill  to  post- 
industrialism  and  Frorn  absolutist  monarchy  to  a  liberal  democratic  system  are 
possible  and  sustainable.  Countries  lacking  the  economic  and  political  systems 
-available  in  tile  so-called  Capitalist  Core  might  improve  their  economic  and 
political  capabilities  by  adopting  patterns  of  development,  and  11ollowing  the 
paths  taken  by  these  more  developed  states  in  the  past.  That  would  rnean  that 
thCre  SIIOUld  first  be  an  industrialisation  and  licrice  modernisation  or  thc  urban 
areas.  then,  as  people  would  migrate  to  the  urban  areas  from  the  rural  -and 
hence  traditional-  sectors  of  the  country,  they  would  be  forced  by  social 
Cil-CLInistances  to  part  with  their  conservative  traditionalism  and  adopt  patterns 
of'  belierand  behaviour  or  tiie  more  modern  industrial  society.  Tile  levels  of 
literacy  and  hence  education  would  rise  and  the  society  would  transForm  itself 
1'rom  a  predominantly  rural,  traditional,  religious,  conservative,  poverty- 
stricken  po%ition  to  a  predominantly  urban,  industrial,  non-religious, 
progressive,  prosperous  stage.  This  would  change  the  shape  of  the  world  as  tile 
international  relations  would  be  more  pacific,  more  end-orientcd,  more  rational 
and  pragmatic  than  it  cm-rcritly  were. 
As  tllc  decolonisation  process  accelerated  and  altered  tile  relationship  between 
(lie  states  in  tile  Core  and  those  in  the  Periphery,  the  above-  nient  i  oned 
arguments  proved  to  be  inapplicable,  and,  became  redundant.  Tile  main 
43  For  Further  anal",  is  of  llic  Brazilian  constitutional  transformation  and  democratisation,  scc  Javicr 
klartincz-Lara.  Iltdiding,  Democracy  In  Brazil,  Ipswich:  Macmillan  Prcss  Ltd.,  1996. 37 
inaCCUracy  ol'thc  Modernisation  Theorists  was  to  perceive  the  socio-cconomie 
development  of*  Europe  as  a  given,  repeatable  experience  by  any  other  country 
which  is  not  as  industrialised.  Such  authors  as  Rostow  and  Rustow  did  not  take 
the  imperialistic  policies  and  hence  the  wealth  accumulated  in  the  continent 
through  these  imperialistic  policies  into  consideration  as  a  motive  affecting  the 
aCCLImulation  in  the  European  core  countries  that  tile  newly 
industrialising  post-colonial  states  lacked.  The  fact  that  when  the  first 
Industrial  Revolution  took  place  all  the  countries  whieli  expcrienccd  the 
industrialisation  process  were  undeveloped  and  not  untlerdeveloped  makes  the 
idea  of'  imitation  of  the  dcvcloped  countrics  by  tile  developing  ones  obsQlcte 
and  baseless.  Moreover,  in  a  eountry  with  a  developing  industry  and  a 
traditional-conservative  behaviour  pattern,  tile  transition  to  an  industrial, 
Westerly  urban  culture  was  not  a  vital  line  of  action.  In  most  of  the  countries 
which  leapt  Forward  in  terms  of  technology  and  industry,  traditional  values  did 
not  vanish  and  no  straight  line  towards  the  values  or  West  European-North 
American  societies  was  hence  pursued.  A  mixture  of  the  indigenous  and 
6oreign  cultures  took  place,  but  no  uniform  post-industrial  society  based  on 
rationality.  pragmatism  and  open-mindedncss  cnierged  ncither  in  the  newly 
industrialised  nations  nor  in  the  established  industries.  Thus.  by  the  late  1960s 
and  carly  1970s.  modernisation  theories  lost  their  appeal  and  gave  way  to  the 
theorics  ol'Dependency  and  World  System  Analysis.  Another  misjudgernent  of 
the  Modcrnist  school  was  to  claim  that  the  West,  as  a  result  of  the  well'are  state 
notion  and  dLIC/thanks  to  mixed  economy,  had  come  to  the  end  of  the 
ideological  age  as  Daniel  Bell  claimed  in  his  End  Of  Ideology  (1960),  an  idea 
%%hich  would  be  carried  into  1990s  by  Francis  Fukuyama  in  his  End  Of  History 38 
(1991  ).  This  pattern  ol'bclief  meant  that  the  Western  social  structure  is  taken 
and  presented  as  tile  end  of  the  human  society's  development.  Thus,  it 
presented  the  West  European  and  North  American  state  and  society  structures 
as  desirable  modcls  for  the  'less  developed'  nations. 
The  first  main  criticism  came  to  Modernist  school  from  within,  from  Sarnuel 
I  ILIntingtOll.  Ill  1962,  basing  his  arguments  oil  the  example  set  by  the  Cuban 
Revolution  of'  1959  led  by  Fidel  Castro  against  Fulgencio  Batista,  Huntington 
argLICd  that  modernisation  in  a  society  might  be  achievcd  through  military 
action  as  well  as  civil  and  civic  mcans  as  claimed  previously.  Then,  gradually 
tile  idea  lost  its  allure  due  to  the  fact  that  it  foresaw  a  very  long  period  of 
transition.  Most  newly-independent  states  had  no  will  to  allow  a  long  period  of 
time  [Ior  transition  and  decided  to  substitute  the  lengthy  transition  with  reform 
from  above.  Moreover,  the  whole  school  of  the  Modernisation  seemed  to  be  a 
representative  of  the  Capitalist  Core's  new  orientations.  That  the  Modernists 
began  to  be  influential  in  the  wake  or  the  Bandung  Conference  of  1955 
strctigthens  the  conspiracy  theory  that  it  was  an  attempt  to  extend  the  control 
of'  the  Core  over  its  flormer  colonies:  if  the  former  colonies  were  to  be 
convinced  to  Follow  a  similar  path  or  social,  political  and  economic 
development.  with  similar  key  institutions,  it  would  mean  that  there  would  be 
similar  economic  necessities  and  similar  types  of  consumers  as  tile  small 
bourgeoisie  would  act  in  a  similar  fashion  in  a  similar  World,  and  there  would 
be  no  -wish  to  switch  -to  a  Communist  coursc  if  in  mid  or  long  term  thcsc 
countries  would  achieve  prosperity  as  their  previous  masters.  'rhe  idea  failed  in 
terms  of*  delivering  prosperity  but  worked  considerably  well  in  ternis  of 
Containment  Policy  and  of  preservation  of  tile  links  between  the  Core  and  its 39 
l'orincr  colonies.  It  was  replaced  by  the  Dependency  School,  as  exernplified  by 
the  works  of*  11.  Cardoso  and  1.  Wallerstein,  which  had  a  more  global,  more 
realistic  and  more  Marxist  tendencies,  as  will  be  dernonstrated  in  the  following 
parts  ofthis  thesis. 
Fhe  retUrn  of  tile  Modernisation  theories  canic  along  with  the  1980s  and  this 
tinic  depcndcd  oil  the  -,  o-callcd  'satellitc  dish  revolutions,  '  or  the  industrial 
revolUtiOn  in  inflort-nation  technology  taking  place  1rorn  the  late  1970s 
on%%ards.  much  treasured  by  the  ex-Modernists  44 
. 
This  time,  tile  argument  was 
bascd  on  the  flact  that  industrial  development  in  tile  leading  industries  or  tiie 
%Norld  necessitated  the  spread  of  know-how  in  a  global  scale  to  increase  high- 
tech  products'  sales.  The  information  technology  revolution  of  1980s  which 
came  %vith  satellite  telecommunications  and  the  use  of  personal  computers 
permitted  the  peripheral  regions  or  the  globe  to  receive  information  that  was 
cmicealed  from  them  by  their  oppressive  authoritarian  or  totalitarian  regimes. 
Thus.  they  claimed  that  tile  world  was  in  a  new  stage  in  which  inrormation 
could  not  be  censored  and  thus  exposed  ties  and  rnisconducts  of  their  leaders. 
This  enabled  the  expression  or  disscnt  which  could  be  used  to  change 
aUdioritarian  and  totalitarian  political  orders  into  a  competitive  liberal 
democracies.  The  fall  of  tile  military  junta  in  Argentina,  the  gradual  rdding  of 
the  Phlochet  reginic  in  Chile,  tile  democratic  elections  in  Nicaragua  aller  tile 
Sandinista  rule  of  21  years,  and  more  importantly  the  loosening  of  the  grip  in 
'"For  inslance.  Lucien  Ilyc's  article  Tolitical  Science  and  the  Crisis  of  Authoritarianism'  in  the 
American  l'olilical  Science  Review,  v.  84  (1),  pp.  3-19  may  constitute  a  very  good  example  of  tile 
Modernisation  (heorists'  adoption  of  the  inforrilation  tcchnology  revolution's  clTects.  Pyc  argues  that 
(lie  inlroduction  of*  satellite  dishes  and  therefore  tile  increase  in  (lie  access  to  international,  uncensored 
broadcast  bý  tile  people  living  tinder  oppressive  reginles  such  as  Latin  American  dictatorships  and  the 
Socialist  Illoc  %%,  cakcilcd  the  grip  or  tile  political  order  on  its  subjects/citizcns  and  hence  prepared  the 
domil'all  orauthoritarian  rcginics. 40 
the  Soviet  Union  with  Gorbachev  reforms  were  taken  as  signs  supporting  tile 
idea  that  satellite  dishes,  or  generally  speaking  advances  in  technology,  could 
undermine  corrupt  authoritarian  and  totalitarian  regimes. 
C.  The  New  World  Order: 
Willi  Mik-hail  Gorbachev's  resignation  on  25  December  1991  and  the 
subsc(limit  collapse  of  the  USSR,  the  bipolar  world  political  structure  ended. 
11cople  began  to  write  about  the  merits  of  democracy  and  or  capitalist  system, 
some  clidnicd  the  history  carne  to  its  end  as  ideological  competition  was  no 
more  existent.  With  the  East  European  states  devoting  themselves  to 
democratisation  of  their  political  and  liberalisation  and  capitalisation  of  their 
econonlic  systems,  the  mainstream  social  science  focused  on  the 
transIlormation  ofthat  part  of  the  world.  Therefore,  theories  concerning  the  fall 
ol'  the  aUthoritarian  regirnes  expanded  into  the  area  incorporating  the 
totalitarian  rcgirnes'  transition  to  democracy  along  similar  lines  to  tile  Latin 
American  scheme  which  preceded  the  East  European  studies  of  transition  by 
nearly  three  decades. 
The  change  was  so  widespread  and  sudden  that  a  new  world  order's 
emergence  came  unexpectedly.  Then,  theories  changed  shape.  Now  that 
democracy  proved  to  be  the  major  winner  in  the  political  systems  competition, 
outdoing  all  repressive  regime  types,  tile  modernist  approach  rocused  on  the 
possibility  or  long-term  cycles.  A  sort  of  Kondratiev  cycles  was  proposed  by 
Sanwel  I  luntington  45  as  he  claimed  that  democratic  and  anti-deniocratic 
sentiments,  or  'waves'  using  the  term  lie  employs,  followed  each  other  since 
45--ee  S 
.,  -  amucl  I  lunting(on's  book  The  Third  Wave:  Democrat  i  zat  ion  in  (fie  Late  20th  Centyry  (London: 
University  of*Oklahoma  Press.  199  1)  for.  a  thoroughgoing  discussion  of  the  subjcct. 41 
the  American  and  French  Rcvolutions  of  1776  and  1789  rcspcctivcly.  Tlic 
elaim  floresces  that  as  there  are  changes  at  given  times  in  the  important 
quantity  of*  places  on  the  globe,  there  are  such  things  as  waves  of 
deniocratisation  and  de-dcniocratisation  triggered  by  certain  key  events.  As 
there  was  -a  SUrge  to  democracy  once  again  From  mid-  I  970s  onwards,  this  time 
including  the  11ormer  USSR  and  its  former  satellite  states,  as  well  as  the  Latin 
American  reginies  and  sonic  African  dictatorships,  and  since  even  the  Chinese 
administration  was  loosening  its  firm  totalitarian  grip  in  favour  of  a  more 
liberal  approach.  one  might  argue  that  we  were  in  a  third  wave  of 
denlocratisation. 
Even  the  supporters  of  hegenionic  stability  /  world  system  approach  seem  to 
have  accepted  the  main  premise  that  democracy  and  democratisation  are  the 
quintessential  parts  or  tile  political  developments.  A.  Bcrgesen  argues  that: 
-  ...  while  stronger  core  states  act  outward.  planning  for 
protective  economic  blocs  to  deal  with  the  world  downturn  - 
EIC  '92  and  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Association  - 
weaker,  more  compromised  scmi-pcripheral  states,  are  only 
capable  ofaltcring  their  domestic  politics  -  the  common  move 
toward  democracy  -  in  an  effort  to  deal  with  their  worsening 
economic  condition.  Finally,  the  periphery,  weakest  and  most 
dependent,  shows  the  least  political  activity.  State  policy, 
then.  is  conditioned  by  world-syst6m.  position:  powcrrul  core 
states  band  together,  weaker  scmi-periplicral  states  change 
regimes:  weakest  peripheral  states  arc  stagnant  and  only  sink 
into  Vurthcr  inimiscration.  Existing  socialist  states,  then,  arc 
more  semi-periplicral  than  socialist,  and  act  similar  to  their 
zonal  compatriots  in  Latin  America  in  the  general  move 
toward  dernocracy.  "46 
Such  approaches.  despit.  e  bcing  cxplanatory  in  their  own  way,  may  mislead  the 
inquirer.  It  is  trLIC  that  one  may  draw  parallels  between  the  clemocratisation 
movements  all  around  the  globe.  flowevcr,  one  must  also  bear  in  mind  that  the 42 
di  I'llerences  between  the  types  or  regimes  and  the  transformations  these  regimes 
go  through,  are  greater  than  the  superficial  similarities  of  the  change.  It  may  be 
argIICLI  thilt  it  is  pointless  to  try  to  create  general  isations  per  se.  Ir  one  tries  to 
do  so,  the  attempt  would  be  ahistorical  as  the  development  or  liuman  society  is 
still  continuing.  Therefore,  there  are  no  model  societies  which  reached  the 
ultimate  ievei  or  development.  This  is  so  because  human  history  and  social 
history  is  in  continuous  motion  and  transition.  To  refer  to  global  laws  and 
cycles  governing  dernoeratisation  of  the  regimes  at  one  period  and  their  un- 
democratisation  at  another  period  is  also  ahistorical  and  illogical  as  such  a  type 
of'  generalisation  is  automatically  discarding  tile  important  and  oninipresent 
structural  framework  in  international  politics,  which  is  the  intemational 
system. 
D.  Different  Conditions,  Incompatible  Transitions: 
The  basic  inaccuracies  in  tile  generalisation  of  democratisation  are  to  take  the 
route  to  democraey  for  granted  and  to  assume  that  tile  needs  and  requirements 
flor  denlocraey  is  tile  same  for  each  and  every  nation  on  Earth.  This  attitude  can 
be  11ound  in  the  Modernisation  school  of  though  which  was  popular  from  mid- 
1950s  to  late  1960s  and  shares  the  same  misjudgements  with  it. 
I'lirce  main  reasons  may  be  mentioned  to  criticise  the  theories  of  the  universal 
and  unilbrin  democratisation  school  of  1990s.  First  or  all,  due  to  socio- 
historical  reasons,  one  may  not  compare  or  contrast  or  liken  a  society's 
structure  with  others.  As  diffierent  societies  develop  their  value  sets  and  rules 
and  laws  on  (lie  basis  or  diffcrcnt  social,  historical  and  gcological 
46  A.  Ber-ewn,  'Communism  Collapse:  A  World-System  Explanation',  Journal  of  Polific(d  und 
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requirements,  the  stage  these  would  switch  their  political  systems  to  liberal 
democracy  and  the  perception  of  tile  concept  of  democracy  and  its 
requircments  would  be  dirrcrent  in  each  particular  case.  For  instance,  the 
United  States  and  France  have  a  head  of  state  who  also  happens  to  hold  the 
chief'  CXCCL1tiVC  POSt  in  tile  country,  while  in  tile  United  Kingdom,  Italy, 
6cmiany.  Turkey  or  Hungary,  the  official  head  of  tile  state  -the  president  or  tile 
queen-  is  ceremonial  and  difTerent  than  the  chief  executive  -the  prime  minister- 
,  and  this  difference  does  not  affect  the  degree  of  dernocratisation  of  these 
countries.  This  issue,  as  is  the  existence  of  unicameral  or  bi-cameral 
representative  assemblies  /  parliaments,  is  linked  with  tile  historical 
developments  which  caused  onc  way  of  institutionalisation  and 
struCtUralisation  or  tile  other.  Tile  preference  of  cither  a  proportional  or 
majority-based  electoral  system  as  well  as  the  definition  of  constituency 
boundaries.  is  also  a  matter  linked  with  the  socio-historical  developments  in  a 
nation's  history. 
Fhe  socio-historical  background  of  a  nation  may  create  very  radical 
perceptions  of'  institutions  and  ilicir  roles  in  society  in  dinlerent  parts  or  tiie 
World.  apart  From  administrative  institutionalisation.  When,  for  instance,  the 
Military  is  considered  as  an  apolitical  institution  in  Western  Europe,  it  is  a 
political  actor  in  such  countries  as  Turkey,  Chile  and  Greece.  The  intervention 
of*  tile  military  into  political  lire  may  be  perceived  differently  in  different 
countries  as  Nvell.  in  -rurkey, Ilor  instance,  Military  Forces  rill  the  gap  of  the 
Left-ol'-flic-Centre  political  institutions  in  such  issues  as  the  preservation  of  the 
secular  system  and  are  supported  by  the  ordinary  people,  while  elsewhere  an 
intervcittion  by  tile  military  part  of  the  society  would  be  considered  as  an 44 
unwelcome,  if  not  larnentable,  event  as  in  most  countries  such  an  event  would 
terminate  democracy  rather  than  keeping  it  in  good  working  order.  Yet,  one 
may  not  argue  that  Turkish  democracy  isn't  working  as  well  as  Italian  or 
Spanish  democracies  because  it  is  different  as  it  bears  a  different  mould  due  to 
the  historical  evaluation  of  Turkish  social  structure. 
There6ore.  to  l'ollow  the  ideas  of  those  like  Lefwich  or  Geddes  and  to  assume 
that  there  is  only  one  tibiquitous  and  ornnipresent  concept  of  democracy  and 
consequently  there  has  to  be  a  single  pattern  of  dcrnocratisation  to  be  followed 
is  incorrect  depcilding  on  the  differentiation  of  socio-historical  backgrounds  of 
differcrit  countries.  Secondly,  the  economic  history  of  different  nations  and 
differcm  states  may  create  discordant  economic  and  social  structures  at  the  end 
and  these  may  require  special  mechanisms  to  deal  with  their  own  problems.  If 
one  subscribes  to  the  line  or  thought  ravoured  by  tile  Dependency  School 
which  includes  such  names  as  Immanuel  Wallerstein  and  llcnrique  Cardoso 
(see  earlier  discussion  of  tile  Dependency  theorists)  one  may  claim  that  rrorn 
thc  16"'  century  onwards,  the  World  economy  saw  the  rise  of  Capitalism47  and 
since  then  three  main  groups  of  countries  exist,  these  being  countries  of  tile 
Core.  ofthe  Periphery  and  of  the  Scmi-Periphery.  While  the  Core  has  been  the 
imperialistic  cciltre  which  dominated  and  exploited  the  resources,  of  the 
Periphery.  tile  Semi-Periphery  has  been  a  middle  unit  between  the  two  which 
neither  exploits  nor  is  exploited  enough  to  be  in  either  category.  Tile 
devc1opment  or  industrial  relations,  of  the  urban-rUral  balance  in  the  society, 
other  demographic  factors  from  the  rate  of  literacy  to  the  GNP  per  capita  are 
'17  For  claborate  diSCLISSiOll  Of  tile  issue  of  tile  rise  of  Capitalism,  see  Immanuel  Wallerstein's  Tile 
Politics  of'World  Economy  (Cambridge,  1984)  and  The  Capitalist  World  Economy  (Cambridge,  1979). 45 
all  affectcd  by  the  economic  role  a  country  plays.  The  variations  in  the 
economic  development  in  different  parts  of  tile  World  therefore  creates 
different  economic  models,  differing  modes  of  production  or  differing 
ownership  over  the  nicans  of  production.  In  the  end,  the  differences  in 
economic  structure  are  to  affect  the  formation  of  democratic  institutions  as 
well  as  their  authority  over  the  society.  The  class  structures,  the  stage  of 
Capitalist  developnicrit,  the  social  oricritation  towards  ownership  affcct  the 
dcniocratic  strUcture  as  parts  or  the  great  social  jigsaw  that  they  play  ail 
important  role  within. 
A  third  I'actor  that  influences  the  democratic  development  of  a  given  country  is 
its  gcopolitical  position.  It  nlay  be  influential  in  both  domestic  and 
international  scale.  Domestically,  the  geographical  necessities  may  dictate  the 
size  ofthe  cities,  the  econornic  or  political  prestige  of  a  given  city  or  region 
over  others  and  may  also  be  influciltial  in  terms  of  the  dcfining  the  borders  of 
constituencies.  On  tile  other  hand,  tile  influence  of  other  states,  either 
neighbOUrs  or  allies  or  competitors  of  a  given  state  is  of  great  importance.  The 
degree  of'  pacific  relations  with  one's  neighbours  as  well  as  strong  political, 
trade  and  security  ties  in  the  international  arena  play  their  parts  in  the 
emergence  of'  the  demand  for  democracy  in  a  country.  Under  constant.  'thrcat 
(rom  a  neighbouring  state  the  mcclianisnis  peculiar  to  liberal  democracy  may 
not  develop  as  freely  and  rapidly  as  in  a  country  situated  in  a  peaceful 
environment.  A  radical  regime  change  as  experienccd.  by  the  Central-East 
European  countrics  in  the  wake  of  the  World  War  11,  or,  or  the  limitations 
imposed  oil  the  capability  of  action  of  Finland  at  tile  Cold  War  Era  are 46 
cxampics  or  the  strong  impact  created  by  foreign  intervention  or  threat  of 
intervention  to  a  country's  political  development. 
As  a  result  of*  the  social,  historical,  economic  and  geopolitical  factors  affecting 
its  historical  development,  a  country  may  undergo  a  very  diflercnt 
devc1opilicilt  process  compared  to  another  country  which  also  experiences  a 
democratic  facclift.  Consequently,  it  can  be  argued  that  a  single  mould  of 
democracy  and  of  democratisation  is  unsustainable  and  is  an  attempt  in  the 
wrong  direction.  To  see  the  incompatibility  of  the  two  different  types  of  social 
transilorniation,  one  needs  to  analysc  the  developments  that  took  place  in  these 
regions  and  the  infrastructure  that  sustained  or  prevented  the  transforniation. 
Such  ail  analysis  seeks  to  clarify  why  the  concept  of  legitimacy  of  a  regime  is 
as  important  as  the  concomitant  liberalisation  proccsses.  To  understand  the 
importance  and  the  modern  context  of  the  concept  of  legitimacy,  one  must 
clarify  that  each  and  every  region  and  state  on  earth  has  its  own  political, 
economic  and  social  balances,  and  that  a  general  rule  is  not  applicable  to  all 
states  oil  earth  regardless  of  their  backgrounds.  Further  discussion  of  the 
sulýjcct  with  a  comparative  study  will  take  place  in  Chapter  4  of  the  thesis. 47 
Figure  I.  I.  Different  Approaches  for  Democratisation  and  Legitimacy: 
Modernist  School  (Rostow,  Pye,  Bell,  et  al.  ):  model  industrial  country-+ 
modernising  country  copies  model-).  industrialisation-+  social 
niodernisation->  democracy-+  legitimate  government. 
Modernist  School  (S.  Huntington):  waves  of  democracy  and  waves  of  fall  of 
democracy->  individual  countries  respond  to  wave  pattem->  legitimate 
political  orders. 
Dependency  School  (Cardoso,  Wallerstein)  (international  Scale):  core 
comitries->  core-  periphery  intcraction-4  periphery  follows  the  core-> 
legitimacy. 
Dependency  School  (Donicstic  Scale):  Core  countries->  core-pcriplicry 
interaction->  intra-clite  struggle  for  power  in  periphery-4  legitimacy. 
Isolated  System-1  (Weber):  leader/charisma;  or  tradition/lcgal;  or 
systemichnstitutional  efrect  on  society-+  legitimacy. 
Isolated  System  -2  (Communist):  proletariat  leads  nation  through  Communist 
Party->  Party  assumes  vanguard  role->  Party  sclf-lcgitirniscs->  legitimacy. 
Isola(ed  System-3  (Ilabermas):  individuals  communicate->  civil  society 
creates  a  bridge->  economy  and  polity  realms  intcract-)ý  legitimacy. 
I  nteractive  System  (Cold  War):  bipolarity  emerges->  countries  form  blocs-> 
individual  countries  abide  by  alliance  ties-+  domestic  regirnes  receive  support 
1'rom  bloc  leaders-)ý  temporary  coercive  legitimacy. 
Interactive  System  (post-Cold  War):  US/LJN  establishes  main  principles  of 
the  systcm->  US/UN  forces  the  principles  on  individual  countries  when 
justifiable->  forced  dcmocratisation  and  human  rights  agenda  dominates 
individual  countries->  forced  legitimacy.  I 
IV.  TOWARDS  A  NEW  DEFINITION  OF  LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy,  in  its  current  perception,  then,  is linked  to  the  international  as  well 
-is  domestic  elements  or  political  change.  As  a  political  conccpt,  throughout 
history.  it  was  generally  accepted  as  an  agency  or  dornestie  politics,  but, 
especially  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  it  relates  to  the 48 
international  changes  as  well.  The  shift  in  the  scope  of  the  concept  is 
significant  since  it  points  out  to  the  fact  that  the  constantly  transmuting  nature 
ol'the  concept  in  history  still  exists. 
The  events  that  take  place  in  the  late  twentieth  century,  therefore,  may  lead  us 
into  a  new  definition  of  the  concept  of  legitimacy  which  is  affected  by 
intunational  events,  domestic  needs,  peculiarities  of  any  given  society  in 
%Nhich  legitimacy  is  perceived  as  a  matter  of  concern,  and  by  tile  historical  and 
contemporary  political  practices.  SLIch  a  new  definition  will  also  lead  to  a  new 
evaluation  ol'the  concept.  As  a  result,  legitimacy  will  then  become  a  subject  of 
international  politics  and  this  will  lead  to  further  exploration  of  the  concept. 
This  thesis  aims  at  emphasising  the  international  dimension  embedded  in  the 
domestic  discussions  or  legitimacy  with  the  help  or  a  case  study.  Further  parts 
of'  the  thesis  will  rocus  on  the  concept  or  legitimacy  in  'opcn'  and  'closed' 
systems  (see  Chaptcr  2),  the  international  elcment  in  the  establishment  and 
continuation  ol'a  political  order  (see  Chapter  3)  as  well  as  domestic  elements 
that  shape  tile  legitimacy  ora  political  order  (see  Chapters  3,4,5and  6). 49 
CHAPTER  TWO 
DEMOCRATISATION  AND  LEGITIMACY 
1.  DEMOCRACY,  DEMOCRATISATION,  LEGITIMACY 
A.  Three  Important  Concepts: 
Democracy.  democratisation  and  legitimacy  are  three  political  concepts  in  very 
Frequent  use  since  the  beginning  of  the  de-colonisation  process  in  the  mid-20"' 
CCIltUry.  These  three  concepts  -not  necessarily,  but  usually-  accompany  the 
concepts  ol'  liberalism,  liberalisation  and  privatisation  in  the  field  of 
economics.  After  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  tile  transformation  of  the  fornier 
Fastern  Bloc  countries  into  libcral  democracics,  these  threc,  political  conccpts 
tire  ol'great  importance  in  the  establishment  of  the  new  political  order.  As  the 
Fast  E.  -m-opean  transformation  represents  a  shifl  towards  both  liberal  economics 
and  liberal  democratic  politics,  there  is  a  strong  association  of  the  two  sides, 
despite  the  fiact  that  conditions  in  favpur  of  free  trade  have  not  always  been 
associated  with  political  liberalisation  and  dernocratisation  as  in  the  ýase  of 
11cople's  Republic  or  China  or  in  the  Latin  American  and  South  European 
dictatorships  during  the  Cold  War. 
B.  The  Cold  War  Environment: 
A  change  in  the  importance  attributed  to  the  question  or  rcginic  legitimacy 
took  place  sinlUltancously  and  as  a  result  of  the  regime  transforniat  i  oils  since 
late  1980s.  Legitimacy  of  a  regime  has  been  seen  in  accordance  with  its 50 
collaboration  with  one  or  the  sides  or  the  Cold  War.  As  long  as  a  oppressive 
regime  was  to  continue  its  tics  with  tile  leading  reginics  of  the  Cold  War  blocs, 
it  %kould  reccivc  military  and  international  political  assistance  to  oppress  its 
subjects  /  citizens,  while  it  would  receive  economic  aid  to  be  used  as  social 
bribery  to  sustain  public  support.  After  the  collapse  of  the  bipolar  world 
structure.  the  political  oppression  and  economic  aid  have  vanished  giving  way 
to  a  democracy-orientcd  structure  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s.  During  the 
post-Nvar  period.  until  mid-1970s  when  the  Difenle  process  accelerated  and 
President  Carter  of  the  United  States  (US)  placed  particular  emphasis  oil  the 
hunian  rights  issue,  corruption  or  illegitimacy  of  a  political  order  was  taken  as 
a  secondary  part  of  world  political  agenda.  There  were  indeed  revolutions, 
regime  changes  and  rebellions  during  thc  Cold  War,  but  very  few  of  these 
created  dramatic  impact  on  tile  general  political  polarisation.  Such  key 
COLIntries  as  Chile  were  'protected'  against  regime  changes,  and  in  such  cases 
-is  Nicaragua  or  Angola,  civil  wars  Nvere  encouraged  if  not  initiated  to  keep  a 
country  within  one  ol'thc  two  political  blocs. 
Fhe  11111  ofthe  Sliall  Pahlavi  regime  in  Iran  was  the  greatest  exception  to  this 
gencralisation.  It  took  place  when  the  human  rights  issue,  rather  than  alliance 
ties,  was  paramount  in  international  political  agenda.  In  the  casc  of  Ira4.  tlic 
corruption  and  oppression  or  the  ruling  political  order  provoked  masses  to 
rebcl  against  it.  This  very  obvious  example  of  a  regime's  perception  as 
illegitimate  remained  as  an  exception  to  tile  general  international  actions 
concerning  legitimacy.  Most  other  civil  unrcst  and  coups  d'dtat  during  the 
Cold  War  period  remained  intra-clite  connicts  as  the  political  order 
experienced  change.  These  ncvcr  achieved  to  be  movements  to  dramatically 51 
disorient  systemic  affiliations  of  a  given  country  as  an  agent  of  world  political 
system.  The  case  of  Iran,  in  which  tile  country  shifted  from  the  role  of  co- 
operative  ally  to  possible  exporter  of  revolution,  remained  an  individual  case 
(ILII-ing  the  Cold  War  in  which  a  country  not  only  went  through  a  political 
regime  change  but  also  changed  its  international  political  orientation. 
C.  The  Concept  of  Democracy  and  the  Idea  of  Modernisation: 
Until  the  rise  ol'the  anti-colonialist  movements  in  late  1950s,  democracy  itself 
was  taken  as  a  mode  of  government  for  a  limited  part  of  the  globe.  While  at  tile 
turn  ofthe  century  the  number  of  countries  ruled  by  a  political  order  based  on 
democratic  principles  was  a  mere  fraction  of  all  countries,  from  1950s  onwards 
flicre  has  bcen  a  drarnatic  inereasc  in  flic  numbcr  of  the  countries  ruled  by 
democracy.  based  oil  the  idea  of  universal  suffrage.  Tile  de-colonisation 
process  and  the  ctilcrgcnce  of  the  Non-Aligned  Nations  movement  as  an 
important  actor  or  international  politics  affected  tile  situation.  Tile  emergence 
of  the  idea  of  one  ivorld  based  on  the  concepts  of  an  inlegivied  world  economy 
and  hence  on  thefi-ee  Ira(le  pi-inciple  took  shape  with  the  Bretton  Woods 
convention  of'  1944.  This  meant  that  tile  Western  powers  began  to  assume  a 
role  in  Nhaping  or  re-shaping  the  cconomic  and  political  attributcs  of  their 
1,01-iner  Colonies. 
D.  School  of  Modernisation: 
This  changc  of'  policy  in  the  West  caused  parallel  changes  in  the  social 
scienccs.  A  group  of  social  scientists  labelled  as  the  School  of  Alodei-nisalion 
cxemplified  by  such  namcs  as  L.  Pye.  D.  Rustow,  R.  Rostow  and  S. 
Huntington  emerged.  According  to  this  school  of  thought,  economic 
liberalisation  would  cause  libcralisation  in  other  sectors  of  the  society.  As  a 52) 
reSLIlt.  the  traditional  and  rural  parts  of  a  society  would  give  way  to  modem 
and  Lirban  values  and  the  society's  modernisation  Would  cause  a  need  for 
liberal  democracy  based  on  representation  and  individual  freedom  as  well  as 
economic  liberalism.  Regime  legitimacy  would  be  obtained  by  reforms  from 
the  top  at  the  beginning,  but  in  time,  as  the  society  develops,  this  would  give 
rise  to  a  public  dernand  for  reforms  and  democracy  and  hence  legitimacy 
%kould  be  gained  by  popular  support  as  well. 
I  lowever.  when  one  looks  closely  to  the  work  of  those  in  this  school  of 
thought.  Such  as  Samuel  Huntington  and  Lucien  Pye,  it  may  be  argued  that  tile 
main  aim  was  to  justify  tile  economic  and  political  choices  of  the  industrially 
developed  countries.  Such  a  justification  might  create  a  need  for  tile  mostly 
newly-independent  industrially  developing  countries  to  follow  tile  same 
patterns  ofpolitical  and  social  development  based  on  tile  developed  countries' 
experience.  As  a  result  of  this,  the  relationships  between  colonial  powers  and 
their  Cornier  colonies  would  develop  in  terms  of  indUstrialisation  and  trade 
relations.  Tile  necessity  felt  by  each  side  to  the  other  would  prevent  any 
political  conflict.  The  issue  of  legitimacy  was  treated  as  a  secondary  issue 
compared  to  tile  economic  openness  and  political  alliliation  of  tile  newly- 
independent  Countries.  What  the  members  of  the  Modernisation  School,  'were 
looking  11or  was  legitimation  rroni  the  top  and  not  the  rule  of  those  who  are 
secii  as  legitimate  by  the  public  in  these  countries.  This  approach  depends  on 
the  idea  that  people  From  a  specific  country  or  a  from  a  particular  group  of 
countries  have  superior  knowledge.  experience  and  intuition  than  others  which 
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E.  Dernocratisation  and  Legitimacy: 
Legitimacy  is  an  age-old  concept,  existing  since  Antiquity.  However,  its 
nicaning  has  changed  over  tinle.  Thus,  tile  term  did  not  definc  tile  same  type  of 
relationships  with  the  same  type  of  parties  involved  throughout  history.  To 
illustrate  the  idea.  an  example  may  be  given  on  the  concept's  change  in  time: 
Bel'ore  the  beginning  of  the  Ddtcnte  period,  the  idea  of  regime  legitimacy  was 
not  considered  -neither  by  the  Students  of  political  science  nor  by  the  ruling 
classes  all  around  the  globe-  as  a  major  concept.  With  the  beginning  of  Ddtcnte 
process  and  especially  after  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics(USSR)'s 
abandonment  of  the  Brezhnev  Doctrine  in  late  1980s  the  issue  of  regime 
credibility  and  legitimacy  in  domestic  terms  began  to  regain  importance.  As 
the  political  flocus  shifted  from  the  needs  of  a  bipolar  world  structure  to  tile 
necds  ol'individual  countries  and  their  respective  populations  legitimacy  from 
below  has  become  an  issue  of  political  scicnce  oncc  again. 
Hie  casing  ol'  international  tension  between  the  superpowers  led  to  tile 
reduction  of'ccononlic.  military  and  hence  political  aid  to  individual  political 
orders.  As  a  reSUlt,  the  number  or  countries  governed  by  sclr-lcgitimising 
regimes  which  rorce  their  legitimacy  from  the  top  decrcascd.  Cuba,  North 
Korea  and  People's  Republic  of  China  are  amongst  the  few  such  countries. 
Legitimacy  has  to  be  considered  at  the  moment  as  a  key  concept  for  the 
transitory  regimes  from  either  authoritarian  or  totalitarian  systems  to 
representative  liberal  democratic  systems.  As  there  is  no  direct  intervention 
from  the  OLItside  forces,  these  transitory  regimes  have  to  receive  the  approval 
ol'  their  citizens  if*  the  transition  is  to  be  completed  successfully.  If  a  newly 
emerging  political  order  fails  to  gain  public  approval  and  support  beyond  its 54 
being  considered  as  legally  legitimate,  it  will  fail  to  be  recogniscd  as 
legitimate  as  a  system.  and  neither  social  nor  political  nor  economic  stability  is 
likely  to  be  maintained  in  such  a  transitory  rcgimc. 
In  the  international  scale,  the  legitimacy  of  a  regime  as  a  concept  and  the 
means  of  legitimation  of  a  regime  have  transmuted  as  well.  While  once  a 
regime's  legitimacy  mightl  be  cstablishcd  by  tile  means  of  oppression  tile 
regime  might  use,  tile  main  focus  is  now  on  the  ruling  reginle's  popularity  in 
the  opinion  of*  the  public  it  ruics,  and  on  its  commitmcnt  to  such  issucs  as 
human  rights  and  frecdonis  and  on  such  secondary  issues  as  corruption.  As  a 
result.  the  issue  of  legitimacy  is  emerging  in  a  different  manner  than  in 
comparison  to  the  last  flour  to  five  decades. 
A  considerable  transition  that  the  change  in  the  concept  of  legitimacy  may  be 
observed  is  experienced  in  Eastern  ELIropc  as  well  as  Latin  America  which  go 
thrOLIgh  a  period  of  transition  and  transformation  since  the  mid-1980s  (this 
issue  will  be  analysed  in  dctail  in  further  parts  of  the  thesis).  The  newly 
cstablislied  democracies  of  Eastern  Europe  are  still  to  complete  a  major  pliase 
or  transilormation.  The  importancc  of  the  stability  and  comnlitnicnt  of  thcsc 
regimes  to  liberalism  and  to  democracy,  and  the  fact  that  the  ancien  rigime  in 
these  countries  were  delegitimised  and  brought  down  on  the  grounds  ýf  the 
popular  will  Im  liberal  democracy  and  liberal  economy,  brings  forth  the 
concepts  ollegitimacy  and  legitimation  as  key  determinants  in  the  current  and 
I'LItUre  developincrits  in  that  part  of  the  world. 
11.  LEGITIMACY  IN  ISOLATED  AND  INTERACTIVE  SYSTEMS 
To  analyse  the  legitimacy  in  a  nation-state  in  the  late  20"'  century  requires  a 
combination  ol'dirtlerent  approaches  to  the  issue  of  legitimacy.  Since  a  nation- 55 
state  is  also  a  part  or  the  international  political  system,  the  need  of  legitimation 
flor  a  political  order  ruling  in  a  given  nation-state  is  of  a  dual  structure  as  the 
issue  is  linked  to  two  different  yet  interacting  levels  of  stimulus  and  response. 
The  first  layer  is  the  domestic  environment  in  which  the  regime  interacts  with 
its  SLIIýIects  /  citizens,  and  is  responsible  to  society,  while  at  the  same  time 
placing  (Icniands  upon  it.  Tlic  second  layer,  however.  is  comprised  of  the 
international  community  and  hence  of  the  regime's  responsibility  towards  the 
international  community.  This  twofold  connection  makes  the  system's 
Functioning  more  complicated  and  the  analysis  of  the  events  related  to  reginie 
legitimacy  harder  for  any  scholar  of  political  science. 
The  main  problem  and  tile  main  difference  is  that  most  political  scientists  who 
I*ollo%v  the  guidelines  set  by  Max  Weber  -frorn  Fcrenc  1-cher  to  Leslie  Holmes- 
cither  totally  ignore  or  reducc  up  to  a  grcat  extent  the  importance  of  the 
international  dinicnsion.  Consequently,  events  are  observed  and  conclusions 
tire  drawn  within  an  isolated  systcrn,  while  politics  in  the  World  cannot  be 
analysed  within  a  closed,  isolated  system.  Such  an  approach  may  lead  to  such 
misitillornied  perceptions  as  the  approach  of  the  Modernisation  School 
diSCLI.  ssed  above,  or  as  the  novel  approaches  towards  the  systemic  changes  in 
the  Fast  European  region  within  tile  last  decade.  Isolating  tile  developments  in 
politics  in  general  and  in  relation  to  tile  issue  of'reginle  legitimacy  in  particular 
to  an  isolated  system  succeeds  only  in  creating  an  illusion.  However,  the  same 
argument  would  be  truc-for  identifying  the  international  influmice  as  the  key 
Rictor  in  a  country's  regime  change.  Tile  dirremices  made  by  domestic  and 
international  I'actors  are  all  components  of  a  larger  scherne  and  as  will  be  seen 56 
below.  the  approaches  towards  an  isolated  system  and  an  interactive  system  are 
radically  different. 
John  Williams  draws  attention  to  this  fact  and  tries  to  reconcile  the  difference 
between  the  international  and  domestic  levels  of  legitimate  action  by  building 
on  the  works  of  such  important  Neo-Realist  scholars  of  International  Politics 
as  I  lans  J.  Morgenthau,  llcdlcy  Bull,  and  Kenneth  N.  Waltz.  Williams  bascs 
his  argument  oil  tile  idea  that  presence  of  order  in  the  international  state  system 
is  the  prior  value.  Order  is  legitimised  as  a  primary  value  in  international 
politics  cither  by  the  anticipation  of  statesmen  that  it  must  be  so  as  Morgenthau 
clainis:  or.  by  tile  need  of  the  states  to  agree  upon  some  rules  so  that  they  can 
co-exist  within  an  anarchic  structure  as  Bull  argues;  or,  by  the  distribution  of 
capabilities  aniong  the  nicnibers  of  the  system  as  Waltz  defcndS48. 
In  either  case,  order  is  accepted  as  a  ccntral  issue  of  international  politics  and 
John  Williams  argues  that  there  is  a  connection  bctween  the  domestic  social 
conlract  Nvhich  grants  Icgitimacy  to  the  rule  of  the  rulers  in  a  given  country  and 
the  foreign  relations  pursued  by  this  country,  for  they  both  are  linked  primarily 
to  tile  salle  existence  or  a  country's  citizens  within  given  territorial  borders 
without  Ilear  of  an  aggression  to  their  security.  I  Ic  agrees  with  Martin  Wight 
that  the  legitimacy  or a  government  depends  "on  its  ability  to  serve  the  people 
who  are  the  basis  of  its  sovereigniy.  "49  However,  in  such  periods  of  World 
history  as  tile  Cold  War  cra,  a  government's  ability  to  serve  its  people  may  be 
replaced  by  its  ability  to'servc  its  allies  and  tile  fear  of  actual  war.  Under  such 
circumstances.  tile  rear  or  war  and/or  invasion  leads  to  the  perceived  need  of 
-19  John  Williams,  Le-gitim-acy  in  International  Rclations  and  the  Rise  and  Fall  of  Yugoslavia,  p.  16. 
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effective  and  excessive  territorial  control  and  thereflare  governments  which 
may  provide  this  but  nothing  much  else,  such  as  tile  Pinoclict  regime  in  Chile 
or  the  Grcck  Junta  or  early  1970s,  can  be  seen  as  legitimate  by  their 
international  allies  and  instead  or  basing  their  legitimacy  on  popular  support, 
flicy  may  build  it  on  the  need  for  international  order.  According  to  Williams 
who  1161lows  the  ideas  of,  Martin  Wight,  it  is  a  need  that  appeared  after  a 
transformation  was  experienced  in  tile  international  politics  with  the 
replacement  of  the  very  limited  elite  politicians  who  decided  on  tile 
international  affairs  by  a  far  greater  number  of  elite  who  were  members  of 
peripheral  opposition  before  the  dccolonisation  cra'O  on  the  one  hand  and 
during  the  rise  orthe  bipolar  state  structure. 
A.  Legitimacy  In  An  isolated  System: 
Taken  as  a  single  agent  or  politics,  the  modern  nation-state  is  an  isolated 
system.  In  ,  in  isolated  system,  the  administration  of  power  is  dependent  upon 
hicrarchical  principles.  However,  even  in  such  a  system  tile  role  played  by 
illdividuals  and  by  their  decisions  is  important.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the 
consent  ol'  individuals  concerning  leadership  choice  is  a  prerequisite  of  the 
proper  Functioning  of  tile  system.  As  a  result  of  this  requirement,  every  modern 
political  system.  From  a  dictatorship  to  a  multiparty  democracy  becomes 
soniewhat  equalitarian-horizontal  as  well  as  hi  crarch  i  cal  -vertical  in  nature. 
A  political  system  is  therellore  based  on  collective  goals.  It  is  also  based  on  tile 
organisation  ill  order  to  attain  these  collective  goals,  or,  ill  other  words,  on  the 
organisational  capability  of  tile  rulers  in  a  given  political  system.  Talcott 
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Parsons  argLICS  that,  legitimacy,  resource  mobilisation  to  implement  policies, 
and  the  associational  subsystem  which  mobiliscs  the  constituent  support  and 
doci-mination  of  tile  policies  to  be  implemented  are  the  three  pedestals  of  a 
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political  System  . 
In  such  a  framework,  tile  legitimacy  of  the  political  system 
NVOUld  depend  oil  the  elements  under  its  control  as  well  as  its  public 
perception.  That  is  duc  to  the  fact  that  the  political  domain  is  responsible  for: 
a)  preparing  and  enacting  tile  laws  and  the  basic  setting  that  deffiles 
politically.  legally  and  therclbre  socially  acceptable  norms  and  rules.  By  this 
po%%cr  over  legislation,  it  legally  legitimises  all  other  social  powers; 
b)  legitimising  itseir  as  well  as  other  social  powers  through  the  same  methods 
as  above-  and, 
0  controlling  (lie  organised  coercive  forces  or  tile  State,  i.  e.  tile  police,  the 
arnied  11orces  and  tile  secret  service.  which  may  contribute  to  legitimacy  of  the 
political  system,  but  which  may,  in  case  of  misuse,  breech  all  legitimacy  the 
system  en.  ijoys 
52 
. 
With  these  functions  being  fullilled,  the  mechanism  that  govems  the  state 
creates  the  grounds  of  legitimacy  for  itself  and  for  the  political  system  that  it  is 
a  part  of.  With  tile  systern's  and  the  rulers'  legitimation,  the  opposition  and  all 
I 
other  elements  of  the  system  are  also  legitimised  within  the  boundaries  of  tile 
isolated  system.  The  exception  to  this  proposition,  of  course,  would  be  the 
existence  of  an  opposition  of  revolutionary  nature,  in  which  case  one  may  talk 
about  a  legitimacy  crisis  11or  both  the  rulers  and  the  political  system  itself  as  the 
51  Falcott  Parsons,  L)L).  cit.,  pp.  338-339- 
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opposition  tries,  to  delegitimise  simultaneously  both  the  government  and  the 
svStelli. 
1.  The  Liberal-Democratic  System: 
At  the  systemic  level,  the  Western  liberal-deinocracy  bases  itself  on  two  niýjor 
realins  11or  self'-legitiniation.  The  first  of  these  two  is  political  legitimation  and 
the  sccond  is  the  econornic  legitimation.  As  the  nicans  of  legitimation,  the 
liberal  Licinocratic  system  employs  elections  for  tile  legislative  organs  of  the 
country  in  which  the  head  or  government  will  also  be  chosen 
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.  Using  the 
elcctions  as  the  main  basis,  the  systcni  secures  the  public  consent  for  its 
clements:  By  letting  a  majority  of  people  in  each  constituency  decide  who  will 
represent  thern  in  the  parliament,  tile  system  gives  people  a  relative  control 
over  the  laws  which  will  be  enacted.  For  the  same  reason,  they  would  show 
consent  and  obedience  to  the  laws  as  they  are  prepared  and  enacted  by  their 
representatives.  That  would  legitimise  the  existence  of  tile  legislative  organ  as 
well  as  the  existence  of  the  govuriment,  formcd  either  by  the  political  party 
which  achieved  the  greatest  amount  of  votes  or  a  coalition  of  parties,  hence 
some\Nhat  loosely  reprcsenting  the  public  will.  Within  that  system,  the 
previously  mentioned  three  responsibilities  or  the  political  domain,  narnely 
legitimising  the  laws  and  the  systern,  self-legitimising  and  legitiniisifig  the 
existence  and  the  use  of  state's  organised  coercive  rorccs  are  achievable.  The 
politieal  key  is  thcreflore  to  convince  the  people  that  they  -at  least  their 
nuýjority.  through  the  electoral  system-  are  tile  decision-makers  in  respect  of 
sysmilic  dcvelopincilts  from  legislation  to  foreign  policy. 
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I  lowever.  the  liberal-denlocratic  system  requires  economic  legitimation,  too. 
BV  establishing  the  principle  that  private  ownership  and  private  decisions  upon 
economic  activities  such  as  investment,  consumption  and  employment  within  a 
rormally  Crec  market  are  the  cornerstones  of  the  system,  the  economic  part  is 
legitimised.  'rhis  somewhat  cxistentialist  approach  to  individual  dccisions  in 
economic  issues  is  breached  by  tile  state  intervention  in  the  market.  State 
intervention  is  explained  in  relation  to  its  protection  or  its  citizens'  rights  as 
the  state  is  presented  as  "flie  ultimate  guardian  of  public  interest 
... 
In  effect,  tile 
contemporary  state  undenvrites  the  legitimacy  of  capitalism  by  ensuring  its 
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social  acceptability  as  well  as  its  legal  validity"' 
Fhe  liberal-deniocratic  system,  thercfbre,  has  its  justification  in  both  political 
and  economic  nicans  based  on  popular  and  individual  choice.  It  offers  different 
choices  in  terms  of  ideologies  and  economic  orientations.  The  choice  within 
the  system  is  then  made  by  individuals  eithcr  voting  in  favour  or  against  a 
political  party.  preflerring  a  political,  ideological,  or  industrial  product  to 
another.  or  by  choosing  or  declining  tile  alternatives  they  are  granted  by  tile 
system.  Although  the  variety  of  tile  alternatives  in  both  econornic  and  polifleal 
fields  may  vary  according  to  tile  capabilities  of  the  country,  the  existence  of  a 
I 
variety  ol'clioices.  or  the  illusion  that  there  is  a  variety  of  choiccs-55,  available 
I'or  the  individUal  decision-maker  contributes  to  the  legitimacy  of  the  liberal 
democratic  system.  Therefore,  the  liberal  democratic  system  has  to  provide  to 
5"iliki.,  1).  16-1. 
55  Political  choice  may  vary  in  terms  or  ideological  inclination  of  a  nation,  the  international  political 
condilions  surrounding  a  given  state  and  the  capability  of  the  I*ollowcrs  of  a  political  view  or  an  L-  ideology  to  promote  their  cause.  Economic  choice  may  be  limitcd  in  a  given  country  by  the  level  of 
industrialkation,  Foreign  trade  balance.  international  relations.  domestic  econornic  indicators,  and 
illdiVidUill  pi-O'crences.  As  for  the  illusion  of  the  availability  of  choice,  in  a  country  where  85010  of  voters 61 
self-legitimise.  That  is  true  in  terrns  of  economy,  so  the  system  at  least  seems 
to  believe  in  competition.  In  terms  of  politics,  too,  the  competitive  character  of 
the  system  is  guaranteed  by  elite  competition.  To  remain  legitimate,  the  power- 
holders  have  to  accept  (lie  existence  of  diffiering  groups  of  intellectuals  which 
would  proVide  a  spectrum  of  elites  to  create  an  alternative  to  the  rulers  at  a 
givcn  momcnt  through  otýjcctive  c1cctoral  process.  Such  a  variety  of  elites  may 
be  insignificant  as  some  may  never  be  favoured  by  the  niýjority  of  the  public 
while  some  others  would  be  favoured,  yet,  one  may  always  refer  to  such  a 
variety  of'choice.  At  this  point,  K.  Newton  states  that 
"Jal  large  number  of  elites  per  se  is  not  a  necessary 
condition  or  a  democratic  political  system  except  in  sofar  as  it 
is  recognized  that  there  is  rarely  a  single  'general  will'  in  the 
society  but  a  large  number  of  varying  and  conflicting  wills 
instead.  Therellore  it  is  necessary  for  society  to  sustain  a  large 
number  orelites  capable  of  expressing  and  defending  the  full 
range  orpolitical  demands  in  a  society.  A  plurality  of  elites  is 
-in  indication  that  society  might  be  organized  into  a  large 
IMIllber  of  different  groups,  each  of  which  is  capable  of 
dellending  its  own  material  and  ideal  interests  against  the 
threat  of  encroachment  of  other  groups.  Similarly,  competing 
elites  are  not  a  necessary  condition  of  democracy  insofar  as 
political  competition  is  a  technique  by  which  accountability 
orrulers  to  tile  ruled  can  be  maintained.  Tile  importance  of  a 
pluralist  political  system  lies  not  in  tile  number  or  competitive 
nature  orelites  but  in  the  extent  to  which  elites  are  responsive 
and  responsible  to  tile  non-elites  ..... 
A  society  in  which  elites 
are  highly  responsive  and  responsible  to  non-clites  is  the  end 
product  ora  democratic  pluralist  SyStern.,, 
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In  such  a  system.  the  political  scheme  itseir,  as  well  as  the  state  concept,  is 
salle  unless  a  delegitimising  factor  jcopardiscs  its  operation  mechanism.  That 
WOUld  tic  possible  ifa,  direct  threat  to  the  individual  fi-cedoms  (e.  g.  frecdom  of 
traditionally  vote  lor  centre-right  parties,  the  existence  of  a  communist  party  is  an  illusion  of  choice  as 
to  vote  for  that  party  will  never  result  in  changes  in  political  system. 62 
speech.  travel.  economic  activity,  right  to  voýe)  or  to  the  power-holders  (e.  g.  a 
coup  d'etat.  invasion  by  another  state)  would  emerge  or  if  the  people  would 
cease  to  believe  in  the  merits  orthe  system  and  in  the  popular  sovereignty  idea. 
Unless  such  cases  materialise,  the  legitimacy  of  the  system  is  intact  while  the 
legitimacy  or  a  given  governnicrit  may  increase  or  decrease  according  to  its 
performance  in  office. 
2.  The  Communist  System: 
The  communist  or  state-socialist  (or,  simply,  socialist)  system,  however, 
difl'ers  in  its  legitimation  bases  from  the  liberal-dcmocratic  system.  Tile 
communist  system  is  again  based  on  political  and  econornic  justifications, 
lioN%cvcr.  the  similarity  does  not  continue  beyond  this  point. 
Politically.  the  system  has  two  main  claims  to  legitimacy.  Primarily,  instead  of 
the  economic  and  political  individual  freedoms,  this  system  empliasises  tile 
equality  principle  among  individuals.  The  claim  of  the  communist  system  is 
that  as  every  man  and  wornan  are  equal,  there  should  be  no  difference  based  on 
social  classes  or  tile  relativity  of  ownership  or property  and  goods  arnong  thern. 
Therel'ore.  the  role  of  (lie  elite  in  the  libcral-dernocratic  society  as  the  actual  or 
potential  leaders  of  the  society  loses  its  importance.  However,  the  society 
needs  a  leading  force.  as  there  is  a  state  and  the  need  of  it  to  be  governed.  In 
this  point.  the  sceond  ground  of  legitimation  for  the  communist  system  enters 
into  the  picture:  Marxist-Leninist  ideology.  This  ideology  claims  to  have 
solved  the  evolution.  of  mankind  in  ternis  of  econornic  and  political 
developments.  Marx  claims  that  that,  passing  through  stagcs,  onc  of  which  is 
capitalism,  the  human  race  would  at  the  end  reach  the  stage  of  communism  in 
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Nkhich  the  state  would  be  obsolete  and  made  redundant.  As  this  ideological 
doctrine  11oresaw  tile  working  class  -tile  prolelarial,  as  tile  main  force  capable 
ol'  overcoming  the  capitalist  modc  or  production  through  an  ultimate 
revolution,  tile  working  class  was  perceived  as  the  leading  part  of  the  society. 
The  Communist  Party.  which  stood  as  a  representative  of  the  proletariat, 
would  make  sure  that  the  transition  would  be  securely  made57.  As  the  working 
class  was  considered  to  be  the  most  progressive  part  of  the  society  and  its 
interests  meant  those  or  the  whole  society,  the  Party  would  be  able  to  protect, 
pui-sue  and  realise  policies  that  would  benefit  the  proletariat  and  the  society 
and  hence  reach  tile  state-rree  era  orcommunism. 
As  the  leadership  of  the  Party  meant  tile  representation  of  tile  pi-olelai-im  and 
the  society.  there  would  be  no  need  for  any  alternatives  or  competitors.  Then, 
there  is  no  need  to  seek  popular  consent  through  elections  as  there  would  be  no 
bct(cr  altcrilative  in  any  individual  or  organised  opposition  as  they  would 
logiudly  contnidict  with  tile  interests  of  tile  Party,  that  is  of  the  proletariat, 
that  is  of'  the  society.  The  show  of  consent,  therefore,  was  to  be  obtained 
through  social  mobilisation,  through  activities  airned  at  thc  ordinary  people. 
Indoctrinafion,  education,  organisation  of  mass  demonstrations  of  support,  and 
oppression  or  any  activity  challenging  the  status  and  the  importance  of  the 
state.  Party,  or  what  the  working  class  was  believed  to  represent  are  tile 
methods  ohnobilisation  (or,  irnmobilisation). 
At  the  economic  level,  too,  the  ideological  difference  is  manifest.  As  the  Party 
ýNliich  is  the  oniniscient  entity  in  the  society,  it  controls  the  economy,  too.  'rhat 
PI).  18-19. 
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task  is  carried  out  by  central  planning  through  administrative  control.  The 
Party  monopoly  in  production  and  ownership  is  legitirnised  through  two 
ideological  clairns:  The  first  clainn  is  that  the  Party  is  the  representative  of  the 
lwolefui-ial,  the  most  progressive  and  hence  the  most  self-aware  part  of  the 
society,  and  thercrore  it  is  capable  of  deciding  for  the  best  interest  of  the 
society.  The  second  claim,  in  parallel  with  the  Marxist-Leninist  ideology,  is 
that  there  is  an  evolutionary  process  in  hurnan  history.  As  the  final  airn  of  the 
progress  is  to  reach  the  state  orcommunism  in  which  people  would  not  have  to 
work  to  satisl'y  their  needs  and  will  have  time  to  develop  themselves,  and  as 
this  aim  is  to  be  reached  by  socialist  system's  evolution  towards  socialism,  the 
process  would  cover  a  long  span  of  time.  A  shortcut  to  reach  the  final  airn  is  to 
allow  the  Party  to  decide  what  is  the  most  productive  method  for  the  society  to 
reach  communism  and  to  let  it  lead  the  way  towards  communism.  This 
engenders  central  planning  which  results  in  a  symbiotic  relationship  between 
tile  government  and  tile  bureaucracy.  Therefore,  while  in  the  libcral-denlocratic 
system  there  is  a  difference  between  tile  state  as  bureaucracy  and  the 
government  as  the  executive  leadership  which  is  elected  to  run  the  state  at  rairs 
in  collaboration  and  in  contact  with  the  bureaucracy,  in  tile  communist  system, 
tile  state  and  the  Communist  Party  have  become  synonymous.  Tile  burca,  Uicratic 
inechanisin  developed  a  direct  link  with  tile  Party  as  key  bureaucratic  positions 
were  to  be  occupied  by  party  apparatchiks  at  corresponding  railk. 
In  such  ail  ideologically-led  system,  both  economic  and  political  legitimation 
are  based  upon  the  systern's  ideological  indoctrination  of  the  people  and  on  a 
social  conlruct  based  on  (lie  belief  in  the  bright  ruture  of  communism  and  on 
tile  txý,  tj  choices  of  consent  or  oppression.  Within  such  conditions,  tile 65 
communist  system  seems  to  be  more  prone  to  a  legitimacy  crisis  than  the 
liberal-democratic  system.  The  reason  for  such  a  crisis  in  the  communist 
system  is  that  the  state  is  far  more  involved  in  economic-,  than  the  liberal  state. 
Failure  in  economy.  JUrgen  liabermas  argues,  questions  the  rationality  of  tile 
system  and  licnce  creates  a  legitimacy  crisis 
58.  I-labermas  focuses  on  tile 
fili  I  Ul-CS  in  the  constrLICtiOll  or  the  system,  arguing  the  system  is  not  rational  and 
therellore  a  legitimacy  crisis  is  inevitable.  If  not  aimed  at  the  system  in  general, 
the  outcome  ol'a  legitimacy  crisis  based  on  popular  disillusionment  would  be 
the  resignation  ol'the  government  and  elections  which  would  probably  bring 
the  government  in  power  for  the  following  term  in  the  liberal  system. 
Meanwhile.  neither  the  state,  nor  tile  I  iberal  -democratic  system  of  government 
nor  the  nation-state  would  encounter  any  challenges  to  their  existence  in  such  a 
crisis  in  terms  ol'their  legitimacy. 
Such  a  claim  would  follow  that  there  is  a  connection  between  the  state 
intcrvention  to  economy  and  the  rulers'  legitimacy.  In  tlic  communist  system. 
as  the  state  is  totally  in  control  or  the  economy,  then  the  system  appears  to  be 
more  prone  to  legitimacy  crises.  Moreover,  as  the  Party  and  the  state  are  in  a 
symbiotie  relationship,  the  crisis  would  affect  all  the  system.  Consequently,  the 
St,  l(C  ill  the  COIIIIIlLllliSt  system  would  lose  its  purpose,  its  raison  d'&rc,  due  to 
its  inability  to  respond  to  public  dcmand  in  econornics. 
lowever.  as  it  is  true  that  there  is  a  close  link  between  the  Party  involvement 
in  tile  economic  lille  and  a  possible  threat  to  tile  Icgitimacy  of  the  Party  and  the 
state.  this  link  may  only  be  established  by  grave  economic  failure  by  the 
central-planning  administration  which  wound  lead  to  be  backed  by  a  total  loss 
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or  political  legitimacy.  As  the  systern  is  based  on  the  Marxist-Leninist 
idcology  and  thcrefore  foresees  the  Party  playing  a  vanguard  position  and, 
more  importantly.  as  there  are  no  feasible  alternatives  to  the  rulers,  such  a 
legitimation  crisis  is  unlikely  except  in  a  situation  in  which  serious  political 
crisis  would  be  accompanied  by  severe  economic  failure.  Moreover,  as  Leslie 
I  lolnies  points  out.  what  happened  in  tile  Second  World  from  mid-1970s 
onwards  was  not  due  to  Party's  over-involvement  in  the  economic  lire,  but  its 
%Nithdrawal  1rom  economic  sphere 
59 
and  giving  concessions  to  private 
entrcill-ClIeUrs  or  the  failure  to  supply  the  dernanded  goods  to  tile  market  while 
rel'using  ý  tile  private  enterprises  that  caused  the  rationality  and  hence  legitimacy 
problem. 
In  a  state  in  which  the  communists  have  come  to  power  as  an  alternative  to  a 
repressivc  reginic  or  at  the  end  or  a  popular  revolution,  despite  the  intensity  of 
economic  crisis.  public  questioning  of  the  merits  of  a  communist  regime  is 
unlikely  unless  (lie  period  of  crisis  lengthens  for  an  indelinitc  period.  Even  in 
SLICh  a  case.  people  may  be  led  to  belicvc  that  tile  I'ailurc  is  not  originating 
From  the  silo  r1coni  i  ngs  of  the  Party  or  of  ideology.  This  would  be  possible 
because  the  communist  party  has  tile  means  of  communication  and  propaganda 
LIIILICI'  its  control  and  tile  mainstream  official  ideology  clainis  that  thý  party 
assunics  a  vanguard  role  for  the  society's  progress.  This  means,  in  Jdnos 
Kornai's  %%ords.  that  -ItIlic  party  knows  better  than  tile  people  itself  what  the 
people's  interest  demands:  this  is  preciscly  what  'vanguard'  nicans.  "60 
Accordingly.  people  may  be  indoctrinated  in  such  a  way  that  they  would 
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believe  the  failures  are  caused  by  the  inability  of  certain  unworthy  apparatchiks 
or  may  be  threatened  by  the  use  of  coercive  mc-ans. 
There  must  be  a  really  strong  counter-point  to  prove  the  failure  of  the 
political-economic  system  as  a  whole  to  result  in  such  a  lapse  of  faith  in  tile 
ideology.  The  totalitarian  nature  of  tile  communist  system  and  its  control  over 
coercive  Ilorces  hardens  the  situation  for  the  opposition.  Such  examples  of 
opposition  and  uprising  against  the  system,  however,  exist  in  the  form  or  the 
1951  F,  ast  German  disturbances,  the  1956  Polish  change  of  govermlicnt,  the 
1956  Uprising  ill  I  ILIngary  and  tile  1968  events  in  Czechoslovakia  during  which 
the  people  showed  clearly  that  they  saw  the  communist  regime  as  illegitimate. 
A  similar  stand  came  from  the  Solidarity  movcrnent  in  Poland  which 
challenged  the  legitimate  atithority  of  the  Polish  government  However,  one 
must  also  bear  in  mind  that  except  for  the  I  lungarian  case  where  the  public 
opinion  associated  the  tyranny  of  Rdkosi  with  tile  communist  rule  itself,  the 
idea  ol'  communist  illegitimacy  took  decades  to  be  popular  in  the  countries 
'libCrated'  by  communists  either  due  to  economic  improvements,  totalitarian 
oppression  and  indoctrination,  or  public  apathy. 
B.  Legitimacy  in  an  Interactive  System:  ' 
All  the  points  discussed  above  are  correct  if  one  takes  a  state  as  a  political  and 
cconomic  ecosystem  which  acts  within  its  own  limits.  However,  as  no  state 
operates  in  political  or  economic  isolation,  any  given  state  cannot  be  perceived 
as  in  isolated.  limited-in-itscir  system.  Each  and  every  state  has  a  place  in 
international  scene  and  has  alliances,  trade  relationships,  debts,  partners. 
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opponents,  even  enernies  that  it  has  to  act  and  interact  with  and  reciprocate  to. 
I-very  state  must  consider  its  capabilities,  its  foreign  policy  objectives,  the 
threats  to  its  economic  and  political  independence,  and  hence  be  a  member  of 
,  in  interactive  system,  however  it  may  try  to  reduce  its  relationship  with  the 
others  to  -a  mere  mininium. 
As  a  result  of  this,  a  total,  ly  isolated  political  and  economic  environment  is 
unleasible.  This  also  needs  an  alteration  to  the  points  discussed  above.  The 
liberal-deniocratic  system  may  be  thoroughly  applicable  in  a  limited  number  of 
liberal-denlocratic  Countries  such  as  the  United  States.  United  Kingdom,  or 
France.  I  lo%vc%,  er.  as  the  degree  of  predictability  and  stability  in  the  systems 
begins  to  become  vaguer,  as  in  such  countries  as  Italy,  Greece,  or  Mexico,  due 
to  systemic  I'laws.  tile  system  would  be  less  clearly  dcfined.  In  such  a  case,  tile 
grounds  ot'legitimacy  flor  a  given  state  and  its  political  systern*s  existence  may 
not  be  equally  legitimising,  or  may  even  help  delegitimise  the  administration 
or  the  system  in  other  countries.  Martin  Wight  claims  that  many  regimes  which 
were  not  considered  legitimate  managed  to  survive  because  the  members  of 
international  state  systcin  accepted  their  legitimacy  based  on  these 
domestically  illegitimate  regimes'  respect  for  tile  territorial  integrity  of  their 
ncielibouring  states  and  their  willingness  to  abide  by  the  values  of  non- 
intervention  and  order  in  international  scale6l.  Furthermore,  their  willingness 
to  accept  the  valLICS  shared  by  a  bloc  or  its  alternativc  within  a  bipolar  world 
political  structure  would  also  make  thesc  reginics  internationally  legitimate 
evcn  il'domestically  illegitimate  and  /  or unwanted. 
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Foreign  intervention  may  also  be  performed  in  a  direct  manncr,  in  addition  to 
indirect  intervcntion  as  political  support.  The  main  way  of  such  intervention  is 
the  invasion  ora  country  by  another  and  imposition  orthe  value-systems  of  the 
victors  to  tile  losers.  In  case  of  the  liberal-democratic  systern's  adoption  as  a 
result  ofa  foreign  invasion,  the  success  or  failure  of  the  systern  would  depend 
on  the  success  or  failure  of,  the  occupant  country's  persuasion  of  the  people  of 
(lie  occupied  country.  A  mid-way  legitimation  of  the  liberal-democratic  system 
and  an  altcration  or  it  nlay  be  seen  in  such  countries  as  India,  Pakistan.  or  a 
rel'usal  ol'the  system  may  be  observed  as  in  the  examples  of  Iraq  and  Syria,  or 
a  scarch  For  an  alternative  while  a  swing  in  between  democracy  and  other 
possibilities  may  occur.  as  can  be  seen  in  the  Algerian  case. 
The  same  proposition  is  -or,  rather,  was-  true  for  the  mcnibm  of  tile  Socialist 
Illoc.  In  countries  like  the  USSR  or  China  which  had  experienced  regime 
changes  through  Popular  revolution  and  civil  war,  the  system's  legitimacy  is 
highly  dependent  oil  tile  ideological  beliers  and  economic  expectations  related 
to  tile  ideological  beliers,  that  is,  on  public  acceptance  of  tile  ideological 
propositions  by  will.  I  lowever.  even  in  case  of  a  socialist  revolution,  with  the 
international  pl  ice  it  holds,  a  country  like  CUba  or  Angola  may  never  reach  its 
gO,  11  01'  C011111lUnism  and  may  become  a  dictatorial  state  as  a  result  U  tile 
presence  or  lack  or  international  pressures  or  help. 
In  case  of*  conversion  by  Ilorce,  the  consequences  may  differ  from  the 
COIISCLjIIeIICCS  or  conversion  by  will.  A  communist  system  imposed  by  force 
results  in  a  direct  rejection  as  in  the  case  of  Afghanistan  or  may  result  in  a 
great  aniount  of'  co-operation  as  seen  in  Bulgaria  during  the  Cold  War. 
Alternatively.  tile  imposed  system  may  be  altered  such  as  in  tile  case  of 70 
Albania.  or  may  be  reinterpreted  such  as  in  the  Yugoslav  Federation  under 
Tito's  rule.  to  serve  the  needs  of  a  given  country  or a  certain  ruling  click.  The 
indoctrination  of  socialism  by  an  occupation  force  may  also  be  perceived 
differently  in  dirfierent  times.  For  instance,  the  occupation  was  first  perceived 
as  a  development  as  it  ended  the  Nazi  occupation,  but  gradually  became  a 
source  ol'discontent  in  Hungary  and  Czechoslovakia. 
In  tile  cases  of  change  or  regimc  due  to  foreign  invasion,  the  capabilities  of  tile 
invaded  country's  people  is  mostly  very  limited.  On  tile  other  hand,  tile 
grounds  flor  legitimising  the  new  regime  arc  also  very  limited.  The  newly 
established  system  would,  in  such  a  case,  represent  not  the  choice  of  the  people 
ofthe  invaded  country.  but  of  those  who  invaded  it.  'rhereflorc,  a  legitimation 
1'rom  the  top  scheme  is  present  in  such  instances.  In  this  case,  the  consent  and 
co-operation  ofa  small  group  of  the  country's  elite  is  enough  to  self-legitinlise 
the  systcm  with  the  support  of  coercive  organs.  Even  though  a  part  of  the 
SOCiCty  OLIt.  Side  the  clite  formation  would  support  the  new  regime,  thesc  would 
COIISfitUte  a  minority  in  the  overall  population. 
As  an  alternative,  the  invasion  force  might  have  liberated  the  country  from 
another  invasion  force  and  a  popular  sy'inpathy  towards  the  latter  invaders  may 
appear  unfil  tile  time  they  make  certain  that  they  have  no  intention  to  leaV'e  tile 
,  liberated'  lands.  In  such  a  case,  tile  minority  collaborating  with  the  invaders 
may  get  into  authority  positions  in  the  initial  period  of  sympathy  with  the  votes 
01'1)COI)IC  Who  NVOUldn't  vote  for  thern  in  normal  electoral  conditions,  as  they 
are  seen  as  national  heroes  who  helped  the  libcrators  liberate  their  country 
from  invasion.  When  it  is  apparent  that  the  liberators  have  no  intention  of 
departing.  the  sympathy  is  likely  to  disappear  and  the  new  political  systern 71 
imposed  by  the  invaders  and  their  brothers  in  arnis  at  the  invaded  country, 
then.  it  is  at  this  point  that  the  new  rcginic  is  likely  to  face  with  a  legitimacy 
crisis.  In  such  a  case,  the  two  toois  or  legitimation  the  new  cadres  may use 
would  be: 
-0  propaganda  and  indoctrination  which  would  take  time  and  is  uncertain  to  be 
sticcessibl.  and. 
b)  the  use  oforganised  state  coercive  forces,  that  is  the  use  of  police  forces  and 
the  armed  Comes.  these  being  backed  and/or  constituted  by  the  occupant  state's 
Corces. 
In  the  case  where  climination  of  opposition  is  followed  by  a  strong  programme 
of  political  brain-wasiling,  the  acceptance  of  the  new  regime  as  legitimate  may 
become  easier.  I  I'this  process  is  backed  by  some  economic  success,  partly  due 
to  the  transcer  or  technology  and  know-how  rrom  the  invader,  which  might 
prove  tile  success  of  the  new  regime,  propaganda  becomes  more  effective. 
I  lowever,  although  the  new  regime  may  have  all  tile  means  to  legally 
legitimise  itselrand  the  components  of  the  new  political  order,  people  may  not 
accept  it  as  legitimate.  This  is  due  to  tile  fact  that  the  new  reginle's  ability  to 
eliminatc  opposition  by  coercion  is  il'ot  equal  to  its  popularity.  Tile  lack  of 
opposition  may  steill  froni  tile  belief  in  the  futility  of  opposition  or  in  the 
impossibility  ol'  a  regime  changc  cvcn  by  a  revolution.  Inaction  against  the 
reginle.  thus,  would  be  a  show  of  popular  consent  oil  its  power  to  eliminate 
opposition.  This  cannotprove  the  systcrn  as  legitimate  because  the  situation  it 
cnJoys  is  based  oil  the  lack  of  alternative.  The  main  base  of  the  government,  in 
such  a  case.  is  tile  international  environment  that  lets  tile  invader  remain  in  the 
invaded  country.  ir  the  balances  change,  the  occupation  forces  need  to 72 
withdraw.  and  ir  the  system  failed  in  achieving  any  success  in  either  political 
or  ccononlic  lields,  it  is  most  likely  to  be  overthrown. 
I'lie  case  in  many  Central  East  European  countries  following  World  War  11,  the 
situation  was  sinlilar  to  that  described  above.  In  the  post-war  period,  Soviet 
invasion  and  backing  ensured  the  triumph  of  communists  in  East  European 
states.  In  the  first  step,  new  regimes  were  established  with  communists 
infiltrating  to  important  political  positions.  As  a  second  step,  in  the  first.  post- 
war  elections.  these  communists  were  elected  to  govern  the  country.  Finally, 
they  established  a  communist  rule  based  on  the  leadership  of  a  Communist 
Party.  the  representative  or  the  pi-olelarial,  and  by  means  of  coercion 
eliminated  all  opposition.  Policies  followed  included  collectivisation  of 
agricultural  sector.  tile  emphasis  on  the  creation  of  a  blue-collar  working  class 
in  tllc.,;  c  mostly  agrarian  countrics,  heavy  youth  indoctrination.  These  aimed  at 
creating  popular  support  and  popular  will  in  favour  of  a  communist  revolution. 
FITective  propaganda  and  the  pursuit  of  an  industrial  isation  programme  sought 
to  create  compensation  in  these  countries  for  the  lack  of  the  class  and  industrial 
structures  floreseen  by  Karl  Marx  for  a  socialist  revolution.  The 
indUstrialisation  process  in  thesc:  countries  was  airned  at  creating  a  working 
class,  a  lwolelai-ial,  which  would  have  close  links  with  the  Communi  st'  Party 
and  in  interest  in  tile  continuity  of  the  socialist  system  as  it  claimed  to  act  on 
its  behal  f.  The  existence  of  Soviet  troops  and  well-trained  actual  and  secret 
police  florces  made  the,  systems  established  in  these  countries  invulnerable, 
hence  reluctantly  acceptable.  me  1956  rebellion  in  Hungary  ended  in  great 
11LIMan  CaSUalties  and  a  painful  pcriod  of  'rc-norilialisation'  in  which  the 
economic  well-being  was  exchanged  for  tile  recognition  of  tile  regime  as 73 
legitimate.  In  most  East  European  countries,  with  the  exception  of 
Czechoslovakia  in  1968,  such  rebellions  were  avoided  by  the  knowledge  on 
the  results  or  tiic  Hungarian  example.  The  economic  failure  of  the  East 
Furopean  communist  regimes  from  nlid-1970s  onwards.  when  combined  with 
the  USSR's  withdrawal  from  direct  involvement  through  the  so-called 
Gorbacho-  Docli-ine  rollowed  by  tile  less  strict  Sinan-a  DoCjj-jjje62  from  illid- 
1980s  onwards.  created  grave  legitimacy  crises  for  the  East  European  regimes 
and  hence  brought  them  down. 
Therel'ore.  the  role  of  international  intervention,  either  as  in  the  case  of 
*Western'  intermition  in  the  conflict  between  North  Korea  and  South  Korea, 
or  in  cases  ol'the  lack  orsuch  direct  intervention,  as  could  be  observed  in  the 
case  of'11-ast  E.  uropean  regime  changes  in  the  aftermath  ortiie  World  War  11,  is 
a  key  issue  of  legitimacy  and  legitimation  which  transcends  the  option  of 
coercive  legitimation.  'rile  cancellation  of  such  aid  and  military  protection 
cascd  the  kill  ofthese  reginies.  Similarly,  the  impossibility  of  intervention  by 
Russian  I"nipire's  allies  duc  to  tile  conditions  of  tile  World  War  1,  such  as  the 
I'act  that  the  Dardanelles  Campaign  failed  and  Germany  was  not  yet  defeated, 
has  made  considerable  contribution  to  the  success  or  the  Russian  October 
Revolution.  In  both  instances,  an  intcrvcntion  by  the  Western  powers'might 
dramatically  change  tile  course  orhistory. 
62  The  term  Sinatra  Doctrine  was  first  used  in  November  1989  by  Gennadi  Gerasimov,  the  then  Soviet 
Foreign  Ministry  Spokesman.  while  trying  to  find  a  way  to  express  the  Pcrestroika-bascd  ne%v  Soviet 
floreign  policy.  as  opposcd  to  the  Brczhncv  and  Gorbachev  Doctrines.  Ile  described  the  new,  libertarian 
approach  as  (lie  Sinatra  Doctrine  on  the  basis  that  the  famous  singer's  popular  song  "My  Way"  in  which 
lie  sings  lie  "did  it  my  way.  "  As  the  new  policy  suggested  the  East  European  subordinates  of  the  USSR 
would  be  able  to  l'ollow  whatcvcr  policy  (hey  chose,  lie  baptiscd  the  policy  as  the  "Sinatra  Doctrine". 
For  this  maller.  see  J.  F.  Brown,  Surge  to  rree(lont,  Adamantine  Press,  Twickenham,  England:  1991.  p. 
62. 74 
The  1956  rebellions  in  Hungary  and  the  lack  of  interest  and/or  support  from 
Wcstern  E'uropean  countries  is  another  clear  example  of  tile  working  of  the 
interactivc-systern.  Mihaly  Vajda  claims  that  while  the  rebellions  were  a 
"Struggle  for  national  independence,  "  the  West  European  states  ignored  tile 
situation.  V.  ýIda  argues  that  "it  was  the  Russian  intervention  in  Hungary  in 
1956  which  revealed  that,  Western  politics  not  only  accepts  tile  post-1945 
situation.  but  also  carcl*ully  safeguards  it.  1163  rhe  Hungarian  political 
philosopher  clainis  that  thc  sareguarding  or  individual  freedoms  by  acccptitig 
the  dominance  or  a  world  system  dominated  by  two  superpowers  created  a 
threat  to  the  rý)uvcnation  of  the  real  European  spirit  which  would  mean  the 
return  to  the  continuous  revision  of  values,  the  ability  to  go  back  to  one's 
roots.  rationalism  and  pragmatiSIT104. 
In  unison  with  V,  ýIda,  Hungarian  sociologist  and  translator  Ferenc  KOszeg 
claimed  that  the  West  was  indifferent  to  the  East  European  discontent  and 
dissent.  K6szcg  clainis  that  Kissinger's  vision  or  a  peaccrul  Europe  based  on 
the  agreement  of  the  superpowers  and  the  preservation  of  the  stalus  quo  failed 
becMIse  people  or  the  Eastern  Europe  disliked  this  agreement.  He  mentions  the 
flact  that  the  US  Secretary  of  State  Schultz  has  praised  Rims  Kdddr  in  his  visit 
to  I  lungary  in  1987  and  "reduced  his  criticism  to  the  simple  observati6n  that 
K,  'id,  'ir  should  not  smoke  so  much  as  the  world  needs  him  to  remain  healilly,  "65 
without  getting  involvcd  into  any  post-Perestroika  discussions  in  the  country 
'3  Nlihaly  Vajda.  'Central  East  Europcan  Perspectives.  '  East  Europeaii  Repoi-ter,  vol.  ](I),  Spring 
1985  (pp.  5-7).  p.  6. 
6-1  11,  i  tj  "  p.  S. 
65  Within  the  Warsaw  Ilact:  An  Interview  With  Ferenc  K6szeg,  '  East  Ettrolvat,  Rej)orler, 
vol.  3(4),  Spring-Summer  1989  (pp.  12-14),  p.  12. 75 
for  the  West  is  too  much  preoccupied  with  the  governments  and 
undercstimates  societies  while  trying  to  protect  its  interests. 
Therellore.  both  I  fungarian  intellectuals  seem  to  adopt  an  accusative  approach 
towards  tile  lack  of  involvement  of  the  West  in  the  domestic  political  sphere  in 
the  Eastern  Bloc  countrics,  particularly  their  own  Hungary.  However,  Vajda 
alld  KOszeg  miss  the  point.  that  the  international  political  environment  forced 
tile  WCSI  FUropean  states  to  ignore  the  Hungarian  revolution  to  prevent  a 
widespread  multinational  war.  When  the  interilational  environment  permitted 
fOr  a  political  change  in  Eastern  Europe,  the  West  European  states,  especially 
the  Furopean  Union  as  a  supranational  institution  were  of  assistance  to  their 
F.  ast  I'Mropean  counterparts  as  well  as  the  United  States.  Therefore,  it  may  be 
claimed  that  lack  or  existence  of  foreign  intervention  is  directly  related  with 
the  changes  in  the  international  political  agenda. 
Foreign  intervention  to  a  country's  political  system  has  eff'ects  beyond  the 
control  ol'govermilent.  The  opposition  in  a  country  which  is  sulýlect  to  foreign 
intervention  is  also  receptive  to  changes.  For  instance,  the  communist 
illIlLICIlCe  in  tile  East  European  states  has  given  way  to  the  formation  of  an 
alliance  ol'Llissideilts  which  covers  the  most  diversiried  groups  together.  In  the 
1956  cvcnts  in  I  lungary.  the  opponents  of  tile  communist  regime  consistcd  of 
an  alliance  orsuch  unlikely  allies  consisting  or  reform  communists,  supporters 
ol'the  flascist  Admiral  I  lorthy  regime  and  the  Catholic  Church  allied  together 
against  the  Stalinist.  pro'-Soviet  regiMC66. 
('11  Male  Siabo.  'Nation-State,  Nationalism,  and  the  Prospects  for  Dcrnocratization  in  East  Ccntral 
Ful-ope,  in  OnnIIIIIIIA1  dilu/  Posi-communist  Studies,  v.  27(2),  p.  381. 76 
As  a  result.  the  international  dimension  of  legitimation  is  to  be  taken  into 
consideration  when  analysing  a  state  system,  as  it  gives  way  to  difTerent 
political  developincrits,  alliances  and  affiliations.  The  role  of  foreign 
intervention  in  the  definition  or  sustainment  of  a  particular  regime  in  a  given 
country  therefore  has  the  ability  to  alter  tile  political  balances  in  that  given 
country.  I  lence,  the  political  systern  is  arrccted  and  so  is  tile  question  orreginic 
legitimacy  and  tile  main  techniques  that  are  available  to  legitimise  tile  regime. 
Fhe  outside  innuence  over  the  political  systern  of  a  country  is  capable  of 
altering  all  the  dynamics  orthc  system  irthe  link  between  the  foreign  source  of 
mlthOritý'  1111d  the  dornestic  rulers  is  capable  or  maintaining  their  control  over 
the  population  by  the  use  ofcoercion,  of  propaganda  or  social  bribcry. ci 
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Ill.  LEGITIMACY  AND  HUNGARY 
A.  Legitimacy  and  Eastern  Europe: 
In  tile  light  of'  all  tile  above  discussions,  it  would  be  correct  to  argue  that 
Icgitiniacy  is  a  dynamic  concept  of  political  life.  Through  its  historical 
CMILItiOn.  tile  concept  has  modified  itself  and  adapted  into  tile  needs  and 
conditions  orthe  changing  systems  and  societies.  Since  the  appearance  or  the 
necd  Im  establishing  a  kind  or  rapport  between  the  rulers  and  the  ruled,  the 
idea  ol*sociul  conn-act  has  been  an  intrinsic  part  of  tile  concept  of  legitimacy. 
'I'lic  developnicilts  in  the  twentieth  century  gave  way  to  further  developments 
and  afterations  in  the  definition  of  the  concept.  Howevcr,  tile  fact  remains  that 
a  regime's  longevity  depends  on  its  being  approved  by  the  people  it  rules. 
The  changes  that  are  observed  in  the  Latin  American  and  South  and  East 
Furopean  regions  since  1974  have  made  it  clear  that  legitimacy  of  a  regime  is  a 
key  concept  and  if  a  regime  cannot  reach  a  social  contract  with  its  subjects  or 
citizens.  it  is likely  to  fail  and  fall  the  moment  it  loses  tile  ability  to  cfficiently 
use  tile  means  of  coercion  to  create  order.  On  that  account,  a  distinction  should 
be  Made  between  the  existence  of  order  -or  the  lack  of  insurrection-  in  a 
country  and  the  actual  public  support  for  a  regime  which  provides  legitimacy 
to  this  regime.  11'  the  regime  is  perceived  as  illegitimate,  its  durability  is  in 
question  x0latcver  means  of  coercion  it  may  employ.  The  international 
intervention  in  terms  of  invasion  or  direct  or  indirect  military.  political,  and 
economic  support  may  not  change  the  late  of  a  regime  or  alter  its  cognition  as 
legitimate  or  illegitimate.  but  may  only  delay  regime  change. 79 
Nor  is  any  one  regime  identical  to  another.  The  conditions  surrounding  a  state 
with  their  demographic,  economic,  social,  political,  geostrategic  and  historic 
backgrounds  enable  diiTcrcnt  scts  of  rcquirements  for  the  survival  and 
iegitiniacy  or  ruling  rcgii-nes.  A  socicty*s  needs  and  perceptions  may  be 
radically  different  frorn  any  other's.  Consequently.  the  concept  of  democracy 
an(]  the  process  of'  democratisation  may  necessitate  different  routes  and 
111-OMILINS  to  be  applied  in  any  given  country.  The  methods  or  legitimation 
and  the  grounds  of  legitimacy  may  differ  From  one  country  to  another  as  well. 
Fastern  Europe  is  a  part  of  the  world  where  one  may  observe  tile  dynarnics  of 
change  and  continuity  in  terms  or  legitimacy  and  legitimation  in  its  own 
specific  conditions.  Due  to  its  post-war  history.  the  region  has  developed  a 
distinct  structure.  Furthermore,  the  transmutation  in  that  region  is  tile  most 
evident.  recent.  and  strong  one.  As  tile  needs  and  perceptions  in  time  changed 
sharply  in  this  region  within  the  last  decade,  so  did  the  expectations  from  and 
(lie  dutics  associated  Nvitll  a  ruling  regime.  Tile  political  concept  or  legitimacy 
has  been  altered  to  suit  to  tile  requirements  of  tile  new  era  as  well.  Legitimacy, 
in  Fastern  U'urope,  now  has  a  clearer,  sharper,  more  pertinent  meaning. 
I'lierel'ore.  its  analysis  would  require  a  more  focused  approach.  This  very 
research  ainis  at  showing  the  importance  of  the  conccpt  of  legitimacy  aý  wcll 
as  the  different  methods  employed  to  guarantee  its  presence  for  a  given  regime 
within  the  changing  rules  or  politics  by  using  a  specific  country  as  its  model 
and  nlcdiLlIll  ol*  representation. 
I  IoN%eN-ei-.  as  the  argument  of  this  thesis  is  that  each  and  every  COUntry  have 
their  own  specific  needs  and  conditions,  a  general,  regional  approach  in  the 
study  ol'legitimacy  is  thought  not  to  be  suitable.  Therefore,  a  model  country  is 80 
to  be  used  to  see  the  change  in  the  perception  of  the  concept  of  legitimacy  and 
the  methods  oNegitimation  after  the  changes  since  late  1987. 
As  a  model  country,  this  thesis  will  focus  oil  tile  transmutation  or  tile  political 
system  and  or  aic  concepts  or  legitimacy  and  legitimation  in  Hungary,  once 
rel'erred  to  as  the  most  liberal  of  tile  socialist  states  or  the  Eastern  Bloc.  This 
thesis.  in  its  Following  parts,  aims  at  pinpointing  the  conditions  that 
surrounded  the  reginic-society  relations  since  World  War  11,  the  changes  in 
terms  ol'  establishing  and  preserving  regime  legitimacy,  and  the  impact  of 
I 
changes  in  tile  aftermath  of  tile  implementation  of  the  Sinatra  Doctrine 
mplacing  the  Bre:  hnev  Doctrine,  in  tile  country.  Tile  main  postulates  of  change 
and  continuity  in  tile  political  systern  of  the  country,  the  change  in  tile 
importance  and  rolcs  orspecific  political  and  economic  institutions,  emergcnce 
or  di  111cmit  political  rorces  and  influcritial  factors  affiecting  the  pcrccption  and 
implementation  of  legitimacy  and  legitimation  tecliniqucs  are  to  be  discussed 
in  tile  flollowing  chapters. 
B.  Hungary  as  Case  Study: 
Fhe  discussion  above  shows  that  legitimacy  is  a  more  complex  issue  than  it  is 
taken  by  social  scientists  who  focus  on  the  subject  as  a  matter  of  an  isolated 
system  analysis.  The  externally  imposed  and/or  protected  sort  of  legitimacy  of 
a  regime.  the  economic  and  social  dynamics  which  afTect  the  relationship 
bemeen  tile  rulers  and  the  ruled,  the  availability  of  options  to  the  rulers,  and 
the  willingness  ol'the  rcgime  in  power  with  the  people  it  governs  are  all  factors 
influencing  the  establishment,  preservation  and  absence  of  legitimacy. 
01*  all  the  possible  recent  developments,  the  East  European  trans  formati  on 
appears  as  the  clearest  example  of  all  in  legitimacy  studies.  The  changes  that 81 
took  place  in  the  political  and  econornic  spheres  in  the  region  rrom  the  early 
20"'  Century  onwards  constitutes  a  very  broad  field  or  observation  for  the 
students  of  tiie  concept  or  lcgitimacy.  The  fall  of  the  empires,  the  emagence  or 
the  smaller  nation-states  that  replace  these  as  individual  kingdorns  or 
republics.  the  devastation  brought  by  the  World  War  11,  the  Soviet  intervention 
11ollowing  the  Nazi  invasion,  the  plantation  of  Sovict-friciidly  communist 
regimes  %Nhich  11orced  changes  in  the  lirestyle  of  the  people  of  this  region,  tile 
resistance  movements  and  the  governments'  methods  to  confront  these, 
constitute  a  rich  historical  background  to  analyse  tile  changes  to  tile  concept  of 
legitimacy.  That  the  individual  reginies  had  each  peculiar  solutions  and 
techniques  also  emphasises  tile  region's  peculiarity. 
01'  the  regimes  in  Eastern  Europe,  though,  Hungary,  tile  chosen  case-study 
sub.  icct  ofthis  thesis.  cmerges  as  a  unique  experience  as  it  provides  different 
NOILItiOlIS  to  similar  problems  than  its  counterparts  in  the  region.  When  we 
look  at  tllc  other  states  in  tile  region,  Guinan  Democratic  Republic  appears  to 
be  merely  beyond  a  buffer  zone  with  a  strict  regime.  The  Polish  example  is  full 
ol'attempts  of*  renewal  ol'the  system  which  meant  a  change  in  the  Party  cadres 
and  nothing  else.  The  Czechoslovak  example,  especially  after  1968  events 
"-lioN%.  s  that  it  was  based  on  terror  and  fear  as  well  as  indoctrination  or  tile 
C,  ommunist  ideology.  The  Rumanian  reginle,  an  outpost  or  the  Soviet  sphere 
of  influence.  Nvas  based  on  very  strong  nationalism  and  on  the  leadership  of 
one  flamily.  'File  Yugoslaý,  state  was  also  based  oil  the  charismatic  leadership  of 
one  leader.  Tito,  while  its  flederated  states  were  in  constant  competition  with 
cach  other.  Ol'the  Soviet-controlled  East  European  states,  only  Hungary  stands 82 
apart  from  tile  others  in  that  its  administration  was  based  on  a  social  contract 
aller  the  1956  events. 
Aller  the  1956  rebellion  to  nlid-1988,  Jdnos  Kddir  stayed  as  the  leader  of  the 
ru  I  ing  reginic  in  II  ungary.  This  makes  him  a  different  leader  as  there  has  been 
sevcral  Icadership  changes  in  ncighbouring  countries  during  his  leadership 
period.  I  lowever.  despite  his  long  reign,  KAdir  never  enjjoyed  the  charismatic 
legitimacy  Tito  made  use  of,  and  as  a  collaborator  of  tile  invaders,  even 
siffIlered  Crom  the  problems  due  to  a  delegitimised  position  vis-A-vis  tile  public 
in  his  first  decade  at  the  head  of  the  Hungarian  regime.  KAdir  enabled  other 
fitictors  to  strengthen  the  regime  credibility  and  legitimacy.  Ile  made  use  or an 
economic  contract  which  enabled  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Workers'  Party  to 
exchange  political  legitimacy  with  economic  prof-it.  Even  tile  use  orthe  policy 
or-those  vvho  are  not  against  us  are  with  us"  shows  that  populism,  economic 
and  social  bribery,  quid-pro-quo  techniques  are  at  tile  core  or  the  KAddrist, 
administration's  search  for  legitimacy.  Unlike  other  regimes  and  other  leaders, 
lungarian  Communists  and  JAnos  Kdddr  have  sought  the  accord  of  the  people 
thev  ruled.  The  ract  that  threat  to  use  coercive  measures  did  not  solve  the 
problem  was  proven  by  the  events  in  1956  led  Kýddr  and  his  cadres  to  look  for 
more  complicated.  more  feasible,  and  more  populist  ways  to  cstýblisli 
legitimacy  For  the  system. 
'I  herellore.  the  period  or  JAnos  KddAr's  rule  in  Hungary  was  different  in  many 
aspects  1rom  other  East  European  countries  of  similar  ideological  orientation. 
In  addition.  the  differencc  in  the  perception  of  the  ruling  political  order  by  the 
lungarian  people  and  the  perception  of  the  people  by  the  Hungarian  ruling 
political  order  created  a  different.  set  of  rules  and  orconditions  in  the  transition 83 
to  liberal  democratic  system  in  this  country.  The  transformation  of  dissident 
CiViC  gi-OLIJIS  into  opposition  political  movements.  tile  transaction  between 
these  and  tile  I  lungarian  Communists  and  the  round-table  discussions  which 
Icd  to  the  114.111  of  the  communist  system  in  the  country  also  make  Hungary  a 
PCCLIliar  example. 
As  a  result  of  all  tile  above-mentioned  matters,  I  chose  to  analyse  the 
II  ungarian  example  or  transition  and  the  transition  or  the  concept  of  legitimacy 
of  the  Riling  political  order/regime  in  this  country.  In  the  following  chapters, 
tile  Kildlir  system's  attempts  to  gain  legitimacy  in  its  difficrent  stages,  tile 
transition  and  its  legitimacy  crisis,  and  the  post-communist  regime's  search  for 
legitimacy  will  be  analysed. 84 
CHAPTER  THREE 
KADARIST  LEGACY  OF HUNGARY:  SOCIETY  AND 
CHANGE  IN  THE  NEW  HUNGARIAN  POLITICAL  ORDER 
1.  THE  DISTINCTIVE  PLACE  OF  HUNGARY 
As  previously  discussed  in  Chapters  I  and  2,  aic  issue  or  regime  legitimacy 
had  been  perceived  differcritly  in  Hungary  in  comparison  with  the 
understanding  or  the  issue  in  the  rest  of  Easteni  Bloc  countries.  The  main 
rcason  flor  this  dirference  is  the  peculiar  patterns  or  interaction  between  the 
administration  and  the  people  during  the  establishment,  development,  and 
decline  of'  tile  communist  regime  in  Hungary.  The  specific  administrative 
methods  used  by  administrations  led  by  Matyas  Mosi,  JAnos  K66r,  and 
K.  'idAr's  short-term  heir.  Karoly  Grosz,  the  problems  they  inherited  firom  their 
predecessors  as  leaders,  and  the  social  and  economic  conditions  they  faced 
caused  tile  emergence  of  a  11ungarian-style  approach  to  tilc  Concept  of 
legitimacy  and  tile  issue  or  legitimation. 
I'lle  di  ITerences  in  confronting  the  problems  or  legitimacy  and  legitimation  in 
I  ILIngary  qualified  the  country  as  a  distinctive  agent  within  the  state  socialist 
system.  The  differences  in  terms  of  rulcr-ruled  relationship  in  comparison  to 
the  rest  ol'the  Eastern  Bloc  and  different  methods  applied  in  that  context  by 
the  I  ILIngarian  administration,  even  under  the  leadership  of  a  single  leader, 
enabled  the  application  of  different  policies  at  different  times  to  preserve 85 
order.  Due  to  the  peculiarity  of  the  state  socialist  period,  the  democratic 
transition  and  the  post-cornmunist  governments'  attempts  at  establishing 
legitimacy  are  linked  to  the  events  that  took  place  and  relationships  established 
during  that  period.  'rhe  methods  used  and  the  social  contract  established  in  that 
cra  still  arrects  tile  developments  in  Hungarian  politics.  Therefore,  the 
interaction  between  the  rulers  and  the  ruled  during  the  reign  of  state  socialist 
leaders  IZ,  ikosi.  KAddr.  and  Grosz  are  to  be  analysed  to  reach  a  conclusion  on 
how  the  current  political  regime  needs  to  respond  to  different  situations  that 
take  place  in  the  post-communist  political  arena.  While  the  policies  of 
differcm  governments  and  political  developments  concerning  legitimacy  will 
be  discussed  in  11ollowing  parts  of  the  thesis,  this  chapter  will  focus  oil  the 
differctit  policies  employed  to  legitimisc  the  system  and  to  secure  a  social  and 
,  in  econonlic  contract  during  the  communist  cra  in  Hungary,  beginning  with 
the  communist  seizure  of  power  in  the  country  and  continuing  with  the  cfforts 
of  J.  'mos  MiLlAr.  (lie  leader  of  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Workers'  Party  Crom 
1956  to  1988  to  keep  regime  legitimacy  undiminished.  The  chapter  will  then 
Iloctis  on  the  dcniocratisation  process  which  began  with  the  Round-Table 
i)iscussions  or  1989.  The  different  methods  employcd  in  the  transitory  period 
in  I  lungary  are  to  be  emphasised  as  the  peculiar  situation  of  the  6untry's 
political  structure  needed  a  different  approach.  Finally,  there  will  be  an 
analysis  on  flic  I  lungarian  pcople's  paception  of  dcmocracy. 
11.  HUNGARY  BEFORE  KADAR 
A.  From  The  Empire  to  the  Communist  Rule: 
Although  the  developments  which  took  place  after  he  IcIl  office  will  also  be 
sed  in  the  thesis.  the  main  rocus  or  tiis  chapter  will  be  Jdnos  Kdddr  and  analys 86 
his  work  as  the  longest-ruling  IlSWP  (Flungarian  Socialist  Workers'  Party) 
leader  4rom  1956  to  1988-  and  the  originator  of  a  quasi-social  contmct 
between  the  I  lungarian  state  and  the  Hungarian  people.  Kddir's  success  as  a 
leader.  his  eagerness  to  adopt  and  employ  difTerent  policies  in  order  to  render 
legitimacy  to  the  communist  rcgimc  in  Hungary  beyond  a  Soviet-imposed 
indoctrination  and  coercive  threat,  and  the  outcomes  of  these  policies  make 
the  KIddr  administration  tile  main  subject  or  tws  study.  Since  tile  legacy  of  tile 
Uddr  administration  in  respect  of  popular  expectations  about  politics  and 
economics  can  still  be  observed  in  the  Hungarian  life,  the  importance  of  the 
K,  ld,  ir  administration  stretches  beyond  the  terill  of  office  of  this  Hungarian 
leadcr. 
I  lo%%e%-cr.  I  lungarian  history  before  KAddr's  rise  to  power  may  shed  some  light 
on  the  development  of  events  in  the  recent  past  in  that  country.  To  analyse  the 
K-,  lidilir  era  without  mentioning  what  preccded  it  would  bc  an  incornplctc 
analysis  as  tile  KAdirist,  policies  have  their  roots  in  tile  RAkosi  cra.  Without 
analysing  what  prcccdcd  the  KAddrist  administration.  one  cannot  understand 
(lie  changes  that  took  place  under  Jdnos  KAddr's  rule  for  the  pre-KddAr 
systems  ol'administration  have  impact  on  tile  KAddrist  administration  as  much 
as  Kild-Ar  has  an  impact  on  the  current  post-communist  political  order. 
Therel'ore.  bcflore  analysing  tile  leader,  tile  events,  and  the  policies  of  the 
KilidArist  era  in  the  country,  a  glance  at  the  events  that  prepared  the  background 
Ilor  the  K,!  d6r  administration  is  necessary. 
The  way  I  ILIngary  was  governed  before  the  communist  take-over  is  important 
to  understand  the  political  tradition  of  the  country.  Hungary.  part  or  tlic 
Austro-Hungarian  Enipire  From  1867  to  1918,  was  administered  by  a  sell'- 87 
government  system.  After  World  War  1,  with  tile  collapse  of  the  Empire,  it 
gitined  its  independence  as  an  individual  nation-state.  For  133  days  in  1919, 
1  lungary  becanic  a  Communist  republic  under  tile  leadership  of  Bdla  Kun.  This 
short-lived  communist  government  was  brought  to  an  end  by  the 
Czechoslo%,  ak-Rurnanian  intervention.  Tile  Szeged  Government  established 
a  11cr  that  event  and  led  by  lstvdn  Friedrich  could  not  survive  much  without  tile 
support  of  Admiral  Miklos  Horthy,  the  aide-de-camp  of  Austro-Hungarian 
Emperor  Franz  Joseph  and  the  commander  or  the  last  Habsburg  flect.  With 
elections  held  on  I"  of  March  1920,  it  was  decided  that  Hungary  would  remain 
a  kingdom  but  would  be  ruled  by  a  regent  who  would  be  Admiral  Horthy. 
Thus,  from  1920  till  the  end  of  the  World  War  11,  Hungary  was  ruled  by 
Admiral  I  lorthy.  acting  as  regent  for  an  unnamed  king67.  After  Hitler's  rise  to 
power  in  Germany  in  1933,  Horthy  fell  more  and  more  under  German 
influence  and  assisted  Hitler  with  the  Hungarian  troops  in  the  Nazi  campaign 
against  tile  USSR  in  1941. 
Willi  the  defleat  orthe  Third  Reich,  Hungary  was  invaded  by  tile  Red  Army 
dUrint'  tile  last  stages  of  the  World  War  11,  in  1944-45.  Admiral  Hortily  fled, 
and  a  provisional  government,  inclu  . ding  the  communist  agriculture  minister 
hilre  Nagy,  was  flornied.,  rhis  formation  marked  the  beginning  of  the  erid  orthe 
non-coniniunist  era  in  tile  country  for  the  next  four  decades. 
B.  The  Pre-KSdAr  Hungarian  Communist  Rule: 
1.  Establishment  of  Communist  Rule  In  Hungary: 
Willi  the  formation  of  the  provisional  government  in  1945,  a  momentum 
lowards  the  establishment  or  communist  rule  in  tile  country  began.  Ail  elected 
(17  William  NI.  Balkay.  Authoritarian  Politics  in  a  Transitional  Statc:  Istvan  Bethlen  and  the  Unifled 88 
assembly  brought  a  republic  into  existence  in  1946,  but  it  soon  fell  under 
Soviet  domination,  although  only  70  communists  had  bccn  elccted  within  a 
total  or  409  deputies.  In  the  1947  elections,  which  were  manipulated  to  a  great 
extent.  tile  communists  became  the  most  widely  represented  party  in  the 
parliament  Nvith  100  seats.  Then,  with  the  slogan  "we  rebuild  the  country  not 
11or  the  capitalists  but  for,  the  people,  "  first  the  new  currency  unit  Forint  was 
introduced.  The  introduction  of  the  Forint  is  comparable  to  the  introduction  of 
tile  Deutsche-Mark  in  tile  parts  or  Germany  occupicd  by  tile  Wcstern  powers  a 
%viiile  later  as  both  indicate  a  sharp,  departure  from  the  previously  existing 
system  and  as  both  signify  the  beginning  of  a  new  era  for  both  countries 
involved.  In  Western  Germany,  the  introduction  of  the  D-Mark  signified  that  a 
unified  control  of  Western  and  Soviet  parts  of  the  German  lands  was  no  more 
a  possibility  while  tile  Hungarian  communists'  introduction  of  the  Forint 
signified  a  departure  from  tile  old  system  by  removing  one  of  tile  most  easily 
identifiable  elements  ortiie  previous  order. 
Fhe  second  step  was  the  implementation  of  a  vast  nationalisation  process, 
beginning  with  tile  nationalisation  of  tile  large  commercial  banks  and  then  of 
all  the  enterprises  employing  more  than  100  workers.  This  process,  too,  was 
ainled  at  undalining  tile  differenccs  of  the  system  with  the  previous  order. 
In  the  third  stage.  a  'Unification  Congress'  was  licid  in  August  1948.  In  the 
congress.  (lie  Ihingarian  Workers'  Parly  (IIWP)  was  foundcd  as  a 
combination  oi'  all  *  remaining  left-wing  fractions,  a  process  observed, 
approved.  and  commanded  by  the  Soviet  leader  Stalin  himself.  Matyas  Rdkosi, 
referred  to  as  'Stalin's  apt  pupil,  '  chosen  as  the  leader  of  the  IIWP,  gradually 
[1,1qyin  II  upgijt)ý,  1919-1926,  East  Enropcan  Monographs.  New  York,  NY,  1982,  pp.  10-18  passim.. 89 
led  tile  Country  to  a  Stalinist  regime.  The  final  stage  or  transformation  came  in 
AtIgLISt  1941)  with  the  approval  or  a  Stalinist,  Soviet-type,  constitution  which 
assigned  the  11ungen-kin  lflorkei-s'  Pai-ly  a  leading  role  in  tile  development  of 
the  society  towards  democracy  and  COMMUlliSM68  From  then  until  the  late 
1980s.  tile  concept  or  Party  was  to  be  used  interchangeably  with  the  concept  of 
state  in  the  country  as  in  many  other  state  socialist  political  orders. 
During  RikosPs  rule,  especially  after  the  adoption  of  tile  new  Soviet-style 
constitution  in  1949,  industry  was  nationalised,  land  was  collectivised  and  a 
wavc  or  secret-police  ten-or  was  launched  to  legitinlisc,  the  systern  by 
suppressing  any  actual  or  potential  opposition  movement  even  berore  such  a 
movement  was  conceived.  The  Stalinist  political  order  of  Hungary,  from  1949 
to  1953  was  devoted  to  attain  goals  in  productivity  and  in  creating  a  model 
socialist  environment  with  collective  farms.  heavy  industry,  and  complete  state 
hegeniony  over  tile  political  and  economic  realms.  Coercion  was  tile  basis  of 
achieving  these  goals  under  RAkosi's  rule,  as  was  under  Stalinist  Soviet  Union. 
Thc  activitics  of  the  secret  police  force,  the  AVO,  and  the  sense  of  terror 
created  by  these  activities  prevented  any  social  opposition.  However,  this 
attitude  towards  tile  relationship  between  the  Party/state  and  the  people  created 
no  impact  oil  the  public  approval  of  tile  new  political  order.  Tile  legitimacy  of 
tile  state  in  the  case  or  Rdkosi's  Hungary  was  based  only  oil  coercive  power 
and  it  is  a  fact  KAddr  sought  to  change  by  early  1960s  onwards. 
The  general  system  of  political  organisation  was  imposed  upon  the  Hungarians 
by  the  libei-alion  of  I  lungary  by  the  Soviet  troops  and  despite  the  success  of 
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the  Smallholders  Party  in  tile  first  post-war  elections,  by  the  end  of  1948,  the 
Communists  Nvcre  holding  tile  power  due  to  RAkosi's  famous  saland  tactics 
%%,  hich  weakened  the  opposition  and  prevented  a  centre-left  coalition  and  to 
extensive  double-voting".  Tile  grounds  of  legitimacy  for  the  Mkosi-led  party 
was  their  ideological  belier  in  the  righteousness  or  what  they  do,  and  the 
Soviet  occupational  forces  to  convince  the  nation  in  case  of  doubt.  Tile 
draniatic  changes  in  the  social  structure,  the  intensive  collcctivisation  of  farms, 
(lie  emphasis  oil  industrialisation  and  oil  tile  creation  of  a  reliable  working 
class.  the  ban  on  the  oll'springs  of  the  former  elite  to  get  a  university 
edmation.  and  the  extensive,  if  not  useless,  use  of  force  against  any  sort  of 
resistance,  created  a  temporary  forced  legitimacy  for  the  Rdkosi  regime  during 
the  final  years  or  the  Stalinism.  However.  with  the  change  of  cadres  in 
Moscow  and  tile  rise  or  opposition  to  Rdkosi  inside  and  outside  the  I  lungarian 
Communist  Party  led  to  tile  events  or  1956.  Rdkosi's  mistakes  were  to  assume 
that  the  threat  and  the  use  of  force  and  an  iiltra-partyjustirication  of  tile  acts  of 
tile  administration  meant  legitimacy  for  tile  system.  fie  also  underestimated  tile 
intra-CPSU  conflicts  and  hence  could  not  foresee  tile  orthodox  and  de-Stalinist 
approach  that  Nvould  replacc  Stalinism. 
2.  The  Hungarian  Revolution: 
On  14  March  1953,  the  leader  or  the  Soviet  Bloc,  Joseph  Stalin  died.  His 
demise  changed  the  Soviet  understanding  or  the  Cold  War  as  well  as  the 
relations  aniong  the  Icading  cadres  of  the  USSR.  This  affected  the  whole  of  the 
Fastern  Bloc  countries.  The  political  struggle  that  emerged.  with  the  death  of 
Stalin  resulted  in  first  the  cstablishment  of  a  coninlittce  to  rule  the  country. 
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This  group  ilICILided  Beria,  Molotov,  Zhukov,  Malenkov,  and  Khruslicliev. 
I  lowever.  by  1956,  the  country  was  ruled  by  a  triumvirate  consisting  of 
Khrushchcv,  Zhukov  and  MalcnkoV70.  The  change  in  leadership  gave  rise  to  a 
soller,  readjIusted  approach  to  the  statc-society  relations  in  the  USSR  and  this 
new  political  order  was  reflected  in  the  USSRs  subordinate  states  in  Eastern 
I,  uro  lie. 
In  I  lungary.  with  (lie  support  of  the  Party  Secretary  Malenkov,  Inire  Nagy 
replaccd  RAkosi  as  tile  prime  minister,  while  RIkosi  remained  as  the  leader  of 
the  Party.  In  1955,  Nagy's  fortunes  paralleled  those  or  Malenkov  in  the  USSR 
as  they  both  were  removed  frorn  off  ice.  This  parallelism  between  the  two 
leaders  demonstrates  the  importance  of  the  global  structure  and  of  the  external 
legitimacy  ol'a  political  order  (as  discussed  in  Chapter  2)  in  the  East  European 
states  during  the  Cold  War  pcriod. 
In  1956.  lio%vcver.  while  the  dctcriorating  dornestic  scene  ensurcd  that  on  23 
October  1956  Nagy  once  more  became  tile  I  lungarian  prinic  minister,  Matyas 
RAkosi  had  to  step  down  from  Party  leadership.  This  was  due  to  a  series  of 
events  which  happened  between  23  October  and  4  November  1956  and 
generally  reflerred  to  as  the  Hungarian  Revolution,  although  there  are  some 
clainis  questioning  the  reliability  of  the  term  'revolution'  since  the  action 
failed  within  twelve  days  from  its  start7l. 
The  liberalisation  and  restructuring  process  initiated  by  public  intervention  to 
the  administration  wenf  on  with  Nagy's  declaration  that  Hungary  was  to  Icave 
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the  Warsaw  Pact  and  become  a  neutral  state.  The  revolution,  as  a  combination 
or  two  interrelated  processes  of  elite  action  which  embodied  "'strata  within  or 
close  to  the  centre  of  the  Communist  power  apparatus  itself'  (such  as  writers, 
ilItClICCILials,  and  revisionist  communist  politicians)  and  a  'mass  process 
spreading  throughout  tile  broad  anonymous  masses"'  as  P.  Kecskemeti 
argueS71.  Nvas  unique  in  this  combination  and  in  its  being  an  uprising  against 
the  Soviet  authority  and  those  who  represent  it,  was  a  momentous  event  in 
European  history.  Hence,  tile  change  of  government,  which,  with  Nagy's 
declaration  or  31  October  might  as  well  lead  to  a  change  of  political  order, 
trigggered  a  strong  Soviet  response,  despite  the  less  strict  attitude  of  tile  new 
Soviet  regime  compared  to  tlic  Stalinist  era.  On  4  November  1956,  Warsaw 
Pact  troops  invaded  Hungary  crushing  tile  revolution,  ending  tile  reform 
process.  Aller  many  coil  frontations,  the  Soviet/Warsaw  Pact  troops  gained 
control  and  while  (lie  revolution  was  crushed,  some  200.000  Hungarians  had  to 
I'lee  the  country  ror  the  WCSt73.  After  tile  Soviet  troops  gained  control  of  tile 
country.  the  I  lungarian  leader  Inirc  Nagy  was  arrested.  Tile  new  communist 
administration  was  to  be  led  by  Jdnos  Kdddr  who  would  become  tile  avatar  of 
tiie  concept  or  state  in  Hungary  from  late  1956  till  his  removal  from  office  in 
May  1988. 
The  events  ol'  23  October  -4  November  1956  proved  two  things  for  the 
Hungarian  communist  leadership.  Firstly,  the  events  demonstrated  that 
coercion  was  not  the  guaranteed  method  of  gaining  legitimacy,  and  not  even 
obedience.  Thc  enormity  of  tile  Soviet  military  support  for  Rdkosi  failed  to 
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prevent  the  Cal  I  of  (he  I  IWII  administration.  Secondly,  the  events  demonstrated 
that  public  support  was  necessary  for  a  regime  to  survive.  The  Rdkosi 
administration's  failure  to  accept  that  power  alone  is  insufficient  to  sustain 
regime  legitimacy  and  that  legal-constitutional  legitimacy  of'  a  reginic  is 
insufficient  to  sustain  regime  existence  led  to  the  multi-centric  approach  of 
. 1i'mos  K6LUir.  The  difficrence  of  Hungary  from  tile  rest  or  tile  Soviet- 
subordinate  states  of  Eastern  Europe  relates  to  tile  events  of  23  October  -4 
November  1956  onwards.  After  tile  suppression  or  tile  1956  disturbances,  tile 
issues  related  to  legitimacy  and  legitimation  in  Hungary  followed  a  difl'crcnt 
developmental  pattern  than  the  other  East  European  members  of  the  Soviet 
Bloe.  The  K6ddr  regime  tried  to  reach  a  consensus  with  the  Hungarian  citizens 
rather  than  Coming  the  rules  of  tile  system  upon  them,  while  nicthods  varying 
From  martial  la%%,  -  to  nationalistic  communism  were  used  in  other  countries  of 
the  region. 
In  the  wake  ofthe  1956  rebellion,  the  KddAr  administration's  first  tasks  wcre 
to  re-establish  tile  communist  order,  establish  a  legitimate  political  order 
acceptable  to  the  I  lungarian  people,  and  which  would  manage  to  achieve  these 
tx%-o  objectives  by  not  alienating  the  , Soviet  -  Warsaw  Pact  principles.  The 
mistake  of  l6kosi  administration  which  gave  way  to  the  public  rcbcllion.  'of  the 
. 
1956  was  to  seek  Soviet  approval  for  all  its  actions  while  ignoring  to  seek 
legitimacy  in  domestic  level.  It  believed  that  coercive  threat  and  legal- 
constitutional  justification/legifirnation  orthe  ruling  political  order  was  enough 
if  the  external  dimension  of  legitimacy  was  established.  In  the  Hungarian  case, 
(lic  close  relationship  between  Stalin  and  RAkosi  and  the  existence  or  sovict- 
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Warsaw  Pact  troops  in  Hungary  appeared  to  be  at  the  heart  of  this  belief.  The 
internal  dimension  of'  legitimacy,  even  in  a  closed  system  -based  on  single- 
party  rule  and  which  excludes  the  idea  of  competitive  elections-,  is  as 
important  -if'  not  more  important-  an  elenicnt  in  respect  of  the  search  for 
regime  legitimacy.  The  revolution  had  aptly  demonstratcd  the  consequcnccs  of 
a  regime  that  relied  solely  oil  Soviet  support.  'nic  riew  regime,  led  by  Milos 
K-6dOm  sought  to  re-cstablish  the  order  -in  all  political,  legal,  and  social  senses 
ol'  the  word-  in  I  lungary.  It  had  to  find  a  consensus  betwecil  the  two  major 
actors  which  will  enable  the  political  system  to  function,  namely  the  Soviet 
Bloc  and  the  I  lungarian  people.  Kdddr's  policies  in  over  a  time  span  of  more 
than  three  decades.  leading  the  country  and  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Workers' 
Party  (I  ISWII)  were  all  aimed  at  establishing  that  balance. 
Therellore,  although  the  period  of  1953-1956  is  very  interesting  for  many  a 
stmient  or  Hungarian  politics  in  the  201h  Century,  one  has  to  focus  on  the 
Kikkir  Era  in  I  lungary  to  see  what  the  current  system  is  replacing  both  in  terms 
ofpolitical  and  economic  system  and  in  ternis  of  legitimacy  and  legitimation. 
Fhis  chapter  will  therefore  be  mainly  a  discussion  of  the  KAdir  Era  in 
I  lungary.  Ilocusing  on  tile  developmen'ts  and  changes  of  the  period  between 
Autunin  1956  and  Spring  1988. 
Ill.  KADARIST  HUNGARY 
A.  JAnos  KAdAr's  Background: 
I 
Janos  Kzlidilr  nlay  be  described  as  tile  most  important  figure  in  post-war 
I  lungarian  politics.  as  both  a  leader  and  a  policy-maker.  I  lis  models  of  New 
I.  -I-onomic  Mechanism  and  Second  economylSeconcl  sociely  havc  become  the 
milestones  ol'  the  I  lungarian  economic  devc1opment  and  underdevelopmcnt. 95 
I  lis  leadership  and  policies  created  tile  framework  for  the  developments  in  the 
I  lungarian  political  lire  since  late  1956  to  date.  I  lis  leadership  period,  from  tile 
Autumn  oN  956  to  the  Spring  of  1988,  may  ideologically  be  labelled  under  the 
heading  of'  K(Wtirism  as  it  significs,  in  a  way,  a  different  attitude  towards 
socialism  compared  to  the  Soviet  model  itself  and  the  spin-offs  from  this 
model  implemented  in  other  East  European  countries.  Therefore,  to  understand 
the  present  political  agenda  of  Hungary,  one  has  to  consider  what  happened 
during  the  32  years  or  Kdddr-led  I  lungarian  Socialism.  Therefore,  in  order  to 
have  a  clearer  Picture  of  the  current  Hungarian  political  landscape  and  to  see 
ývhat  aff"ects  the  legitimacy  problem  in  the  current  political  order.  a  thorough 
study  of'  tile  developments,  policies  and  legitimation  techniques  of  the  KAddr 
cra  is  to  be  carried  out. 
J6nos  K66r.  a  typewriter  repairman  by  profession,  joined  the  Hungarian 
socialist  underground  movement  in  his  youth  and  remained  in  the  party 
structure  becoming  a  member  of  the  Politburo  of  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Party 
and  1roni  1948  to  1951,  serving  under  the  leadership  of  Matyas  RAkosi  as  tile 
Minister  of  Interior.  I  lowcvcr.  lie  spent  tile  period  1951-1953  in  prison  ror 
charges  of'  anti-Stalinisni.  Then,  in  1956,  lie  regained  his  place  in  tile 
nomenklatiti-a  and  became  a  Politburo  member. 
136ore  the  1956  uprising,  lie  was  "not  well-known  in  the  country  but,  where  lie 
was  kno-vvil.  rccognised  as  a  victim  of  the  Stalinist  trials  and  as  such  relied  on 
as  an  opponent  of  Stalinisni  -a  reasonably  popular  if  untried  new  Party 
Icader-74,  although  his  loyalty  to  Rdkosi  regime  as  one  of  its  cabinet  ministers 
74Willi,  llll  Shawcross,  Crime  and  Coninromisc:  Rings  Ud6r  and  the  Politics  of  llunga!  )ý  sincc  tile 
Revolutioii,  Weidenrield  and  Nicholson,  London:  1974,  p.  14. 96 
was  also  noted.  KAddr,  a  supporter  of  KhrLISIlCllCV'S  moderate  political 
approach,  was  in  Inirc  Nagy's  Politburo  in  late  1956.  He  was  also  the  only 
person  who  expressed  anger  towards  Yuri  Andropov,  then  tile  Soviet 
ambassador  to  I  lungary,  on  I  November  1956  meeting  of  Andropov  with  the 
Hungarian  politburo.  The  same  night,  KAddr  was  reading  a  declaration  in 
Radio  Kossulli  stating  that  "in  their  glorious  uprising  [tile  Hungarian]  people 
have  shaken  offthe  RAkosi  reginie"75. 
The  sanie  KidAr.  though,  abandoned  Nagy's  and  his  supporters'  side  and,  on 
4"'  of'  November  1956,  declared  the  formation  of  tile  Sovict-backed 
Revolulioniny  II,  'W-kei--PeasanI  Govei-nment  at  the  time  tile  Soviet  invasion 
began.  I  le  was  to  return  to  Budapest  in  a  Soviet  arnioured-vehicle  and  assume 
the  leadership  of'  the  Party  for  the  next  32  years  while  his  government 
colleagues  were  arrested  and  at  times  executed. 
With  the  overthrow  of  the  Nagy  administration,  a  new  communist  dictatorship 
was  set  up,  with  K6ddr  as  the  premier  and  head  of  the  renamed  and 
restructured  IhingaHan  Socialist  Woi-kcrs'  Parly  (I  ISWP),  the  replacement  for 
the  dcl'amed  and  by  then  notorious  Hungarian  Irorket-s'  Pai-ty.  Tile  Soviet 
administration  promptly  promised  $150  million  in  financial  aid  and  full 
Support  11or  the  new  Party  and  tile  new  administration  of  I  lungary.  Punishment 
of  insurgcnts  which  had  begun  immediately  arter  tile  Warsaw  Pact  troops' 
invasion  ot'l  lungary  continued  throughout  1957  and  1958,  and  thousands  were 
deported  to  the  USSR.  'Nagy's  promise  of  free  elections  was  broken  and  the 
only  elections  were  those  within  the  Communist  system,  that  is  with  single 
candiditcs  from  tile  same  party,  the  HSWP.  By  1960s,  Nagy  and  many  of  his 
75ibid..  p.  15. 97 
associates  had  been  executed.  In  the  meantime,  Cardinal  Mindszenty,  tile  head 
or  the  I  lungarian  Catholic  Church  who  played  a  role  in  the  short-lived 
liberalisation  period,  took  refuge  in  the  US  council  in  Budapest,  where  he 
remained  until  lie  was  permitted  to  leave  the  country  in  1971,  four  years  prior 
to  his  deatI116.  The  new  era  in  Hungarian  life  would  from  late  1956  onwards  be 
indexed  to  the  successes  anýl  failures  orone  key  political  figurc,  Jdnos  Kdddr. 
B.  K6dAr's  Party:  The  HSWP's  Developmental  Phases: 
The  I  Itnigarian  Socialist  Workers'  Party  (1-iSWP),  a  formation  that  emerged  on  Lý 
the  day  of  the  Soviet  intervention,  was,  at  least  theoretically,  a  creation  of 
Rims  K.  IdAr.  'File  I  lungarian  Workers'  Party  that  it  replaced  was  a  product  of 
the  harsh  Stalinist  line  as  was  its  leader,  Matyas  RAkosi.  The  new  formation,  or 
rather  the  old  party  with  a  new  name  and  a  facelift,  was,  on  the  other  liand,  an 
I  ofFspring  of'  a  softer  generation  of  communism.  The  softer  approach  of  the 
I  ISWII  in  comparison  with  I  IWP  owes  to  two  important  reasons.  Tile  first.  and 
domestie.  reason  is  the  impact  the  1956  uprising  had  on  the  communist  leaders 
or  I  lungary.  The  1956  events  were,  as  Terry  Cox  points  out,  the  first  mass 
challenge  to  a  communist  regime  since  the  first  years  of  Soviet  communism, 
and  "were  exceptional  in  giving  birth  to  a  sustained  mass  inowment  that 
brielly  promised  a  genuine  share  of  state  power  to  non-conuilunist  parties  and 
the  prospect  or  a  radical  restructuring  or  social  relations  and  institutions 
(III-OllgilOLIt  I  fungarian  society"77.  The  second,  and  international,  reason  is  that 
by  tile  tinle  I  ISWII  rcgained  control  of  the  country,  tile  Stalinist  terror  had 
ended  and  a  new.  more  tolerant  approach  represented  by  Nikita,  Khruslichev 
76  Gyorgy  Utvan  (ed.  ),  0.  it..  p.  205. 
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and  his  colleagues  had  replaced  it.  Jdnos  Kdddr,  leaming  from  the  mistakes  of 
his  predecessors,  adopted  a  far  more  toned  down  approach.  All  through  the 
three  and  a  hal  F  decades  or  its  existence,  the  lISWP  would  adopt  a  low-key 
approach  and  would  try  to  use  other  means  of  legitimation  than  to  use  or  to 
threat  to  use  coercion. 
Rudoll*  'PUs  argues  for,  a  three-phase  course  in  tile  Hungarian  Socialist 
Workers*  llarty*s  evolution.  According  to  ToWs.  the  I  ISWP  began,  as  all  other 
Communist  parties,  as  a  winguar(I  party,  then  adopted  a  syslem-management 
mode.  and  at  the  end.  becarne  a  i-eurguar(l  party.  In  the  vanguw-d  mode,  the 
I  ISWP  assurned  tile  role  or  an  institution  providing  guidance  and  leadership  to 
the  nation.  The  party,  in  this  stage,  strengthened  its  political  power,  re- 
designed  property  relations  in  thc  country,  mobiliscd  society,  and,  employed 
the  coercive  forces  ofthe  state  to  gain  public  compliance.  During  that  first 
phase  which  was  between  late  1956  and  1962-1963,  T;  jkds  claims  that  the 
party  administration  rid  itself  of  its  opponents,  both  Stalinists  and  radical 
re  lo  rin  -seekers.  and  created  an  ideological  framework  for  its  existence. 
The  Udzir  administration's  aim  was  to  diri*crentiate  itself  from  the  Stalinism 
just  like  the  20th  Congress  of  Soviet  Union  Communist  Party78  and  to 
0 
convince  the  masses  that  it  was  a  legitimate  institution.  The  vanguard  phasc 
was.  then.  in  a  way,  a  stage  of  gaining  legitimacy  by  use  of  force  and  by 
proving  that  there  were  no  alternatives  to  the  systcni.  The  restoration  of  power 
was  also  based  on  seeking  an  agreement  with  the  I  lungarian  people.  KAddr's 
1961  phrase,  I  le  who  is  not  against  us,  is  with  us-  really  describes  tile  mood 
78  Rudoll-FOUs.  I  lunuai-N.  's  Ncuotiatcd  Revolution,  Cambridge  Uni.  Press,  Cambridge,  England:  1996, 
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of  the  new  system  and  of  its  search  of  legitimacy.  The  urgent  requirement  in 
this  stage,  though,  was  not  public  legitimation,  but  was  to  be  seen  as  all  entity 
the  I  lungarian  people  had  to  learn  to  live  with  and  which  would  not  threaten 
liVCS  01'  tile  Hungarians  unless  another  rebellious  movement  took  place.  Tile 
search  11or  compromise  begins  in  tile  first  phase  of  the  Kdddr  administration, 
but  it  is  only  in  the  systein-managenicrit  phase  that  tile  famous  KAddrist 
compromise  and  KAddrist  social  and  economic  contract  appear.  A  discussion 
oil  the  impact  of  these  on  legitimacy  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  section  on  civil 
society  tinder  KA&r  or  this  chapter. 
The  second  phase.  tile  sjsleni-nianagemenl  period,  began  in  early  1960s  to  last 
until  tile  end  of'  1970s.  By  the  early  1960s,  political  power  secure,  tile  Party 
was  reorganised.  tile  'security  belt'  organisations  such  as  tile  Young 
Communist  League  or  the  trade  unions  were  revitaliscd,  the  political 
opposition  -nationalist  and  Stalinist  alike-  were  eliminated  and  hence  tile 
system  seemed  to  be  immune  to  another  rebellion.  In  tile  SYsIeni-mantigement 
mode.  tile  I  ISWP  began  to  emphasise  tile  diffiercrice  between  the  Party  and  tile 
State  and  gradually  lell  the  roles  of  economic  management  to  the  state 
oil  icials.  I  lo,,  %,  evcr.  this  policy  was  aimed  at  giving  the  IlSWP  less  emphasis  in 
public  relations.  By  diminishing  the  level  of  contact  between  the  Party  aýd  the 
public  by  locating  the  state  mechanism  instead  of  the  Party  mechanisms  in 
issues  directly  related  to  public  life,  such  as  the  management  of  economics,  the 
role  ol'the  state  was  redc1lined.  'rhe  airn  in  this  policy  was  to  channel  any  sort 
of  public  discontent  away  from  the  IlSWP  to  the  organs  of  state.  As  a  result,  if 
economic  policies  faltered,  the  bureaucracy  and  not  the  IlSWP  would  be 
blamed  as  the  Party  would  attribute  the  failure  to  economic  policy  makers. 100 
I  lowever,  due  to  the  fact  that  key  figUres  in  the  HSWP  were  also  key  figures  in 
the  state  bureaucracy,  the  control  or  the  Party  has  not  diminished  over  the  state 
mechanism.  A  decrease  in  Party  control  over  the  state  sought  to  redefine  the 
basic  tenets  ol'communist  state  systern  in  which  tile  communist  party  and  the 
state  Nvere  interactive  as  their  structures  and  perfon-nances  overlapped  as  the 
construction  ol*a  DNA  spiral. 
Oil  tile  other  hand.  according  to  T6kds.  the  decrease  in  the  superficial  Party 
involvement  in  (lie  administnition  may  be  linked,  to  tile  flailure  of  the  rerornis 
to  create  the  expected  development.  In  such  a  case,  the  Party  has  few 
alternatives  Such  as  returning  to  the  use  of  Stalinist  methods  that  it  inight. 
exercise  in  a  very  limited  manner  not  to  cause  a  new  public  outburst,  or  try 
new  reforms.  11'ricither  works,  T6kds  argues,  tile  Party  sought  to  disassociate 
itseir  cron,  tile  Cailurcs,  attributing  the  blame  to  the  state.  'rhis  would  lead  the 
Party  into  a  new  phase  in  its  developmental  scale,  namely  the  rearguar(I  phase. 
The  filikire  in  achieving  tile  economic  objectives,  especially  in  the 
commitment  to  the  expectations  DIP  (dognal'  i  peregmil  -  catch  tip  and 
Surpass)  policy  which  was  a  product  of  tile  21st  Soviet  Communist  Party 
Congress  o  1'  19587".  brought  the  H  SWP  into  tile  rearguardphase. 
The  rearguard  mode  "is  dcsigncd  to  gain  time  for  organisational  self- 
ýxamination,  policy  reassessment,  and  the  orderly  re-deploynient  of  the  party's 
personnel  resources  to  non-party  entiti&'80.  In  this  phase,  emphasis  is  placed 
oil  tile  bold  and  charismatic  leadership,  on  tile  party's  retreat  from  the  political 
71)  ibid..  p.  92. 
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scene  as  direct  manager  of  public  policies,  and,  on  the  new  'contract'  between 
the  party  and  tile  low-ranking  members  of  tile  nomenklatura. 
TOWs  claims  that  at  tile  end  of  this  phase,  the  party  beconles  a  "helpless 
captive  oi'a  system  ol'its  own  creation*',  because  the  military  shifts  its  loyalty 
Crom  the  Party  to  the  state.  expertise  outweighs  party  membership,  and 
economy  takes  over  from  idýology  in  the  conduct  or  foreign  affairs  of  the  state. 
Thus.  the  party  becomes  a  follower  of  developments  in  the  country  rather  than 
being  the  creator  of*  the  agenda.  'nic  events  that  took  place  in  the  country  f1rorn 
late  1970s  onwards  may  be  seen  as  an  example  or  such  a  lose  of  control. 
I  lowever.  it  is  also  true  that  ideological  loyalty  to  the  Party  was  a  key  element 
in  obtaining  and  prescrving  prorcssional  positions.  Ergo,  T6kds's  argurnent  L- 
that  the  party  becomes  an  outcast  in  its  own  systern  is  not  sound.  That  the 
I  ISWP  has  lost  its  ideological  integrity  and  commitment  to  create  ail  ideal 
communist  state  and  that  it  appeared  to  provide  solutions  to  the  economic  and 
social  probicnis  is  true,  however.  that  tile  Party  was  not  in  command  and 
control  ol"  tile  developments  in  the  country  and  that  its  leadership  lost  its  edgc 
to  provide  new  solutions  to  tile  problems,  are  not  true.  One  Must  bear  in  mind 
that  the  secon(I  econoinylsecond  socOy  model  came  into  existence  during 
what  TOUs  labels  tile  rearguard  phase  and  this  model  provided  a  inajjor 
hIlluence  in  the  transition  to  dernocracy  and  oil  the  expectations  of  the 
I  linigarian  people  from  democracy. 
This  said,  (lie  lailure  or  tic  system-managemcnt  phase  is  undeniable.  T6kds 
links  it  to  the  railure  in  flic  New  Economic  Akehanism  (NEM)  policy, 
introdLICed  in  1968.  following  the  New  Course  approach  introduced  in  1961,  at 
the  OLIUSO  of  (lie  Kdddr  regime.  The  NEM  introduced  the  concept  of 102 
consumerism  to  a  society  in  which  98%  of  tile  nicans  of  production  were  state- 
owned.  Given  the  lack  of  economic  expertise  in  the  Politburo  members,  the 
failure.  combined  with  tile  state  monopoly  over  the  production,  was 
unavoidable.  By  the  end  of  1970s,  the  systcrn  was  struggling  to  prevent 
I  lungary  from  folding  down  under  the  combined  burdens  of  the  state's 
external  debts  and  the  Party's  railure  to  provide  what  it  promised  in  its  social 
contract  with  the  people.  TUds'  observation  is  true  but  odd  as  he  doesn't 
believe  in  the  existence  ol'a  social  contract  between  KddAr  and  his  citizenry. 
I  le  sees  the  I'ailure  of  this  phase  as  the  beginning  or  the  beginning  or  political 
rcilorni-seek-ing  in  the  society  and  links  the  secondsociely  idea  to  this  failure. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  one  disregards  'r6kds  on  the  issue  of  social  contract, 
combining  Ilis  idea  of  rearguard  policies  or  tiie  IISWP  with  tile  second 
econonty  concept,  thesetting  is  applicable  to  I  lungary.  With  the  acceptance  of 
-a  KAdArist  social  contract,  the  rcarguard  phase  in  the  IISWP  history  becomes 
an  attainable  idea.  I  believe  that  KAddr  has  ofTered  a  series  or  compromises 
1'rom  the  top.  bellore  these  were  demanded  by  the  public,  and  these 
compromises  constitute  a  scrics  of  ccononlic  conccssions  from  the  Party  to  the 
people  in  exchange  or  their  obedience.  The  KAddrist  social  contract,  therefore, 
is  not  a  single  contract.  but  a  continuum  orquitlin-o  quo  policies  based  6n  the 
exchange  ol'  a  rise  in  welfare  with  political  obedience.  That  the  economic 
rellorms  of'  1960s  failed  do  not  and  should  not  lead  us  to  tile  conclusion  that  tile 
Party  has  become  a  rearguard  organisation  itself.  Unlike  in  Poland  where  tile 
communist  party  became  politically  rearguard  and  was  -Icft  as  a  niere 
reactionary  to  the  political  developments  which  were  led  by  outside  forces, 
especially  the  Solidarity  n1ovemcnt,  the  IISWP  remained  in  control  of  tlic 103 
political  agenda  as  long  as  the  international  agenda  permitted  for  the  continuity 
of'  the  siums  quo.  Thcrellore,  one  should  not  take  a  shill  in  tile  Party  policies 
which  allowed  the  introduction  of  various  economic  concessions  serving  the 
same  end  as  the  Party  losing  control  of  tile  events  in  Hungarian  social  and 
economic  lil'e. 
The  change  in  the  key  bureaucratic  positions  at  managerial  level  from  an  older 
generation  to  a  younger  generation  is  seen  as  another  important  point  in  the 
change.  TOUs  argues  that  professional  ism  was  preferred  rather  than  party 
membership  in  bureaucracy.  Fle  reaches  the  conclusion  that  by  the  1980s, 
I  lungarian  social  structure  was  thoroughly  difilerent  from  the  origins  or  ttic 
regime.  The  rise  in  social  mobility  and  hence  in  social  stratification  according 
to  prollession.  educational  background,  involvement  in  tile  second  economy 
and  the  like  are  also  seen  as  factors  that  created  a  blueprint  for  the  Hungarian 
civil  society. 
F'rvin  Laszlo  takes  another  approach.  He  sees  the  development  or  communism 
in  I  lungary  in  four  stages.  Tile  first  is  the  period  qf  iransition,  covering  the 
time  bet,,  veen  1945  and  1948,  from  the  Soviet  'liberation'  of  Hungary  from 
Nazi  invasion  to  the  communist  take-over  of  power  afIcr  the  1948  elections. 
The  second  phase  is  tile  Gleichschallung  period  (1949-1956)  in  whA  tile 
communists  under  l6kosi's  leadership  tried  to  suppress  and  eliminate  all 
politieal  opposition  by  harsh  Stalinist  methods.  The  final  outcome  of  this  cra 
%vas  tile  1956  uprising  during  which  Nagy  became  tile  leader  of  the  country, 
the  Soviets  invadcd  Hungary,  and  KAddr  became  the  new  leader  of  the  new 
communist  party.  re-labellcd  as  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Workers'  Party.  These 
developments  were  rollowed  by  tile  pet-iod  qfmoi-ienlalion  (1957-1960)  as  the 104 
regime  tried  to  re-establish  itself  through  ideological  orthodoxy  and 
SLIppreSSiOII.  That  period  would  transform  itself  into  the  perio(I  of 
libei-tilisulion  firom  1961  to  the  end,  and,  during  that  period  one  can  see  the 
KMAr  regime  struggling  to  redefine  itself  as  can  be  seen  in  the  introduction  of 
the  New  COUrse  in  1961  and  in  the  implementation  or  the  New  Economic 
Meelianism  in  196881. 
Both  approaches  see  a  similar  logic  behind  the  development  of  the  HSWP. 
Flie  driving  lorce  behind  this  logic  was  a  desire  to  retain  political  power  while 
seeking  domestic  legitimacy.  Both  the  success  and  Failure  of  KddAr's  Party 
steni  From  the  very  reason  of  trying  to  reach  that  aim  within  a  limited 
capability  ol'acting  in  a  limited  operational  space.  Tile  limitation  comes  from 
the  dual  nature  or  its  rcsponsibilitics  which  it  has  to  perform  to  satisry  both  the 
USSR  and  tile  I  lungarian  nation  to  prevcnt  a  repetition  or  1956. 
C.  The  Question  of  System: 
The  above-mentioned  lines  of  development,  and  especially  the  general 
departure  ol'  K6ddr  From  the  policies  followed  and  implemented  by  his 
predecessor  RAkosi.  invites  questions  concerning  the  nature  of  the  KAdAr 
regime.  It  is  generally  accepted  that  -any  state  socialist  system  is  actually 
totalitarian  in  nature.  This  belief  classifies  the  Sovict-type  state  socialism, 
regardless  ol'period  or  country.  under  the  heading  lotalilaHan.  I  lowevcr,  if  we 
can  site  a  social  contract,  or  at  least  a  quasi-social  contract.  between  the 
Uddrist  administration  and  the  Hungarian  nation,  then  the  systern  perhaps 
should  not  be  ref  . erred  to  as  totalitarian. 
HIErvin  Laszlo.  'rhe  Communist  Ideology  in  Ilunga!  3!,  D.  Rcidcl  Publishing  Co.,  Dordrecht,  lioland: 
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l'otalitarianism  canic  into  use  in  the  20"'  century,  firstly  to  describe  thc  Italian 
111scism,  despite  similar  precedents  in  history.  Critics  of  authoritarianism  began 
to  use  the  term  to  describe  the  three  systems  that  are  fundamentally  against 
democratic  pluralism.  nanicly  Nazism,  communism,  and  Italian  fascism.  After 
World  War  11.  the  term  began  to  imply  Stalinist  communist  963.  *rule  and 
I-C111,611CLI  to  describe  state  socialist  reginies  of'  Eurasia.  The  greatcst, 
contribution  to  tile  issue  canic  from  Carl  J.  Friedrich  who  gave  five  factors  that. 
constittacd  or  justified  Ilic  labcl  'totalitarian'  in  the  Tolalilai-icinism 
Cmilerence  of*  1953.  Later,  when  he  published  the  book  titled  Totalitarian 
Dictatorship  and  Autocracy  in  1956  with  the  co-authorship  of  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski.  tile  number  ol'factors  rose  to  six  for  Friedrich  and  Brzczinski  had 
considered  communism  as  tile  real  modcl  for  totalitarian  rule  since  tile  Nazis 
wcre  del'eated.  The  six  factors  that  made  a  regime  totalitarian  according  to 
Friedrich  and  13rzezinski  were: 
1.  An  ol'ficial  ideology  focused  on  a  perfect  Final  state  of  the  hurnan  race,  to 
which  everyone  is  supposed  to  be  devoted. 
2.  A  single  mass  party  usually  symbolised  by  or  subordinated  to  one  person. 
I'lic  party  has  a  hierarchical  structure  and  is  considered  to  be  superior  to  or 
united  with  the  state  bureaucracy. 
3.  A  technologically  advanced,  near-compicte  monopoly  or  ti,  c  coercive 
weapons  by  that  party  and  the  bureaucracy  subordinated  to  it. 
4.  A  complete  or  aiiiiost  complete  monopoly  of  tllc  nicans  of  mass 
communication. 
5.  A  central  control  of  and  direction  over  the  entire  econonly. 106 
6.  A  system  ofphysical  or  psychological  control  by  use  of  terror.  82 
According  to  these,  the  Stalinist  RAkosi  reginic  proves  to  be  totalitarian. 
I  lowever.  ir  one  takes  into  account  the  1956  uprising  and  its  consequenees  for 
the  political  leadership  of  Hungary  and  of  the  USSR,  one  expects  changes 
From  the  line  11ollowed  by  the  RAkosi  administration  under  the  rule  or  JAnos 
Kild6r. 
When  we  analyse  Kiliddrist  policies,  it  is  obvious  that  there  is,  at  least  in  the 
theoretical  level  which  does  not  reflect  on  the  execution  level,  therc  is  a  belief 
on  a  perflect  final  state  or  human  race.  It  is  the  basic  communist  belief  that  the 
ideology  ol'the  system  burgcons  from,  thcrcfore  it  is  normal  that  it  is  present  in 
the  K,,  1(16rist  system  of  administration  as  well.  Tile  existence  of  a  single  party 
under  the  control  of  one  person  is  also  present  and  is  united  with  the  state 
bUreaueracy  as  111LICII  as  to  be  seen  identical  to  it.  There  also  is  a  state  /  Party 
monopoly  over  the  coercive  weapons  and  mass  media,  so  tile  third  and  fourth 
requirements  ol'a  totalitarian  reginic  are  fulfilled  by  KAdAr's  I  ISWP. 
Control  over  the  entire  ceonomy  exists  in  the  KAddrist  system,  as  well.  uic 
entire  economy  was  centrally  planned  in  KIddr*s  administration  as  well  as  it 
was  under  l6kosi's.  The  iater  stages  ot  the  K66rist  regime,  though,  may  be 
taken  as  a  diversion  from  the  mainstream  totalitarian  rule  over  ccot6iiic 
activities.  It'  one  accepts  the  argument  or  Alec  Now  that  "therc  is  not  and 
cannot  be  a  political  economy  of  socialiSM,  "83  the  Mdarist  attempts  to  create  a 
socialist  market  cconoiny,  the  so-called  goulash  socialism  (to  be  discussed  in 
82  F.  ugene  Kamenka,  'Totalitarianism,  '  in  Robert  E.  Goodin  and  Philip  Petit  (ed.  s),  A  Companion  to 
Philosophy,  Blackwell,  Oxford,  England,  1993,  p.  632. 
L' 
83  Alec  Nove.  The  Economics  of  I-elsiblc  Socialism  Revisited  (2""  ed.  ).  Ilarper-Collins  Academic, 
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this  chapter  and  in  Chapter  Four)  appears  to  be  a  contradiction  to  one  of  the 
main  principles  of  the  totalitarian  rule.  The  socialist  system  cannot  have  a 
political  economy  because,  according  to  many  scholars  of  socialism,  including 
BUkharin.  llrcobrazliensky,  and  Stepanov,  political  economy  analyses  the 
unorganised  national  economy  and  is  unsuitable  for  an  economy  which  is 
adJusted  by  a  consciously,  made  plan84.  Thus,  one  may  argue  that  by  the 
introduction  or  goulash  socialism,  creating  ail  anarchical  economy  coexisting 
with  the  centrally-planned  economy,  Jdnos  Kdddr  has,  created  a  diversion  from 
tile  orthodox  totalitarian  organisation  and  took  the  administration  of  the 
economy  1rorn  a  totalitarian  socialist  form  and  transl'ormed  it  into  a  quasi- 
socialist  and  quasi  -total  i  tarian  form.  However,  under  KddAr  the  economy  was 
mostly  based  on  central-planning  and  hence,  tile  economic  system,  even  with 
some  diversity  1roni  the  original  blueprint,  may  still  be  considered  totalitarian 
in  nature. 
Under  these  circumstances,  one  can  say  that  five  out  of  the  six  requirements 
pronounced  by  Friedrich  and  Brzezinski  exist  in  the  KAddrist  regime. 
Consequently.  tile  K6dar  administration  may  be  generally  branded  totalitarian. 
I  lowever,  there  is  a  sixth  clenicnt  aniong  the  requirements  of  Friedrich  and 
Brzezinski  vis-ä-vis  a  regiiiic's  totalitarianisni,  naniely,  a  system  of  phýsical 
or  psychological  control  by  use  of  terror.  Hannah  Arendt  clainis  that  'total 
terror'  is  the  main  component  of  total  itarianisn185  while  Franz  Neumann  argues 
that  total  itarianisin  is  the  most  repressive  of  political  systems  and  its  main 
characteristics  are  "the  destruction  of  the  line  bct%vccn  state  and  society  and  the 
84  N.  Ilukharin.  Ekonomika  Perekhodnogo  Perioda  (Moscow,  1920)  citcd  in  ibid.,  pp.  13-14. 108 
total  politicisation  of  society  by  the  device  of  the  monolithic  party"86  and  that 
the  society  "is  totally  permeated  by  political  power.  "  87  By  this,  Neumann 
means  that  individuals  become  ingested  within  the  system  as  society  loses  all 
independence.  and  hence  individuals  become  subject  to  control  and 
manipulation  more  easily".  It  is  obvious  from  the  events  of  the  Autumn  of 
1956  that  the  processes  or  mass  mobilisation  and  terrorisation  of  the  society 
1'requently  used  by  the  R.  Ikosi  administration  had  provcn  un  prod  ticti  ve.  Undcr 
. 
16nos  MiXtr's  rLIle.  especially  from  early  1960s  onwards,  there  exists  a  regime 
that  declares  "those  who  are  not  against  us  is  with  Lls"89  and  it  is  a  regime,  as 
will  be  discussed  below,  which  chooses  social  contract  -or  economic 
briberýv--  to  terrorising  the  masses.  As  the  sixth  requirement  is  a  key  feature 
xvith  regards  to  people's  lives,  one  may  claim  that  KAddr's  way  of  leading 
I  lungary  may  not  be  considered  to  be  totalitarian  in  the  entirety  of  the  meaning 
the  term  suggests. 
I  Ising  tile  term  aullimilarian  sometimes  used  to  refer  to  this  sort  of  a  quasi- 
permissive  totalitarian  administration  seerns  unsuitable.  Since  the  use  of  the 
term  'authoritarian'  by  Jane  Kirkpatrick  in  delining  right-wing  and  Westcrn 
Bloc-member  despotie  reginies  as  opposed  to  'totalitarian'  which  she  used  to 
describe  lefli-xving  and  Eastern  Illoc-niernber  despotic  regirnes.  the  term 
authoritarian  is  used  to  define  right-wing  autocracies  thus  unsuitable  for 
defining  KidArist  reginic. 
85  See  Ilinnah  Arendt's  The  Oritains-of  Total  itarianism  (2  cd..  Meridian,  Nc%v  York:  1958)  for  a 
detailed  discussion  ol'thc  subject. 
86  Franz  Neumann.  ]  lie  Democratic  and  the  Authoritarian  State,  The  Free  Press:  Glencoe,  1957,  p.  245. 
87  lbid..  1).  2,14. 
John  J.  Schwartmantel.  Structures  or  Power.  Whcatshcaf  Books,  Brighton,  England:  1987,  p.  2  10. 
Andrew  Felkay.  I  Greenwood 
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Thudore.  it  may  be  argued  that  Kdddr's  regime  was  totalitarian  in  its  core, 
lio%%,  c%,  cr  it  did  not  comply  with  two  important  aspects  of  the  definition  or  a 
totalitarian  regime,  hence  making  it  a  quasi  -total  itari  an  regime  as  opposed  to 
the  total  Stalinist  total  i  tarianism  of  Rdkosi  era  in  Hungary.  The  difference  in 
the  implementation  of  the  rules  of  the  system  under  K6ddr's  rule  stemmed 
1'rom  tile  socio-political  oýitcomes  or  tile  1956  uprising.  Consequently,  tile 
Kikkir  regime  was  diffierent  in  tcrms  of  its  foundation  Crom  its  predecessor  and 
therd'ore  brought  along  a  new  kind  of'  socialist  system  to  the  Eastern  Bloc, 
working  as  if*  a  balancing  act  betwcen  tlic  rcquircmcilts  of  socialist 
administration  and  the  needs  and  dernands  of  a  resentful  nation. 
IV.  THE  ISSUE  OF  LEGITIMACY 
A.  A  Balancing  Act: 
The  system  in  I  lungary,  therefore,  suffered  frorn  a  dilcrnma  of  balancing 
loyalties  since  the  beginning.  While  under  tile  rule  of  the  post-war  communist 
regime  Icd  by  Rdkosi  loyalty  was  to  Stalin  and  the  Stalinist  pattern  of 
socialism  rather  than  to  the  I  lungarian  people.  Under  KddAr's  rule.  flic  balance 
alternated  in  order  to  adjIust  to  the  changes  in  the  domestic  front  and  in  the 
Kremlin.  The  ainn  in  this  balancing  act  was  to  secure  the  positions  of  the 
ruling  elite.  I  lo%N-cvcr,  any  such  changes  can  result  in  political  instability  that 
limits  the  acts  ofthe  ruling  regime. 
RudolUra6s  identifies  the  key  domestic  policy  dilemmas  of  K6ddr  regime 
through  its  rule  ol'flaur  decades  as  follows: 
a)  accumulation  of  political  legitimacy; 
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c)  social  engineering; 
d)  political  stcering,  and, 
e)  keeping  ideological  liarniony9O. 
Securing  regime  legitimacy  is  the  most  important  or  these  as  it  forms  the  basis 
of'  tile  other  points.  The  use  of  sheer  coercion,  as  proven  by  the  Rdkosi 
experiment.  is  not  a  problem  eliminator  in  the  Hungarian  case  though  it  may 
appear  to  be  a  problem  solver  in  the  short-run.  Thus,  tile  regime  had  to 
legitimise  itscl  f  and  in  so  by  avoiding  the  use  of  slicer  coercion  and  avoiding  to 
upset  the  USSR  administration. 
K,  'tdArism  is  thereflore  a  delicate  balancing  act.  This  issue  will  be  addressed  in 
further  detail  in  tile  flollowing  parts  ortiis  chapter. 
B.  KAdArisation: 
Charles  Gati  sees  tile  process  of  reconciliation  in  Hungary  as  a  product  of,  and 
a  proeess  initiated  by.  Jdnos  KAdAr  and  identifies  it  as  K6ddrisalion.  He  points 
out  that  rather  than  perrorming  structural  changcs,  what  KAddrist  regime  did 
was  simply  to  develop  a  set  of  political  otýjcctivcs  aimed  at  maintaining  power 
while  avoiding  more  vigorously  ideological  political  prograninics  seen  in  other 
East  European  countries.  In  due  course,  the  reginic  tolcratcd  religion  and 
material  ambitions  of  its  subjects  as  long  as  these  sustained  tile  regime's 
approval  by  the  people.  The  main  idea  was  to  reach  the  socialist  nian  "who  is 
Unselfishly  dedicated  to  that  which  is  good  for  society,  but  in  the  meantime  the 
system  accepts  and  works  with  a  population  considerably  less  perfect  than  tile 
ideal  type"' 
90  I'Okds.  pp.  cit..  1).  1. 
')ICharles  Gali.  I  lunggy  and  the  Soviet  Bloc,  Duke  University  Press,  Durharn,  US:  1986,  pp.  160-16  1. The  First  step  or  Uddrisation  was  the  oppression  of  the  opposition  in  tile  wake 
of'  the  1956  uprising.  but  tile  real  Kdddrist  era  began  in  the  early  1960s.  In 
1961.  K6d,  ir  was  able  to  make  changes  in  his  cabinet  and  remove  most  of  the 
remaining  Stalinists.  By  replacing  them  with  Khrushchevite  reformers,  he  was 
strengthening  the  link  bctwcen  his  cadrcs  and  the  Sovict  administration.  His 
speech  at  the  22"d  Congress  of  the  Soviet  Communist  Party  was  aimed  at 
enipliasising  the  negative  aspects  of  the  cult  of  personality,  a  means  of 
legitimation  used  by  both  Stalin  and  Rdkosi.  Aftcr  rrceing  himsclf  rrorn 
suspicion.  lie  initiated  his  campaign  against  RAkosi,  forming  a  commission  to 
inspect  RAkosi*s  crinics  during  his  reign.  KAddr's  position  with  regards  to 
R-6kosi  and  Stalinism  gained  public  approval,  which  was  vital  in  establishing  a 
basis  Ilor  legitimacy  for  Kddir's  new  regime.  To  quote  Andrew  Felkay, 
"KilklAr  was  well  aware  ol'the  truism  that  the  more  people 
flound  themselves  in  agreement  with  him,  the  less  they  would 
oppose  him.  With  this  in  mind,  he  formulated  the  Party's 
"alliance-  policies  and  summed  up  his  approach  at  a  People's 
Front  meeting,  by  restoring  116kosi's  dictum  "Those  who  arc 
not  with  us  are  against  us,  "  to  "Those  who  are  not  against  us 
are  with  us.  '*...  I  le  believed  that  there  was  no  need  for 
individuals  to  overtly  proclaim  their  loyalty  so  long  as  they 
(lid  not  challenge  tile  Party's  supremacy  and  tile  country's 
link  with  the  Soviet  Union.  lie  held  the  view  that  tile  regime 
must  provide  people  with  opportunities  to  improve  their  lives. 
..  ()2 
Otherwise.  there  would  be  no  chance  of  survival  for  the  KAddrist 
regime  and  of*  preventing  social  disturbances.  Even  though  tile  main  source  of 
legitimacy  11or  Kidar  in  tile  early  period  of  his  rule  was  the  Soviet  military 
presence.  the  threat  to  use  coercive  means  of  the  state,  these  alone  would  not 
be  enough  to  keep  the  regime  in  power  in  the  long-run.  People  needed  to  have 
92Andrcw  Felkay.  LILipply-ii-ILd 
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holic  ror  their  ruture  and  needed  to  see  that  those  who  provoked  the  1956 
evellts  were  removed  from  power.  Kddir  gave  them  both  with  his  Neiv  Course 
policy.  From  September  1961  onwards  Kdddr  removed  tile  remnants  of  Rdkosi 
regime  from  poN%,  cr  and  the  administration  sought  a  peaceful  coexistence,  if  not 
an  alliance,  Nvith  the  public. 
The  next  step.  in  KAddr's  course  to  gain  legitimacy,  was  to  bcgh!  to  convince 
the  I  lungarian  public  opinion  that  the  new  socialist  rcgime  was  different  than 
the  previous  one  and  that  it  thought  of  the  welfare  of  the  public.  KAddrist 
regime  ainied  at  reaching  this  end  was  to  work  on  the  improvement  of  the 
I  lungarian  economy  and  ensure  that  every  sector  gained  more  from  the  general 
improvement. 
TO  SLIIII  tip.  Uddr's  reginic  ticcded  to  brihe  people  to  convince  them  to 
support  the  new  rcginic  and  KAdAr  did  just  that.  With  a  rcalistic  re- 
arrangement  ol*  agricultural  policy,  which  allowed  private  owncrship  of 
household  land  with  Canning  rights,  agricultural  production  improved  slowly 
but  steadily.  By  mid-1963.  flic  'houschold  plots'  wcrc  producing  50%  of  milk, 
40%  or  pork  and  fat.  60%  of  poultry  and  egg.  30%  or vegetable  and  fruit,  and 
SLIpported  38%  of  the  cattle  while  they  covered  10.6%  of  the  arable  land  and 
28.5'/"'o  of'  vineyardSO.  At  the  same  time,  foreign  trade  was  ernpliasised.  and 
both  trade  and  touristic  relations  with  the  West  began. 
I'lic  new  approach  or  tile  KAdArist  regime  showed  it  in  political  scale,  as  well: 
In  March  1963,  an  aninesty  was  announced  for  the  refugees  of  1956,  prisoners 
convicted  flor  their  activity  in  1956  uprising,  war  criminals  -who  had  served 
o.  vo-thirds  of'  their  sentenccs,  and  rormcr  Stalinists.  This  amnesty  was  to 113 
demonstrate  tile  rcgirne*s  tolerance  for  opposition  and  different  thinking.  An 
agreement  with  tile  Vatican  on  15  September  1964  regulated  the  position  of 
(lie  Catholic  Church  in  Hungary.  That  would  also  contribute  to  the  public 
perccption  ol'KddAr. 
All  these  domestic  activities,  therefore,  aimed  at  two  main  purposes:  a)  to 
develop  an  image  of  Kdddr  as  a  tolerant,  understanding  and  hence  tolerable 
leader.  and.  b)  to  prove  that  socialism  was  not  unbearable  as  a  regime  and  that 
g  it  might  even  lead  to  sorne  individual  gains  if  one  did  not  overtly  oppose  the 
system.  '['here  were  t-wo  main  policies  to  prove  these.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
K.  I&Irist  regime  was  struggling  against  tile  Stalinists  and  Nagy-supporters.  Tile 
claim  was  that  they  were  revisionists,  and  therefore  ideologieally  inapprovable. 
The  I  lungarian  Socialist  Workers'  Party  bureaux  and  Evening  Schools  were  to 
have  a  2-year  special  course  in  addition  to  their  one-year  course  on  ideology  so 
that  these  points  Nvere  made  clear  in  people's  minds.  On  the  other  hand, 
liberalisition  in  tile  economic  and  social  spheres  was  aimed  at  eliminating 
dogmatist  Stalinism  and  assuring  public  opinion  that  tile  system  was  tolerant 
enough  within  the  firaniework  of  the  socialist  system. 
In  cillect.  that  mcant  'we  do  whatever  we  can,  '  a  message  aimed  at  the 
I  lunprian  IlLiblic  opinion,  showing  that  the  new  administration  was  willing  to 
make  changes  as  long  as  these  changes  were  not  obstructed  by  the  Soviet 
administration.  The  expulsion  of  Mosi  and  Gcr6  from  the  Party  and  the 
investigations  against  theni  was  an  attempt  of  reconciliation.  With  public 
sympathy  still  with  Nagy  and  his  colleagues,  the  expulsion  of  the  two  from  the 
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Party  aimed  at  showing  the  public  that  tile  new  HSWP  administration  cared  for 
what  happened  in  1956. 
Accordingly.  tile  KAdArist  attempts  to  gain  legitimacy,  except  the  first  four 
years  oi'  firm  oppression  that  followed  the  1956  uprising,  may  be  labelled  as 
populist  practices.  The  compromise  was  between  a  regime  that  sought  not  the 
direct  involvement  of  its  sutýjects  to  the  fulfilment  of  its  ideological  olýjectives, 
but  their  silent  support.  The  perception  of  support  here,  indeed,  is  in  the  form 
ol'  not  directly  challenging  the  systern  bearing  in  mind  that  full  and  voluntary 
co-operation  is  out  of  the  question.  People  supported  the  KAdAr  regime  by 
remaining  indifferent  to  who  rules  the  land  and  by  what  ideological  tendencies, 
ýNliile  seeking  inaterial  improvements.  So,  a  clear  quid  pi-o  quo  strategy  can 
summarise  the  Kdddrist  regime's  relationship  with  the  people  it  ruled  as  far  as 
tile  domestic  political  relationships  are  concerned.  Surely,  all  this  depended  oil 
the  developments  in  international  politics. 
At  this  point,  one  must  remember  that  tile  Kdd6rist  choice  of  interacting  with 
the  public  is  a  breakthrough.  Although  the  system  appears  to  be  a  normal  quid 
pro  quo  relationship  within  tile  Western  nornis  of  political  interaction,  it  is  not 
so  in  the  socialist  system.  As  discussed'previously  in  this  thesis  (see  part  II.  A.  2 
in  Chapter  I'Nvo).  the  socialist  systcrn  legitimiscs  itscir  lot  within  tile 
1'ramework  ol'a  the  i-ttlei-s  and  the  i-ided  relationship  but  within  the  framework 
of*  a  the  nilem  und  the  ridem  relationship.  That  means,  in  the  rest  or  the 
Eastern  Illoc  and  in  I  lungary  before  Kdddr,  tile  socialist  administration  sought 
to  legitirnise  itseir  vis-a-vis  the  bureaucracy  rather  than  vis-a-vis  public 
opinion.  As  the  party  justified  itself  to  tile  bureaucracy  and  vice  versa,  the 
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to  after  this  legitimation  process  by  introducing  ordinary  people's  opinion  into 
the  general  framework  of'  political  system.  This  difTers  Kdddr  from  all  other 
leaders  of'  the  Eastern  Bloc,  for  lie  is  the  only  East  European  leader  who 
managed  to  seek  public  approval  as  well  as  approval  from  the  ruling  elite  and 
tile  Soviet  administration.  Both  Nagy  in  Hungary  in  1956  and  Dubcck  in 
Czechoslovakia  in  1968  disrcgardcd  the  ruling  elite's  (and  Soviet)  approval 
and  wanted  to  have  only  popular  consent  and  Icgitiniation.  The  results  for  this 
loss  of  perspective  was  tile  Sovict  and  Warsaw  Pact  military  intervention  to 
their  countries  and  flicir  loss  of  their  position.  Thus,  Kdddr's  choice  of 
introducing  public  approval  into  the  socialist  legitimation  process  while  not 
disregarding  the  role  of  the  Party  elite  and  the  Soviet  authority  is  the  main 
rcason  for  his  regime's  succcss. 
C.  The  External  Influence  on  Legitimacy: 
As  cited  above,  in  addition  to  the  domestic  relations  in  terms  of  legitimacy  in 
N%hich  K6dAr  introduced  a  novel  interpretation  to  the  socialist  understanding  of 
legitimacy.  there  is  a  powerful  international  dimension  to  be  considered  with 
regards  to  reginic  legitimacy.  The  legitimacy  of  the  I  Itingarian  reginie,  as  well 
as  any  other  E-astern  Bloc  country's  reginic,  depended  on  the  Soviet  approval 
or  oic  leadership  in  the  country.  Even  in  tile  seemingly  most  unusual  case, 
kviien  Whadyslaw  Goniulka  was  elected  as  tile  leader  of  the  United  Polish 
Workers*  Party  in  1956,  lie  had  to  be  endorsed  by  the  Soviet  leadership.  While 
the  K-6dAr  reginie  was  to  establish  a  feeling  of  trustworthiness  based  upon  flic 
system  -and  not  necessarily  upon  the  leader-  at  the  domestic  level,  its 
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Oil  tile  domestic  level,  the  post-1956  regime,  populist  as  it  might  be,  was  not 
backing  tile  image  orJAnos  KddAr  as  a  leader  at  tile  beginning.  Instead  it  had 
chosen  to  emphasise  the  image  of  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Workers'  Party  and 
its  main  aini  was  to  prove  that  the  Party  was  not  against  but  for  tile  welfare  of 
tile  people.  Oil  the  other  hand,  all  the  1-ISWP  performance  depended  on  the 
approval  or  disapproval  of  tile  USSR's  administration.  Rdkosi  had  based  his 
rule  oil  the  personality  cult,  constructing  it  oil  tile  examples  of  Lenin  and 
Stalin.  had  to  flee  to  tile  USSR  when  his  strategies  collapsed.  The  Party  had  to 
be  backed  by  tile  Soviet  troops  to  regain  control  of  Hungary  in  November 
1956,  however.  it  managed  to  reconstruct  itselfby  alienating  R6kosi,  his  image 
and  the  maJor  principles  tile  Party  which  operated  under  Rdkosi's  control.  Tile 
use  of  the  leader  motive.  considering  tile  low  level  of  approval  that  KAddr 
received  during  tile  restoration  period,  was  untleasible,  and  thus,  tile  role  of  tile 
leader  was  substituted  by  the  Party  as  an  agent  of  politics,  at  least  for  a  decade 
11ollowing  the  1956  rebellion. 
I  lowever.  as  speeific  leaders  in  tile  Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union 
(CPSU)  were  tile  representatives  or  different  Fractions  of  the  original  Soviet 
nomenkhamw  and  as  the  leader  of  the  USSR  was  regarded  as  the  leader  of  tile 
Socialist  World,  tile  cult  of  leadership  was  indispensable  in  that  countrý.  The 
change  of'  leadership  meant  a  serious  change  of  policies,  and  it  meant  that  if 
Khruslichev  was  to  stay  in  Moscow,  he  would  require  assurances.  Tile  attempt 
to  by-pass  the  occupant-of  Kremlin  by  Inire  Nagy  proved  disastrous,  and  K6ddr 
was  %vell  aware  of  tile  situation  and  was  not  to  repeat  tile  same  mistake.  Hence, 
oil  tile  one  hand,  lie  had  to  prove  that  the  system  was  not  leader-depcildent  and 
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other  hand.  lie  was  to  admit  that  there  was  both  an  ideological  and  leader- 
dependent  legitimacy  in  Muscovite  administration  and  act  accordingly. 
This  created  a  dichotomy  for  the  KAddr  administration:  On  the  one  hand.  it  had 
to  prove  to  the  I  lungarian  people  that  the  regime  itself  is  good  and  on  the  other 
]land,  lie  had  to  prove  himself  to  the  Soviet  leadership  as  a  worthy  leader.  I 
narne  this  situation  that  narrowed  the  manoeuvring  space  for  tile  Kdddr  regime 
as  the  ificholomy  qfK&I(ii-  (see  sub-heading  on  the  subject).  Khrushchcv  was  a 
liberal  compared  to  Stalin,  but,  as  the  1962  Missile  Crisis  would  prove  once 
more.  lie  had  no  intention  of  giving  up  his  reginie's  ideals  and  principics  when 
SLICh  an  act  might  be  interpreted  as  a  sign  of  weakness.  Consequently, 
%%hatever  the  Uddr  administration  was  doing,  it  had  to  be  in  conformity  with 
the  thoughts  ofthe  Muscovite  leadership  as  it  lield  the  real  power  in  Hungary 
through  direct  control  or coercive  forces.  Hungary  was  also  licavily  dependent 
on  Soviet  raw  materials  and  tcclinological  know-how  to  sustain  its  industrial 
(level  opmen  1.  The  lack  of  mineral  resources  in  tile  country  and  the  apparcritly 
limited  possibility  of  trade  with  the  West  forced  I  lungarian  leadership  to  have 
good  relations  with  the  USSR,  beyond  ideological  commitment  or  political 
necessity. 
KAddr  had  to  have  good  relations  with  the  USSR.  Such  a  limitation 
on  the  rraniework  or  action  for  the  Hungarian  administration  meant  that  it  was 
bound  to  a  po-,,  %,  cr  outside  its  boundaries  for  the  approval  of  its  acts  performed 
for  the  benefit  of  its  subjects.  For  that  reason,  international  rather  than 
domestic  factors  appear  to  create  the  major  consideration  of  policy  shifts  for 
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'*In  early  1956  it  was  the  anti-Stalinism  of  the  20th  CPSU 
Congress  -and  Mikoyan's  and  Suslov's  visits  to  Budapest- 
that  made  Kld6r  an  active  opponent  of  Rdkosi  and  Rdkosi's 
Stalinist  practices.  In  the  early  1960s  lie  assumed  a  moderate, 
reformist  stance  only  after  Khrushchev's  decisive  victory 
over  the  hard-line  dogmatists  at  the  22  nd  Congress  of  the 
Communist  Party  orthe  Soviet  Union  in  October  1961.  ")4 
Therel'ore.  in  political  terms,  KAddr  was  bound  to  please  both  tile  USSR  and 
(lie  I  lungarian  public  for  tile  political  survival  or  both  tile  regime  and  llimsclf 
as  its  leader.  As  lie  was  neither  a  thcoretician  nor  a  real  intellectual,  keeping 
the  balance  between  the  two  sides  was  based  on  his  negotiation  capabilities 
and  social  bribery.  Politically,  that  worked  in  tile  form  of  liberalisation  to  flic 
extent  that  the  international  climate  allowed,  the  development  of  simple 
populistil  in  the  Western  sense  of  the  word.  The  acceptance,  and  even 
willingness  to  be  a  part  of  a  COMECON  agrcernent  in  1962  which  would 
create  a  division  of  labour  among  the  Eastern  Bloc  countries  is  a  sign  of 
attempts  to  please  both  sides.  Hungary  was  given  the  task  of  specialising  in  the 
proLILICtiOll  ohiianullacturing  goods,  and  production  ofaluminium  as  I  lungary 
%vas  the  o%viier  of  the  third  richest  bauxitc  mines  in  E.  uropc.  Though,  it  was  to 
extract  the  niatcrial,  ship  it  to  the  USSR,  and  then  receive  the  semi-processed 
aluminium  from  there  and  produce  goods  with  it;  an  arrangemqnt  that 
contented  both  sides. 
Legitimation  of'  the  systcrn  was  depcndent  on  this  two-sidedncss  of  KAddr's 
policies.  K,!  dAr  could.  not  risk  a  repetition  of  what  happened  under  Rikosi's 
rule  Ilor  nationalistic  feelings,  but  also  for  it  would  manufacture  grounds  for 
international  anti-propaganda  material  for  the  Eastern  Bloc.  His  close 
')4C.  Gati,  Wi.  cit.,  p.  165. 119 
inspection  and  interpretation  of  the  developments  within  the  Communist  Party 
of'  the  Soviet  Union  (CPSU)  helped  hirn  to  have  a  more  relaxed  attitude 
towards  his  own  nation.  I  le  managed  to  use  the  1956  revolution  as  a  trump 
card  against  the  Soviets  and  hcnce  could  afford  to  give  greater  concessions  to 
Hungarians  compared  to  other  East  European  regimes  and  leaders' 
capabilities.  I  lis  alignment  with  Khrushchev,  and  later  with  Brczhnev  helped 
I  lungarian  political  and  economic  development.  When,  in  1968 
Czcchoslovakia  %vas  invaded  by  the  Warsaw  Treaty  Organisation  (WTO) 
troops  which  included  Hungarian  as  well  as  other  WTO  members'  troops, 
I  lungary  was  implementing  the  first  stages  of  its  New  Economic  Mechanism,  a 
flairly  liberal  attitude  towards  economy  thanks  to  KAddr's  good  relations  with 
the  Kremlin.  For  that  matter,  L.  Jubo  Sirc  points  out  to  the  differencc  of  the 
I  lungarian  system  as  early  as  1966,  when  the  antecedent  of  the  NEM,  the 
I  ILIngarian  Reform  Resolution  was  put  into  effect.  Sirc  clainis  that  the 
I  lungarians  were  "aiming  at  a  faster  rate  of  economic  growth,  while  preserving 
the  equilibrium  of  the  economy,  "  by  one-year.  short-term,  economic  planning 
and  by  intending  to  regulate  the  economic  processes  by  making  use  oF  market 
mechanisms'l-5.  Thus.  the  Hungarian  regime,  therefore,  was  able  to  introduce 
market  mechanisms  into  the  system  and  rcmain  supported  rath&r  than 
penalised  and  corrccted  by  the  core  of  the  Second  World.  When  one  compares 
tile  Czechoslovak  and  Hungarian  situations,  tile  distinction  enjoyed  by 
KAdArist  I  lungary  becomes  more  evident. 
At  that  point,  it  should  once  more  remunbered  that  in  analysing  tile  legitimacy 
of'  any  regime  in  E.  astern  Europe  during  tile  Cold  War  cra,  to  simplify  the 
[jubo  Sirc.  I:  conomic  Devolution  inE-astcrn  Europe,  New  York,  Praeger,  1966,  p.  91. 120 
situation  in  terms  of  regime  legitimacy  into  a  matter  of  public  approval  and 
CXCILIde  the  international  factor  would  be  a  mistake.  The  relationship  or  the 
heads  ol'state  in  East  European  region  with  their  Soviet  counterparts  decided 
the  Fate  of  the  East  E-uropean  leaders  as  well  as  the  fate  of  their  countries. 
I 
Nagy's  nationalistic  eagerness  and  his  na7ivctd  led  to  tile  1956  confrontation 
between  the  I  ILIngarians  a,  nd  the  WTO  member-states.  Nagy's  belief  that  if 
I  lungarian  administration  asked,  the  Soviet  control  would  end  in  Hungary  gave 
way  to  the  seriOLIS  problems.  On  the  otlicr  liand,  Wladyslaw  Goniulka.  by 
establishing  good  ties  with  the  Soviet  leaders  of  the  tinic  and  at  least  appearing 
to  he  willing  for  compromise  and  consensus,  managed  to  lead  Poland  until 
1970.  Following  the  footsteps  of  Goniulka  rather  than  cither  Matyas  R,,  Ikosi 
who  gave  too  much  emphasis  oil  his  ties  witil  tile  USSR  or  Inlre  Nagy  who 
totally  ignored  this  relationship  and  focused  on  populist  policies,  Kdddr  played 
his  international  card  right  during  the  rules  of  Kliruslichev  and  Brezlinev,  but 
lost  his  initiative  against  Gorbachev  reforms  since  lie  was  too  old  and  too  old- 
flashioned  to  rellorni  himself  and  his  administration. 
One  can  also  observe  that  Kdddr's  administration  has  always  supported  tile 
I  JSSR  in  all  the  foreign  policy  actions'orthe  superpower.  That  helped  KddAr  to 
create  the  impression  that  his  regime  was  in  unison  with  the  USSR  and  that 
%%hatever  ideological  alteration  lie  might  pursue  in  the  domestic  level  would 
not  alter  I  lungary's  support  for  tile  USSR  and  the  socialist  cause. 
With  that  clear  commitment  to  tile  Soviet  foreign  policy  objectives,  lie  could 
also  satisl'y  his  country's  domestic  needs  of  -especially  economic-  reform. 
Charles  Gati  implics  that  his  policies  vis-A-vis  the  Soviet  Union  are 
reminiscent  of  tile  'i-ehicuml  tilly'  role  assumed  by  Hungary  as  against  the 121 
Third  Reich  during  World  War  11.  During  the  war,  Hungary  was  allied  with  the 
Axis  powers,  but  it  was  trying  to  keep  the  door  open  to  the  Allies  and  that, 
policy  was  called  as  the  hinfalwfilikit,  literally  'see-saw  poliCy'96.  What  KAdAr 
did  For  the  three  decades  or  his  rule  may  be  dubbed  to  be  a  wiser  and  more 
careftillypla)edvasion  of  hinlapolilika. 
Yheref'ore.  to  gain  legitimacy  before  the  eyes  of  tile  Hungarians  without 
up%etting  the  Soviets  was  a  hard  task  to  accomplish  and  one  which  left  very  L- 
Cew  alternative  routes  to  (Iollow  to  its  pursuer.  The  KAddr  regime  may  not  be 
simply  discredited  for  its  lack  of  creativity  in  its  search  or  internal  legitimacy, 
%%hich  -was  established  on  a  quidpro  quo  basis.  Populism  and  social  bribcry 
seem  to  be  the  only  alternatives  IcIl  to  an  administration  which  has  to  keep  tile 
system  going  and  tile  USSR  content.  As  no  major  deviation  frorn  the  socialist 
principles  was  possible  and  manifest  use  of  force  to  control  the  masses  proved 
to  be  a  1111ilUre.  what  Uddr  did  is  the  only  rational  way  to  keep  the  sumis  quo 
alive. 
D.  The  Economic  Dimension: 
Under  the  circumstances  described  above,  tile  Uddr  administration  had  to 
provide  a  considerable  imprownient'in  the  lives  or  the  I  lungarian  people  in 
order  to  accumulate  the  support  it  required  to  keep  the  domestic  side  of  the 
balance  working.  Offering  prosperity  in  exchange  for  superficial  political 
support  in  the  form  of  remaining  indifferent  to  the  political  order's  structure 
and  ofengaging  in  no  open  opposition  activity  was  the  main  proposal  of  the 
Kikk1ir  reginic.  MdAr  aimcd  at  exchanging  economic  prosperity  for  political 
Gati,  oll.  cit.,  pp.  169-170. 122 
indifTerence  rather  than  for  straightforward  support.  For  that  reason,  Rudolf 
"I'lik&s  argument  can  be  adopted.  TWs  argues  that: 
"Kild5r's  main  social  policy  objective  was  the  amelioration 
of  the  regime's  congenital  illegitimacy  through  the 
transformation  of  tile  non-clitcs'  conlingeni  compliance  with 
the  party-state's  watered-down  ideological  expectations  and 
key  policy  outputs  into  consensual  support;  or,  failing  that,  at 
least  into  passive  toleration  of  the  political  milus  quo.  For 
this  reason,  terms  such  as  "informal  understandings,  '*  "(id  hoe 
trade-offs,  "  and  "protracted  non-institutionalised  bargaining" 
seem  to  be  more  accurate  descriptions  of  the  operative 
characteristics  ofpcople-regirne  relationships  in  tile  KAdAr  era 
than  is  "social  contract""97-  98 
The  regime  sought  to  maintain  the  slatus  quo  in  intra-bloc  relations  while 
providing  growth  in  the  economy  and  hence  prosperity.  This  may  be  taken  as  a 
realistie  goal  ora  regime  which  had  bad  experiences  with  over-ambiti  oils  goal- 
setting  l'ollowcd  by  economic  and  political  problems. 
In  ideological  terms,  K66rism  may  be  taken  as  an  understated  social  contract. 
The  creation  orthe  socialin  man  was  not  a  priority  or  this  regime  as  foresecri 
in  the  socialist  ideology.  Instead,  its  main  priority  was  to  keep  social  peace  and 
order  in  tile  society.  ir  one  takes  tile  main  aim  or  a  social  contract  as 
establishing  the  stability  and  continuity  or  tile  regime  that  is  in  power  instead 
or  reaching  a  highly  philosophical  aim  such  as  to  reach  the  stage  or 
communism  and  creating  tile  socialisl  man,  then,  KAddrisni  is  a  proper  social 
contract.  It  managed  to  survive  for  more  than  two  decades.  It  provided  tile 
most  free  breathing  space  in  Eastern  Europe  for  intellectuals,  either  of  regime- 
9711.  ToWs.  2p.  cit..  p.  119. 
"  Rudolf  TOWs  is  not  the  only  person  who  dislikes  to  use  the  tcrrn  'social  contract'  to  brand  the 
relafionship  between  the  Hungarian  people  and  those  who  rule  it.  C.  M.  llann  labels  the  process  as 
'Kidilri%t  social  compromise.  '  to  give  an  example  (see,  for  instance.  Hann's  'Introduction'  in  C.  M. 123 
supporting  or  dissident  kind.  Tile  Kdddr  regime  provided  an  economic  recipe 
to  inake  I  lungary  tile  most  competitive  and  most  compatible  economy  with  the 
West  aniong  tile  Second  World  members. 
The  two  most  important  features  of  the  KAddrist  economy's  differences  from 
its  E*ast  European  counterparts  were  the  New  Economic  Mechanism  (NEM) 
programme  laUnclied  on  I  January  1968,  and  the  late  1970s'  so-called  secon(I 
econono,  initiative.  Or  these,  the  rormer  was  aimed  at  developing  the  national 
economy  and  hence  increasing  national  prosperity.  The  latter,  wilen  tile  first 
failed  in  late  1970s,  was  to  convince  people  that  they  could  acquire  extra 
earnings  through  moonlighting.  The  NEM  was  to  prove  the  socialist  system 
%vas  capable  of'  sustaining  the  prosperity  or  its  sulýjccts  while  tolcrating 
individual  economic  ambitions.  These  were  meant  thus  to  provide  the  regime 
with  some  relative  public  support  that  it  began  to  lose  due  to  economic 
Cai  I  ures. 
The  New  Exononlic  Mechanism,  introduced  on  I  January  1968,  was  aimed  at 
responding  the  needs  ol'a  foreign-dependent  economy.  The  NEM  foresaw  the 
replacement  of  tile  'S  ovict-style  plan  directives  of  the  I  lungarian  econonly  with 
market  relations  aniong  firms,  the  litilitation  of  ccntral  pricc  determination;  a 
link  between  domestic  prices  of  exported  and  imported  goods  and  the  world 
market  prices:  and.  decentralisation  of  a  major  part  of  investment  decision09. 
Fhe  ref'orm  programme  was  radical  to  say  tile  least  by  Socialist  Bloc  standards. 
To  achieve  his  goal  of  implenicnting  the  NEM.  KAdAr  had  to  convince  Leonid 
I  lann  (ed),  Market  Economy  and  Civil 
-Society 
in  tfuniZary,  Frank  Cass  Publishers,  London,  England: 
1()90). 
'"Bela  Balassa.  Rerorming  the  New  Econornic  Mechanism  in  I-lunp-na,  World  Bank  StafT  Working 
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Brezhnev  that  Hungary  was  and  would  remain  a  socialist  country  and  that 
problems  peculiar  to  I  lungary  would  need  solutions  peculiar  to  Hungary.  In  a 
period  of  intra-alliance  conflicts  and  of  the  Arab-Israeli  War,  Brczhncv  was 
convinced  and  accepted,  ir  not  approved,  the  NEM.  Thus,  Hungary  became  the 
first  country  to  adopt  senii-capitalistic  measures  to  deal  with  its  economic 
prollIctils. 
I'lic  I  lungarian  administration's  willingness  to  support  the  Soviet  intervention 
to  Czechoslovakia  provided  greater  Soviet  approval  of  the  NEM,  and  the 
rellorms  went  on  until  mid-1970s.  From  1968  to  1972,  the  Hungarian  economy 
grew  with  an  annual  rate  of  6.2%.  The  long-standing  price  subsidies  were  kept 
even  under  the  NEM  to  prevent  a  high  increase  in  prices.  In  the  meantime,  the 
I  lungarians  had  begun  to  purchase  product  licences  from  the  West  so  that  they 
could  sell  the  goods  produced  with  the  new  know-now  to  the  COMECON 
countries.  The  intra-COMECON  division  of  labour  also  helped  the  country's 
industry  to  mass  produce  such  material  as  the  Ikanis  busses  which  served.  the 
Soviet  Bloc. 
I  lowever.  the  other  socialist  countrics'  leaders,  as  well  as  conservatives  in  the 
I  ISWP  were  against  the  reforms,  and,  by  mid-1  970s,  KddAr  was  isolated  in  the 
del*ence  of  the  reforms.  The  managers  of  large  enterprises  feared  lest  things 
Nvent  wrong.  The  trade  unions  saw  that  the  peasants  and  small  private 
entrepreneurs  were  getting  bctter-off  while  industrial  workers'  real  wages 
decreased.  Some  members  of  intelligentsia  opposed  the  reforms  as  they 
thought  the  economy  was  taking  precedence  over  culture  in  the  country.  With 
this  politically  influential  opposition,  the  NEM  began  to  slow  down,  and  then, 125 
with  tile  1974  Oil  Crisis,  came  to  a  haltIO0.  What  Hungary  had,  then,  was  a 
rigid  command  economy  unable  to  cope  with  the  serious  world  oil  crisis.  By 
the  end  of'  1970s,  the  economy  was  in  dire  straits  as  the  gap  between'the 
domestic  and  international  market  prices  widened,  government  preferences 
came  before  market  necessities,  and  foreign  debts  grew. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  problems  of  the  N  EM+9,  as  C.  M.  I  lann  recognises,  were 
I 
not  dircctly  domestic  in  natUre  and  coincided  with  the  developments,  positive 
and/or  negative,  in  tile  international  economy.  I  lann  observes: 
"In  a  small  Country  such  as  Hungary,  very  much  exposed  to  the 
international  econonly,  at  every  stage  in  the  reform  process  a  great 
deal  has  depended  upon  trends  in  tile  wider  economy.  The  initial 
euphoria  surrounding  tile  reforni  was  considerably  influenced  by  a 
Cavourable  external  coqjIuncture.  The  faltering  of  growth  in  the 
later  1970s  was  partly  due  to  the  energy  price  crisis  or  the 
decade.  "I'll 
On  the  other  liand,  as  Marlon  Tardos  observes,  there  was  a  very  important 
domestic  clement  in  the  problems  faced  by  the  NEM  systern.  According  to 
Tardos.  tile  probIcnis  arose  both  from  the  structure  of  tile  socialist  systern  and 
the  unwillingness  for  rcrorrn  within  the  ruling  elite.  Tardos  claims  that: 
-Those  who  uns,.  verwingly  pursued  nationalisation  after  1945 
resisted  to  any  reform  measure  of  the  system  for  a  long  time. 
Moreover.  no  comprehensive  reform  was  made  until  the  New 
Economic  Mechanism  (NEM)  was  introduced  in  1966-1968. 
Then.  too,  tile  change  was  focused  oil  tile  management  of 
state  and  co-operative  enterprises  which  were,  in  practice, 
vei),  similar.  Substantial  freedom  was  offered  to  these 
enterprises.  but  tile  so-called  'market-like'  regulation 
remained  under  tile  bureaucratic  state  hierarchy  dominated  by 
party  bodies. 
.... 
[T]he  NEM  constrained  tile  increase  of  [the 
1'"'A.  ['elka).  ýT.  cit.,  pp.  230-236  passim. 
I'll  C.  M,  I  lann,  Introduction  in  C.  M.  11ann  (cd.  ),  Market  Economy  and  Society  in  Hungary,  Frank  Cass 
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private  sector's]  share,  and  limited  its  activitY  to  small-scale 
III-OLILICtion  and  the  scrvice  sector.  "102 
In  1978  and  in  1982,  new  measures  were  taken  to  prevent  a  total  collapse  of 
tile  I  ILIngarian  economy.  Foreign  trade  balance  was  in  serious  imbalance,  as 
were  production.  productivity,  and  the  individual  income  levels.  The  loss  of 
the  economic  edge  brought  along  a  legitimacy  crisis  for  the  Kiddrist. 
government.  The  severity  of'  the  economic  crisis  nicant  that  Kdddr  regime's 
ofTcr  in  exchange  ol'peacerul  obedience  to  the  reginic,  was  no  more  available. 
Such  a  situation  placed  the  fragile  legitimacy  or  the  regime  in  jeopardy  as  one 
of'  tile  two  bases  flor  the  regime's  legitimation  of  its  raisons  d'&rc  was  lost. 
Soviet  anned  muscle  might  be  a  deterrent  capable  of  suppressing  any  form  of 
social  unrest  but  would  be  unable  to  prevent  the  materialisation  of  social 
unrest.  Thus.  from  1982  onwards, 
'*the  reginle  allowed  a  limited  libcralisation  under  the  slogan 
of*mass  participation'.  First  within  the  Soviet  bloc,  Hungary 
introduced  compulsory  multi-candidacy  in  parliamentary  and 
local  council  elections,  gave  regional  administrations  greater 
political  and  financial  independence  and  relaxed,  to  some 
cx1ent.  controls  over  tile  forming  of  voluntary  associations. 
State-owned  ministry-run  companies  were  handed  over  to 
boards  ol'  directors  and  workers'  assemblies.  New  sorts  of 
business  initiatives  -Such  as  tile  'contract  shop'  scheme  under 
which  individuals  could  hire  franchises  frorn  state  firms,  or 
tile  enterprise  'economic  work  collectives'  (VGMKs)  were 
permitted.  "103 
These  changes  were  the  steps  to  create  the  so-called  second  economY  which 
WOUld  permit  individual  workers  and  peasants,  as  well  as  small  entrepreneurs 
102  NVirton  Tardos.  "]Iie  Property  Rights  in  Hungary.  '  in  J.  Matyas.  S.  Kovacs,  M.  Tardos  (eds.  ), 
Rel'ounLand  TransCormation  in  Eastern  Europe,  London:  Routledgc,  1992. 
1113Stephen  Noti.  'I  lungary  AfIcr  KAddr,  '  The  lVorld  Today,  v.  44,  no.  8-9,  pp.  128-130,  pp.  128-129. 127 
to  cam  greater  sunis  of  money  in  exchange  of  moonlighting  or  working  extra 
hours. 
The  seconil  econonij,  had  two  main  legitimacy-rclated  features:  Firstly,  it 
helped  people  to  accumulate  a  considerable  amount  of  income  which 
sometimes  would  exceed  the  related  person's  wage  by  tenfold.  Therefore,  a 
sense  of'  prosperity  continued  to  exist  despite  tile  worsening  of  the  overall 
economic  situation.  Moreover,  tile  econonly  was  profiting  from  the  surplus 
value  produced  in  tile  extra  working  hours.  These  would  contribute  to  the 
reginie*s  image  orprovider  of  wealth  and  prosperity.  The  second  aspect,  oil  the 
other  ]land.  was  ail  indirect  contribution  to  the  regime's  legitimacy:  'File  people 
%Norking  indiVidLUIlly  to  provide  their  household  with  some  money  gradually 
shirted  rroill  having  a  class-consciousness  to  individLialisnlIO4.  The  extent  of 
individualism  might  be  cillarged  to  covce  the  household  or  tile  working  person 
or  his  or  her  workniates  in  moonlighting  hours.  However,  the  individuals 
working  in  tile  secontl  econonij,  lost  tile  social  bond  with  tile  members  of  tile 
same  social  class  or  social  environment.  Although  one  would  mainly relate  this 
individualisation  to  industrial  work,  Nigel  Swain  points  out  that  the 
encouragement  of  the  so-called  'household  plot'  during  the  last  years  of  the 
KAdilir  regime  created  in  alternative,  agrarian  second-ccononly  which'enabled 
private.  that  is  family  as  opposed  to  corporate,  co-operative,  farming.  an 
1"  Dr.  itilia  Szalai.  Hungarian  sociologist  and  the  head  of  the  Max  Weber  Institute  in  Budapest, 
emphasised  the  cll'cct  of  second  economy  in  the  society  in  the  interview  I  conducted  with  her  in 
Budapest  on  16  April  1996.  Dr.  Szalai  argues  that  social  alienation  of  individuals  and  the  loss  of  the 
'we-feeling'  within  (lie  society  have  their  roots  in  the  second  economy.  She  clainis  (lie  rise  in  material 
ambitions  is  brought  along  by  the  concept  or  second  cconorny  and  this  has  affected  the  balance  of  the 
society  by  limiting.  ir  lot  ell'acing  For  good,  the  social  side  or  individuals.  Prof.  Joszef  Bayer  of  the 
EIAT  lh;  iversity  and  Dr.  Gabor  K'OrOsi  or  the  KTI  Institute  ill  Budapest  supported  her  argunlent  ill  tile 
interviews  I  conducted  with  thern  oil  18  and  19  April  1996. 128 
practice  Car  less  common  in  Czechoslovakia  of  the  time'O.  I.  The  Roman 
principle  (fivitle  el  impera,  divide  and  rule,  is  still  a  strong  policy  and  thercf6re, 
while  people  flocuscd  oil  their  personal  or  family  interests,  they  spent  far  less 
time  in  order  to  judge  the  legitimacy  of  the  political  system.  The  fact  that  the 
NNorking  11OUrs  were  considerably  extended  through  the  second  economy 
initiative  contributed  to  the  flact  that  people  had  materially  no  time  to  deal  with 
politics. 
V.  THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  THE  KADAR  REGIME 
A.  The  Beginning  of  the  End: 
Despite  the  flact  that  people  had  less  time  to  spend  on  politics  -partly  due  to 
tile  qUaSi-social  contract  labelled  as  the  'Kdddrist  social  compromise'  by  C.  M. 
I  lann-.  developments  outside  the  country  forced  changes  in  the  domestic  front. 
Changes  in  the  international  background,  especially  policy  changes  or  bloc 
leaders  11orced  changes  in  tile  position  and  relationship  models  of  tile 
subordinate  states.  Important  events  in  the  Soviet  Union,  namely  the 
Afghanistan  campaign  of  tile  USSR,  tile  mplacenicilt  or  Lconid  Brczhnev  after 
his  death  by  Yuri  Andropov  in  1983,  and  Andropov  bcing  succccded  first  by 
Konstantin  Chernenko  in  1984  and  then  by  Mikhail  Gorbachev  in  1985, 
creatCd  first  a  wave  or  uncertainty  in  the  Soviet  political  scene.  *ri,  csc 
developments  ai'llected  East  European,  then  European  and  World  politics  in  a 
great  extent.  Later  oil.  these  changes  led  to  a  new  and  fairly  radical  economic 
, and  political  rel'brin  programme  in  tile  USSR  From  late  1986  onwards.  Under 
such  conditions.  once  tile  foreign  intervention  disappeared  or  seemed  to 
11'5  Nigel  Swain.  'A.  gricultural  Restitution  and  Co-opcrativc  Transformation  in  the  Czech  Republic, 
I  Wngarý  and  Slovakia.  *  Europe-11shiStudies,  v.  51(7),  1999,  p.  1216. 129 
dis,  ippear.  there  Nvere  not  many  alternatives  to  be  taken  by  the  I  ISWP  to  retain 
its  %%  eak  position  oflegitimacy  before  the  eyes  of  the  I  lungarian  public. 
The  struggle  of  tile  succession  now  was  apparent  in  the  Hungarian  political 
sccile  and  it  was  now  between  three  main  groups;  the  conservative  wing  of  the 
I  ISWII.  tile  rerbrin-seeking  wing  of  tile  IISWII,  and,  tile  dissidents.  The  final 
outcome  was  the  loss  of  MdWs  leadership  position  and  then  the 
dismemberment  ortiic  i  iswp. 
As  a  restilt  ol'all  tliese,  cliange  in  the  IISWII  cadres  becaiiie  iiiiiiiinent.  Jänos 
K,  Id.  Ir  %vas  removed  from  office  and  was  appointed  to  tile  honorary  role  of 
Part),  presidency  at  the  special  conference  or  the  I-ISWP  in  May  1988.  In  the 
same  congress  and  tile  following  Central  Committee  session,  37  new  members 
joined  the  I  09-member  Central  Committee.  These  changes  meant  tile  removal 
of'  not  only  KAdir  but  also  most  of  the  influential  figures  of  tile  KAdAr 
administration  from  orfice  and  the  beginning  of  a  new  administration  in  line 
with  tile  requirements  ofthe  new  Soviet  administrative  policies. 
January  1989,  there  was  a  clear  division  between  the  rerormist  and 
conservative  wings  of'  the  IISWII  as  well  as  a  dramatic  increase  in  tile 
opposition  to  the  single-party  systcm.  Political  organisation  capablc  of  running 
candidates  in  a  possible  forthcoming  election  -such  as  the  Alliance,  'of  Free 
Democrats.  tile  Hungarian  Democratic  Forum  and  the  Siliallholders  Party- 
emerged.  Oil  14  January  1989,  the  New  March  Front  attempted  to  establish 
communication  between  tile  I-ISWP  and  the  newly  formed  parties  for  the  first 
time.  This  attempt  was  followed  by  tile  acceptance  of  a  multi-party  future 
political  environment  by  the  I  ISWP  on  II  February  1989  and  tile  formation  of 
the  Opposition  Roundtable  oil  22  March  1989  as  suggested  by  tile  Forum  of 130 
Independent  Lawyers.  The  Opposition  Roundtable  comprised  of  eight  political 
organisations,  namely  the  Alliance  of'  Free  Democrats,  Alliance  or  Young 
Democrats.  the  Sniallholders  Party,  the  League  of  Democratic  Trade  Unions, 
tile  Hungarian  Democratic  Forurn,  11ungarian  People's  Party,  and  tile  Social 
Democrats.  Tile  summer  of  1989  saw  the  establishment  of  the  National 
Roundtable  talks  and  the  acceptance  of  decisions  concerning  the  regime 
change.  The  end  or  the  IISWP  rule  canic  in  the  wake  of  the  National 
Roundtable  talks  and  by  tile  spring  of  1990,  Hungarians  were  voting  in  multi- 
pally.  11IL11ti-candidatc  elections  for  the  seats  in  a  multi-party  parliament.  JAnos 
U&Iir  %%ould  not  see  the  new  era  of  multi-party  liberal  democracy  as  lie  died 
on  6,1uly  1989106. 
B.  Tile  Dissidents,  The  Roundtable  and  the  Transformation: 
To  clairn  that  tile  opposition  in  tile  country  appeared  as  a  result  of  tile  changes 
in  tile  USSR  would  be  just  ovcrsiniplirying  tile  scene.  The  changes  that  took 
place  in  the  USSR  and  lience  in  tile  Soviet  attitude  towards  tile  East  European 
states  and  their  administrations  have  galvaniscd  tile  opposition  movements  in 
I  ILIngary  as  elsewhere  in  tile  Eastcni  Bloc.  Tile  opposition,  though  suppressed. 
"as  in  ever  present  'I'orce'  in  tile  Hungarian  systern.  Based  oil  the 
chronological  path  or  three-tier  party  scheme  lie  makes  use  or,  Rudolf  TAds 
analyses  the  role  of  the  opposition.  the  dissidents  and  their  inipact  in 
III.  Ingary's  'negotiated  revolUtion'107.  lie  invests  ail  important  role  in  tile 
political,  acadenlic  and  literary  elite  or  tile  country  in  respect  of  the  transition 
I"(,  Nigel  Swain-  I  lum-,  arv:  The  Rise  And  Fall  Of  Feasible  Socialism.,  pp.  18-23  passirn. 
107  Ruioi  Kiss  sees  the  process  somewhere  in  the  middle  of  revolution  and  reform,  and,  based  on  an 
idea  ol"Tinio(h),  Garton-Ash.  labels  the  transformation  as  'refolution,  '  as  it  is  a  hybrid  of  reform  and 
revolution.  It  is  basically  the  same  as  TiAds'  'negotiated  revolution.  '  See  JAnos  Kis'  'Between  Reform 
and  Revolution.  '  in  East  Eurolvan  Polilics  antI.  Socielies,  v.  12  (no.  2,  pp.  300-389),  on  the  subject. 131 
tO  111LIlti-party  democracy.  because  these  were  the  members  of  the  non- 
governmental  party  in  the  roundtable. 
TiUs  groups  tile  dissidents  into  three  categories:  a)  those  supported  by  tile 
reginic.  b)  those  whorn  the  reginic  was  indifrerent  to,  and,  c)  those  takcii  as 
illegitimate  and  had  to  be  suppressed  by  the  reginne. 
Those  Nvho  Nvere  supported  by  tile  reginle  were  generally  high-level  members 
(it'  the  nomenkhmaw.  economists,  scientists  and  non-party  intellectuals  who 
championed  tile  reginic  but  criticised  it  for  being  not  patriotic  enough  or  not 
too  much  in  flavour  or  the  Party,  and  their  runction  was  in  a  way  to  sustain  tile 
legitimacy  of  the  reginic.  Thcir  contact  point  was  flic  high-rank  party 
authorities. 
The  tolerated  dissidents  were  after  human  rights,  religious  autonomy,  greater 
artistic  Frecdoms,  and  supported  a  lirt  on  censorship.  They  were  retired  party 
offlicials.  high  and  medium  status  intellectuals,  and  those  non-party  elite  who 
had  good  connections  in  the  Party.  Their  contact  was  either  with  tile  proper 
authorities  or  with  unauthorised  recipients  like  the  foreign  media. 
The  suppressed  dissidents,  on  the  other  liand,  consisted  of  low  status 
intellectuals  with  no  Party  connections,  youth.  rcligious  activists  and  former 
political  prisoners.  These  were  asking  for  a  regime  change,  the  withdrawal  of 
SO%,  'iCt  tI'OOPS  fi-0111  IlLingary,  in  effect  following  Inire  Nagy*s  legacy  in  their 
way.  These  organised  strikes,  printed  samiatals,  directly  connecting  with  the 
people  and  were  organised  under  multi-purpose  groups,  unlike  the  previous 132 
two  which  were  acting  cither  on  individual  basis  or  in  small,  objject-oriented 
1,,.  roLii)sl()x. 
Dissent.  according  to  '176k6s.  changed  its  shape  in  tinle  and  began  to  irritate  tile 
administration  in  an  increasing  manner.  'ne  shill  of  majority  of  dissident 
movements  From  the  first  group  to  the  third  as  tinic  went  by  created  an 
atmosphere  of  intolerance  in  the  government  nnd  hence  greater  suppression 
bcgaii  to  appear.  TOUs  tries  in  Ilis  book  to  create  an  image  or  oppressive 
regime  against  the  dissidents,  howcver  fails  to  firmly  back  his  argument.  lie 
mentions  the  15  March  1988  demonstration  and  tile  police  intervention  to  it  as 
an  example  of  the  suppression.  lie  claims  that  while  for  years  the 
demonstrations  were  seen  as  a  sort  or  peaceful  marches  of  high-spirited  high- 
school  and  university  students,  in  1988,  the  police  intervened  and  lience 
oppression  is  observable.  On  the  other  hand,  lie  seenis  not  to  mention  that  the 
Ud6r  reginic.  from  1972,  the  first  ycar  of  15  March  nationalistic 
demonstrations.  till  1988  had  not  intervened  by  using  force.  Therefore,  one 
may  think  that  tile  tolerable  nationalistic  youth  might  as  well  transilorm  itself 
with  the  help  or  some  agitators  to  a  suppressible  group  or  dissidents.  His  other 
examples  of'  the  suppression  of  dissent  are  not  very  convincing  either.  The 
point  seems  to  be  an  attempt  to  exaggerate  the  sufferings  of  the  dissid6its  who 
wcre  at  tile  end  sharing  tile  same  negotiation  table  with  tile  IISWP 
apparatchiks,  rather  than  providing  an  objective  overview  of  what  happened. 
TiUs  claims  that  especially  from  1986  onwards,  dissent  has  begun  to  be 
perceived  as  a  'hostile'  party  rather  than  a  tolerable  'opposition'.  lie  states  that 
the  dissident  groups  were  from  then  on  taken  as  a  force  threatening  the 
ll',  4  RudolfTiUs.  SN)-.  -Cit.. 
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regime.  fully  collaborating  with  Western  powers,  namely  the  US,  and  with 
each  otlicr"I".  I  Ic  mentions  such  sainizdals  as  tile  special  issue  of  Beszýlij  of 
inid-Jime  1987  which  began  with  the  message  "Kdddr  Must  Go!  "  as  an 
example  ol'organised  democratic  opposition  which  was  powerful  enough  to 
see  Minos  KA&r  leave  his  post  of  Party  leadership  in  a  year's  time.  The 
paniphlet  liad  cotiie  aller  tlie  change  of  preiliiersliip  in  tlie  country,  and  there 
WOUld  most  certainly  be  greater  changes  within  tile  I  ISWP  cadres,  including 
most  possibly  J6nos  K66r.  Therefore,  to  clairn  that  tile  ideas  mentioned  in  tile 
samizdat  %vere  influential  is  not  exactly  the  best  way  of  commenting  on  the 
situation.  especially  when  one  considers  the  new  policies  adopted  by  the  USSR 
concerning  the  East  Europcan  involvement  ol'tlle  country. 
R)Us,  perhaps  deliberately.  I*ocuses  mainly  and  solely  on  the  internal  political 
debates  and  developments  or  Ilungary  and  never  mcritions  the  international 
environment  which  let  the  dissidents  to  become  a  strong  opposition  and  a 
ma  jor  factor  in  I  lungarian  political  life  in  the  second  part  of'  the  1980s.  Tile 
lack  or  introduction  or  the  developments  in  the  international  environment  that 
SUrromided  the  change  is  a  rnýjor  flaw  in  his  theory,  because  all  of  a  sudden, 
the  dissidents  sceni  to  get  more  and  niore  powerFul  and  take  control  without 
any  considerable  changc  in  the  domestic  political  scene.  flowekr,  had 
Brezlinev  or  his  two  immediate  successors  been  still  alive  and  had  Mikhail 
Gorbachev  been  a  member  of  and  not  the  leader  of  the  Soviet  Politburo,  none 
(if'  the  changes  in  the-  Eastern  European  region  were  likely  to  happen,  at  least 
not  at  the  same  pace.  Gorbachev's  dual  policies  of  Peresimik(i  and  GItisnost 
and  his  ambition  to  replace  tile  leaders  of  tile  subordinate  states  to  the  USSR 
P"'  pp.  173-200  passim. 134 
created  the  impact  that  led  to  the  change  of  Hungary's  as  well  as  any  other 
socialist  state's  systems.  The  absence  of  intervention  by  the  Soviet  troops  and 
the  USSR*s  willingness  to  renovate  the  East  European  regimes  and  its 
adoption  ofthe  Sinatra  Docirine  gave  way  to  tile  National  Roundtable  -ralks  of 
1989. 
At  this  point.  one  must  ngte  that  Gorbachevite  rel'orms  were  different  Crom  the 
previous  attcnipts  at  relorming  the  communist  systern.  According  to  Pcter 
NI'll-cuse. 
"The  beginnings  or  the  transition  from  real  existing  socialism 
in  most  ofthe  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  were  led  by  those 
who  saw  themselves  as  reformers  of  socialism.  Even  in  the 
heydev  ol*  the  strongly  centralised  state-run  systems  of 
production  and  distribution,  in  some  cases  out  of  pragmatism, 
s  with  'goulash  communism'  under  Kaddr  in  Hungary,  in 
others  out  of  a  concern  about  failures  in  tile  centralised 
economy.  as  tinder  Khruslicliev  in  the  Soviet  Union....  With 
perestroika.  it  was  different.  Gorbachev. 
...,  flor  instance  saw 
his  clTorts  as  'encroaching  on  socialism,  but  only  the 
socialism  that  was  built  bureaucratically,  tinder  which  the 
countrv  vecred  off  tile  path  on  which  it  had  embarked  in 
1917.  ':  '  1() 
I'lius.  Gorbachev*s  attempts  at  changing  tile  Soviet  society  as  well  as  tile  way 
Fastern  Furope  was  administered,  both  in  ternis  of  politics  and  in  tcrms  of 
ccononly,  lailed  to  overlap  with  the  general  understanding  or  ref'orT  in  the 
Second  World  and  led  to  a  period  of  surprise  in  which  the  East  European 
leaders  belonging  to  the  old  guard  did  not  know  what  to  do.  The  success  orthe 
1989  -  1991  reflornis  and  revolutions  lies  partly  in  the  new  a'pproach  adopted 
by  Gorbachev.  This  can  bc  seen,  for  instance.  in  I  locricckcr's  insistence  on 
11cler  Marctise.  'Privatisation  and  its  Discontents:  Property  Rights  in  Land  and  I  lousing  in  the 
Transifilin  in  Eastern  Europe,  '  in  Gregory  Andrusz  et  al.  (eds.  ),  Cities  After  Socialism:  Urban  Change 
Lfljjsýt  in  Pom-Socialist  Societies,  Blackwell,  Word,  England:  1996,  p.  149.  alit]  C( 135 
staying,  in  power.  and  in  KAdir's  inability  to  react  to  developments.  The  role  of 
(Yorbacliev  in  the  process  is  therefore  paramount. 
TiUs  observes  a  transfiorniation  in  KAddr's  perceived  image  following  the 
route  or  reinctuni  liosiage  in  late  i  950s,  risk-laking  reformer  in  1960s,  and  1he 
goo(I  kilýq  in  the  1970s  which  would  be  transilornied  into  eifficeble(I  autarch  by 
the  1980s.  By  the  mid-1980s,  Kdddr  was  a  tired  and  nearly  scnile  leader 
incapable  orflast  decision-making  and  his  only  ability  was  to  change  people  in 
the  Politburo  and  to  try  to  keep  the  economy  afloat  with  great  amounts  or 
roreign  (.  Icbt.  Thus.  tile  end  of  tile  KAddr  administration  gradually  took  place 
I'ronl  rnid-1980s  onwards.  This  gradual  decline  is  reflected  in  the  fivc-stage 
evolutionary  scheme  by'1'8kds: 
a)  the  collapse  orthe  KAdArist  centre  form  April  1984  to  November  1986; 
h)  the  advance  of'  bureaucrats  and  technocrats  to  high  posts.  from  December 
1986  to  June  1987. 
c)  the  Karoly  Grosz  campaign,  rrom  July  1987  to  March  1988; 
(1)  the  conservative  counter-mobilisation  to  prevent  Grosz's  replacement  of 
KLU'ir.  1roni  November  1987  to  March  1988; 
c)  the  negotiated  succession,  from  April  to  May  1988111. 
This  gradual  process  or  Kdddr's  loss  of  control  in  the  country  created  a 
vactaim  through  which  reflormist  ideas  were  able  to  penetrate  into  the  I-lSWP 
management.  Karoly  Grosz  needed  progress  in  tile  economic  reforms  lie  had 
begun  to  implement  in  his  premiership.  On  tile  other  hand,  he  had  to  struggle 
to  keep  his  leadership  position  against  tile  Reform  Socialists  in  the  IISWP. 
Throughout  the  1980s  then,  with  power  shifting  from  tile  centre  to  the 136 
periphery  in  the  i-earguard  fashion,  tile  rise  of  dissident  formations  as  strong 
political  actors  became  unavoidable. 
Fhe  benel  Marics  ol'the  Party's  adoption  or  a  rearguurd  position  can  be  sited 
as  tile  state  bureaucracy,  tile  interest  groups  and  policy  lobbies,  and,  indirectly 
the  citizens  of  I  lungary.  In  the  rearguard  mode,  the  state  bUreaucracy  was 
more  independent.  %%hile  civil  associations  kept  growing.  Therellore.  a  greater 
degrce  or  political  Freedom  was  available  for  the  citizens. 
Fhe  change  in  the  Party  cadres,  the  rcplacciiient  of  the  old  guard  by  the  new 
nanics  such  as  Laszlo  Marothy.  Matyas  SzOr6s.  Gyorgy  Adzel,  Rezs6  Nyers, 
and  . 16nos  Berccz  in  the  partly  free  elections  of  1985  resulted  in  tile 
strengthening  ol'the  rellormist  wing  in  the  timp.  'rhe  new  forces  gathered  by 
(lie  bureaucracy.  regional-scale  party  organs.  organiscd  intercst  groups, 
politicised  intelligentsia  are  all  domestic  factors  influencing  the  changes  in  tlic 
domestic  political  climate.  However,  these  changes  were  strengthened,  ir  not 
ignited.  by  international  developments.  For  instance,  tile  rise  of  tile 
independent  social  groups  from  mid-1980s  onwards  nlay  be  linked  to  tile 
relaxation  in  the  Soviet  attitude  towards  such  social  activities. 
In  the  domestic  level  though,  to  claim  that  the  dissident  groups  and  the 
independent  civil  associations  may  be  seen  as  descendent  of  the  latý  1960s 
and  1970s  nlay  not  be  too  wrong.  As  Terry  Cox  and  Laszlo  Vass  argue,  there 
is  a  loose  link  between  the  tradition  of  rcrorm  and  the  emergcnce  of  such 
groups.  The  development  of  fully  sentient  and  functional  political 
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organisations  Nvas  possible  only  by  the  end  of  1980s'12.  This  connection  may 
lie  extended  to  include  the  relationship  created  between  tile  dominant  and 
subordinate  parts  of  the  society  in  Hungary.  The  legitimacy  of  the  regime  in 
I  ILIngary  Nvas  special  to  that  country  within  the  general  context  of  tile  Eastern 
1310C. 
By  the  end  oi'  1988,  there  were  twenty-one  new  or  recently  founded  political 
Iissociations  which  identified  themselves  as  societies,  leagues,  associations  or 
171-onts.  Nvith  tile  exception  of  tile  Independent  Sniallholders  Party  (SlIP)  which 
promptly  chose  the  word  'party'  which  was  usually  associated  with  tile  IISWP 
and  hence  ývhich  was  quite  unpopular'13.  These  formations  would  lead  to  the 
creation  ot`6  political  parties  until  the  Opposition  Roundtable  that  would  begin 
oil  22  March  1989.  The  participants  of  the  National  Roundtable  that  would 
begin  on  133  June  1989  were  the  IISWP,  these  aforementioned  6  political 
parties.  11bur  policy  lobbies.  Four  social  groups,  and  an  observing  organisation. 
I'lle  transfiormation  was  strengthened  by  the  beginning  or  the  withdrawal  or 
Soviet  troops  1rom  I  lungary  on  25  April  1989.  It  continued  when  the  1ISWP 
surrendered  its  nomenklanit-a  rights  to  the  Wmeth  government  on  8-9  May 
1989.  the  death  of  JAnos  Kilddr  on  6  July  and  the  Hungarian  Democratic 
Forum  (I  IDF)  candidates'  election  victory  in  the  by-elections  or  Jýuly  and 
August  1989. 
The  National  Roundtable  or  14  June-18  September  1989  was  a  crucial 
breakthrough  11or  regime  transformation,  and  thcrcrore,  a  unique  and  successrul 
112  Terry  Cox  and  Lasz1o  Vass.  'Civil  Society  and  Interest  Representation  In  [Jungarian  Political 
Development',  dourna/  qfCommunisl  Studies  aml  Transilion  Politics,  vol.  10,  no.  3.  p.  16  1. 
113  Indelmident  Smallholder  party  claimed  to  bc  the  offspring  of  the  pre-communist  SIIP  and  thcrcforc 
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process  towards  denlocratisation  of  the  system  as  a  whole.  The  Hungarian 
National  Roundtabic  had  coilccrns  beYond  regime  change  as  it  sought  to  make 
the  transition  to  multi-paily  competitive  politics  as  easy  and  as  painless  as 
possible.  'rhis  situation  secnis  to  be  peculiar  to  Hungary  as  the  domestic 
political  conditions  differed  frorn  other  East  European  countries  due  to 
different  approaches  in  the  regime,  -  subject  relations  and  in  legitimation  ortbe, 
regime.  For  instance.  the  Polish  Roundtable  was  merely  an  attempt  to  prolong 
tile  stay  ol*  the  Communist  Party  and  or  Jaruzelski  in  power,  and  not  a 
gathering  ainled  at  casing  the  tensions  or  transition  to  a  new  political  systern. 
011  7  October  1989  at  22:  24,  in  tile  second  day  of  the  14th  Congress  of  the 
I  ISWP  it  was  annOLInced  that  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Workers'  Party  ceased  to 
exist.  The  declaration  also  announced  the  establishment  of  the  ncw  Hungarian 
Socialist  Party  which  was  to  host  the  Reformist  wing  of  tile  party  in  the  new 
multi-party  systcn1114.  This  announcement  canic  nearly  a  montli  after  the 
National  Roundtablc  -agrcenient's  signature.  This  act  shows  that,  unlike  in 
Poland  and  many  other  East  European  countries,  the  ruling  party  was  not  to  try 
to  fight  to  the  end  and  accept  to  be  conquered,  but  would  re-shape  itself  and 
fight  Im  the  domination  of  tile  system  under  diffierent  conditions.  So,  tile 
importance  ol'  the  negotiations  may  be  linked  to  this  -very  well  calculated- 
decision  ol'the  Communists. 
V1.  THE  KADARIST  LEGACY  OF  HUNGARY 
TO  SUM  tip.  I  lungarian  political  structure  presented  a  different  environment 
compared  to  other  East  European  states  in  its  transition  to  democracy.  The 
basic  reason  for  tile  diilcrcnce  is  the  political  peculiarities  of  the  Hungarian 139 
state  due  to  the  1956  uprisings  and  its  consequences.  The  events  that  took 
place  in  1956  have  created  a  need  to  have  a  diversion  from  the  orthodox 
Stalinist  method  of  legitimation  through  coercion.  rhat  forced  the  Hungarian 
leadership  to  pursue  different  methods  or  legitimation.  Due  to  tile  fact  that 
there  was  no  possibility  of  creating  a  more  liberal  political  environment 
because  ol'  the  conditions  the  international  environment  dictated.  ref'orms  in 
(lie  cconomy  which  would  make  up  for  the  loss  in  political  freedonis  were 
used  to  legitimise  the  reginie.  'nic  introduction  of  economic  liberties  sustained 
the  lormation  of  indcpcndcnt  civil  -associations  -such  as  flic  student  or 
prollessional  representative  groups-  and  permitted  flic  formation  or  a  kind  of 
civil  %ociety  background.  Oil  tile  other  hand,  tile  second  econonýi,  initiative 
caused  a  I'amiliarity  in  public  towards  tile  liberal  economy  and  hence  eased  the 
economic  transition  to  an  extent,  at  least  in  comparison  with  the  other  Eastern 
Bloc  conversions  into  C-apitalism. 
The  National  ROLIndtable  or  1989  may  also  be  taken  as  a  major  and  unique 
evcilt  in  tile  East  E.  uropean  trans  rorniat  ion.  During  tile  National  Roundtable, 
both  the  I  ISWP  and  the  opposition  were  willing  to  reach  the  aim  of  a  least 
troublesome  transition  to  a  multi-party  liberal  dcniocratic  system. 
A  fler  1956.  the  I  ISW  P  sought  a  sort  or  economic  legitimation.  It  atteiilpted  to 
be  perceived  as  a  provider  of  economic  bencFas  to  its  subjects  unlike  any  other 
Eastern  Bloc  communist  party.  However,  when  the  economic  policies  of  tile 
Parly  failed,  it  had  to  gradually  retreat  to  a  rearguard  role,  letting  the  dissidents 
gain  greater  political  control.  The  Party  then  tried  to  shift  the  image  or  failure 
into  other  parts  of  tile  state  mechanism  and  tried  to  disengage  itself  from  tile 
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stale  mechanism.  Thus.  the  HSWP  under  Kdddr's  rule  tried  to  be  a  defender  of 
its  subJects"  economic  beilefit,  and  when  things  began  to  go  wrong.  it  tried  to 
save  its  popularity  by  shilling  the  blame  on  sonic  other  part  of  the  state 
mcclianism.  'I'lle  same  policy  may  be  seen  in  tile  political  scene  as  tile  message 
given  by  the  I  ISWII  was  that  it  could  not  engage  itself  in  political  reforms  as  it 
would  jeopardise  the  economic  frecdonis  gained  due  to  very  hard  persuasion  of 
the  Soviet  authorities.  'rhc  HSWP  therefore  was  giving  messages  or  being 
restricted  in  both  its  relations:  In  the  domestic  Icvel,  the  message  was  that  the 
I  lutigarians  were  to  be  satisfied  with  what  they  are  granted  in  ternis  of 
economic  benefits  as  in  political  sphere  the  IISWP's  actions  were  seriously 
finlited  by  tile  USSR.  Oil  the  other  hand,  tile  message  given  to  tile  USSR  was 
that  the  liberal  econornie  attitude  was  a  must  due  to  political  reasons  as  tile 
I  lungarians  have  shown  that  they  were  not  much  pleased  with  tile  Communist 
rule  in  1956. 
The  changes  in  (lie  USSR  during  the  second  part  or  1980s  created  tile  grounds 
l'or  both  sides  to  putting  more  pressure  on  Kdd6r  and  his  administration  as  the 
USSR  was  willing  for  more  political  concessions  and  the  Hungarians  were 
unhappy  with  the  state  of  the  economy  which  began  to  collapse  at  the  end  of 
1970s.  The  rise  or  the  political  opposition  was  due  to  econornic  failure  hs  well, 
and  as  the  IISWII  had  lost  its  main  tool  of  legitimacy  as  well  as  its 
international  raison  d'ýIre  in  the  rorm  of  a  barn-dog  ror  the  USSR  whosc 
actions  would  be  permitted  as  long  as  it  played  its  part  proficiently,  to  stop  the 
change  Nvas  not  possible  anymore. 
Hie  nc\v  leadership  of  the  IISWP  thercrore,  From  nlid-1988  onwards  had  to 
find  a  way  to  reform  the  credibility  of  the  Party,  reform  the  economy,  and  find 141 
new  gl-OUIRIS  of  legitimacy  for  itself.  It  failed  in  all  these  aspects.  The  National 
Roundtable  discussions  and  the  dissolution  of  the  Party  were  therefore  the  only 
sensible  way  to  go  as  it  might  give  a  chance  to  the  I-ISWP  or  its  derivatives  to 
seize  po%Ner  once  again  -as  it  happened  in  1994-.  A  new  rcgime  with  new 
grounds  of'  legitimacy  was  needed  after  the  failure  of  KAddr's  legitimation 
processes  aller  flour  decades  of  work  due  to  social  bribery  to  a  great  extent. 
New  institutions,  new  policies,  new  political  rules  and  a  new  period  of 
orientation  Nvere  the  elements  the  new  political  order  needed  to  rind  an 
alternative  to  the  KAddrist  social  contract115.  Thercrore,  the  future  of  the  new 
political  order  depended  and  depends  on  how  it  deals  with  tile  KAddrist  legacy 
of'  I  lungarian  political  system  As  will  be  discussed  in  Further  parts  of'  the 
thesis.  a  decade  after  the  fall  of  the  communist  regime  in  Hungary,  MdAr's 
political  legacy  still  afTects  political  developments  in  the  country. 
115  The  attempts  to  instittitionalisc  and  ideologically  rcshapc  thc  new  systcm  will  bc  discussed  in 
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CHAPTER  FOUR 
SOCIETY,  INSTITUTIONS,  AND  CHANGE  IN  THE  NEW 
HUNGARIAN  POLITICAL  ORDER 
1.  CIVIL  SOCIETY,  CHANGE,  AND  LEGITIMACY 
A.  Discussions  On  Civil  Society  Under  KAdAr: 
vile  concept  or  tile  secontl  society  and  that  or political  dissent  in  the  KAdAr  era, 
especially  1rom  mid-1970s  onwards,  was  taken  as  a  sign  of  the  existence  or 
civil  society  in  I  Itingary.  Observation  of  the  events  that  took  place  in  thc  wake 
orthe  letter  or  intellectuals  supporting  the  Czechoslovak  Charta-77  movement 
and  of'  the  socio-cconomic  conditions  forcing  the  implementation  or  tile 
secon(I  cconomy  /  seconcl  sociely  concept  into  the  I  lungarian  system,  led  to 
discussions  oil  the  existence  of  civil  society  in  IlUngary.  That  the  dissident 
movement  in  the  country  grew  and  formed  what  were  to  become  the  legally 
illcgitimate  parts  of  tile  National  Roundtable  Discussions,  and  that  the 
systemic  transformation  took  place  in  a  politically  more  advanced  manner  in 
I  lungary  than  its  East  European  confederates.  are  two  points  supported  by  such 
aUthors  as  It.  TOWs.  J.  Frentzcl-Zagorska,  Oleg  G.  Rumiantsev  and  David 
Beetham.  who.  based  on  these  two  points,  argue  that  civil  society  existed  in 
I  IL111g,  11-Y  bellore  the  transfiormation  to  democracy. 
'ro  analyse  the  existence  or  non-cxistence  of  civil  society  in  prc-transitional 
I  lungary.  especially  during  tile  late  1970s  onwards,  one  has  to  focus  primarily 143 
on  the  definition  or  the  term  civil  society.  Only  when  one  clearly  defines  the 
concept  and  understands  its  implications,  a  discussion  on  the  existence  or non- 
existence  ol'the  concept  in  the  KAddrist  era  can  be  shaped. 
B.  A  Definition  Of  Civil  Society: 
Civil  society.  as  a  concept,  has  a  variety  or  definitions.  These  diverse 
definitions  of  civil  society  may  however  be  reduced  to  three  groups.  Civil 
socict),  nicans: 
in  the  Weberian  sense,  a  world  or  interests  (such  authors  as  Locke  and 
I  legel  who  preceded  Weber  are  to  be  incorporated  into  this  group  as  well); 
b)  in  a  Gramscian  sense,  a  rendition  of  the  society  as  the  suni  of  all  social 
groulls  and  connections  which  are  independent  oF  the  state  at  institutional 
IeN  el.  and. 
0  as  a  nan-mcd-down  political  concept,  tile  purposeful  sell'-organisation  of 
socially  active  lorccs' 
16. 
I  I'onc  combines  tile  second  and  the  third  propositions.  and  takes  the  concept  of 
civil  society  in  a  neo-Gramscian  understanding,  that  is.  if  onc  takes  civil 
society  as  a  "structure  of  the  self-organisation  of  society,  located  outside, 
though  not  disconnected  firom,  the  institutional  framework  of  the  statc,  "I  17  the 
definition  ol'ci,,  -il  society  becomes  clearer.  Civil  society  results  in  the'creation 
of'  the  normative  structures  which  define  group  identities  and  interests. 
Morem,  cr.  it  has  to  present  a  link  between  tile  members  constituting  tile 
society  and  its  past,  its  traditions,  and  its  normative  and  hicrarchical  valucs  of 
social  behaviour.  It  Fulfils,  based  on  these  two  points,  the  tasks  of  inspecting, 
116  Oleo  G.  Rumiantsev.  Trom  Conrrontation  to  Social  Contract,  '  East  European  Polifics  and 
Societies.  v.  5(  1  ).  Winter  199  1.  (pp.  113-126)  p.  114. 144 
controlling.  and  criticising  state  policies  on  all  sulýjects,  and,  if  necessary, 
(IcIlending  the  interests  ol'the  society  against  tile  statel  18. 
011  the  one  hand.  therefore,  civil  society  means  a  restriction  on  the  power  of 
the  state  as  an  entity.  It  constitutes  an  obstacle  to  the  state  so  that  the  state  will 
be  Iorccd  to  linlit  its  control  over  the  whole  body  of  social  activity.  On  the 
other  hand.  civil  society,  nlay  also  stand  for  a  composite  of  self-orgallised 
social  Foci  within  tile  society  through  which  people  can  work  collectively  to 
sol%c  problems  or  to  channel  them  to  the  organs  -usually  within  tile  state- 
N%llich  may  solve  thern. 
In  all  descriptions  of  the  term  'civil  society',  there  is  a  common  set  of  required 
elements  so  that  civil  society  would  runction.  These  are: 
a)  z  za  iiial-k-et  ccolioliiy. 
b)  independcnt  media  of  communication  and  information, 
c)  sources  or  expertise  which  are  independent  orthe  state  but  which  provide 
experlise  on  all  governmental  policy  issues,  and. 
d)  a  network  of'voluntary  associations  in  all  areas  of  social  life'  19. 
Of  these,  the  cxistcncc  of  a  market  economy  provides  the  freedom  of 
ctiterprise  and  ol'choice.  The  existe6ce  ol'cxpert  organisations  inspecting  the 
government  provides  an  objective  look  at  the  deeds  of  tile  state  and  of  the 
ruling  political  order  or  government.  The  existence  of  voluntary  organisations 
in  all  fields  sustain  the  availability  of  political  choice  and  of  the  right  to 
choose  aniong  difreront  organisations.  The  existence  of  independent  media, 
117  Janina  h-ciltzel-Zagorska,  'Civil  Society  in  Poland  and  Ilungary,  '  56viet  9udies,  v.  42  (4),  1990 
(pp.  759-777),  p.  759. 
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and  fi-cedoni  over  communications  and  the  ilow  information  enable  the 
expression  of'  the  Frcedoilis  of  thought  and  or  spcech  and  the  unccnsored 
COIIIIIILIIIiCatiOll  or  ideas.  The  state's  role  in  the  creation  of  civil  society  is  to 
cnable  the  lwo  basic  Crecdorns.  that  is.  the  frcedorn  of  association  and  the 
freedom  of'speech  so  that  civil  society  may  truly  function. 
C.  Civil  Society  and  'Second  Society'  In  KSdArist  Hungary: 
As  one  may  induce  1rom  flic  cxplanations  above,  civil  society  appears  to  be 
capable  ol'  existing  only  under  a  liberal  democratic  system  which  comes  with 
1'reedoms  of  spcech.  inflormation.  association.  and,  1'rec  elections.  Without  the 
presence  ol'the  basic  constituents  ora.  liberal  democratic  system,  i.  e.  open  and 
accountable  governnicilt,  free  and  fair  elections  carried  out  on  tile  basis  of 
universal  sulfrage,  civil  and  political  rights,  and  a  democratic  society  resulting 
ofand  based  oil  these,  the  cxistence  of  civil  society  may  not  be  claimed.  Ergo, 
in  lhe  light  ofthe  parameters  of  the  definition  ol'civil  society  described  above, 
a  communist  civil  society  may  be  labelled  as  an  oxymoron  and  tile  Kdddrist 
I  ungary  may  not  be  considered  to  have  a  civil  society. 
On  the  other  liand,  one  lias  also  to  bcar  in  mind  that  tiic  concept  or  civil 
socicty  discussed  from  tile  beginning  of  tile  section  is  based  on  the  West 
Furopean  -  North  American  model  of  society  and  political  order.  Tlýercforc, 
the  concept  defined  above  is  not  at  all  times  applicable  to  tile  conditions  of*  tile 
East  Furopean  states  within  tile  Cold  War  context. 
Hungarian  sociologist  Flemer  Ilankiss  addresses  this  issue  in  his  study 
COIILILICIC(I  ill  1987  and  published  ill  1988.1  lankiss  proposcs  a  model  ol'second 
I  1'ý  David  Beetham  and  Kevin  Boyle.  Introducing  Dernocrac  , 
UNESCO-Polity  Press,  Padstow:  1995, 
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sovioy  to  bridge  the  gap.  Instead  ora  separate  and  fully  functional  civil  society 
system  as  understood  in  tile  Western  sense,  lie  proposes  a  two-tier  social 
organisation.  In  this.  the  first  society  represents  all  that  has  been  rcalised  by 
the  ideology-sanctioned  model,  that  is,  in  tile  East  European  case,  the  socialist 
system.  The  second  sociely  thercrore  becomes  in  I-lankiss'  view  all  that  is 
outside  tile  structure  or  the  first  society.  Tile  secon(I  society  therefore,  would 
he  lilade  up  ol': 
a)  a.  second  economy,  which  is  private  economy  which  is  either  legal  or  in  the 
Conn  of*black  market, 
b)  ail  alternative  public  opinion  as  a  result  of  illegal/underground  media 
operations. 
c)  a  second  Culture  including  sub-cultural  groups  as  hippies  as  well  as  religious 
groulls. 
(1)  a  second  social  consciousness  which  preserves  and  develops  value  systems 
dii'llcring  fiviii  those  of  dic  statc,  and, 
e)  a  secomi  set  or  socio-political  interactions  including  opposition  activities, 
citizcn  initiatives.  and  a  network  of  informal  relations  in  professional. 
religious  and  other  groups. 
I  lank-iss  clainis  that  these  would  give  rise  to  the  rormation  of  interest  groups 
%%hiCh  Will  11,1%'C  influence  on  the  policy-niaking  in  the  country.  flankiss 
conchides  that  a  secontl  society  which  may  be  all  East  European  alternative  to 
the  Western  concept  of  civil  society  does  not  exist  although  activities  exist  ill 
ill  I  the  I  ive  areas  lie  proposes.  I  [is  reason  is  that  these  activities  never  suril  up 
tO  COnStitUte  a  grouping  capable  or  proposing  a  different  set  or  paradigms  to 
those  pi-o,,,  -ide(I  by  the  first  society.  Ile  concludes  that  the  cilicrgence  or  civil 147 
socicty  in  I  lungary  in  partiCUlar  and  in  Eastern  Europe  in  general  is  obstructed, 
but  may  emerge  in  fimcl2ll.  Thcrerore.  it  can  be  claimed  that  Hankiss  takes 
I  ILIngarian  second  society  as  a  quasi-civil  society  which  may  either  be 
cate,,  oriscd  as  a  subgroup  or  civii  society  or  something  that  has  the  power  to 
evolve  into  the  form  orcivil  society  in  time,  rulfilling  A  the  rive  rcquirements. 
Follo%%ing  I  lankiss'  I  ist  of  requirements  Forthesecondsociqy  but  avoiding  his 
conclusions  which  were  premature  as  expressed  in  1985  in  tile  prc-Perestroika 
period.  one  may  claim  that  the  concept  of  seconct  socielj,,  vaguely  described  as 
al  I  activities  beyond  the  economic  and  social  control  or  uie  totalitarian  regime, 
constitutes  the  equivalent  of  civil  society  in  the  Western  sense.  As  in  a 
totalitarian  political  order  there  is  no  political  discussion  nor  possibility  for  tile 
public  to  have  any  control  nor  inspection  power  over  tile  deeds  or  the  state 
administration,  the  concept  of  second  society,  as  a  network  of  economic  and 
socio-political  activities  and  of  religious,  traditional  and  of  national  values 
which  normally  are  unauthorised  by  the  communist  system,  serves  as  a 
substitute  as  close  as  possible  to  the  concept  of'civil  society.  Andrew  Arato, 
%N  riting  on  the  Polish  civil  society  activity  in  198  1.  argues  that  civil  society  in  a 
communist  system  may  be  SLIMIlled  tip  as  what  is  uncontrollable  by  tile  state 
apparatus.  Ile  also  points  out  that  tile  two  ways  that  civi  I  society  might  change 
the  social  structure  in  Eastern  European  states  during  the  Cold  War  era  were 
blocked.  The  first.  lie  claims,  was  the  revolution  from  below  which  was 
unlikely  to  take  place  after  the  1956  experience  in  Hungary  (see  part  ILB 
above  on  this  matter),  with  the  only  possible  exception  of  one  such  revolution 
in  the  imperial  cciltre  itself,  in  this  case,  the  USSR.  The  second  nicans,  Arato 
Mý.  ciL,  pp.  766-778. 148 
proposes.  is  the  reform  movements  implemented  from  above  by  the  rulers  of  a 
country  and  sees,  with  the  exception  or  Hungary,  that  this  option  was  blocked, 
aller  the  events  of  1968  in  Czechoslovakia.  Arato  then  claims  that  a  third  way 
is  possible  as  shown  in  tile  works  of  Kolakowski  in  1971  and  of  Michnik  in 
1976:  Partial  yet  structural  reforms  from  below.  Instead  of  an  'all  or  nothing' 
approach.  the  ordinary  people  were  to  ask  ror  improvements  in  flicirsocial  life, 
living  standards,  working  hours  and  such,  and  to  form  organised  structures  to 
I- 
obtain  these.  if  possible.  The  Solidarity  movement  in  Poland  which  insisted 
that  its  main  aim  was  to  improve  the  rights  and  working  conditions  of  the 
Polish  workers  and  that  it  had  no  political  ends  (in  January  1981)  can  be  seen 
-is  an  example  of  such  an  attemptl2l. 
Following  Arato*s  argument  of  the  third  possibility,  one  may  claim  that 
I'Olalld.  Czechoslovakia,  and  Hungary  arc  the  three  Soviet  Bloc  countries 
where  a  Nort  ol'secoml  sociely  emerged  and  developed  into  an  East  European 
version  ol'civil  society.  In  Poland,  the  Solidarity  movement  and  its  followers 
confronted  the  ruling  political  order  in  an  openly  political,  confrontational 
manner  with  collective  action  and  organisation.  The  aim  was  to  change  the 
state  structure  by  nicans  or  reform  from  below  which  would  give  way  to  a 
structural  change  at  the  end.  The  Polish  example  of  second  socictý  /  civil 
socict),  therellore  is  a  political  and  visible  scheme,  especially  after  tile  tOLIgll 
stand  the  Polish  government  took  against  tile  Solidarity  Movement.  When  tile 
ganisation  gained  structural  legitimacy  in  the  public  despite  its  illegal  nature,  ort 
it  became  an  alternative  Nvay  orexpressing  political  needs  of  the  Polish  people. 
121  Andrew  Arato,  'Civil  Society  Against  The  State:  Poland  1980-8  W  Telos,  no.  47,  Spring  1981  (pp. 
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The  Solidarity  movement  has  also  benefitcd.  from  charismatic  legitimation  by 
the  influence  ol'its  leader  Lech  Walessa  who  becanic  a  symbot  for  the  Polish 
struggle  against  the  communist  total  itarianism. 
In  Czechoslovakia,  political  activities  were  concentrated  in  the  actions  of  tile 
intelligentsia  especially  after  the  Spring  of  1968  events  and  the  reign  of  terror 
that  l'olloved  it.  Unlike  Poland,  no  popular  movement  with  strect 
Licnionstrations  or  industrial  action  took  place  to  disturb  the  ruling  political 
order.  The  main  concern  of  the  dissident  intelligentsia  was  the  issue  ofliurnan 
rights  and  to  case  tile  tight  control  the  administration  applied  in  the  wake  of 
Sprino  1968. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  I  hingary,  based  on  the  need  of*  the  administration  to 
negotiate  to  gaill  legititilacy,  and  based  oil  the  recollections  or  tile  popular 
memory  on  the  1956  uprising.  a  compromise  was  SOUght  and  reached.  From 
carly  1960s  onwards.  as  Janina  Frentzel-Zagorska  observed,  critical  but  not 
01111OSin,  "  ilitelleCtLials  asked  for  economic  reform  from  above,  and  only  in  the 
I-ate  1980s  voiced  their  wish  for  political  reform  from  above  as  well  as  further 
liberalising  economic  rcl'ortilsl22.  CiVil  society  in  Hungary  in  the  intellectual- 
political  sense  therellore  consisted'  of  the  intellectuals  who  sought  the 
continuity  (if  the  regime  through  rerbrillation.  'rhe  idea  or  lcgitimacý  of  the 
regime  flor  the  I  Imigarian  intellectuals  therctlore  lied  upon  tiie  success  or  tiie 
reform  programmes  in  tile  ficid  of  economy  as  tile  external  support  made  tile 
overthrow  of'  the  regime  impossible.  As  a  result,  I  believe  that,  although 
dismissed  by  Arato  and  others  as  a  revisionist,  this  compromisc-based  system, 
the  transaction  bct%vcen  the  I  lungarian  ruling  political  order  and  the  I  ILingarian 150 
PLIblie.  despite  being  based  on  econornic  reform  and  the  improvement  of 
econonlic  libcaics  most  or  tiie  time.  constitutes  an  example  of  the  third 
possibility  to  change  the  systcm. 
Likewise.  as  excrnplificd  by  the  introduction  or  the  secoml  economy  idea  in 
late  1970s  and  by  many  other  reforms  from  the  top  which  preceded  it,  the 
belief  of  the  ordinary  people  and  not  only  of  intellectuals  that  the  political 
order  is  legitimate  was  a  primary  objective  sought  by  the  Kdddr  administration. 
What  Uinos  K,  i(lAr  wanted  to  have  was  a  sort  ol'social  contract  which  would 
bind  tIIC  public  not  to  rebel  against  the  ruling  political  order,  but  which  would 
not  on  the  other  liand  bring  any  unbearable  burdens  for  the  administration. 
Thinking  in  ternis  or  Western  i  ilterprctat  i  oils  of  the  concepts  or  social  contract 
and  ol*  civil  society,  the  idea  that  a  unilateral  social  agreement  appears  not  to 
be  a  prool'  [Ior  tile  existence  of  civil  society.  Oil  tile  other  hand,  in  a  system 
Wicre  the  state  has  a  selr-declared  legal  legitimacy  and  is  tile  oninipotent 
political  power-holdcr.  and  where  the  institution  of  communist  part),  is 
interchangeable  Nvith  the  state  apparatus,  an  authoritarian  agreement  may  be 
rl 
(1111)bCLI  as  a  social  contract  and  the  pLiblic  (consisting  of'ordinary  people  and 
intelleetuals  alike).  taken  as  a  side  to  this  agrecrnent,  may  be  understood  as 
assuming  a  part  ol*civil  society. 
In  such  an  agreement.  "the  citizens  will  rcIIOUncc  certain  liberties,  il'thc  state 
NOI  guarantee  them  a  stable  rise  in  the  standard  of  living"123.  In  I  lungary,  what 
happened  since  tile  cild  of  tile  1950s  was  that  Kdddr  -always  sought  to  reach 
compromises  if*  not  agreemcnts.  The  system  was  restrictivc  towards  a  social 
jj  122.1anina  1'rent/el-Zagorska,  pp.  it.,  pp.  772-773. 
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contract  based  oil  mutual  political  compromise  as  proven  by  tile  events  or  1956 
and  with  the  presence  of  the  external  element  of  regime  legitimacy.  Ergo, 
instead  of'  a  social  contract  based  oil  pure  political  terms,  KAdAr  proposed  a 
series  ofecononlic  contracts  with  some  political  concessions  implemented  in 
bet%%cen  economic  liberties.  The  public  would  have  a  better  living  standard 
and  the  I  ISWP  would  have  undisputed  political  authority  (for  post-coi  u  ist  n  ITI  11 
implications  orthis  Kdddrist  social  contract,  see  below)124. 
The  existence  of  such  a  system,  despite  the  ract  that  the  government  was 
immune  rrorn  public  inspection  by  either  tile  means  or  some  extra- 
gox,  crnmental  organisations  or  by  the  means  of  firce  elections.  created  the 
ground  flor  civil  society  in  KAddr's  Hungary.  However,  the  limits  on  the 
runctions  and  oil  tile  sphere  of  influence  or  this  society  is  a  matter  which 
requires  further  analysis  as  it  gave  rise  to  both  the  dissident  movement  which 
became  the  opposition  in  the  interim  to  democracy,  as  well  as  to  the  main 
problem  orthe  K6d6r  administration  that  I  brand  as  the  Dicholom.  y  of  KtUit-. 
D.  The  Dichotomy  Of  KAdAr: 
The  post-war  Hungarian  political  order  was  based  oil  a  Stalinist  constitution 
and  despite  all  the  reforms  which  were  carried  out  after  the  1956  uprising,  the 
s)  stem  continued  to  be  a  Stalinist  system  in  essence.  The  KAddr  administration 
oil  the  one  hand  had  to  give  or  appear  to  give  concessions  to  the  public.  oil  tile 
other  hand  it  had  no  external  credibility  to  afford  to  refibrill  the  system  from 
top  to  bottom.  The  regime,  as  observed  by  Josef  Gorlice,  invited  people  to 
124  1  lowevcr.  this  never  means  that  the  state  never  gave  political  concessions.  The  very  basic  example 
that  a  Depariment  orSymbolic  Logic  was  set  tip  and  then  replaced  the  Department  of  Dialectical  Logic 
in  the  I  Iniversity  or 
hudapest  h4iý'  1980s  (see  Janos  Laki  and  Katalin  Ncurner,  'Past  Continuous: 
Philosophy  in  I  Itingary  Before  and  Aller  the  Political  rurn,  '  Shidies  In  E(isl  EuropeaiiThoiýizhf,  v.  5  1, 
1999.  p.  2.47)  shows  stich  a  trend  in  politicsas  well  as  in  economics. 152 
C011111,11-C  tllC  I  ILIngarians*  situation  with  the  populations  of  otlicr  East  European 
countries  and  this  WOUld  lead  to  a  conviction  that  Hungarian  society  was  -a 
richer.  more  dynanlic,  reasonably  Freer  society  in  comparison  to  othcr  societies 
in  the  same  situation.  The  Ilungarian  state  permitted  "a  significant  range  of 
indiVidUal  freedoms,  especially  in  the  field  of  economics,  but  it  was  not 
allm%im,  the  essential  questions  or  power  and  strueture  to  be  brought  into 
question  -a  strategy  of  granting  concessions  without  rights  as  JAilos  Kis  calls 
it"125. 
In  cach  and  every  possibility  that  the  international  duties  of  the  Hungarian 
ruling  regime  would  permit,  reforms,  especially  in  the  field  or  economics, 
were  granted.  The  aim  of'  the  KAddr  administration  was  above  all  to  avoid 
social  complexities  and  a  conrrontation  with  tile  publiC126,  thercrore  it  granted 
NNIlat  would  be  tile  bascs  of  socio-cconomic  development  Ilor  the  exchange  of 
social  obedience. 
I  lowever.  as  there  Nvere  internal  balances  to  be  considered.  namely  the  issue  of 
obtaining  in  intra-party  legitimacy  which  would  enable  the  ruling  cadres  to 
remain  in  power.  some  compromises  were  suspended.  For  instance,  tile  1968 
economic  relornis  were  withdrawn  in  1972  to  silence  the  hard-line  communist 
opposition  within  tile  IISWP.  The  return  to  repression  over  the  dissident 
intcliectual  took  place  in  1972-73  period  as  several  dissidents  %vere  expelled 
from  the  I  ISWP  and  sonic  distinguished  members  of  Budapest  intelligentsia 
like  Ferenc  Felier.  Ivan  Szclcnyi.  and  Milialy  Vajda  were  forced  to  emigratc127. 
12ý  Jowl'  Gorlice,  'Introduction  to  the  Hungarian  Dcmocratic  Opposition,  '  Berkelcy  Journal  Of 
Sewiologv.  v.  31.1986.  (pp.  117-167),  p.  117. 
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The  cancellation  of  some  reforms  and  tile  hardening  of  the  administration's 
approach  lowards  dissident  voices  were  reflections  of  the  personal  fears  of 
Midir  and  his  close  colleagues  for  the  rate  of  their  prospective  positions 
against  the  Muscovite  administration.  imiddr  was  to  compromise  too  much  in 
the  eyes  ol'the  Soviet  administration  at  a  givcn  time,  lie  would  be  replaced  by  a 
hard-liner.  or  another  1956-style  military  intervention  could  take  place.  On  the 
other  hand.  il'the  KAddr  administration  was  to  totally  ignore  the  public  wish, 
then  another  uprising  might  occur. 
Ergo.  oil  the  one  hand.  K6ddr  had  to  satisfy  the  wishes  and  orders  of  the  Soviet 
regime.  and  on  the  othcr  hand.  the  needs  and  deniands  of  the  I  lungarian  public. 
I  lie  Klickirist  compromise  was  granted  From  the  top  with  no  apparent  demand 
1'rom  the  below.  because  the  demand  from  the  below  would  only  be  too  vocal 
to  be  limited  to  donlestic  scalc  only.  On  the  other  hand,  KAd6rist 
administration  was  unable  to  disregard  the  terms  and  conditions  or  tile 
compromise  with  the  public,  as  it  was  a  quid1ro  quo  sort  of  politico-economic 
contract  with  the  I  lungarian  public.  I  brand  the  situation  that  Kdddr  suffered 
durhig  the  balancing  act  of'  various  internal  elcments  by  competing  groups 
%Nhile  maintaining  a  lidelity  to  the  USSR  and  preserving  tllc  stalus  quo,  as  the 
PicholoinY  (?  fKddcir. 
The  dicholomy  of'  K(Uir  is  the  essential  building  stone  or  tiie  sullus  quoist 
policies  ldoptcd  and  implemented  by  KAdar  during  his  32  years  reign  as  tile 
I  ISWII*s  supreme  figure.  These  policies  acted  as  preventive  devices  for  the 
establishment  ora  Solidarity-like  movement  in  the  country-with  the  claims  that 
I  lungarians  were  in  a  far  better  situation  compared  to  other  East  European 
pcople.  'I'lic  KAdArist  dichotomy  prevented  on  the  one  hand  the  KAddr 154 
administration  to  impleincrit  truly  and  thoroughly  comprehensive  cconomic 
and  soeial  rellorms,  yet  on  the  other  hand  prevented  the  formation  or  a  strong 
opposition  to  go  beyond  the  symbolic acts  or  the  underground  artists  calling 
themselves  tile  hiconnu  and  who  organised  unofficial  art  exhibitions  in  privatc 
apartments128  or  bcyond  tile  attempts  to  change  the  political  order  bY  tile 
vinbourgeoisemew  ol'the  Hungarian  society. 
Due  to  the  %ticcessrul  impleniciltation  of  Uddrist  legitimation  tccliniques 
based  on  the  qui(Ilwo  quo  strategy,  the  communist  system  survived  in  I  lungary 
until  the  great  change  in  the  world  political  structure  in  late  1980s  permitted 
greater  structural  change  in  individual  countries  of  tile  Soviet  Bloc.  Tile 
change  was  to  remove  some  restrictions  in  respect  or  the  freedom  or  speech 
and  ofcommunication.  notably  after  the  general  aninesty  of  1985.  The  change 
caused  political  activity  in  the  country  to  expand.  ne  switis  quo  KddAr  tried  to 
prescrve  hence  becarne  tile  slahis  quo  anle,  this  resulting  in  Kaddr 
administration's  loss  ol'Iegitiniacy.  Kdddr  was  unable  to  ofrer  fui-ther  changes. 
Flie  political  environment  that  created  the  Dicholomy  (?  f  KtUir  kept  Jdnos 
KA(Uir  in  power  flor  32  years,  bUt  because  of  tile  existence  of'  this  dichotonly, 
tile  same  KAdAr  had  to  leave  office. 
11.  THE  EFFECTS  OPCIVIL  SOCIETY' 
A.  Two  Perceptions  Of  Civil  Society: 
Civil  socia-v  was  dcscribcd  abovc  from  Elemer  I-lankiss'  point  of  vicw. 
I'liroughout  this  thesis,  in  order  to  be  more  identifiable,  tile  term  'civil  sociely' 
rercrs  to  the  scctors  orsociety  which  are  not.  by  definition,  inseparable  parts  of 
the  state  realm.  that  is.  which  are  non-political  parts  of  the  society  outside  tile 
12K  Roger  Scruton.  "I  lie  New  Right  I  nCentral  Europe,  2:  Poland  and  II  ungary.  '  PoliticalSimlies,  v.  36, 155 
policy  -making  process.  Although  there  are  a  variety  of  definitions  concerning 
cil'il  sociel-r.  the  above  definition  seems  to  be  accurate  in  terms  or  dcscribing 
the  Functions  ol'civi/  socie(v. 
Whatever  description  is  extended  to  the  concept,  civil  sociely  is  perceived  in 
two  precise  manners  by  two  difrerent  schools  of  thought  vis-A-vis  its 
relationship  with  (lie  state.  The  two  schools  consist  of  the  Hegelian  and  Nco- 
I  legelian  school  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Scottish  Enlightenment  school  on 
the  other.  The  I  legelian  and  Neo-Ilegelian  approach  to  the  subject  of  civil 
socioy  is  based  on  the  claim  that  state  and  civil  sociely  are  two  different  and 
adverse  entitics  and  cannot  co-cxist.  Hegelians.  and  aniong  them  those  such  as 
Gramsci.  think  that  when  one  of  the  two  sides  has  a  loss.  the  other  grows 
-stronger  as  one  is  the  complete  opposite  of  the  other.  On  the  other  hand, 
Scoltish  1-iflightenment  thinkers  such  as  Adam  Smith  were  argLlillg  that  state 
and  001  sociely,  may  and  do  coexist  and  are  actually  parts  or  a  whole  rather 
than  two  opposite  sides  or  a  conl1rontation129.  Therefore,  while  cither  the  state 
or  civil  socicty  has  a  loss,  both  sides  lose,  or  when  one  has  a  gain,  both  gain. 
While  the  political  change  in  Southern  Europe  and  Latin  America  might  be 
used  to  support  the  I  legeliall  vision  of  civil  society.  Ilic  Past  European  and 
post-Sovict  transformation  rrom  mid-  I  980s  onwards  is  more  on  tile  side  of  the 
Scottish  E-rilightenment  approach.  The  changes  in  the  existence  or  credibility 
of'  one  part  or  the  equation,  for  instance  a  change  in  the  living  standards 
towards  better  or  worse,  may  have  direct  indications  oil  the  public  perception 
1988.  (pp.  638-658),  p.  647. 
12'1  Krishan  Kumar,  'The  Evolution  or'Society:  A  Darwinian  Approach,  '  in  C.  M.  Hann  (ed.  ),  When 
In  Rapid  Social  Chang.  Complexity  and  Creativity,  London,  UK:  The  !_  Kl 
Athlone  Press.  1994.  pp.  25-26. 156 
of  the  new  political  order.  The  development  of  civil  society  agencies  may 
contribute  to  the  public  acceptance  and  approval  of  the  new  political  order  or 
diminish  the  strength  of  a  negative  response  up  to  a  certain  extent. 
Willi  (lie  historicall  background  of  tile  second  socieiy  which  dominated  the 
I  IMigarian  social  life  from  1970s  onwards,  it  is  possible  to  claini  that  the 
I  lungarian  people  Nvere  already  practising  sorne  soil  of  non-governmcrital, 
social  organisation.  Although  there  is  an  ciement  or  familiarity  with  the  second 
economy  and  the  second  sociely.  wlictlier  thesc  two  coiiccpts  wcre  supporting 
or  hindering  the  formation  of  a  post-communist  civil  sociely  nceds  to  be 
discussed. 
B.  Is  The  Second  Society  a  Civil  Society  or  a  Proto-Civil  Society?: 
The  Kad-,  Irist  social  contract  was  based  on  the  provision  of  a  better  standard  of 
living  in  comparison  Nvith  other  East  European  nations  in  exchange  of  political 
obedience.  or  rather  depoliticisation.  Tile  diminishing  economic  benefits  of 
Udilr's  New  Economic  Mechanism  in  the  mid-1970s  led  to  the  widespread 
organisatio  n  or  %Nhat  would  later  be  dubbed  as  tile  second  economy,  a  concept 
%Oich  was  present  since  tile  early  1960s.  With  the  simultaneous  existctice  of  a 
secondImblieslAem  which  covers  the  illegal  and  serni-legal  publications  like 
the  sumblal.  it  was  characterised  by  Elemer  Hankiss  who  branded  the  whole 
ol'this  set  ol'social  networks  as  the  secoml  sociely.  Ilankiss'  idea  of  second 
sociely  comprises  of'  a  combination  of  a  second  econonty,  second  culture, 
second  social  consciousness,  a  second  level  of  social  networks  which  made  up 
11  111(),  1(Ilitllie  %%,.  1101e130. 
131)  Susanne  Klausen.  Tirst  Society,  5econd  sociqv:  Mutual  Discontents.  Interview  with  Elemer 
I  lankiss.  '  Eit.  %/  Europetin  Reporter,  vol.  3(l),  November  1987  (pp.  63-65),  p.  64.  See  Chapter  2  for  a 
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I  lowever.  as  the  second  sociely  is  a  derivative  coneept,  that  is  as  it  is  a  concept 
N%hich  Nvas  created  to  Ilind  a  solution  to  the  shortcomings  of  thefirst  sociely 
NNhich  was  the  lcgally  legitimate,  socialist  socicty  existing  only  at  tile  official 
level  and  within  the  I  ISWP  and  the  bureaucracy.  its  merits  as  a  quasi-civil 
sociely  are  disputable.  In  the  last  two  decades  or  tile  KAddr  administration  in 
Hungary.  the  mzýjority  or  tic  people  who  were  eligible  to  work  were 
participating  in  the  secon(I  economy  and  a  considerable  part  of  the 
intelligcnisia  Formed  tile  segment  in  the  society  I  lankiss  rerers  to  as  tile  second 
sl)here  (?  /*  I  lowever,  Im  tile  former  was  not  directly  interested  in  the 
latter*s  activities.  one  may  not  possibly  clairn  that  there  was  a  civil  sociely.  at 
least  in  the  mak-  ing,  in  the  late-Kdd6rist  I  lungary.  As  Elenicr  flank-iss  observed 
inan  interview  in  Nomliber  1987: 
"ITIlie  nizijjority  or  tile  population  lives  a  more  or  less 
negative  existence.  By  that  I  mean  that  they  in  fact  do  not 
really  participate  in  tile  "first  society*s"  political,  social  or 
spiritual  litle.  They  do  not  live  from  the  values  of  tile  first 
society  and  these  values  have  no  influence  in  their  lives. 
People  are  neutral  or  indifferent  towards  these  institutions  but 
they  have  been  unable  to  develop  new  ideas.  values  or 
institutions.  Nor  does  the  second  way  of  lille  offer  attractive 
conditions  flor  tile  vast  majority.  The  seconcl  sociqy  as  a 
whole  is  placed  in  a  difruse  socýal  position.  It  is  twisted  and 
distorted,  but  with  a  core  structure  which  resembles  proto- 
institutions  or  proto-mcchanisms,  but  which  in  this  quasi- 
legal  posture  cannot  be  used  as  a  model  for  a  new  social 
sysicin.  In  this  glictto-like  condition  it  cannot  evolve  into 
anything  truly  healthy  and  dynamic  and  attain  a  larger 
significance.  Hence.  I  do  not  believe  that  in  the  future  we  can 
expect  a  realisation  of  tile  second  socielj%  Oil  the  contrary, 
... 
it  would  completely  disappear  were  tile  first  society  to 
denlocratise.  -131  ' 
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I  lankiss'  rctilarks  point  to  the  fact  that  the  second  society  as  a  concept  is  an 
aftempt  to  an  alternative  culture  within  tile  pararnetcrs  of  the  state  socialist  rule 
'Ind  not  a  form  of  civil  society  in  the  making  even  before  tile  opening  of  tile 
s),  stcm  to  the  en'cct.  -,  of  dernocratisation.  Albeit  the  existence  of  dissident 
groups  and  illegal  or  scmi-legal  publications  such  as  in  swnizdca,  the  public 
involvement  in  tile  political  level  of  tile  second  sociely  is  negligible.  That  is 
(hic  to  the  nature  ol'the  KddArist  social  contract  and  the  social  bribery  which 
was  a  part  ol'this  social  contract. 
When  one  looks  at  the  formation  of  tile  non-governniental  organisations  and 
other  civil  sociely  components  in  the  post-communist  era,  one  can  see  that 
these  organisations  rcilect  to  a  great  extent  the  non-political  nature  of  tile  pre- 
(Icniocratic  society 
. 
in  I  lungary.  I  lowever,  there  are  elements  in  this  generally 
depoliticised  environment  which  may  be  linked  to  a  more  politically  oriented 
segment  ol*the  seconclsociely. 
C.  The  Roots  of  Politicised  Civil  Society  in  KAdArist  Hungary: 
Within  the  Gorbachevite  international  political  framework  of  d6tclite  and 
against  tile  backgrOUnd  or  gimnost,  politically  oriented  groups  emerged  in  ,  L_ 
I  ILIIlgll')'  Within  tile  SeCOII(l  SOCiely.  These  groups  may  even  be  considered  as 
tile  possible  ancestors  or  a  post-communist  Hungarian  civil  sociely.  These  may 
also  be  dubbed  as  alternative  cultures  in  the  Western  understanding  or  tile 
N%ord  and  these  have  Four  main  foundations:  a)  tile  minority  groups  who  fought 
to  keep  their  national  identity  such  as  the  Gypsies  and  tile  Jews,  b) 
environmentalists  and  urban  conservation  groups  vv'ho  were.  politicised  as  their 
conservationist  demands  clashed  inevitably  -and  deliberately-  with  the 
government's  policies  oil  industrial  development,  c)  members  or  tile  political 159 
dissident  groups  who  published  material  in  the  sainizdca  format,  or  published 
and  circulated  other  illegal  or  senii-legal  newspapers,  journals,  and  magazines, 
and  finally.  d)  tile  general  public  who  in  fact  were  not  involved  in  politics,  but 
Nflio  Lire  a  party  in  the  Uddrist  social  contract  and  who  therefore  expect 
economic  benclits  in  exchange  for  political  indirfcrencc. 
Fhe  first  1%,  vo  ofthese  rour  categories  are  legal  as  there  was  a  right  to  organise. 
I  lo%ý.  ever.  while  tile  national  minority  groups  were  truly  interested  in 
prescrving  their  social/national  identity  within  the  I  lungarian  state  which  was 
in  essence.  at  least  in  the  ideological  level,  universalist,  the  environmentalists 
and  urban  conscrvationists  had  a  further  political  agenda:  As  to  criticisc  tile 
administration  oil  ideological-political  grounds  consisted  a  crinle  even  in  the 
loose  glasnost  atmosphere.  to  voice  environmental  conccrns  and  to  claim  that 
the  administration  had  no  interest  in  the  environmental  health  or  its  population 
was  a  means  of  discrediting  the  administration  without  apparent  political 
involvement.  Besides.  since  the  1956  events  have  created  a  cautious  public 
response  to  political-ideological  agitation,  the  voicing  of  seemingly  apolitical 
concerns  werc  likely  to  receive  more  public  backing.  The  environmental 
campaign  to  prevent  tile  constrLICtion  or  tile  Bos  (Gabcikovo)-Nagyniaros  Dam 
011  the  11LIngarian-Slovakian  border  has  been  a  lively  issue  of  clikussion 
aniong  the  I  lungarian  public.  The  debate  which  began  in  1983  continued  with 
the  emergence  of  (lie  Danube  Circle,  an  organisation  which  did  not  ask  Im 
permission  to  organisC  and  which  replaced  tile  legal  ly-establislied  Association 
for  the  Protection  of'  the  Danube  ItCgio,  1132,  and  continued  into  the  post- 
1.12  Gyula  Denes,  'The  Politics  or  Environmental  Protection,  '  Eas/  European  Reporter,  vol.  2(2), 
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C01111MIniSt  cra'3-1.  This  was  pcrceived  as  a  political  campaign  to  discrcdit  the 
I  ISNVII  government  without  a  real  political  involvenictit  and  creatcd  interest  in 
the  generally  apolitical  Hungarian  public  over  the  issue  and  over  the 
misconduct  or  tiie  I  lungarian  communist  regime.  The  Danube  Circle  became  a 
succcssl'ul  public  rclations  cause  of  the  Hungarian  dissident  movement  as  it 
managed  to  gather  five  thousand  people  to  dcrnonstratc  against  the  Bos- 
Nagyniaros  Dam  in  May  1988  while  in  September  1988  it  arranged  for  a 
massive  florty  thousand  people-strong  dernonstration  urging  the  suspension  of 
the  construction  work.  Although  the  attempt  failed  at  the  moment,  the  Miklos 
Neincill  government  suspended  work  on  tile  darn  and  tried  to  cancel  the 
pl-()  J  eCt134 
Formations  vvhich  supported  a  social,  as  well  as  a  political  cause  filled  the  gap 
bowecii  Ilic  sccond  and  the  third  groups.  For  instance.  tile  Social  Coninlittce 
flor  the  I  loincless  (SCI  1)  which  emerged  in  early  1989  and  which  supported  the 
cause  ol'  the  homeless  but  which  rerused  any  homeless  person  to  enter  the 
committee  as  a  member  because  it  was  an  organisation  "llbi"  the  homeless  and 
not  -ol-  the  homeless.  It  was  run  by  intellectuals,  "it  was  a  social  nimcnient 
which  used  demonstrations  and  petitions,  it  was  a  movement.  fi)r  rather  than  of 
its  target  group:  it  Nvas  ready  to  discuss  with  the  [Budapest  m6liicipal] 
comicil...:  and  finally  it  achieved  reSUItS.  "13.1  The  SCI  I,  therefore  has  become 
an  organisation  attempting  at  politicising  the  Hungarian  pcople,  howcver  it 
lacked  the  political  nature  of  the  third  group.  The  Tenants  Association  formed 
133  I-amas  I'leischer.  "I'lle  BILIc  Danubc,  '  East  European  Reporter.  vol.  4(2),  Spring  1990  (pp.  78-80), 
1).  78. 
1.1-1  Ijill  J,  omax.  'The  Strange  Death  of  'Civil  socicýv'  in  post-Communist  Hungary,  '  Journal  (?  f 
Communism  Studies  wid  b-ansilion  Politics,  vol.  13(1),  March  1997(pp.  41-63),  p.  45. 161 
in  1988  N%as  a  similar  movement.  These  groups,  helped  in  some  central  issues 
like  environmental  protection  and  housing  problems,  but  in  the  long  run,  werc 
limitcd  in  scale  and  scope  and  could  not  reach  tile  mqlority  of  the  population 
and  wcrc  helped  by  the  post-Gorbachev  atmosphere  or  greater  understanding 
as  %kell  as  abusing  it  to  harass  the  ruling  regime.  As  they  were  short-lived, 
issue-orientcd.  and.  had  a  secondary  airn  as  wearing  out  the  administratioWs 
already  sinking  popularity.  they  cannot  be  mentioned  as  a  group  on  their  own 
but  as  a  niche  between  the  politicised  activists  and  the  overtly  political 
dissidents. 
The  third  group  in  the  communist  era  alternative  culture  formations  consists  or 
tile  polideally  active  dissidents.  These  published  material  as  tile  sand-dals  or 
other  illegal  or  semi-legal  newspapers,  journals.  magazines,  held  opposition 
meetings.  11ormed  political  groups  and  attempted  to  politicise  tile  nation.  Such 
samizdats  like  the  Beszelij  and  Val&  I  helped  the  members  of  this  group  to 
spread  their  ideas  and  create  an  intra-clite  discussion  forum  outside  the  reach 
ol'  the  oll-teial  control  and  censorship.  The  members  or  this  group,  however, 
tire  themselves  members  of'  tile  intelligentsia  who  are  outside  the  decision- 
making  Cli(jUc  but  within  tile  boundaries  of  intellectually  influential  part  of  the 
society.  This  group  is  made  up  of  students,  philosophers,  teachers,  members  of 
acadenlia.  economists  and  other  political  ly-incl  ined  profcssionals,  and,  by 
definition.  they  are  not  mcnibers  of  the  common  public  in  general.  Their 
higher  political  awareness  and  their  comparatively  higher  living  standards  - 
despite  tile  gradual  decrease  in  the  living  standards  ol'the  academicians  which 
LIS  C.  (;,  vickvance.  'Environmental  and  I  lousingMoveinents  in  Cities  After  Social  ism:  The  Cases  of 
Budapestand  Mosco%v.  *  in  G.  Andrusz  et  al.  (cds.  ),  Cities  After  Socialism,  p.  252. 162 
continues  N%,  cli  into  the  post-communist  cra-  put  these  into  a  different  position 
ol'  relationship  with  the  power-holders  as  the  members  of  this  groups  arc 
potential  powcr-liolders  themselves. 
Onc  major  difflerence  between  tile  intelligentsia  in  this  third  group  and  the 
ordinary  people  in  the  fourth  group  is  the  former's  ability  to  negotiate  with  the 
ruling  class  oil  a  philosophical  -  ideological  basis.  While  the  KAdArist  social 
contract  was  an  exchange  of  economic  benefit  or  relative  economic  freedom 
with  political  obedience.  the  intc1ligentsia.  asked  For  intellectual  fireedoni. 
Thcrellore.  they  were  not  part  or  the  Kdddrist  social  contract.  The  censorship 
and  a  lack  of'  1ree  expression  of  thought,  and  not  the  econornic  hardship,  were 
the  main  problems  flor  tile  intelligentsia,.  In  tile  nicantime,  tile  general  public, 
the  parts  of  the  socicty  which  arc  outsidc  tile  definition  of  intelligmtsia 
identilied  their  nuýjor  probIcnis  as  those  issucs  conccrning  evcryday  lire  such 
as  the  rising  prices.  the  lack  of  needed  consumer  goods  in  the  supermarket 
shelves  or  the  lack  or  financial  ability  to  arrord  these.  ir  we  keep  this  in  mind, 
it  is  arguable  that  while  the  dissident  part  of  the  intelligentsia  carried  out 
activities  to  dellend  the  intellectual  rights  and  freedoms  in  Kdddrist  Hungary. 
the  main  support  to  thern  came  from  the  public  when  the  economic 
inconsistencies  of'  tile  communist  administration  began  to  undo  tile 
'depoliticisation  in  exchange  for  economic  benefits'  equation. 
The  best  example  for  the  differences  of  the  intellectual  dissident  approach  and 
the  ordinary  citizens"  understanding  of  the  UdArist  regime  is  the  youth 
movement  Diah;  gus.  It  emerged  in  the  1980s  as  ail  organisation  or  young 
secondary  school  pupils.  It  Sought  nuclear  disarmament.  The  leaders  of 
Diah;  gus  attempted  at  keeping  their  distance  firom  both  the  government  and 163 
the  intellectual  dissident  class  for  they  thought  Di(ih;  gus  was  in  fact  a  legal 
organisalion.  working  tinder  the  guidelines  set  by  the  KAdAr  administration.  in 
the  end.  the  I  ISWP  disagreed  and  Dial6gits  was  disbanded  in  the  wake  of 
threats  over  the  educational  Futures  of  the  members  and  of  pressures  both  on 
the  members  and  their  parents'-16.  The  organisation,  unlike  tile 
environmentalist  organisations  stich  as  the  Danube  Ch-cle,  did  not  receive  any 
assistance  1'rom  the  dissident  circles  who  thought  it  was  just  an  offspring  ol'the 
KA&Irist  establishment's  brainwashing  campaign.  'rhe  Western  equivalents  or 
such  an  orgaili  sati  oils  showed  no  interest  either  for  it  remained  unnoticed  due 
to  the  lack  ol'a  famous  figure  in  its  leadcrship  cadres. 
Thc  indifference  of  the  Hungarian  intelligentsia  towards  such  an  'innocent' 
organisation  as  the  Dial6gies  shows  that  thcre  was  a  gap  or  understanding.  ir 
110t  01'  trust.  between  the  intelligentsia  and  the  general  public.  The 
intelligentsia's  relusal  or  the  existing  social  contract  under  the  Kdddrist  system 
and  their  negative  attitude  or  ti,  ose  who  abide  by  its  rules,  and  the  general 
publiCs  general  indifferctice  to  the  pcrils  the  dissident  intellectuals  race, 
created  this  gap  and  kept  it  alive.  It  was  only  when  tile  dissident  intellectuals 
begail  to  make  use  or  the  economic  decline  as  flicir  nicatis  of  communication 
%Nitil  Ilic  gcncral  public  that  interaction  between  tile  two  sides  really,  I began. 
. 
From  then  on.  that  is  from  mid-to-late  1980s  onwards,  a  popular  mobilisation 
against  the  rLding  political  order  emerged.  Hence,  only  from  that  point  onwards 
one  may  reller  to  the  existence  of  a  nation-wide  pscudo-civil  society  with  mass 
participation. 
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D.  The  Reform  Proposals: 
In  order  to  enable  civil  socieýv  to  function  properly  in  its  liberal  democratic 
seilse.  tlie  reloriiis  souglit  aller  by  tlie  Ilungarian  intelligentsia  liad  to  be 
carried  out.  With  the  transfer  of  some  segments  of  political  power  to  the 
public.  with  economic  liberalisation  and  with  public  participation  into  policy- 
making  process  tip  to  an  extent,  civil  sociqv  might  bUrgeon  in  the  KddArist 
I  IL111"ary.  I  lowever,  as  tile  members  of  the  dissident  intelligentsia  were  and  are  tý 
by  definition  a  marginalised  minority  of  the  society.  the  efforts  towards 
creating  the  environment  suitable  for  the  establishment  of  civil  society 
components  came  into  existence  only  when  tile  economic  requirements  forced 
political  change  in  the  domestic  scalc  and  when  the  international  political 
environment  pumitted  such  changes. 
As  Csaba  Oombar  and  Laszlo  Lengyel  observed  in  their  1986  article,  tile 
changes  came  not  rrom  the  activities  of  the  intelligentsia  to  create  a  haven  of 
ilItClICCtLial  Freedoms.  but  from  the  negative  response  frorn  the  general  public 
towards  the  lack  orcommitment.  to  the  economic  causes  of  the  Kdddrist  social 
Contract: 
'I'lic  common  denominator  is  that  until  now  there  has 
been  no  political  reform. 
The  reason  Im  our  uncertainty  are  as  Follows.  From  the 
OLItSel.  we  have  witnessed  not  just  rellornis  with  an  economic 
content,  bill  we  have  also  seen  how  since  the  late  1960s  the 
activit),  or  higher  political  organs  involved  in  direct  econornic 
management  have  been  transrormed  institutionally. 
.... 
But 
wc  have  noticed  that  quasi-political  alternatives  have  been 
constructed....  And  what  is  important,  a  start  has  been  made 
in  institutional  nictarnorphosis.  .... 
Quasi-interest 
rcliresentation  organs  have  emerged,  which  are  ill  part  no 
longcr  transmission  belts  for  tile  central  organs  of  state  and 
party.  Ilaillautonornous,  half-independent  ecorlornic  areas 
have  come  into  being,  notably  the  private  plot,  ancillary 165 
industries,  small  enterprises  etc.  and  these  have  not  been 
integrated  into  any  kind  of  hicrarchical  political  order.  The 
mass  media  pursues  the  propaganda  or  success,  but  even  if  it 
does  so  with  great  unevenness,  it  is  developing  gradually 
towards  an  all  but  open,  almost  critical,  here  and  there 
independent  European-type  of  autonorny.  "137 
The  main  catalyst  which  enabled  the  formation  or  a  pscudo-structure  of  civil 
sociqv  in  I  lungary,  therefore,  is  not  the  political  efforts  or  the  first  three 
groups  which,  aller  all,  were  minorities  in  terms  of  dcrnography  and  social 
class  structUre.  but  the  economic  discontent  of  tile  masses  with  the  ongoing 
econoniie  decline  proeess.  The  members  of  intelligentsia  who  published  the 
sanlizdals  were  also  aware  of  tile  situation  and  in  tile  late  1980s,  tile  economic 
element  has  become  their  main  point  of  argument,  rather  than  the  political 
freedoms  iSSLIe. 
In  Ame  1987.  a  group  of  intellectuals  who  were  gathered  around  the  satilizdat 
Bes:  elij  published  a  programme  titled  Tonditions  lor  a  Political  Renewal'. 
I'his  manillesto  pointed  out  to  the  fact  that  the  reluctant  public  consent  era  was 
over  due  to  tile  consequences  of  econonlic  decline.  Its  authors  attacked  the 
KillLU11-iSt  social  contract  as  a  negative  consensus  reached  between  the  Kdddr 
administration  and  the  Hungarian  people  which  resulted  ill  the  granting  of 
small  sacrifices  by  (lie  state  instead  of  large-scale  social,  political  and 
economic  rcrorm.  The  programme  foresaw  that  there  arc  three  ways  out  of  the 
crisis  situation  ror  Hungary:  a)  a  series  of  campaigns  to  5trengthen  the 
nationalistic.  ideological  or  racial  feelings  through  mass  mobilisation  and 
relocation  of'  populations  like  in  Rumania;  b)  a  widespread  economic 
137  Csaba  (j()jjib,  ir  and  Laszlo  l,  cjj_gycl,  'it  May  Be...,  '  Easl  European  Repwier.  vol.  2(2),  Spring 
1986.1).  10.  emract  firom  the  authors'  atlicle  titled  IOn  the  Queslion  of  Social  Worm'  published  in 166 
liberalisation  programme  which  would  change  the  economic  environmcnt 
dramatically  while  tile  single-patly  dictatorsilip  would  rcmain  intact  likc  in 
South  Korea:  or.  c)  a  social  contract  which  would  replace  the  existing 
4consensus*  with  tile  participation  or  all  layers  or  the  society.  The  first 
condition  flor  the  realisation  or  tiic  last  possibility  was  Jdnos  KAdAr's  Icaving 
his  post  as  the  head  ofthe  state  and  or  the  administration13.1.  It  is  interesting  to 
sce  that  tile  first  alternative  was.  up  to  an  extent,  adopted  and  used  by  tile 
I  11,111g,  11-4111  Democratic  Foruill  government  dUring  the  First  post-communist 
parliamentary  term.  the  second  alternative  failed  during  the  later  stages  of  the 
communist  rule  in  the  country,  and  the  third  way  was  actually  adopted  as  the 
basis  ofthe  National  Roundtable  negotiations  of  1989. 
A  second  group  ol'ititelicctuals  which  might  be  described  as  nationalist-radical 
110PLIlists  and  N%ho  were  within  the  ruling  clique  or  tiie  communists,  nict  in 
Lakitelck  in  late  Septenibcr  1987.  During  flic  niecting,  Inire  Ilozsgay,  tlic 
leader  of  tile  People's  Patriotic  Front  (PIT).  made  a  speech  stressing  on  the 
problems  (if'  the  state  apparatus.  With  the  participation  of  twenty-two 
iIIICIleCtUalS.  thC  PIT'  had  already  issued  a  reform  proposal  titled  'Turning 
Point  and  Rellorm'  which  was  published  unauthorised  in  the  March-Junc  1987 
iSSLIC  or  tile  samizdat  IfinnoncM.  This  manifiesto  accused  tile  staie  or 
establishing  a  monopoly  over  tile  sources  ol'inflormation  and  thcrcrore  creating 
mishil'ormation  on  the  condition  or  the  I  lungarian  econonly.  This  claim  was 
based  on  tile  assumption  that  most  people  considered  tile  country's  economy 
T(irxat  h  doin  A  tilt  this,  1936.  issue  1. 
13.4  *A  Social  Contract:  Conditions  ror  a  Political  Renewal.  '  East  Eurolvan  Relvi-fer,  vol.  3(l), 
November  1987  (pp.  54-58).  pp.  54-55  pass.  im;  taken  rrom  special  issue,  June  1987. 167 
to  be  better  than  their  own  economic  situationlY).  Tile  remedy  the  PPF  was 
proposi  ng  was  the  strengthening  or  the  mass  niedia  and  its  public  credibility  as 
%vell  as  strengthening  the  position  of  the  Party.  me  perception  of  public  by  the 
twent)  7 
-tx%o  intellectuals  who  wrote  the  proposal  are  interesting: 
"A  significant  sector  of  the  population  is  ruled  by  apathy. 
They  receive  no  information  as  to  how  they  should 
understand  tile  loss  of  previously  professed  values  of 
socialism  (i.  e.  material  certainties,  stable  prices  -and  job 
security)  and  cannot  distinguish  between  the  enforced  retreat 
and  tile  unavoidable  reevaluation  ofthe  system. 
In  the  most  recent  period,  because  or  the  divergence 
bet%%cen  tile  use  of  reform  phraseology  in  tile  media  and  tile 
actual  social  and  political  practice,  the  word  "reform"  has 
become  voided  of  meaning  and  devalued.  even  for  those  who 
largely  know  what  it  means.  It  is  though-provoking  that 
ncarly  40  percent  or  those  asked  in  a  Survey  could  not  answer 
the  question  as  to  what  this  concept  meant  .[.... 
]  No 
economic  consolidation  or  renewal  of  any  kind  is imaginable 
NN,  ithout  regaining  credibility  in  the  public  splicrc.  "140 
The  clevcil  years  that  followed  the  publication  or  this  document  has  seen  a 
total  political  and  economic  transtlorniation  and  a  reform  process.  As  a  result 
ol'this  rellorm  process.  the  mass  media  became  a  rreer  institution  with  floreign 
im-cstment  -and  know-how  transrer.  The  flow  of  hiron-nation  bccanic  an 
unintermpted,  uncensored  process.  However,  despite  all  these  changes  the 
public  vie%v  of*  the  role  of'  the  administration  did  not  alter  dramatically  to 
prioritise  intellectual  Freedoms  over  economic  concerns.  Economic  problems 
are  still  tile  most  important  issue  in  tile  agenda  of  the  ordinary  people  in 
I  lungary.  The  respectability  of  such  institutions  as  pol  itical  parties, 
11"  Troposal  flor  the  Reform  of  the  Public  Splicrc.  '  Eist  European  Rcporter,  vol.  3(l),  November  1987 
(pp.  58-61),  p.  58. 
"()  IL)ULý  pp.  59-60. 168 
government  and  tile  parliament  are  still  very  low  (see  rurther  parts  of  this 
chapter  Cor  a  detailed  discussion). 
On  the  other  hand.  one  must  admit  that  the  samizdat  system,  based  on  the 
illegal  publication  and  distribution  of  dissident  ideas,  has  worked  in  creating  a  L- 
national  interest  and  flamiliarity  with  the  political  sphere.  -  As  the  distribution 
nullibc1's  ol'these  journals  and  newslettcrs  increased.  tile  ideas  of  tile  dissidents 
N%lio  vvi-ite  flor  these  publications  spread  around  slowly  but  unmistakably.  That 
the  1989  National  Roundtable  discussions  were  so  successful  in  persuading  the 
ruling  class  to  leave  officc  without  popular  uprisings  or  a  civil  war  as  in  other 
neighbouring  COLIntries  within  tile  sarne  pact,  can  be  linked  to  the  fact  that  tile 
diSSidClItS  were  by  then  well-known  and  respected,  and  that  was  due  to  the 
impact  ol'  the  sarnizdats  in  addition  to  tile  failures  or  the  Hungarian 
communists  in  the  fields  of  economics  and  of  public  relations. 
To  sum  up.  it  is  rational  to  claim  that  tile  activities  ofthe  dissident  groups  have 
bcen.  tip  to  an  extent.  SLICCCSSfUl  in  undermining  the  Hungarian  communist 
reginic.  I  lowever.  the  inability  of  the  Hungarian  administration  of  the  tinic  to 
tackle  the  pressure  stemilling  from  a)  ti,  c  ioss  or  its  international  backing  due 
to  the  policies  ol'glasnasl  and  1wi-eso-Whi,  b)  the  domestic  economic  failure 
due  to  the  inability  to  catch  up  with  the  rcquirenlents  or  the  new  infbriýnatics 
industrial  revolution  which  took  place  From  early  1980s  onwards  and  due  to 
the  inability  to  make  the  scmi-liberal  second  economy  mechanism  in  a  manner 
to  beilefit  the  state  and  the  people,  and  as  a  result  of  these,  c)  the  failure  of  the 
state  apparatus  to  play  its  part  in  the  Kaddrist  social  contract,  were  the  main 
reasons  Im  the  j*,  111  or  tile  communist  systern  in  I  lungary.  It  is  hard  to  claim 
that  the  second  society  idea,  under  these  circumstances,  may  be  considered  as 169 
either  vivil  sociqv  or  a  pscudo-civil  sociely  which  emerged  from  the  conditions 
of*  I  lungarian  state  system.  That  some  parts  or  the  second  society  were  indeed 
floundations  for  a  post-cormilunist  Hungarian  civil  sociely  is  a  corrcct 
assumption.  but  to  observe  a  civil  sociqy  in  the  K66rist  I  lungary  which  had 
no  widespread  POPLIlar  support  nor  wide-scale  activities  of  protest,  no  access  to 
NNidespread  mass  media,  and  no  role  of  inspection  or  pressure  over  tile 
government  policies  would  be  irrational.  The  process  or  strengthening  which 
took  place  in  the  last  three  years  of  1980s,  especially  allcr  JAnos  Kdddr's 
replacement  in  the  May  1988  Congress,  may  be  seen  as  a  civil  society 
formation.  however.  even  so,  it  is  too  short-livcd  to  influenec  the  totally 
, 
di  ITerent  nieclianisnis  or  tiic  post-communist  I  fungarian  socicty. 
111.  CIVIL  SOCIETY,  CHANGE,  AND  POLITICAL  AGENDA 
A.  The  Mechanism  of  Change  and  the  Social  Factor: 
I'lie  changes  in  tile  agencies  of  tile  political  order  in  Hungary  altered  tile 
superstructure  or  the  political  order  in  the  country  through  a  new 
institutionalisation  process  (see  a  detailed  discussion  in  Chapter  3  concerning 
civil  society  and  Chapter  4  for  institutional  cliangcs).  Ho-wever,  the 
institutional  change  in  the  superstruCtUre,  for  instance  the  cstablislimcnt  of 
political  parties.  their  nation-widc  organisation,  the  change  in  the  importance 
and/or  perception  ol*  such  agencies  as  tile  parliament.  political  parties,  or  tile 
trade  unions.  the  restructuring  or  the  economic  and  political  mechanisms  and 
agencies,  the  separation  of  power  within  the  legislature,  executive  and  the 
judiciary.  were  either  rmlltS  or  causes  of  infrastructural  changes  in  the  society. 
Thc  Ilorniation  1roni  scratch  in  some  areas,  and,  strengthening  in  sonic  others, 
ol*  eivil  society.  led  to  and  interacted  with  a  nuýjor  social  transrormation  in 170 
%%hich  people  have  experienced  difTerent  levels  or  change,  novelty  and 
(I  i  sa  ppoi  litillent. 
As  a  proccss.  although  supported  by  popular  will,  tlic  transilormation  from 
totalitarianism  to  liberal  democracy  was  experienced  as  a  series  of  rerornis 
Crom  above.  The  process  of'cliange,  therefore,  has  been  an  issue  handled  by  the 
clite  ofthe  I  Imigarian  society.  The  introduction  Of  SLIch  alien  concepts  as  civil  L- 
rights  and  1'reedonis,  new  electoral  procedUres,  political  parties  and  election 
campaigns  in  the  realm  of  politics,  and  such  concepts  as  inflation, 
unemployment.  Ilexible  exchange-rate  mechanisms,  dcvaluation  in  the  realm 
of'  economics.  have  created  their  relevant  social  consequences,  affecting  all 
layers  of  the  society.  Although  there  has  been  an  increase  in  tile  activities  of 
vivil  sociel.  1,  and  civic  organisations,  the  population  had  to  go  through  a 
process  ol'  learning  tO  Use  and  mistiSC  UIC  11CW  ill-StiftltiOllS,  tO  CIIOOSC  from 
arnong  new  concepts  and  sets  of*  valuesI41.  Tile  learned  difference  in  tile 
paccption  ot*  and  reactions  to  the  process  of"change  have  influenced  both  the 
structure  and  stratification  of'  the  society  and  tile  perception  and  role  of  tile 
concept  o  I'legiti  iliacy. 
Theref*ore.  tile  winners  or  losers  in  the  new  system,  the  expectations  and 
disappointments  ol'  the  public  within  tile  new  socio-political  order,  ana  the 
activity  ol'civil  sociel),  are  key  elements  aftlecting  the  perception  of  the  concept 
oflegitinmey.  The  concept  of  civil  sociely  and  whether  it  is  a  reliable  source  to 
examine  the  evolution  of'  clemocratisation  is  ail  issue  this  chapter  will  be 
dealing  with.  I  lomever,  changes  in  the  social  structure  of  the  country,  as  well 
141  Ferenc  Nlis/livet/.  'Pirticipation  and  Transition:  Can  civil  vociel  ,v 
Project  Survivc  in  I  lungary?.  ' 
'0111111  it/  1A  I  Sludies  und  Dwnsifloit  Politics,  vol.  13(l  ),  I  March  1997  (pp.  2740),  p.  27. 171 
as  the  mood  swings  in  social  classes  due  to  tile  change  in  specific  parts  orthe 
economie  and  political  mechanisms,  have  a  great  impact  oil  people's  thinking 
and  perception  or  political  developments.  Therefore,  national  voting  bchaviour 
and  tile  perception  of  political  parties  and  their  political  platforms,  as  well  as 
support  Im  particular  political  parties  are  also  affected. 
B.  The  Problem  of  Adaptation: 
While  analysing  the  change  in  the  society  and  therellore  in  the  perception  and 
signi  i  icance  or  tile  concept  or  iegitiniacy  ill  UIC  I  11.111garian  society,  the  issue  or 
adaptation  needs  to  be  closely  considered.  In  the  transition  to  any  novel  form 
ol'behaviour.  adaptability  and  the  costs  and  effiects  of  adaptation  play  a  pivotal 
role.  When  one  considers  the  differences  bct%veen  tile  aLithoritarian  reginic  of 
the  pre-communist  cra  which  only  experienced  one  Free  election  process  and 
the  communist  cra.  it  may  be  claimed  that  although  there  was  a  transition  From 
authoritarianism  to  total  i  tarianism,  the  transition  was  without  revolutionary 
changes  in  the  state-socicty  relations  as  both  authoritarian  and  totalitarian 
regimes  are  state-centric. 
On  the  other  hand.  the  new  political  order  is  individual-centric  and  is  based  on 
the  interactive  relationship  between  state  and  tile  citizen.  The  change  from 
intcracting  with  a  totalitarian  state  mechanism  which  owns  all  the  nicans  of 
production  and  wilich  was  largely  self-legitimising  to  a  system  which  requires 
public  participation  and  public  approval  of  its  acts,  and  which  is  legitimised  by 
tile  public  approval,  is  a.  first  for  Hungarians.  The  shecr  existence  or  tile  new 
political  order  demands  tile  existence  and  ffinctioning  orcivilsociely.  In  effect, 
this  legilimises  the  new  political  order  as  well  as  easing  tile  interaction 
between  tile  state  and  the  citizens  and  providing  a  checks  and  balances 172 
mcchanism  for  the  ncwly-enicrging  political  superstructure.  The  issue  or  civil 
socieiy  and  its  I'Linction  is  thercrore  vital  to  the  Hungarian  political  transition. 
IV.  POST  COMMUNIST  CIVIL  SOCIETY:  GROUNDS  FOR  LEGITIMACY? 
A.  Is  There  a  Post-Communist  Civil  Society?: 
In  spile  ol'  the  lack  of  political  participation  by  the  general  public  into  the 
membership  of  non-governmental  organisations  during  the  KAdAr 
administration'42',  rrom  1970  onwards  there  has  been  an  increase  in  non- 
political  civil  representation  organisations.  The  rigurcs  of'  membership  have 
gromi  1rom  2.171.000  in  1970  to  2,979.000  in  1989  despite  a  decrease  in  the 
IlLIIIlbCI-  ofcivic  associations  Crorn  8,886  to  8,514  during  the  sarne  period,  43. 
The  increase  in  the  nurnbcr  or  youth  organisations,  pensioners'  associations, 
the  emergence  of'  civic  legal  aid  groups,  political  organisations  and  of' 
prollessional  chambers  and  associations  is  a  positive  sign  pointing  to  tile 
emcrgencc  (if'  it  civil  socie(y  structure  similar  to  that  in  tile  Western  political 
system.  I-specially  notable  is  tile  increase  in  representative  organisations  for 
such  economically  vulnerable  groups  as  the  youth  (troubled  by  unemployment) 
and  the  pensioners  (troubled  by  cver-dirninishing  living  standards).  Such 
organisations  prove  that  there  is  a  development  in  public  consciousness 
towards  the  checks  and  balances  mcchanisms  and  policy-manipulatiort  and 
awarenes%  orthe  uses  orinterest  representation. 
"12  To  this.  Irade  unions  may  constitute  an  exception  as  they  were  organisations  of  interest 
representation  under  the  old  regirne  with  extensive  membership  numbers.  Ilowever.  it  must  be 
remembered  thit  these  were  extensions  of  the  ruling  order  and  were  generally  controlled  by  the  Party- 
appointed  managers  rather  1han  e  Cý  genuine  workers'  representatives  in  most  cases. 
113  Cox  and  Laszlo  Vass,  'Civil  society  and  Interest  Representation  in  Hungarian  Political 
DevelopnICIII.,  Journal  qfCommunin  Sluclies  wid  Ti-ansifloit  11ofilics,  vol.  10(3),  1994  (pp.  153-179), 
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On  the  other  hand.  it  is  also  interesting  to  see  that  an  actual  49%  of  the  total 
number  ol*  civil  socielY  lorniations  in  1992  belonged  to  sports  and  sports  ran 
clubs.  that  some  ol'  tile  environmental,  wonlen's,  educational,  human  rights 
associations  are  actUally  political  party-affiliated.  Besides,  when  one  considers 
that  or  the  one  and  a  half  million  members  or  the  non-governmental 
organisations,  1.147.157  are  actually  members  or  trade  unions  with  no  active 
participation,  Ferene  Miszlivetz's  assumption  that  "organ  i  sati  onal  density  docs 
not  necessarily  an  expression  of  tile  civil  ethos.  or,  as  Agnes  Heller  puts  it.  of 
the  *republican  spiriC.  "  144  needs  to  be  considered.  The  lack  of  an  established 
middle-class.  along  with  the  lack  of  intercst  due  to  the  gencral  suspicion 
tox%ards  the  nature  or  politically-inclined  non-govanniental  organisations 
%%  hich  is  a  remainder  or  the  communist  era,  diminish  the  active  participation 
ratio  in  tllcsc  orgailisations  lience  narrowing  down  their  cliances  of  influciicing 
the  government  in  policy-making  and  policy-implemmiting  stages. 
Table  4.1.  Civil  Associations  in  Ilunp-arv.  1989  and  1992145: 
Association  Type  Number  in 
1989 
Number  in  1992 
Mass  communication  -  72 
Artists'  Associations  616  439 
Trad.  Folk-Arl  Circles  634 
Sports  and  sports  fan  clubs  3,066  6,315+ 
Leisure/  hobby  groups  93  399 
Fralcrnal  societies  -  237 
Elducational  societies  105  220 
Scientific  societies  123  193 
Children's/Farnily 
organisations 
139 
Vouth  organisations  55  496 
Disabled's  assoc.  141 
Pensioners'  assoc.  38  .  140 
Offier  health-care  assoc.  62  95 
llencrit  groups  141 
Emironmental  assoc.  75  246 
Architectural  groups  - 
246 
Economic  Interest  660 
III  Ibid,  1).  21). 
143  Data  Ilrom  ibid.,  pages  155  (1989)  and  174  (1992)  respectively. 174 
representation  groups 
Proressional  chambers  and 
rederations 
299 
Civic  legal  aid  groups  419 
International  relations  194 
Political  organisations  -  61 
TOTA  1,  (including  not 
li-tefl)146 
8,396  30,507 
j. 
till.  N  ligult:  1-1  lakul  Iroill  I.  lNilsmetz  anicic.  'rarticipation  anLI  I  ransition:  Can  Ovilsociety  llr(ýIcct 
Sur%  i%  e  in  I  lmmar)?.  '  1997. 
The  increased  florcign  ownership  of  production  facilities  in  tile  country  either 
by  means  or  11oreign  direct  investment  or  by  means  orioint  ventures  also  limit 
the  hilluence  or  tile  non-governnicrital  citizens'  organisations.  That  tile 
cconorny  is  run  in  co-ordination  with  rules  introduced  by  the  stand-by 
agreements  with  tile  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  rneans  that  Hungarian 
governments  do  not  have  much  of  a  say  in  the  way  tile  economy  is  managed 
creates  11urther  problems  for  the  civil  institutions.  Tile  lack  of  influence  of 
civic  organisations  over  economic  policies  of  tile  government  diminishes 
public  interest  towards  these  organisations  as  the  public  interest  is  mainly  in 
the  improvement  of  the  standard  offiving. 
B.  Two  Protests  Within  Civil  Society  and  Social  Fragmentation: 
1.  The  Tax!  Drivers'  Blockade  and  Following  Public  Protests: 
The  low  priority  assigned  to  politics.  and  political  participation  in  civil  sociely 
activities  may  also  be  linked  to  tile  lack  of  communication  bet,.  ycen  the 
intelligentsia  and  tile  rest  of  the  society.  While  a  considerable  section  of  the 
Hungarian  intelligentsia  chose  disscnt  and  flought  against  the  communist 
regime.  all  I  lungarians  now  middle-aged  or  older  have  spent'the  mtýjor  part  of 
their  lives  under  the  same  regime  and  normally  would  not  like  to  think  of 
1-16  Numbers  l'or  (lic  totals  l1rom  17-crenc  Miszlivctz,  'Participation  and  'rransition:  Can  the  Civil  Society 
ProJect  Stirvivc  in  I  lungaD,?,  'Journ(d  (fConummistSfudies  (ind  b-ansilion  Politics,  vol.  13(l),  March 
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virtually  their  entire  adult  life  as  a  dark  age  of  shame  and  defeat  as  the 
intelligentsia  members  propose  that  era  to  be.  The  Hungarians  would  like  to 
see  a  certain  continuity  in  their  lives,  and  this  is  the  point  where  the  distinction 
occurs:  While  the  ordinary  people  would  like  to  perceive  a  continuity  element 
vvith  the  improvement  of  their  economic  environment,  a  trend  which  began 
under  Klmos  Kildili's  leadership,  the  intelligentsia  is  more  concerned  with  the 
bUildillg  ofa  continuous  line  of  political  developilicnt  which  might  be  traced 
back  to  KAdArist  era  as  well. 
Fliereflore.  the  publie  perception  ol'the  new  post-communist  political  era  and 
the  public  expectations  from  this  new  system  differ  from  the  perception  and 
expcoations  or  the  intelligentsia  rroni  tile  satile  systeni.  The  two  important 
post-communist  means  or  action  taken  by  the  ordinary  people  and  by  the 
intelligentsia,  the  taxi  drivers'  blockade  or  1990  and  the  Democt-atic  Charter 
or  1991  respectively,  show  the  diflerence  in  the  attitude  and  understanding  or 
the  liew  regillic. 
'I'lic  taxi  drivers*  blockade  took  place  in  the  wake  orthe  first  anniversary  oruic 
proclamation  ofthe  I  lungarian  RepubliC147,  From  24  to  26  Octobcr  1990.  The 
rise  in  tile  pctrol  prices  rcsulted  in'a  spontaneous  demonstration  by  the  taxi 
drivers.  The  protest  emerged  from  the  discussions  between  the  taxi  drivers  and 
the  petrol  station  owners  and  the  drivers  gathered  before  the  parliament  on  the 
night  ol'the  Friday,  24  October  and  when  their  demands  of  negotiation  were 
reJected,  they  blocked  the  roads  first  in  Budapest  and  then  in  most  towns  and 
inter-city  roads.  By  26  October,  all  the  trafflic  in  the  country  ground  to  a  halt 
flor  al  I  the  nic(lor  arteries  were  blocked  by  the  taxi  drivers.  The  government  first 176 
responded  to  the  blockade  by  the  threat  of  using  coercive  means,  however, 
vvith  %Nide  pUblic  support  from  the  lower-incoilic  segnicnts  of  the  society  and 
the  I-elUctanee  of*  the  police  and  the  armed  forces  to  enter  into  conflict  with  the 
protesters.  as  well  as  large  parliamentary  pressure  from  the  main  opposition 
parly  of'  the  tinle,  tile  AFD,  it  agreed  to  negotiate.  The  negotiations  were 
COIIdLIctcd  through  the  already  existing  Council  of  Interest  Representation,  ail 
institution  originally  aimed  at  solving  problenis  betwecii  the  employers, 
employees  and  tile  government.  At  tile  end  of  tile  three  days  of  blockade,  the 
goveninmit  limited  tile  pctrol  price  increase  to  only  35%  of  the  original 
increase  and  accepted  not  to  prosccutc  the  protesters.  On  tile  other  Iland,  the 
protesters  accepted  that  the  petrol  prices  were  to  be  set  by  the  world  market 
11LICtuations  in  tile  future  and  to  remove  all  tile  barricades  by  the  l'ollowing 
Monday  mornillg148. 
The  taxi  drivers'  blockade  has  beconle  tile  first  post-communist  social 
movement  in  which  tile  ordinary  people  confronted  tile  governing  elite.  Its 
cause.  as  most  other  problems  relt  by  the  general  public  in  tile  post-communist 
cra.  was  purely  economic.  The  iow  ievci  or  adaptation  at  thc  higlicst  point  of 
tile  transitory  period  and  tile  public  frustration  stemming  from  the  incapability 
to  change  government  policies  gave  rise  to  such  an  impromptu  act.  Public 
SLIpport  flor  tile  taxi  drivers,  the  lack  of  violent  confrontation  despite  the 
counter-protests  of  (lie  ruling  I  IDF  partisans,  the  reluctance  or  the  army  and  of 
117  -I,  Ile  new  post-comillunist  I  lungarian  Republic  was  proclaimed  Oil  23  October  1989. 
ga  1-19  AIILII'-,  I';  Boioki,  'Dernocrats  Against  Democracy?:  Civil  Protest  in  I  lung  ry  Since  1990.  '  in  Gyorgy 
gMing  Democracies  in  Fast-Ccntrýl  E:,  tiTrgp-e,  Budapest:  Hungarian  S/oboszlai  (ed.  ).  Flying  Blind:  Eiji 
-1 
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tile  police  to  intervene  point  to  the  shared  recling  of  frustration  with  tile 
novelties  ol'the  new  system  by  the  public. 
The  taxi  drivers'  blockade  was  followed  by  many  small  and  large-scale  public 
protests,  ranging  from  (lie  protest  against  tile  president  Arpdd  Goncz  in  1993 
by  tile  skinheads  to  the  right-  and  left-wing  protest  movements.  Smaller  scale 
blockades.  similar  in  essence  to  tile  drivers'  blockade,  just  like  in  tile  case  of 
the  Wirosliget  blockade  oil  the  Earth  Day  in  Budapest  in  1993  and  tile  Bocskai 
Street  school  dernonstrationl49  fililcd  to  gain  the  same  impact  on  the  society 
and  %%ere  controlled  and  limited  by  police  presence.  The  farmers'  protest  in  the 
Spring  or  1997  has  blocked  halrof  the  motorways  ill  Hungary.  Thc  reason  for 
this  blockade.  and  then.  the  I'arniers'  rally  in  front  of  the  Parliament  in  tile 
autunin  of  tile  same  year,  was  the  rise  in  agrarian  taxes'-10.  The  general 
character  of'  the  public  protests  is  that  ordinary  people  ill  I  lungary  failed  to 
express  their  displeasure  From  the  regime  in  another  way.  If  one  considers 
these  protests  were  conclueted  in  a  period  where  unemployment  rates  soared 
11-0111  tell  thOUSand  to  six  hundred  thousand  people,  and  that  ,  lost  or  the 
unemployed  Nvere  seen  as  long-term  unemployed,  it  is  clear  that  tile  public 
%NOLIld  IM  estrangement  from  the  new  system  and  hence  express  itself'  with 
Such  protests. 
2.  The  Democratic  Charter  and  the  Point  of  View  of  the  Intelligentsia: 
On  the  other  hand.  the  Democratic  (liarler  is  ail  act  originating  from  within 
the  intelligentsia.  In  Septembu  1991.  Jzlnos  Kis  who  was  the  chairman  of  the 
141)  NIAle  S/abo.  Trom  a  Police  State  to  a  Demonstration  Democracy:  Policing  Mass  Demonstrations 
in  I  lungary  Before,  Duringand  After  the  Regime  Changc,  '  unpublished  paper,  p.  19.  cm 
*  15"  Ibid..  p.  20. 178 
AID.  and  Tanias  Bauer,  a  member  of  tile  AID  National  Council  publislicd  an 
article  arguing  the  I  IDI--led  ccntre-right  coalition  governnicilt  was  gradually 
shilling  to  the  right  and  authoritari  ail  i  sm.  They  proposed  a  charter  in  which 
citizois  would  declare  their  principles  and  argue  that  the  democratic 
transilorniation  was  not  yet  complete.  It  was  an  attempt  to  improve  the 
participation  ol'the  intellig  ntsia  into  the  political  affairs  in  I  Itin  ary.  Tile  main  IN  9 
problem  perceived  by  the  initiators  or  the  Democratic  Charier  project  was  the 
danger  ol'  thern  bcconling  perceived  as  opposing  to  the  system  once  again, 
rather  than  the  opposition  to  the  government.  Tile  charter  which  was  pUblished 
in  September  1991  and  penned  by  such  well-known  figures  within  the 
IlLingarian  intclligentsia  such  as  Gy,  3rgy  Konrad  and  Milialy  Kornis,  was 
signed  by  arOL111d  five  thousand  people  within  two  niontlis'  time. 
Fhe  charter  became  an  issue  of  political  debate  as  the  opposition  parties 
%Upported  it  cspecially  after  tile  IM  Rmsef  Antall  removed  tile  head  of  the 
IMIg',  11-iffli  National  Bank  after  lie  had  signed  the  charter.  With  the  support  of 
the  opposition  pat-tics  and  in  accordance  with  the  results  of  a  meeting  of  nearly 
halkif(he  signatories  ofthe  charter  in  December  1991,  it  became  the  core  ora. 
social  movement  and  on  the  national  holiday  of  15  March  1992,  tile  Charter 
nimement  asked  its  11ollowers  to  protest  in  streets.  The  result  wýs  a  ten 
thOUSMILI-StrOng  mass  demonstration  in  Budapest  on  that  date'". 
At  the  end.  the  Charter  did  not  evolve  into  a  political  party.  However,  its 
impact  is  considerable  when  one  takes  into  account  that  it  began  as  an  elite 
mowment  and  largely  remained  so  despite  its  popularity.  The  success  the 
Democratic  Charter  movement  is  due  largely  to  unpopular  governmcnt 179 
policies  and  their  outcomes,  including  price  rises,  increasing  inflation  and 
unemployment  rates.  and  social  instability.  The  discontent  with  the  I  IDIF-led 
coalition's  policies  gave  rise  to  political  fears  which  included  a  fear  to 
transcend  from  a  totalitarian  communist  regime  to  an  authoritarian  capitalist 
reginic.  The  public  fear  or  I  lungary  becoming  a  capitalist  authoritarian  regime 
aftcr  11our  decades  of'communist  total  itarianisill  was  tile  reason  for  widespread 
public  support  to  tile  movement. 
'I  lie  imijior  difIlerence  between  the  esseticc  and  growth  of  tile  two  movements 
ol'protest  is  that  they  ire  based  oil  difTerent  priorities  in  people's  minds.  Tlic 
taxi  drivers'  protest  has  become  a  public  all'air  overnight  due  to  its  direct 
contact  %%ith  the  most  popular  public  problem,  namely  the  rising  prices  which 
constantly  pull  down  the  standard  of  living  to  Iowa  limits.  The  Democratic 
Charter  was  dilTerent  in  essence,  and  although  being  a  popular  movement.  due 
to  its  mainly  intelicctual  basis,  it  remained  limited  to  a  group  of  tile  population. 
In  a  rapidly  changing  environment,  wilen  tile  econornic  necessities  are  the 
main  concern  Im  the  general  public,  a  change  in  the  political  agenda  is  always 
taken  as  ofsecondaq  importance. 
The  difTerence  between  the  priorities  of  the  ordinary  people  and  of  the 
intelligentsia  also  sets  the  basis  for  a  two-ticr  legitimisation  process:  While  an 
intclligentsia  incorporated  into  the  ruling  clite  may  perceive  a  political  order  as 
legitimate.  the  general  public.  those  who  arc  outside  tile  highly-educated 
prollessionals.  may  perceive  it  as  illegitimate.  The  necessary  step  to  guarailtec 
the  continuity  ol'the  post-communist  systcrn  in  I  fungary  is  to  ensure  that  both 
segments  oftlic  society  approve  of  the  new  regime. 
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The  main  fiactors  which  influence  tile  difference  of  perception  between  the 
ordinary  people  and  tile  intelligentsia  is  the  levels  or  education  and  or  income, 
-is  N%cl  I  as  the  txvo  sides'  ability  to  find  jobs  under  the  new  economic  and  social 
circumstances  created  in  the  post-communist  era.  These  factors  create  a  social 
fi-a-mentation  and  are  to  possibly  create  a  polarisation  between  the  well-  L- 
educated.  politicised  prollessionals  and  poorly-educatcd,  apolitical  masses.  The 
1"onlier  is  likely  to  be  the  driving  forcc  in  the  I  lungarian  capitalisation  process 
and  create  the  new  I  lungarian  middle-class,  while  the  latter  may  encounter 
%%orsc  livino  conditions  than  under  Kdddr.  L- 
1.  Educational  Differences: 
In  terms  ofeducation,  there  is  a  real  difference  between  the  urban  areas  oil  tile 
one  liand  and  the  rural  regions  or  Northeast  I  lungary  and  Lower  Transdanube 
region  in  the  Southeast.  Whilc  in  tile  urban  areas  tile  education  levels  indicate 
that  1rom  15%  in  general  urban  areas  to  up  to  30%  of  tile  population  in 
Budapest  to  have  Ilighcr  education,  in  Northeast  and  Transdanube  regions  the 
I-IgLil-CS  are  usually  tip  to  5%  ol'  tile  population  having  higher  education.  In 
contrast.  in  tile  Northeast  and  Transdanube  regions,  where  tile  main  unit  of 
dwelling  are  small  villages.  the  ratio.  of  people  with  a  maximum  of  eight  years 
ofelenlentai3,  education  goes  up  to  50%  in  some  parts.  In  Budapest  a,  nd  other 
urban  arcas.  this  figUre  is  down  to  a  maximum  of  20%112.  Table  4.21  gives  a 
clearer  indication  or  tiie  educational  dirfercnces  between  social  classes  and 
hence  clarifies  tile  answer  to  the  question  wily  tile  intelligenisia's  world-view 
di  111crs  1rom  that  ol'the  ordinary  people  so  definitely. 
152Data  Il-0111  JOS7Cf  Mevaros  and  Istvan  S7akadat,  Ma,,,,  yai-orszaa  Politikai  Atlasza,  Budapest:  Konrad 
Adcnatier  Stillting,  1995,  maps  4  and  5. 181 
The  table  below  shows  that  after  a  year,  those  having  a  higher  education  or 
more  qualified  jobs  or  jobs  requiring  some  learned  skills  have  seen  an 
inillrovenlent  in  their  income  levels  and  there  has  been  drops  in  tile  percentage 
ol'  their  grOLIPS'  involvement  in  the  lowest-carning  one-fifth  of  the  society 
%%hich  includes  people  or  16  years  of  age  or  older.  In  contrast,  people  who  have 
1111  Clenlentill'N'  education.  no  job-spccific  skills,  those  involved  in  agrarian 
scOor  and  those  with  disabilities  or  liabilities  have 
seen  a  rc(luction  in  their 
incomes  and  began  to  live  in  greater  poverty's-I. 
Table  4.2.  Poverty  1)),  social  class  and  education.  Percentage  of  people 
above  16  years  of  age  and  living  in  the  lowest-carning  20%,  of  the  society 
in  terms  of  per  capita  inconicl54: 
Educational  and  social  classl  /Percentage  or 
the  population  living  in  the  lowest-earning 
1992 
(%) 
1993 
(%) 
MUCATION 
0-7  ý  ca  rs  of  prima  ry  schooling  30.6  31.6 
8  yea  rs  or  primary  schooling  26.5  29.2 
Professional  skill-teaching  schools  21.8  23.2 
Secondarv  School  12.1  11.1 
University  or  offier  higher  education 
insfifutions. 
8.3  4.0 
MICIA  I,  CLASS  OF  III  EM"FIVE  PE.  011LE, 
Iligh  Position  11olders  6.0  2.7 
Intellectuals  7.1  6.6 
Middle-Rank  rmploycesand  Foremen  7.3  7.4 
Employees  (Ordinary.  lobs)  11.2  10.7 
Private  Entreerencurs  18.2  13.6 
Qnalificd  Workforce  17.4  16.7 
Unqualiried  Workrorce  22.4  25.6 
Peasants  and  Agrarian  Workers  21.3  37.7 
SOCIAL  CLASS  OFTIIE  INACUIVE  PEOPLE.  1992  1993 
uncnlploýcd  44.7  43.9 
Pen-Ooners  15.8  11.9 
Disabled  Pensioners  26.7  34.3 
Single  Moffiers  35.8  38.5 
153  Also  %cc  OIX  D.  Social  and  Labour  Market  Policies  in  II  ungary.  OECD.  Paris,  1995,  for  more 
detailed  data  on  the  decline  ofincome  in  the  lowcr-earning  parts  or  the  11  ungarian  society. 
I"  From  Rudoll'  Andorka,  'Ancicnncs  ct  Nouvelles  In6galitds  Sociales  en  I  ton  "'  ric,  '  Revue  D'Ftudeýv 
Compin-wives  Em-Ow.  %1.1994(4),  December  1994  (pp.  II  1-  129).  table  8  in  p.  125. 182) 
When  edueation  and  job  qualification  affect  so  much  in  turns  of  income 
dirl'erences  within  the  space  of  one  year,  the  degree  or  appreciation  and 
involvement  by  individUals  in  the  new  political  process,  are  unsurprisingly 
IONN'.  With  SO  IIIIICII  IIUCtUation  in  the  levels  of  income,  in  an  environment 
v.  -here  only  having  higlicr  education,  capital  to  start  onCs  owil  company,  or  a 
ski  Iled-labour-oriented  proression  helping  to  improve  one's  standard  of  living, 
the  lack  of'  intercst  towards  politics  and  political  life  which  includes 
participating  in  the  activities  or  civil  s-ociely  formations  is  undustandable,  ir 
not.  justiliable. 
2.  Economic  Differences: 
, S)OCial  class  distinction  with  regards  to  employment  type  and  educational 
background  is  afTecting  income  levels  and  hence  living  standards  of  the 
IlUngarians.  The  difflerenee  between  those  Nflio  have  higher  than  average 
income  and  those  vdio  are  below  tile  poverty  line  also  indicates  to  the  different 
standpoints  in  perceiving  tile  new  reginle.  As  tile  expectations  and  tile  positive 
or  negative  olltcollie  01,  tliese  expectations  in  relation  witli  one's  cducational 
and  prollessional  background  and  hence  onc*s  ability  to  fit  in  and  adapt  to  the 
working  conditions  or  the  new.  capitalist,  liberal-democratic  cra,  are  factors 
%NlliCII  iI1lILIeIICC  (lie  perception  or  the  regime.  Conscqucntly,  the  legitimacy  or 
the  post-communist  I  lungarian  political  depends  on  the  feeling  of*  adaptation 
that  the  I  hingarian  people  exhibit. 183 
Table  4.3.  Differentiation  or  houschold  income  by  profession  from  1962  to 
1992  in  Hungary,  in  relation  to  the  national  income  level  (100%)155: 
Ilotnehold  head's 
social  Class 
1962  1972  1982  1987  1992 
I  ligh  Ilosiflon 
I  lolder 
154  150  127  125  16F 
Intellectual  154  ISO  127  125  140 
Middle-Ilank 
Employee 
128  115  107  117  114 
Elliplo)  cc$ 
(Ordiniry.  lobs) 
119  108  99  93  120 
Private 
Entrepreneurs 
N/A.  N/A.  N,,  A.  N/A.  122 
Skilled  Workrorce  109  loo  99  102  100 
Unskilled 
Workrorce 
82  86  84  81  90 
Peasants  and 
Agrarian  Workers 
87  105  95  90  99 
Pensioner  84  83  98  94  91 
Unemployed  N/A.  N/A.  N/A.  N/A.  J  7  S 
Student  N/A.  N/A.  N/A.  N/A. 
EE1 
10 
E 
I  lod 
The  data  1roni  the  table  above  suggest  that  some  groups  experienced  an 
improvement  in  their  income  levels  over  (lie  last  three  decades.  Changes  in 
income  levels  in  many  prollessions  indicate  the  purchasing  power  or  all  but  a 
small  Fraction  ol'  the  employed  people  increased.  However,  the  data  above 
reflers  to  only  offlicial  income.  Frorn  early  1970s  onwards,  first  illegally  and 
then  in  a  quasi-legid  structUre,  the  secon(I  economy  activities  were  another  and 
more  important  part  of  national  inconle  generation.  Tile  use  of  the  I  lungarian 
version  of'  moonlighting  worked  on  an  untaxcd.  uncontrolled  basis;  and  are 
excluded  rrom  the  table  above.  In  general,  with  the  exception  or  the 
agricultural  production,  the  ilicans  of'  production  used  in  the  process  of 
creating,  tile  extra  inaterial  wcre  owned  by  the  state  and  workers  were  able  to 
use  tile  state-owned  workshops  and  machinery  ror  frec  in  exchange  for  flicir 
political  obedience.  HoNNever,  when  the  political  systern  shifted  from  state 184 
socialist  to  liberal  democratic,  the  accompanying  shift  took  place  in  the  field  or 
economics  firom  communist  to  capitalist.  Most  factories  were  privatised  with 
their  control  going  to  cither  foreign  owners  or  to  joint  ventures.  The 
sociological  as  well  as  econonlic  result  of  this  was  the  loss  of  access  for  most 
ol'  the  blue-collar  workers  to  the  means  to  produce  the  extra  material  to 
provide  thein  with  a  second,  unofficial  and  quasi-illegal  inconic  which  in 
general  was  more  significant  than  their  legal  inconic  presented  at  the  table 
above. 
Consc(luently.  although  tlicre  appears  to  be  an  increase  in  the  levels  or  incorne 
thrOLIgh  the  past  three  decades  in  Hungary,  the  gencration  of  household  income 
depended  more  on  the  second  econonij,  activities  than  the  actually  recorded 
income  levels.  Tile  loss  or  part,  most,  or  all  or  that  secondary  income  is  far 
more  important  in  terms  or  standard  of'  living  improvement  than  any  increase 
in  the  ol'ficial  inconle  as  these  were  not  considered  as  adequate  even  by  the 
K.  I(Virist  state  structure  which  at  the  end  permitted  tile  rorniation  or  a  tax-free 
and  illegal  secoml  economy  for  it  could  not  provide  the  ticcessary  Icvels  or 
income  to  support  the  desircd  living  standards. 
The  lollowing  table  which  indicates  the  levels  of  satisfaction  of  private  life 
based  on  a  poll  taken  in  1992  may  constitute  a  more  aecurate  basjý  for  the 
commenting  on  the  social  fragmentation  in  I  lungarian  society  and  the  effects 
ol*this  Cragmentation  towards  regime  perception. 
As  can  be  scen  from  *tlic  results  of  the  survey,  the  lower-incomc  groups  in  the 
socicty  are  pessimistic  towards  the  future  while  the  intcliectuals  and.  thosc  who 
carn  higher  aniounts  than  average  have  higher  expectations  towards  the  future. 
1-55  Data  gathered  Crom  Lit  Lid,  tabIcs  I  and  3,  pp.  122-123. 185 
The  StUdents.  categorically  a  preliminary  group  of  intelligentsia-members  havc 
the  highest  cxpectations  From  the  I.  uture  as  their  education  will  guarantee  theni 
a  place  in  the  higher  carning  segments  of  tile  society  if  the  economic  trends 
continuc  in  the  same  manner  of  development.  This  general  decline  in 
IIOLISChOId  income  has  to  do  with  the  change  from  the  Kd&rist  policies  and 
liciicc  lias  bcen  a  problem  flor  Hungarian  reginic  transition  tllrOLIgllOlIt  UIC 
1990S. 
Table  4.4.  Satisfaction  towards  four  dimensions  on  private  life  in 
II  ungary,  1992:  (The  table  is  made  on  a  level  of  0-10  scale,  0  signiryingthe  lowest  and  10 
the  highest.  ) 
Social  class  of  standard  income  lire  111)  to  future 
the  personI  of  life  now  in  perspecti 
/  Average  general  ves 
%atisfaction 
a%  tip-+: 
High  Position  5.7  5.9  7.3  5.6 
II  older 
Intellectual  5.2  4.8  6.8  5.7 
Nfiddle-Rank  4.5  4.7  6.4  4.4 
Employee 
Em  plo)  ces  4.9  4.5  6.3  4.6 
(Ordinary 
.  101)%) 
Private  4.8  4.4  5.9  4.6 
Entreprencu 
rs 
Skilled  4.4  3.7  5.8  4.1 
%Vorhforce 
Unskilled  4.5  3.8  5.4  4.2 
Workforce 
Peasants  and  4.2  3.2  6.1  ý.  8 
Agrarian 
WorLm 
Pensioners  4.4  3.5  5.5  3.8 
Unemployed  3.3  1.5  4.4  3.1 
Student  6.6  3.1  7.1  5.9 
General  4.5  3.6  5.7  4.2 
population  pool 
above  18yr  of  age 
In  contrast  with  the  well-educated  and  well-employed,  the  lowly  expectations 
From  the  Future  aniongst  the  peasantry  and  agrarian  labour  force,  the 
micniployed.  and  the  pensioners  is  alarming.  That  tile  private  enterprise 186 
owners  are  not  as  optimistic  as  tile  Iligh-position  holders  and  tile  intelligentsia 
'IbOUt  the  future  of  their  standard  of  living  while  these  arc  supposed  to  beconic 
part  of'.  ir  not  the  driving  rorce  in,  tile  newly-  rorilling  Hungarian  middle  class, 
miggests  that  tile  ncxv  regime  is  unsuccessful  in  creating  confidence.  The  main 
reasons  Im-  (lie  lack  of  confidence  from  the  middle-class  entrepreneurs  towards 
111C  1-10st-CO111  In  Lill  i  St  systcm  are  the  lack  of  stability  and  the  need  to  live  by  a 
scries  ol'ccononlic  emergency  measures.  As  the  state  is  unable  to  print  moncy, 
raise  %%agcs.  disable  hillation  and  its  outcomes,  and  as  tile  economy  is  run  in 
connection  with.  il*  not  in  command  of,  the  IMF  and  the  international  market 
I'luctuations.  the  competitive  free-market  mechanism  is  likely  to  create  sonic 
more  disadvantage  ror  tile  lowcr-inconic  carners  in  the  short-to-medium  run 
and  hence  create  in  aura  of  dissatisraction  in  the  Hungarian  public. 
klorcovcr.  as  can  be  seen  from  Table  4.5  below.  during  tile  mid-1990s.  the 
trend  set  in  tile  table  4.4  continued.  Most  of  tile  people  surveyed  in  Hungary  in 
1994  through  1996  believcd  their  household  finances  went  worse  than  berorc. 
It  is  remarkable  to  see  that  tile  level  ol'pessirnism  in  Hungary  was  similar  to 
the  other  countries  SUrveycd  in  1994,  but  it  changed  dranlatieally  in  thile  and 
vvhile  the  people  questioned  in  other  countries  became  more  optimistic  and/or 
saw  a  positive  change  in  their  income  levels  in  1995  and  1996,  HuAgarians' 
position  remained  unchanged. 187 
Table  4.5:  Change  In  Household  Finances:  Better,  Worse,  or 
Unchanged?  U16 
Vear  /I  :  lungary  Poland  Belarus  Czech  Rep.  Slovakia  Bulgaria 
counir  - 
1996  1  i:  51  11:  20  11:  15  11:  28  11:  21  11:  18 
1):  18 
%V:  76 
11:  43 
W:  35 
U: 30 
W:  54 
1995  11:  9  11:  11  11:  9 
11:  2.1  IJ:  32  11:  18 
\V:  66  W: 54  W:  72 
1994  It:  8  It:  10  11:  9 
I  1:  23  0:  32  U:  18 
\V:  68  W, 54  W:  71 
B:  Better.  U:  Unchanged,  W:  Worse 
U:  43 
W:  28 
U:  37 
W: 41 
1):  36 
W: 42 
11:  22  11:  16  11:  9 
t  1:  37  U:  31  U: 23 
W:  40  W:  52  W:  66 
B-.  22  13-.  14  11:  10 
U:  33  LI:  26  U: 24 
W:  45  W:  60  W:  65 
Besides  creating  a  vacuum  of  systemic  legitimacy  before  the  eyes  of'  the 
general  publie.  the  regime  itself  is  damaged  from  the  economic  gap  being 
created  aller  the  transformation.  Moreover,  inequality  in  income  distribution 
may  lead  to  serious  social  probicnis.  However.  the  immediate  problem  which 
I'Liecs  tile  iSSLIC  of  legitimacy  in  contcniporary  I  fungary  is  the  nlemorics  or  thc 
Kild,  'u-ist  social  contract  and  tile  nostalgia  towards  tile  positive  effects  or  that 
social  contract  not  f'ound  in  the  level  or  the  intelligentsia  or  high-position 
holders.  but  aniongst  the  majority  ortlic  people,  the  ordinary  people. 
V.  THE  ELEMENTS  OF  CONTINUITY  AND  CHANGE  IN  THE  NEW 
SYSTEM 
A.  The  Change  and  the  Legitimisation  Criteria: 
1.  Change  In  Political  Structure: 
The  Call  ol'the  socialist  rule  and  the  dismemberment  orthe  Hungarian  Socialist 
Workers'  Party  marked  the  beginning  of  a  new  era  in  the  Hungarian  political 
,;  )-%  The  new  systern  which  differed  firom  the  previous  one  in  many  aspects 
.,  teni. 
required  ,t  new  framework  for  legitimacy  of  the  ruling  political  ordcr.  The  state 188 
StRICture  as  a  whole  required  to  be  based  oil  new  principles,  because  tile 
political  system  undergoing  change  within  the  capitalist  system  -e.  g.  from 
I'ascism  to  liberalism-  or  within  the  socialist  system  -e.  g.  from  Stalinism  to 
rellorm  socialism-  but  from  one  end  of  the  political  spectrum  to  its  antithesis, 
1'rom  single-party  state  socialism  to  multi-party  liberal  democracy.  Although  in 
Cliapter  One  it  is  argued  that  I  support  Immanuel  Wallerstein's  idea  that  both 
the  socialist  and  capitalist  camps  of  the  Cold  War  era  (which  may  respectively 
be  rellen-cd  to  as  First  World  and  Second  World  or  West  and  East)  were 
actually  part  of'  a  single  capitalist  world  structure  in  view  of  tile  fact  that  tile 
communist  canip  has  originated  as  a  response  to  the  capitalist  carnp  (see 
('11,111tCr  I).  One  must  also  rccognisc  the  structural  and  operational  differences 
between  the  communist  and  capitalist  institutional  and  social  structures. 
Therellore.  tile  systemic  change  from  one  end  of  the  political  and  economic 
spectrum  to  the  other  requires  tile  development  of  new  patterns  of  action  and 
interaction  within  tile  post-transformatory  regime. 
As  a  result  or  this,  in  legal,  social  and  political  terms,  the  new  political  order 
that  emerged  aller  the  fall  of  the  socialist  regime  in  Hungary  had  theoretical 
and  practical  bases  that  differed  widely  from  tile  general  practice  within'the 
socialist  system.  This  chapter  will  focus  on  -tile  change  in  the  new  system 
which  led  to  the  development  or  new  laws,  new  requirements,  new  criteria  to 
. 
judge  for  the  performance  or  the  system  and  ofits  main  elements. 
The  institutionalisation  orthe  new  system  may  be  seen  most  clearly  in  tile  first 
parliamentary  term  Crom  mid-1990  to  mid-1994.  Firstly,  this  period  witnessed 
156  Data  collected  fi-Ol"  (lie  1994,1995.1996  surveys  of  the  European  Union,  published  in  Candidate 
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the  development  or  a  new  political  systern  based  on  rrce  elections  and 
universal  suffrage.  Secondly,  the  first  post-socialist  government  created  the 
norm  Im  the  Following  governments  to  be  evaluated.  Thirdly,  the  voting  public 
became  able  to  judge  tile  changes  in  the  political  system  by  examining  the 
changes  in  the  parliamentary  structure,  the  competition  among  political  parties, 
and  the  general  level  of  satisfaction  concerning  policies  rollowed  by  the 
government. 
As  to  the  observation  or  aic  change  in  tams  orlcgitimacy,  one  may  claim  that 
it  is  observable  through  tlic  domain  of  legality  and  the  domain  of  politics 
which  also  incorporates  ideology.  'nic  legality  of  a  regime  is  linked  to  its  claim 
to  legitimae.  y.  It  is  so.  because,  when  flic  legal  environment  changes  with  the 
socio-political  transibriliation.  the  legality  of  the  new  regime  becomes  distinct 
Crom  the  legality  of'  the  regime  that  preceded  it.  This  differenee  is  caused  by 
the  change  in  the  legislative  mechanisms  and  by  the  legal  Framework  thc  state 
and  its  executive  branches,  tile  government  and  the  bureaucracy,  embeds 
themselves  in.  In  ternis  of  politics  and  ideology.  there  is  ail  observable  change 
in  respect  ol'the  issue  of'regime  legitimacy.  While  tile  former  change  nlay  not 
be  as  clearly  observable  as  tile  latter,  they  both  play  crucial  roles  in  tile 
translIonliation  orthe  systcm. 
2.  The  Legal  Aspect: 
In  legal  term.  %.  the  claim  to  legitimacy  may  be  brought  forward  by  examining 
the  Icgal  bases  of  the  ruling  political  order.  In  due  course,  just  as  the  cincien 
regime.  the  new  political  order  accepts  the  i-ide  oflair  principle  and  builds  its 
legal  claim  ror  legitimacy  upon  this  principle.  Basically,  both  the  (Inciell 
regime  and  the  new  regime  share  the  same  understanding  of  law  and  order 190 
ý%Iiieh  means  that  the  working  political  order  must  be  based  on  the  existing 
kms  and  regulations  and  aet  within  tile  guidelines  set  by  those  laws  and 
I-CgUllitiOnS.  Consequently.  although  the  laws  and  regulations  have  changed  in 
the  transf'ormation  from  the  ancien  regime,  tile  new  I  lungarian  political  order 
has  a  claim  to  legitimacy  which  is  bascd  oil  identical  ground  as  its 
111-cilecessol.. 
As  a  result.  in  legal  terms,  the  legitimacy  or  tie  new  regime  is  based  oil  the 
constitution.  the  laws,  rules  and  regulations  that  arrange  tile  election  and 
perflormance  of'  the  political  authorities.  However,  although  the  patterns  or 
legal  legitimacy  used  by  botil  regimes  are  identical,  there  is  an  important 
difilercnce  in  the  essence  of  these  two  clainis:  F.  veil  though  the  new  systcill 
bases  its  claim  ollegal  legitimacy  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  lawful,  and  is  acting 
within  the  limits  of*  the  existing  constitutional  rules  as  its  predecessor  did,  the 
clement  of  consenstis  gives  ail  advantage  to  the  new  regime  the  socialist 
I  hingarian  regime  had  failed  to  experience.  The  new  regime's  advantage  is  that 
it  gained  %%idespread  national  support  through  the  amendment  process  of  tile 
1949  Constitution  by  the  means  or  the  National  Roundtable  Discussions  of 
1989.  This  is  a  very  important  differcnce  between  the  communist  and  post- 
communist  reginies  ol'ilungarian  State.  Unlike  tile  Sovict-backcd  coiýnrnunist 
regime.  the  new  constitution  as  well  as  other  elements  -as  tile  electoral  law  and 
procedures-  were  a  result  of  tile  consensus  reached  at  tile  National  Roundtable 
discussions.  This  con*scllSLIS  was  reached  by  the  representatives  of  all  political 
Ilactions  and  1ractions  in  the  country,  represcnted  by  the  members  of  the 
opposition  and  or  ti,  c  government  or  the  time  during  the  talks.  Thercrore.  it 
may  be  argued  that  tile  11CW  gUidelines  that  tile  Hungarian  political  order 191 
operates  under  have  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the.  Hungarian  people, 
wilike  those  of  the  socialist  regime  which  operated  within  the  parameters 
dictatcd  from  outside  I  hingary. 
Flie  legitimacy  ol'the  statc  as  a  political  actor  is  another  fortifying  element  for 
the  idea  of  the  rule  (?  /*  1mv.  If  the  existence  of  the  Hungarian,  State  as  a 
superstructure  is  questioned,  the  legitimacy  of  the  regime  that  rules  it  cannot 
be  dellended  -is  the  state  as  an  ciltity  would  not  bc  considered  as  a  legitimate 
Cramc%%ork  Im  the  operation  of  such  sub-systems  as  political  order  or 
cconomic  structure.  I'llereflore,  so  far  as  tile  legitimacy  or  tile  regimc  in 
conJunction  with  tile  state  as  a  superstructure  is  concerned,  the  lack  of  any 
opposition  to  the  existence  of  the  Hungarian  state  as  a  supustructure  points  to 
the  existence  of'  a  national  agreement  on  the  entity  called  the  Hungarian 
Republie.  While  other  parts  of  Eastern  Europe,  such  as  in  the  cases  or  tiic 
YLIgOSIavian  Coil  Ilederation  or  Czechoslovakia,  surflered  from  national  and 
ethnic  strains  between  tile  forming  nations  of  tile  state  which  resulted  in 
fragmentation.  tile  existence  of  Hungary  as  an  independent  and  unified  state 
remains  unchallcilged.  For  that  reason,  as  there  is  support  for  the  existence  of 
the  state  structure.  it  is  seen  as  a  liýgal  and  Icgitinlate  ctitity,  and,  thereforc, 
legal  structures  that  defines  I  lungary  are  legitimate. 
II 
I  lowever.  legality.  even  irsustained  by  public  approval  of  the  statc*s  and  the 
systeiWs  legal  legitimacy,  is  insufficient  by  itself  to  sustain  legitimacy  of  a 
gi%-cn  political  order.  Legitimacy  of  a  ruling  political  order  has  to  depend  on  its 
political-ideological  basis  and  its  interaction  with  people,  that  is,  its  public 
perception  and  its  exchange  or  policies  or  economic  measures  to  deserve  a 
positive  perception. 192 
3.  The  Political  -  Ideological  Aspect: 
Consequently.  to  obtain  legitimacy  through  the  political-ideological  level  is 
more  wcansome  than  to  be  legally  recognised  as  legitimate.  Due  to  the  nature 
ol'transition.  it  has  been  difflicult  to  convince  people  of  the  merits  of  the  new 
system.  This  is  partly  due  to  KAdarist  economic  policies. 
While  the  Antall  and  Baross  governments  which  served  between  1990  and 
1994  Ilocused  on  ideology  and  nationalism  to  provide  a  new  set  of  values  to 
undo  (lie  communist  set  of  valLICS.  the  I  lorn  government  From  1994  to  1998 
Focused  oil  promises  for  improwinents  in  the  field  or  cconomy  and  in  living 
standards.  11olloNving  a  nco-KAddrist  policy.  The  following  Orban  government 
1'rom  1998  to  (late  has  rollowed  more  liberal  but  as  much  populist  policies,  yet 
dillIers  Ilrom  its  predecessors  in  its  more  system-oriented  approach  to  politics 
and  public  relations.  In  comparison  to  Czechoslovakia  and  Poland,  it  has  bccil 
dil'ficult  to  secure  public  Support  for  the  new  political  order  and  individual 
governments  x0ich  serve  within  this  new  political  system,  due  to  the  lack  of 
charismatic  leaders.  I  lowevcr.  in  some  sense  the  absence  of  such  leaders  has 
'also  eased  the  transition  as  a  systernic  process  rather  than  a  leader-based 
charismatic  process  -to  employ  Weberian  terminology.  The  only  problem  in 
I  lungary  NNas  not  tile  lack  of  popular,  mediatic  leaders,  as  there  are  problems 
originating  1rom  the  political  legacy  of  Jdnos  MdAr.  Irving  Luis  Ilodebateitz 
explains  tile  change  in  tile  East  European  political  system  in  general  as 
Follows: 
--in  its  simplest  historical  terms.  the  breakdown  of  the 
BreAnev  Doctrine  and  the  rise  of  Gorbachev's  Pei-estmika 
provided  Eastern  Europc  with  a  window  of  opportunity  to 
break  the  shackles  of  an  unwanted,  oppressive  regime.  Only  a 
short  decade  ago,  tile  Soviet  Union  and  its  satellites  were 193 
captive  to  the  claim,  one  that  united  every  regime  since  the 
tinle  or  Lcnin,  that....  to  embrace  tile  communist  system  was 
to  cross  o%-cr  fi-oni  the  mythical  bilateral  world  or  capitalism 
to  communism  once  and  Cor  all.  With  tile  'revolutionary  seize 
or  poN%-cr.  *  any  real  politics  ceased  to  be  practiced,  replaced, 
as  it  were.  by  circusscs  and  caucuses  dedicated  to  celebrating 
the  new  order. 
The  explosiveness  of'  the  events  is  partially  explained  by 
the  absence  orroutine  politics  in  the  communist  world.  After 
the  concentration  of  power  in  the  liands  or  party  offlicials  and 
government  bureaucrats,  organised  opposition  collapsed,  or 
was  crushed.  in  each  East  European  nation.  What  emerged 
N%as  an  essentially  apolitical  opposition,  drawn  rrom  a  variety 
of'  fields  and  proressions  but  outside  the  rrarnework  of'  thc 
communist  pail),  as  such.  What  rapidly  unflolded  was  a 
struggle  between  party  officials  without  legitimacy...  and  the 
emerging  ilon-political  rigures  4roni  welders  in  Polish 
shipyards  to  poets  in  Czech  bistros-  who  established  solid 
support  Croin  broad  sectors.  "157 
Thc  above  aCCOUnt.  with  the  exception  of  its  final  part.  applies  to  11LIngary  as 
%%Cll.  It  iS  11-11e  that  tile  I  ILIngarian  opposition  emerged  under  Gorbachev's  new 
liberal  policies.  and  that  the  opposition  leaders  were  of  different  backgrounds. 
I  lowever.  the  similarity  ends  there.  None  of  tile  opposition  leaders  were 
charismatic  or  fiamous  cnough  to  inflUence  development  and  to  be  seen  as 
symbols  ol'a  nev%p  era.  It  was  only  aller  1<66r's  removal  from  office  and  tlicn 
his  death  that  the  I  lungarian  transition  to  I  iberal  dernocracy  gathered  pace.  'nic 
clI'ccI  ot*  K,  klAr  on  I  lungarian  people  was  an  important  element  in  thcý  change, 
although  changes  in  the  international  environment  were  crucial.  The 
implementation  or  the  Glasnost  and  Perestroika  policies  and  the  abandonment 
oI,  illtel.  %.  elltiolli.  st  policies  in  the  East  European  region  by  tile  USSR,  assisted 
the  process  ol'cliange  ill  I  ILingary.  The  lack  or  great  popular  movements  from 
157  Irving  Luk  I  lodebateitz.  'Revolution,  Longevity  and  Legitimacy  in  Communist  States,  '  Siudies  hi 
C-  Conflyarillive  hilel-lialiolial  Deveh)pmem,  vol.  27(l).  Spring  1992,  (pp.  61-75),  p.  62. 194 
befoxv.  unlike  in  Poland  -with  the  Solidarity  movement-.  meant  that  the 
I  lungarian  demand  flor  change  was  a  contest  among  intellectuals,  and  hence, 
the  change  came  as  a  compromise  between  the  wishes  of  the  intelligentsia, 
either  members  of'  tile  communist  or  of  tile  anticommunist  camps.  Therefore, 
the  political  change  has  been  limited  to  the  negotiations  among  different 
Fractions  ofthe  elite.  Those  outside  or  the  intelligentsia  were  more  interested 
in  a  positive  change  in  their  economic  conditions  than  tile  change  in  terms  of 
ideology.  The  use  of  tile  concept  of  ideological  change  per  se  was  insuffilcient 
in  convincing  people  that  tile  new  regime  with  its  difTerent  economic 
1'ranieNvork  was  better  than  the  ancien  i-egime. 
B.  The  Issue  Of  Representation: 
Along  with  the  change  in  the  political-ideological  axis  comes  change  in  tile 
t_ 
understanding  and  implementation  of  the  idea  of  representation.  III  a 
communist  system.  the  communist  party,  the  representative  of  tile  proletariat 
by  definition.  is  assumed  to  Fulfil  tile  task  of  representation  by  standing  as  the 
progressive  segment  of'  society.  Consequently,  in  a  communist  system, 
wpi-csentation  is  executed  through  kleologicid  i-ein-esentation  idea  and  tile 
C0111111LIlliSt  party  is  the  main  agency  of  representation.  Meanwhile,  the 
industrial  and  agricultural  trade  unions  act  as  pressure  groups  in  a  very  limited 
sense  ofthe  term.  In  liberal  democracy,  however,  representation  is  required  to 
be  carried  out  through  a  series  of  institutions  including  the  parliament,  political 
parties.  and  pressure  groups.  Tile  transition  rrom.  being  a  subject  under 
C0111111LIllist  rule  to  be  a  citizen  in  a  democracy  is  a  major  attribute  of  the 
systemic  transl'orniation  for  any  individual,  and  tile  change  in  the  mode  or 195 
representation  is  a  part  of  (his  continuum  or  transformation.  Accordingly,  tile 
structure  of  tile  political  mechanism  has  to  endure  several  changes  in  the 
transition  to  democracy  fi-orn  the  communist  system.  The  transition  which  took 
place  in  I  ILIngary.  as  in  other  E.  ast  European  states,  has  brOLIght  major  changes 
in  the  substance  and  tile  perception  of  the  political  system  as  a  whole,  and  as  a 
part  of  it.  has  strong  implications  concerning  the  change  of  rcpreselitativc 
111cchanism. 
In  such  a  fundamental  transition,  the  change  in  tile  mainframe  calls  for 
changes  in  tile  SUbdivisions.  The  electoral  system  needs  to  be  altered  to  enable 
individual  candidates  and  tile  candidates  or  independent  political  parties  to 
contest  parliamentary  scats,  the  government  type  needs  to  be  altered  to  specily 
cither  a  presidential  or  a  parliamentary-governmental  system;  the  electoral 
system  needs  to  lie  rearranged  so  that  a  system  or  electoral  representation 
based  oil  either  a  proportional  representation  (11R)  or  majoritarian  system  in 
general  and  local/niunicipal  elections  may  be  adopted.  In  tile  Hungarian  case, 
tile  change  in  the  political  system  required  the  adaptation  and  alteration  of  tile 
electoral  system  and  choices  over  the  forms  of  government  and  representation. 
All  these  issues  were  solved  in  Hungary  by  a  series  of  roundtable  discussions 
aniong  tile  members  or  tile  communist  regime's  ruling  clite  aýnd  tile 
(Icniocracy-sceking  opposition  of  the  time  in  1989.  The  negotiations  outlined 
the  boundaries  of  the  future  political  system  through  a  set  of  compromises 
from  both  sides.  The'conclusions  that  the  negotiating  parties  reached  mostly 
proved  to  be  a  inid-way  between  the  dem  ands  of  the  opposition  and  the 
leadership  ofthe  time,  ensuring  tile  guaranteed  participation  of  the  opposition 196 
to  tile  political  lire  in  a  formal  manner  while  also  ensuring  socialist 
representation  even  in  a  limited  way  in  the  new  system. 
VI.  POLITICAL  TRANSFORMATION 
'I'lie  political  transformation  which  took  place  in  Hungary  from  late  1980s 
onwards  caused  changes  in  nearly  all  aspects  ofthe  I  lungarian  social  lire.  'File 
changes  included  the  rc-cmcrgcncc  of  political  parties-,  tile  direct  and  indirect 
participation  in  tile  political  realm  by  the  citizens  of  tile  country;  the  rise  of 
civil  socict),  orgailisations,  changes  in  tile  electoral  and  legislative  processes; 
and  tile  adoption  of'  different  economic  and  social  policies  by  the 
administration.  The  major  change  in  tile  interim  to  democracy  was  tile 
politicisation  of  the  masses  which,  by  means  of  elections  and  representation, 
shaped  the  new  regime's  working  frarnmork. 
A.  Political  Representation  in  Democratising  Societies:  the  Rokkan  Hypothesis: 
Stein  Rokkan.  in  his  1970  book  Cilizens.  Eleclions.  Pyt,  lies  proposed  a 
hypotlicsis  oil  tile  emergence  or  the  proportional  representation  (PR)  in  the 
electoral  realm.  To  begin  with,  Rokkan  observes  that  in  the  history  or  West 
European  politics.  there  is  a  tendency  of  extending  tile  right  to  vote  to  wider 
and  wider  circles  of  citizens  since  the  French  Revolution  of  1789  so  that  at  the 
end  a  universal  suffrage  might  be  reached.  rllcn.  lie  proposes  a  four  -  step 
11orniula  11or  political  transf'orniation.  rhe  first  step  is  tile  incoi-Imi-alion  or  tile 
classes  and/or  sections  of'  residents  kept  out  or  the  system  under  tile  original 
political  criteria.  The  second  step  is  the  mobilisalion  of  these  citizens  into 
electoral  contests.  The  third  step  is  their  tiaivalion  into  diFect  participation  in 
public  fille.  and.  finally,  the  fourth  step  is  thefin-mmion  (If  1he  nuflon-10(le 197 
polilicul  Inn-IJ,  oi-gunisalions  which  would  eventually  alter  the  old  political 
system  as  it  would  change  local  and  national  political  power  structurcsi  58. 
In  accordance  with  this  11OUr-step  model  of  change,  Rokkan  claims  that  tile 
In-ollorlionol  relwesentution  system  in  elections  is  an  outcome  of  this  political 
cliange  process.  I  le  claims  that  the  rise  of  tile  working  class  as  a  political  actor 
-it  the  end  or  the  19"'  and  tile  beginning  or  20"'  centuries  gave  way  to  1  tl  C 
In-o1wrliontil  rel7resenfulion  (PR)  system.  Rokkan  argues  that  as  tile  working 
class  became  quickly  politicised,  it  demanded  a  lower  representative  threshold 
so  that  its  members.  as  well  as  tile  members  of  the  aristocracy  and  the 
bourgeoisie  might  be  represented  in  legislative  organs.  At  the  same  time,  as  the 
po%ý,  er  of'  the  working  class  political  force  threatened  the  monopoly  or  power 
of'  the  mature,  well-establishcd  political  parties.  these  too  asked  lor  tile  PR 
system  Ilor  they  knew  the  rise  of  the  proletariat  was  inevitable  and  that  they 
might  preserve  at  least  some  seats  they  held  in  the  parliament  irproportional 
representation  replaced  the  niýjoritarian  system.  Tile  preservation  of  tile 
majoritarian  system  of  election  might  deny  tile  bourgeois  parties  tile  ability  to 
preserve  the  parliamentary  seats  and  lience  tile  legislative  power  they  held. 
Therellore.  Rokkan*s  hypothesis  proposes  that  in  a  dernocratising,  transitory 
society  in  which  the  liower  to  vote  is  transrerred  into  wider  scgnýcnts  of 
society.  PR  is  tile  logical  electoral  system. 
Arcnd  I.  i.  iphart  clainis  that  tile  same  logic  is  applicable  to  the  post-communist 
transition  in  Fastcrn  Europe.  ir  one  replaces  tile  rising  Nvorking  class  with  tile 
newly  burgeoning  democratic  forces  and  tile'cS-tablislied  ruling  class  with  tile 
15,  ý  Stein  Rokkan,  Cititens.  Elections.  Partics:  Approaches  to  Ilic  Comparative  Study  of  the  Proccsses 
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COMMUniSt  party  cadres,  the  structure  of  the  East  European  transition  or  I  9gos 
can  be  explained.  Poland  with  its  extreme  PR  system  and  presidential  political 
Formation  is  the  main  example  of  what  Lijphart  names  as  the  Rokkcin 
14i-lywhesis  159. 
B.  The  Making  of  the  New  Hungarian  Electoral  System: 
Despite  tile  similarity  or  tile  events  in  Hungary  to  tile  presupposcd  changes  in 
the  Rokkan  I  lYpothesis.  tile  I  lungarian  political  systcnI  differs  from  tile  system 
proposed  by  Rokkan  and  Lijphart.  From  1989  onwards,  the  political  systeni  in 
Hungary  experienced  changes  which  allowed  the  masses  to  participate  in 
policy-making.  The  changes  sincc-1989  enabled  tile  rcalisation  or  nlulti- 
candidatc  free  elections  based  oil  universal  sulTragc  as  well  as  political 
mobilisation  of  previously  depoliticised  masses  which  was  achieved  largely 
through  file  I-eSUrrection  of  civil  society.  Their  incorporation  into  tile 
negotiation  process  shaped  tile  new  regime  through  political  organisations 
which  in  turn  became  political  parties,  and  led  to  the  establishment  of  nation- 
%vide  political  parties. 
Thereflore.  political  changes  in  I  lungary  between  Spring  1988  and  Spring  1990 
4rom  the  retirement  ofJdnos  Kdddi  to  the  first  free  elections-.  followed  tile 
path  pursued  by  tile  West  European  democracies.  However,  altho,  ligh  tile 
pattern  flollowed  by  the  Hungarian  political  structure  was  similar  to  the 
transIlormation  scheme  proposed  by  Stein  Rokkan.  tile  outcomes  of  tile 
transl'ormation  were  not  in  unison  with  Rokkan's  predictions.  The  Hungarian 
systein  which  makes  use  of  a  mixture  of  the  rnýjoritarian  and  PR  types  of 
14"  Arend  Li 
' 
iphart,  Democruflunion  ond  Constilulional  Choices  in  Czechoslovakia.  11ungary,  und 
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electoral  representation  and  its  parliamentary-based  government  with  a 
symbolic  president  is  outside  the  stereotype  proposed  by  Rokkan  and  voiced 
by  Li.  iphart.  'I'lic  representation  system  used  in  Hungary  is  more  majoritarian 
than  PR.  This  resulted  despite  the  fact  that  the  systern  broadened  its 
boundaries  by  including  the  majority  of  tile  Hungarians  in  tile  indirect 
(Iccision-making  process  in  nleans  of  first  tile  National  Roundtable 
diSCLISSiOlIS.  and  then  by  nicans  or  free  elections  based  on  universal  sulTrage 
and  representation  by  political  organisations. 
The  main  reason  I'm  the  existence  or  tiic  current  post-commullist  I  lungarian 
system  may  be  attributed  to  flic  negotiation  process  bcfore  flic  systernic 
chan  e.  As  both  the  opposition  and  the  government  of  the  tinic  wcrc  aware  L 
that  democratisation  was  incvitable  and  wished  for  a  pacific  change.  the 
multiparty  talks  led  to  a  hybrid  system.  Oil  tile  one  hand,  the  communist  rulers 
ol'the  countD,  knew  they  could  not  hold  to  power  ror  long  as  tile  Popular  will 
and  tile  intcrnational  political  environment  were  against  such  a  course.  On  the 
otlicr  hand.  the  opposition  knew  that  tile  I-ISWP  had  the  power  to  block  tile 
change  lor  a  long  time.  Thererore,  tile  electoral  system.  the  presidential  offlicc 
n  and  the  powers  and  responsibilities  or  the  reah-  s  or  the  estate  were  defined  by 
a  series  of'  compromise.  -,.  The  lack  of*  a  unirying  figure  as  the  head  or  tile 
i 
Hungarian  political  opposition  powerful  enough  to  lead  masses  into  a 
revolution.  and.  tile  wish  to  give  the  administrative  power  to  a  government 
directly  elected  by  people  rorced  the  participating  parties  to.  adopt  a  system  of 
government  based  oil  a  powerful  executive  led  by  a  primc.  ministcr  and  lience 
to  tile  adoption  of'  a  limited,  representative  presidential  role.  The  desire  to 
Budapest.  1992,  pp.  100-  104  passim. 200 
prevcm  a  vcry  large  number  of  political  parties  being  represented  in  the 
parliament  gave  way  to  the  imposition  of  ail  electoral  threshold,  while  the  1ear 
ol*one  party  having  a  substantial  majority  in  tile  parliament  and  hence  possibly 
leading  to  a  C011tillUation  or  the  ancien  regime  led  to  the  complicated  electoral 
pl-OCC(ILli-e.  s.  As  a  result  or  the  Roundtable  negotiations,  tllc  Hungarian 
Parliament  in  the  beginning  had  six  part  iamentary  parties  and  the  number  of 
political  partics  represented  in  the  parliamcnt  rernaincd  tile  same  in  all  three 
POSt-COII  I  III  Lill  i  St  parliamentary  terms.  III  the  meantime,  coalition  governments 
lime  become  the  norm  either  due  to  necessity  -as  in  the  first  and  third 
pulianicnts-  or  due  to  a  preilerence  to  share  responsibility  and  tile  blame  in 
national  mattas  -as  in  the  second  parliament-. 
As  to  the  (Ype  of  representation,  it  was  decided  as  a  result  of  a  debate  over 
%%liether  to  adopt  a  proportional  or  a  majoritarian  representative  model.  rlic 
I  lS\VP  was  interested  in  a  tn,  ýIority  representation  basis  ror  they  were 
com'inced  that  their  better-known  candidates  secure  their  return  to 
government.  while  the  opposition  backed  a  proportional  representation  scheme 
as  their  candidates  were  by  and  large  total  strangers  to  the  public.  To  oN,  crconle 
this  stalcmate.  tile  electoral  system  was  formed  in  a  lialf-majority  -  half-PR 
basis. 
The  parliament  modified  lie  text  or  the  agreed  law  to  change  tile 
rcpresentational  schemes.  According  to  tiis,  orthe  386  available  scats.  176 
%%,  cre  to  lie  elected  in  single-member  constitLICIlCiCS,  152  in  a  proportional  way 
and  58  seats  were  to  be  allocated  to  the  National  List  to  correct  the 201 
representational  disproportion  which  are  to  take  place  in  county  and  single- 
IlICIllbCr  C01lStitUCIlCiCS  160. 
A  two-stage  minirnum  threshold  to  prevcnt  an  ovcr-divided  parliament  was 
also  florcscen.  The  first  step  requested  a  pre-candidate  to  collect  at  least  750 
signatures  in  his/lier  district  to  ensure  his/licr  candidacy,  and  the  second  step 
lbrcsa%Ný  a  necessary  4%  or  national  votes  to  be  won  by  each  political  party  in 
order  to  be  represented  in  tile  parliament.  A  political  party  was  also  asked  to 
have  candidates  in  at  least  7  constituencies  to  be  able  to  present  a  national  list. 
A  political  party  %Nhich  satisfies  the  nornis  of  both  electoral  thresholds  may 
then  compete  within  a  two-round  election  process.  In  this  election  round,  tile 
voter  is  to  decide  Cor  a  candidate  for  his/her  constituency  and  then  vote  for  a 
national  list  by  a  political  party.  irthere  is  a  turnout  above  25%  and  irone  or 
the  rcgional  candidates  manages  to  get  more  than  50%  orthe  vote  cast  at  that 
district.  there  is  no  need  for  a  second  round,  but  ir  it  turns  out  to  be  the  other 
%%ay  around  the  sanic  process  has  to  be  l'ollowed  once  more  yet  with  tile  two 
mostly-voted  candidates  or  the  first  round. 
This  system.  while  protecting  tile  greater  organisations  against  the  smaller 
ones.  secures  a  representation  or political  parties  in  the  parliament  in  a  fashion 
%0ich  \%ould  either  let  one  single  party  or  two  parties  form  a  government, 
%NithOUt  the  need  to  1101-111  multiparty  coalition  governments  which  inay  create 
instability  in  a  not-yet-stable  system.  Of  about  60  political  parties  that  were 
registered  by  the  end  or  1989,  only  12  managed  to  present  a  National  List  and 
only  19  could  do  so  with  county  lists.  13  parties  held  a  majority  of  97%  of  all 
'ý'41('armcii  Gon/ales  Enriquez,  'Ilectoral  Systems  and  Political  Stability  in  Centml  and  Eastern 
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candidates  in  the  1990  elections  while  28  parties  cither  nominated  their 
members  as  candidates  or  supported  some  others'  members  as  candidatesl6l, 
and  6  political  pat-ties  became  represented  in  tile  parliament. 
C.  Deviations  From  the  Rokkan  Hypothesis: 
1.  Electoral  System  Formation  and  Activation: 
Even  if*  in  terms  of'  political  change  they  follow  the  Rokkan  Hypothesis,  in 
lerms  (it'  representation  the  East  Central  European  countries,  including 
I  lunuary.  tic  not  fit  into  the  Rokkan  I  lypotilesis.  Arend  Li  phart  points  out  to 
IýJ 
the  fact  that  (lie  condition  of  Icgifirnacy  and  the  role  played  by  the  old 
established  parties  determined  the  outcome.  In  Poland  tile  traditional 
communists  licld  poNver  in  a  system  imposed  by  tile  prevailing  international 
environment.  However,  tile  international  environment  had  changed  while 
giving  rise  to  open  opposition  which  challenged  tile  legitimacy  or  tile  existing 
order.  With  tile  withdrawal  or  tile  Soviet  support  and  the  rise  or  the  reform 
wing  within  the  I  ISWP.  tile  opposition  had  nothing  to  fear  during  the  Round- 
I- 
Table  discussions  or  1989.  The  ref'orm-secking  communists  Nvithin  the  I  ISWP 
did  not  see  the  issue  of*  continuity  in  the  power  positions  as  ail  immediate 
issue.  and  the  opposition  knew  that,  the  quasi  -1  egi  ti  macy  or  tiie  communist 
regime  Nvas  rractUred  at  the  time  of  discussions.  Therefore,  the  opposition  was 
stronger  than  the  ruling  regime  during  the  talks. 
In  addition  to  the  unstable  position  in  terms  of  legitimacy,  the  attitude  of  the 
1xii-ties  to  the  changes  in  political  system  and  the  attitude  of  the  general  public 
to  the  political  process  afficeted  the  formation  or  the  new  Hungarian  electoral 
s)s(cm.  The  over-enthusiastic  and  extremely  optimistic  approach  or  the 
ibid.,  pp.  20-2  1. 203 
Reflorm  COIIlIIlLIIliStS  Within  tile  IISWP  led  them  to  insist  on  a  mainly  single 
candidate  by  district  ni,  ýIoritarian  electoral  system  with  a  semi  -presi  dent  ial 
government  type  with  a  higher  electoral  threshold  of  5%  as  opposed  to  3% 
demanded  by  the  opposition.  The  legislature  or  tile  time  was  also  made  up  by 
communists  as  a  %khole,  so  the  final  electoral  system  was  more  majoritarian 
than  PR.  %%  hich  in  01'ect  cost  tile  ex-I  ISWP  a  number  of  members  in  tile  post- 
communist  parliament.  Public  mistrust  of  communist  party  led  to  a  mistrust  of 
the  concept  of  'political  party'  as  a  whole,  as  well.  Therefore,  as  Pit  nearly 
almost  111cant  party-list  PR  system,  tile  case  for  the  PR  appeared  weak  during 
the  negotiation  processl6l. 
2.  The  Problem  of  the  Intelligentsia  and  Konrad  and  Szelenyi's  Approach: 
One  niaJor  problem  with  the  Rokkan  -  Lijphart  point  of  view  is  that  it  is  based 
on  a  palli  that  was  11ollowed  by  the  Western  industrialised  states,  and  therel'orc 
it  is  based  on  the  development  of  social  classes.  social  strata,  and 
1111LICI'Standings  or  cultural  and  economic  capital  in  that  part  or  tiie  World. 
llo\%ever.  in  Eastern  E-urope,  as  pointed  out  by  George  Konrad  and  Ivan 
Szclcnyi.  as  well  as  others  such  as  Claus  Offe,  Bela  Grcskovitz,  and  Gil  11-yal. 
a  dill1crew  developmental  path  was  rollowedl(I-1. 
According  to  Konrad  and  Szelenyi,  tile  Eastern  European  socialism  has  created 
its  own  system  oroppression  and  exploitation  orthe  working  class.  This  nicant, 
that  '*under  tile  'dictatorship  or  tile  proletariat'  it  is  actually  the  workers  who 
Arend  Lij1phirt.  ppxif-  p.  106. 
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make  tip  the  most  underprivileged  class.  "104  Thus,  tile  extension  or  tile 
privilege  (which  would  become  tile  right  in  tinic)  to  participate  in  the  decision- 
making  process  Im  the  %vorking  class  that  lorilled  tile  backbone  of  Rokkan's 
hypothesis.  had  railed  to  materialise  in  East  European  socialist  systern. 
Intellectuals.  with  their  understanding  of  socialist  theory  and  their  influence  in 
decision-making  circles  even  when  they  are  not  directly  incorporated  in  these 
circles.  have  become  influential  in  dccision-making  while  tile  workers  were 
lell  in  more  or  less  tile  sarne  position  as  their  Western  counterparts,  despite  the 
flact  that  the  main  basis  or  tiie  communist  system  is  the  dictatorship  of  tile 
pi-oletariat",  -5.  This  situation,  combined  with  the  intellectuals'  domination  over 
the  bUreaucracy.  has  prevented  the  development  of  even  a  quasi-civil-society 
as  reqUired  by  Rokkan  and  Lij1phart  for  tile  dcvclopilient  of  a  liberal  dcniocratic 
System. 
The  doillillint  position  of  tile  intelligentsia,  despite  part  or  it  was  rnarginalised 
l'or  they  rellused  to  be  incorporated  within  tile  ruling  socialist  party.  enabled 
thein  to  secure  a  leading  position  in  the  post-cornmunist  society  alongside  tile 
members  ol'politocracy  and  managerial  class.  The  intellectuals,  therefore,  have 
retained  their  controlling  position  in'the  decision-tilaking  process  of  their 
country  and  hence  prc%,  cnted  the  political  decision-illaking  to  be  alTectcd  by 
the  general  publie,  illCILiding  workers,  peasants,  small  entrepreneurs,  and 
StUdCrIts.  by  forming  alliances  with  the  post-conimunist,  power  elite'66.  The 
transition  was  reached  by  the  Roundtable  Discussions.  ail  intra-clite 
1111  George  Konrad  ind  I  vati  Szelenyi.  Thc  I  ntcllcctuals  on  the  Road  Lo_ClassPower,  I  larcourt,  Bracc, 
Jovanovich  Itic..  Nc%%  York.  NY,  1979.  p.  xiii. 
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negotiation  process.  and  the  new  order  was  established  not  by  tile  masses  but 
by  the  power  clite  orthe  communist  and  post-communist  cras. 
As  a  result.  it  may  be  claimed  that  the  Rokkan  Hypothesis  and  the  Rokkan  - 
I.  i.  iphart  point  ol'  vieNv  I'ails  to  explain  the  post-communist  East  European 
situation  as  it  is  rellcrring  to  a  gradual  generalisation  or  illflLlencc  on  the 
decision-making  process  while  in  the  East  European  cases,  tile  illflLICIICe  Was 
narro%Ned  down  to  a  group  of  intellectuals  rather  than  to  be  generaliscd  into 
greater  segmients  ol'the  society. 
3.  Electoral  System  and  Its  Applications: 
In  conjiunction  with  the  formulation  of  the  clectoral  system  and  its  application, 
one  may  claini  that  the  Rokkan  Hypothesis,  although  in  itscir  a  valuable  guide 
to  the  stages  of'  flormation  of  a,  new  political  order,  is  inapplicable  to  the 
I  lungarian  situation  in  terms  of  providing  a  framework  or  prediction  in  respect 
of*  the  chronology  ofevents.  Although  it  is  possible  to  claim  that  the  necessary 
pi-crequisites  Rokkan  indicated  took  place  in  tile  I  lungarian  context.  one  may 
not  claim  these  Functioned  within  tile  parameters  set  by  Rokkan  and  LýIphart. 
In  a  plain  approach,  it  may  be  claimed  that,  in  I  lungary,  tile  incolI)ol'alion  step 
took  place  with  the  National  Roundtable  discussions  and  tile  free  elections  that 
followed,  tile  mobili.  wilion  step  took  place  with  tile  political  campaigns  and 
"ith  such  events  like  the  1990  taxi  drivers'  strike  (see  the  l'ollowing  part  oil 
cki  I  society  I'm  a  discussion  or  thc  sutýject);  the  aclivallon  andpolifical-parly 
. 
1brin(ni"n  steps  took  place  within  the  pre-deniocratic  threshold  from  n1id- 
1980s  mmards.  However.  that  these  steps  Nvcre  taken  in  Hungary  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  Rokkan  I  lypothesis  is  justificd.  Tlic  lack  of*  popular 
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interest  in  the  formation  and  use  of  civil  society  mcclianisms  in  ternis  of 
political  influence.  the  low  ratio  of  voters  attending  tile  ballots,  the  similarity 
ofnearly  all  political  parties  in  tlicir  cconornic  choices.  and  the  low  figures  of 
membership  Im  political  parties  point  out  to  tile  fact  that  despite  socio- 
political  change  and  three  multi-party  clections,  tile  Hungarian  political  system 
is  not  as  mature  as  Rokkan  and  Lijphart  thought  it  to  be. 
The  main  deficiency  in  the  application  of  tile  Rokkan  Hypothesis  into  tile  East 
Fluropean  situation  stcnis  from  the  fact  that  one  may  Foresee  a  logical  path  For 
the  developnicilt  or  dcinocracy  in  a  totalitarian  system,  but  oilc  cannot  impose 
rational  choice  to  the  systcrn  from  outside.  To  believe  that  tile  public  is  rational 
'is  in  entity  and  hence  is  to  act  in  a  given  pattern  within  given  parameters, 
cspccially  in  the  wake  Of  SLIC11  social  turrnoil  as  experienced  in  Eastern  Europe, 
is  un6easible.  Consequently,  while  the  Rokkan  Hypothesis  is  sound  for 
creating  a  transitory  model  and  for  following  the  developments  in  the  post- 
C0111111LIlliSt  transition.  it  is  unhelpful  in  trying  to  predict  what  took  place  in  a 
given  stage  of  development. 
VII.  TRANSMUTING  SYSTEMS:  SIMILARITIES  AND  DISSIMILARITIES 
A.  Systems  in  Transition: 
Tile  Rokkan  I  lypoillesis  discussed  above  deals  with  the  internal  political 
clements  ol'  change.  Oil  the  other  hand,  more  comprehensive  theories 
concerning  the  political  cliangc  were  produced  in  tile  last  two  decades.  These 
Cocus  oil  the  idea  that  tile  individual  or  regional  political  transitions  which  took 
place  in  1980s  and  1990s  in  difTerent  parts  of.  tile  World  prove  that  the 
existence  ol'  a  political  trails  formati  on  in  global  scale.  These  theories  argue 
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that  the  basic  needs  or  individual  societies  changed  simultaneously  to  seek  the 
implementation  liberal  democracy.  Consequently,  the  political  changes 
resulted  in  gencralisations  and  these  took  the  form  or  comparative  studies 
betwecii  the  deniocratising  regions  of  the  world.  The  comparative  studies 
I'OCUSCd  cspecially  oil  dernocratisation  processes  in  Eastern  Europe  and  in 
Latin  Ainerica  and  Southern  Europe.  The  former  was  seen  as  a  colitinuation  or 
the  transrorniation  or  (lie  South  European  -  Latin  American  denlocratisation 
process  which  had  started  nearly  a  decade  bellore  the  East  European 
trails6orniations. 
The  institutional  trails  formation  in  Hungarian  political  system  is  discussed  in 
the  previous  parts  of'  this  tlicsis.  The  following  part  aims  at  analysing  tile 
coi  n  pari  soil-,  between  the  Latin  American  -South  European  political 
transIbriliation  and  tile  East  European  transformation  which  includes  tile 
I  hingariall  case  analysed  in  this  thesis.  Tile  main  reason  for  such  all  analysis  is 
to  lind  N%hether  or  not  a  mould  or  transfiormation  frorn  totalitarian  and 
authoritarian  reginies  to  dcniocracy  exists.  For  this  airn,  tile  agencies  that  forni 
and  sustain  the  political  order  before,  during,  and  artcr  the  political  transition, 
the  social  backgrounds  of*  the  two  parts  of  the  globe,  the  driving  forces  in  the 
transition.  ideological  and  economic  causes  and  outcomes  of  tile  transition  will 
be  analysed. 
i.  System  Building: 
The  niain  comparison  brought  forward  to  indicate  to  similar  trends  ill 
demoeratisation  in  recent  years  was  the  onc  between  Latin  America  and 
Eastern  Furope.  The  comparison  emerged  as  there  were  sonic  common 
elements  ol'democratic  systcni-building  and  sonic  similarities  in  the  wa.  v  the 208 
society  Nvas  organised  in  totalitarian  and  authoritarian  reginies  in  ternis  of  the 
relationship  ol'the  rulers  with  those  they  rule  upon.  The  main  driving  force  11or 
the  comparison  is  the  way  these  two  groups  of  countries  are  perceived:  The 
Latin  American  countries  wcre  l'otindcd  by  the  Europcan,  mainly  Spanish  and 
PortUgUeSC.  conquistadors  destroying  the  state  mcchanisms  that  existed  oil 
these  countries  prior  to  (lie  conquest.  Latin  American  state  structures  and 
societies  have  emerged  as  a  mixture  of  the  outside  influence  dictated  upon  the 
natives  and  native  clements  which  somehow  managed  to  resist  to  the  change. 
I'lie  result  was  a  colonial  system  which  endured  from  the  early  sixteenth 
witury  till  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Tile  first  independence 
movements  date  Crorn  18  1  Os  and  continued  since  then.  Thercfore,  the  Countries 
in  tile  hatin  American  region  had  to  survive  for  four  centuries  with  a  political 
system  which  wasn't  their  own,  under  a  colonial  administration  which 
alicnatcd  natives  from  the  power  positions  and  bureaucracy,  and  which 
dictated  the  needs  and  wishes  of  the  overseas  coloniser  over  the  country's 
economy  and  society.  When  the  countries  in  the  region  gained  their 
independence  and  (lie  colonisers  became  assimilated  in  the  new  system  as  parts 
ol'the  elite.  there  was  no  one  in  these  newly  independent  countries  experienced 
in  bureaucracy.  technological  details  or  production,  administration,  exýccpt 
n)ilitary  issues.  I  lence.  these  countries  were  driven  to  a  chaotic  environment  in 
which  tile  key  to  solutions  were  seen  either  as  to  seek  outside  help,  this  time 
from  (lie  United  States.  or  as  resolving  the  matters  by  military  coups  d'6tat. 
A  parallel  may  be  drawn  with  Eastern  Europe  from  this  point.  Although  the 
1:,,  ISt  European  Countries  had  periods  of  independence  during  their  existence 
and  were  not  created  by  an  enforcement  or,  a-  foreign  culture,  they  were 209 
OCCUPiCd  by  great  powers  of  Europe  for  very  long  pcriods  during  the  last  five 
centuries.  'I'licil.  tile  'Soviet  invasion  -or  liberation-  during  tile  1945-1989 
period  ClISUred  that  these  countries  experienced  similar  positions  to  tile  Latin 
American  countries  in  the  colonial  era.  Although  tile  main  difference  between 
(lie  tvvo  systems  was  that  while  tile  Latin  American  system  was  based  on  race 
and  hence  those  would  be,  allowed  to  positions  in  state  bureaucracy  or  ill 
engineering  positions  were  those  who  were  of  European  origin  and  or  Catholic 
I'aith  (excel-it  Surinam  %Nhere  the  Dutch  ruled).  in  Eastern  Europe  those  to  be 
allowed  to  Iliese  positions  might  be  natives  yet  had  to  be  of  Marxist  faith,  tile 
system  worked  in  a  very  similar  pattern.  That  is  the  underlying  reason  for  tile 
I'act  that  after  tile  end  or  tile  communist  rule,  most  of  the  key  position  holders 
had  to  be  lell  in  their  positions  with  a  mere  declaration  of  conversion  to  liberal 
(Icniocracy  as  there  was  no  replacement  for  them  at  tile  immediate  post- 
Communist  cra.  Such  similarities  gave  rise  to  tile  claims  that  one  may  draw 
paralicls  betwcen  tile  two  deniocratisation  processes  as  tile  social  backgrounds 
and  the  post-'independence'  situations  arc  somewhat  similar. 
2.  Changes  in  Political  Structure: 
In  the  realm  of'  political  structural'  changes,  there  are  more  manifest 
similarities.  There  is  a  denlocratisation  of  tile  regimes  in  both  parts  or  the 
world.  flollowing  (lie  same  key  patterns  or  institutional  isation  and  restitution. 
Therellore.  it  may  be  claimed  that  the  Latin  American  denlocratisation  may  be 
seen  as  -in  exemplary,  if  not  a  rorcrunner,  to  the  East  European  changes  as  the 
transilorniation  towards  liberal  democracy  from  authoritarianism  began  first  in 
Latin  America  and  then  was  followed  b  tile  East  European  states.  Tile  need  to  y  -1 
grant  more  individual  Freedoms  in  both  cases  ignited  the  fall  of  the 210 
authoritarian  and  totalitarian  reginies.  Moreover,  both  series  of  changes  took 
place  as  a  result  ofthe  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  of  the  emergence  of  a  New 
World  Order.  There  certainly  are  sonic  similar  processes  in  both  regimes  to 
make  the  comparison  look  worth  the  cfrort. 
To  begin  ,,,  ith.  the  changes  towards  a  truly  democratic  system  seek  primarily 
the  establishment  of  a  system  responsive  and  responsible  to  the  public.  The 
establishment  of  such  a  system  would  require  guarantees  on  basic  rights  and 
freedoms.  the  introduction  of  political  and  economic  choice;  and  the  litling  of 
censorship  orall  kinds  and  the  calibration  orclection  results.  Therefore,  it  may 
be  argued  that  the  establishment  ofccrtain  components  of  a  liberal  democratic 
system  is  required  in  both  authoritarian  and  totalitarian  regimes  in  the 
transition  to  democracy.  Of  the  necessary  changes,  the  emphasise  is  placed  on 
the  need  to  have  a  competitive  political  systern  with  a  conipetitivc  and  free 
c1cuoral  process  based  on  universal  suffrage.  Consequently,  as  this  major 
component  of  denlocratisation  is  lacking  in  all  deniocratising  regimes. 
parallels  may  be  drawn  between  the  problems  and  solutions  to  these  problems 
that  may  be  raccd  in  each  and  every  democratising  rcgirne. 
As  to  the  similarities  or  the  regimes  to  be  replaced,  one  may  emphasisc  the 
iniportaiwe  the  unelected  bureaucrats  and  technocrats  enjoy  in  both  totalitarian 
and  MIthoritarian  systems.  As  these  have  no  power  assigned  on  them  by  tile 
popular  choice,  i.  e.  as  they  are  not  elected  but  appointed  to  their  positions, 
their  wsponsibilities  arc  normally  towards'  those  who  appoint  them  and 
therellore  not  to  the  public's  demands.,  Also,  the  limits  Over  the  regime 
legitimisation  is  restricted  to  the  opinion  of  those'in  power  positions,  nallicly 
the  high  bureaucracy.  local  notables,  and  tile  political  leaders.  Whether  the 211 
nicnihers  of*  a  Latin  American  junta  or  the  members  or  tile  Politburo  of  a 
socialist  state.  the  power-holdcrs  had  a  very  limited  responsibility  towards  tile 
public  as  they  derived  their  staying  power  From  the  coercive  means  they 
control  and  ideological  orientations  which  enable  them  to  influence  the  public 
opinion  and  tile  international  environment  during  tile  Cold  War  era. 
3.  Change  and  the  Question  of,  Regime  Legitimacy: 
At  this  point,  one  must  remember  the  Grarnscian  argument  that  "even  in  tile 
most  despotic  societies,  there  is  a  measure  or  active  support  by  a  minority,  and 
there  is  passive  acceptance  by  larger  sectors  who  believe  there  are 
compensating  advantages  to  themselves  and  no  realistic  alternat  iVC,,  167.  In  the 
authoritarian  Latin  American  regimes,  the  minority  on  whose  support  tile 
regime  depended  was  tile  traditional  elite  consisted  of  either  drug  barons  or 
great  lanners  or  industrialist  owning  generally  assembly  plants.  This  group  of 
inllucntial  people  N%,  Iio  had  either  a  limited  degree  of  public  support  or  none  at 
all.  had  hilluence  as  the  owners  or  tiic  means  of  production.  Hence,  as  they 
gained  prosperity  under  the  authoritarian  regime,  they  supported  it  in  the 
domestic  scale.  In  the  meantime,  they  supported  tile  anti  -communist  Western 
Bloc  ol'countries  in  the  international  ar&na.  Tile  vic%v  was  taken  that  the  deeds 
ofaily  regime  might  be  acceptable  as  long  as  it  was  not  lost  to  the  comniunist 
camp.  The  main  support  for  the  totalitarian  regimes  or  tile  Eastern  Bloc  came 
1'rom  high-rank  offlicials  in  the  armed  forces  and  bureaucracy,  as  well  as  from 
recruits  to  tile  Party  and-through  ideological  propaganda.  On  tile  international 
side.  support  came  rrom  the  USSR.  the  political  and  ideological  leader  of  tile 
Fastern  Bloc.  Thereflore,  in  both  types  of  reginles,  one  may  talk  of  a  limited 212 
legitimacy  and  a  low  need  for  legitimisation  while  there  is  a  need  to  Icgitimise 
tile  rule  oftlic  rulers  before  tile  eyes  of  those  who  might  end  it. 
Consc(luciltly.  the  legitinlisation  process  is  based  on  intra-clique  legitimisation 
in  both  types  of'regimes.  Yet,  the  system  might  require  some  alterations  as  tile 
general  public  might  come  to  a  point  of  total  dissatisfaction  and  force  the 
ruling  class  to  leave  their  positions  either  by  rebellion.  civil  war.  or  a  series  of 
industrial  action  and  by  other  non-violent  means.  To  prevent  this,  tile  rerorms 
ill  SLICII  systenis  conic  from  tile  top  as  well:  Once  there  is  a  general 
dissatisfiaction  in  the  public,  especially  in  the  realm  or  economics,  rcilorm 
prograninies  are  initiated  and  applied  without  asking  to  the  public.  In  tile  realm 
or  pol  itics.  some  concessions  are  possible,  yet  these  need  be  limited  in  scope. 
A  good  example  of'  such  political  initiatives  in  tile  Eastern  Bloc  were  the 
policies  or  Glasnost  and  Perestroika.  They  both  have  become  tile  bases  for  tile 
deniocratisation  in  (lie  Eastern  Bloc  although  the  main  intention  of  the  policy- 
makers  was  to  reflorni  the  state  socialist  system  and  not  to  dcrnocratise  it.  With 
(lie  draniatic  increase  in  the  public  expectations  and  in  tile  freedom  of' 
expression,  these  policies  also  became  the  major  motor  forces  to  create  tile 
momentum  ordismembernient  of  the  U§SR  as  they  created  tile  suitable  milieu 
For  the  dissident  ideas  to  spread  beyond  what  was  thought  possible  a  decade 
ago.  These  policies  could  not  be  labelled  as  real  steps  towards  democracy  or 
liberalisation,  but  to  bypass  tile  malfunctions  in  the  communist  systern.  Similar 
processes  Nvere  observed  in  tile  Latin  American  political  life  as  Russel  Bova 
demonstrates: 
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"In  its  original  and  most  narrow  sense,  "glasnost"  referred 
to  a  policy  aimed  at  increasing  access  to  inflormation,  thereby 
rcdUCiIlg  tile  Veil  of'  censorship  and  secrecy  that  had  long 
%mothered  SOViCt  Society  .... 
[G]Iasnost  shared  little  in  common 
with  tile  Western  idea  or  "frecdorn  or  inflorniation"  and  even 
less  with  Western  notions  of  democratic,  constitutional 
governincilt. 
.... 
This  liberalisation  often  referred  to  in  discussions  of  the 
Latin  American  world  as  decornpressao  (dcconipression)  or 
apertura  (Opening).  typically  involves  tile  institution. 
restoration  and  liberties  of  individuals  and  groups...  (Andj  in  a 
rcgime  (if  liberalised  authoritarianism,  -,  the  liberalisation 
CIIJON'CLI...  is  granted  and  controlled  from  above,  and  is 
potentially  subjject  to  revocation  at  any  time.  "  168 
I'liere  irILICC(l  is  a  similarity  in  the  reform  processes  and  in  the  objectives  the 
rdorm  proccsses,  are  meant  to  aini  at.  Consequently,  one  may  argue  that  tile 
change  from  authoritarianism  to  liberal  dernocracy  in  Latin  America  and  the 
change  1rom  total  itarianism  to  liberal  democracy  in  the  former  Eastern  Bloc 
are  similar  procedures.  lience  the  two  transformation  proecsses  may  be 
comparable  and  contrastable.  If  one  adds  that  similar  problems  and  similar 
solutions  are  around  in  both  transitions  in  terms  of  institutionalisation,  as 
countrics  in  both  parts  ofthe  world  needed  new  constitutions,  new  sets  ol'laws 
and  regulations,  new  electoral  processes.  new  institutions  as  parlianients  and 
political  parties  %%hich  flunction  propqly,  one  nlay  see  tile  case  in  getting 
involved  in  comparisons.  Not  surprisingly,  in  the  last  coupic  of  yea,  rs,  to 
equate  the  change  processes  in  tile  two  difTering  parts  of  tile  world,  united  only 
by  their  desire  to  adopt  liberal  democracy  and  their  technological  inequality 
,,  vith  the  countries  of*  Core  Capitalism,  became  a  widespread  'practice.  Such 
com  pari  soils  intensillied  dUring  the  institutionalisation  process  in  the  florilierly 
communist  and  lascist-dictatorial  reginics.  As  the  Latin  American  countries 214 
were  first  to  demoeratise.  they  were  seen  as  an  example  for  their  East 
Furopean  counterparts. 
B.  Dissimilarities  in  Transformation: 
1.  Driving  Forces: 
In  spite  of'  the  t1het  that  there  is  a  great  similarity  between  the  relationship 
patterns  ol'the  ruling  classes  vis-A-vis  the  other  important  power-holders  and 
IIIC  public  opinion  in  both  authoritarian  and  totalitarian  reginies,  one  may  not 
compare  the  two  sets  of*  regime  transformation.  The  main  reason  for  this  is  that 
the  two  regime  types  and  the  countries  they  dominated  difTer  in  terms  or 
historical  background,  social  structure.  economic  system  and  political 
orientations  both  in  domestic  and  international  scale. 
The  main  obstacle  Ilor  comparison  of  the  two  regime  types  sterns  from  tile  fact 
that  the  proposed  cycles  ofdcniocratisation  and  Un-dernocratisation  are  merely 
illusions.  It  is  true  that  the  world  has  experienced  some  'waves  of  democracy,  ' 
yct  it  is  not  possible  to  vcrilýv  whether  these  waves  occurred  as  waves  or 
democracy  pei-  se.  In  all  instances,  there  has  been  a  driving  Force,  an  ignition 
point  and  in  international  frarnework  which  eased  tile  other  reginies  pursue  in 
tile  S,  1111C  direction.  In  tile  last  decade  o(democratisation,  one  may  identify  two 
niaior  Caetors  in  tile  shape  of  economic  necessities  and  changes  in  tile  world 
order. 
01'  these  driving  forces.  economic  necessities  have  been  the  main  concerti  of 
the  Latin  American  states  and  of  tile  USSR,  the  main  benefactor  in  the  East 
I'All-OPCall  Scheme.  In  Latin  America,  as  the  economy  had  reached  to  a  point  at 
v,  hich  majjor  social  disturbances  might  take  place.  changes  were  introduced. 
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The  economic  environment  which  necessitated  the  changes  consisted  of  high 
levels  of'  internal  and  foreign  debt.  high  inflation  rates,  decrease  in  real  income 
of*  the  ni,  ýIority  of'  the  population,  and  incapability  to  adopt  to  new 
technologies.  The  changes  came  as  the  fiberalisation  of  the  systern,  rather  than 
tile  adJustnient  of  the  economic  itýjusticc.  These  may  also  be  seen  as  tile 
adjustnient  ol'the  private  sector  to  tile  new  economic  requirements  so  that  it 
would  not  lose  its  competitive  edge. 
The  11orcign  pressure  oil  human  rights  issue  on  tile  Latin  Americans 
authoritarian  regimes  From  the  US  and  the  EU  meant  a  decrease  in  foreign 
economic  and  political  support.  The  change  of  the  world  political  structure 
with  the  de%clopment  or  tile  D6tcnte  policies  was  of  no  assistance  to  tile 
authoritarian  regimes  either.  As  the  strategic  importance  and  the  need  to  keep 
tile  Latin  American  states  on  the  side  of  tile  Western  Alliance  decreased,  the 
pressure  on  the  regimes  to  adopt  political  and  civil  rights  and  Freedoms 
accclitable  in  European  and  North  American  standards  increased.  Furthermore, 
the  collapse  of  the  bipolar  world  order  from  1989  to  late  1991,  meant  that 
these  reginies  had  no  more  support  from  outside  and  hence  were  forced  to  give 
way  to  more  democratic  schemes. 
As  to  the  Fastern  Bloc,  from  1987  onwards,  a  process  of  r6orni  was 
pecessary  -as  the  planned  economics  or  the  bloc  members  were  seriously 
Cailitig.  The  same  problem  haunted  tile  USSR,  the  main  benefactor  or  the 
whole  socialist  world,  as  well.  To  regenerate  its  economy,  it  had  to  rid  itselfor 
the  burden  of'  supporting  a  series  or  countries  in  Europe  which  functioned 
merely  as  a  bLll'[*cr  zone  that  modern  war  technology  did  not  really  necessitate. 
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The  main  idea  behind  tile  'Sinali-a  Docn-ine'  was  to  free  tile  USSR  from  tile 
burden  created  by  its  satellite  regirrics  in  Europe. 
It  is  also  true  that  the  industrial  revolution  of  inrorniation,  technology  ill  tile 
1980s  which  made  nearly  all  previous  services  sector  technologies  obsolete 
had  its  filir  share  in  the  way  to  the  transition  as  tile  Modernists  claim.  As  the 
economic  burdell  ofcoping  with  tile  new  technologies  in  computer  science  and 
telecommunications  was  enormous  for  closed  economics,  all  economic 
liberalisation  was  necessary  and  once  tile  access  to  inflorniatioll  eased  ill  the 
Eastern  Bloc,  the  end  of  the  reginics  came  quickly. 
W'hen  one  looks  at  tile  matter  in  the  light  of  these  lacts,  it  can  be  argued  that 
the  deniocratisation  processes  are  linked  with  the  international  order.  The 
world  order  from  late  1940s  to  late  1980s  was  pernlissive  of  authoritarian 
reginies  as  the  notion  of'  loyalty  to  an  ideological  cause  -and  liencc  to  a 
superpower-  was  the  main  identifier  of  a  country's  regirne  rather  than  its 
hunian  rights  records  or  economic  achievement  or  income  distribution  in  that 
country.  A  change  in  tile  world  order,  specifically  the  end  of  the  bipolar  era 
a  shill  towards  a  rilulti-polar  system  that  we  now  experience.  has 
some  and 
resonance  in  history.  For  instance.  the  cbllapse  of  tile  European  based  balance- 
or-power  system  with  the  United  Kingdom  performing  the  role  of  tile  keei)el-  q1' 
h.  alance  and  the  rise  ol'a  inulti-centric  system  in  the  interwar  period,  and  the 
rise  ol'the  bipolar  system  allcr  World  War'll,  caused  changes  in  the  perception 
and  in  the  priorities  in  tile  perception  of  regimes.  Therefore.  as  the  rules  of 
ii,  iternational  politics  change,  a  once  vital  ally  may  lose  -its  status  to  be 
perceived  as  a  harsh.  oppressive  and  unworthy  dictatorship  that  has  to  be 
isolated  in  order  to  enforce  global  aernocratisation.  Thus,  one  may  talk  of 217 
cycles.  but  only  provided  that  tile  cycles  are  related  with  the  global  political 
system  changes  and  not  related  to  an  invisible  hand  which  conducts  tile 
beginning  and  end  ofwaves  of  dernocratisation  because  the  World  feels  the 
need  Im  democracy.  That  is  to  say  that  a  cyclical  change  environment 
concerning  all  the  world  political  structure  may  be  proposed,  however  this 
wotild  only  be  11ormulated  as  "whenever  a  change  in  the  world  order  occurs, 
states  and  other  political  actors  react  to  this  change  by  adapting  to  tile 
necessities  of  the  new  ordcr".  A  very  long  and  vague  cyclical  occurrence  this 
may  be.  it  also  is  tile  equivalent  of  the  physics  law  "every  action  has  an  equal 
and  opposite  reaction'*.  Moreover,  tile  cyclical  dcrnocratisation  approach  is 
insLifficient  to  explain  why  anti-denlocratic  forces  develop  if  democracy  is 
considered  the  most  desirable  system. 
2.  Alliances  and  Cultural  Camps: 
From  this.  a  brief  second  point  may  be  made  claiming  that  while  East 
Furopean  people  depended  oil  tile  termination  of'  their  alliance  ties  with  tile 
stiperpo%%cr  that  controlled  them  to  denlocratisc.  tile  Latin  American 
denlocratisation  was  dictated  in  a  way  by  tile  superpower  which  manipulated 
them.  Although  tile  initial  steps  of  democratisation  came  from  the  Soviet 
administration  and  with  the  opposition  or  ,  lost  leaders  of  East  European 
countrics.  the  main  drive  was  from  below  and  tile  end  of  tile  Soviet  control 
marked  a  way  orindependence  for  the  East  Europeans.  lience  while  tile  end  of 
tile  Soviet  control  meant  a  rebirth  for  tile  East  European  countries,  tile  end  or 
tile  Soviet  threat  meant  tile  fall  of  their  regimes  for  the  Latin  American 
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A  third  difTerence  is  that  the  Latin  Americans  always  associated  themselves 
with  the  Wcstern-Capitalist  culture.  Thercibre,  even  the  most  oppressive 
re-inie  in  Latin  America  sought  ties  with  the  Western  world  and  emphasised  L- 
its  place  in  the  Western  civilisation  while  tile  West,  in  general,  embraced  such 
regimes  as  one  of*  its  variations.  On  tile  other  hand.  the  East  Europeans  were 
caught  in  in  experiment  of'  alternative  to  that  mode  at  least  in  terms  of 
economies  and  politics.  The  ideological  dill'crcnccs  meant  a  total  alienation 
1'rom  the  values  and  norms  of  the  Western  culture  and  indoctrination  or  the 
Marxist-Leninist  alternativcs  to  the  Wcstcrn  system.  Hence,  the  Eastern  Bloc 
played  the  role  ol'an  alternative  to  the  Western  world  and  was  perceived  as  a 
dillIerent  entity  by  the  West.  Moreover,  as  Laurence  Whitehead  points  out,  tile 
East  Furopean  case  or  late  1980s  may  be  likened  rather  to  the  dccolonisatioil 
process  or  Africa  and  Asia  in  1960s  than  Latin  America.  as  East  Europeans 
are.  in  a  way,  struggling  to  rind  their  national  identities  and  their  long- 
suppressed  sovereignties  169. 
It  is  Ilor  this  reason  that  the  forces  competing  for  power  differs  in  these 
countries.  Political  lille  in  most  authoritarian  Latin  American  countries  is  based 
on  (lie  competing  local  notables  these  be  great  land-owners,  coffee  or  drug 
barons.  or  high-rank  military  officials.  The  main  aim  of  a  party  is  to  prevent 
the  others  to  seize  power.  Therdore,  if'one  of'  these  traditional  elite  canic  to 
power.  the  main  aini  would  be  to  maintain  power  as  long  as  feasible.  That 
means  the  use  or  such  methods  as  cheating  in  elections,  dictatorship  without 
elections.  suppression  ol'other  powerful  people  and  tile  like.  The  opposition 
11"Laurence  Whitehead,  'East-Central  Europe  in  Comparative  Perspective,  in  Geoffrey  Pridham,  Eric 
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consisted  of  other  bidders  flor  power.  However.  in  the  Eastern  Europe,  the 
regime  was  ideologically  solid  and  well-defined  and  the  only  grouping  was 
between  tile  Communist  Party  and  its  members  and  the  others.  Thus,  there  is  a 
very  definite  difference  between  the  origins  of  the  two  transitions  and  nature 
and  meaning  orthe  change. 
3.  Ideology: 
ILICO]Ogý'  plays  I  crucial  role  in  both  political  and  economic  parts  of  tile 
system.  To  begin  with.  the  definition  of  tile  needs  of  the  systern  is  made 
according  to  the  iLlcological  choices.  Tile  Socialist  system  was  based  oil  the 
dominance  orthe  ideology.  That  meant  that  the  East  European  countries  were 
to  have  a  centralised  bureaucracy  and  a  central  ly-planned  econonly. 
The  bureaucracy  in  the  Eastcrn  Bloc  were  part  of  an  intrinsic  relationship  with 
(lie  ('0111111LItliSt  Party.  Under  tile  COIllIllLIIliSt  theory,  the  Communist  Party  held 
the  vatiguard  role  to  lead  tile  nation  to  tile  final  stage  of  Communism.  The 
Party  controls  (lie  whole  state  mcchanism  as  it  has  a  Supposed  leadership  role. 
ThcrOlore.  the  key  positions  of  tile  bureaucratic  mechan  i  sill,  if  not  all  tile 
bureaucraey.  were  in  the  hands  or  tile  Party  apparatchiks.  At  the  end,  this 
relationship  C(lUated  tile  concept  of  the  'state'  with  the  concept  or  tile  'Party', 
eliminating  the  possibility  that  any  ideologically  unsound  practice  might  be 
carried  out.  I  lence,  ideological  needs  carne  berore  the  pragniatic  necessities.  In 
tile  POSt-COMITILIlliSt  era.  therefore,  privatisation  policies  and  tile  liberalisation 
in  tile  economy  in  general  "in  Eastern  Europe  means  tile  creation  of*  a  new 
class.  a  bourgeoisie 
... 
[creation  of  which]  is  made  morc.  probleniatic  in  tile 
contemporary  context,  wherein  an  internationalised  economy  may  pre-empt  tile 
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development  or  an  indigenous  alliance  or  analogous  function"170.  Thercrore, 
there  is  tile  problem  ol'a  structural  change  in  the  economy  in  Eastern  Europe 
%%hieh  is  peculiar  to  the  relationship  created  during  the  Communist  rule 
between  the  State  and  the  other  segments  or  the  society  in  relation  to 
CCO11011lics. 
On  the  other  liand.  as  flenrique  Cardoso  has  noted,  "dissinlilarities  in  Latin 
Anicrican  political  regimes  and  other  variables  should  not  obscure  the  fact  that 
all  these  countries.  with  the  exception  or  Cuba,  are  capitalist  and  occupy  a 
subordinate  position  in  the  international  cconomic  orderl7l.  This  means  that 
they  were  part  of'  the  (quasi-)  liberal  econornic  system  of  the  West  with  the 
occasional  protective  regulation  or  two.  while  their  political  system  was 
incompatible  with  liberal  democracy's  requirements.  In  economic  terms,  cost- 
ellIcctiveness  was  considercd  to  be  more  important  than  ideological 
motivation.  Consequently,  the  economic  and  bureaucratic  mechanisms  or  the 
Latin  American  reginics  were  administered  by  technocrats.  The  similarity  of 
(lie  technocrats  to  (lie  apparatchiks  is  that  they  both  put  emphasis  on  planning 
and  they  both  are  appointed.  Apart  from  these  two  points,  however, 
technocrats  are  entirely  dirferent  in  performance  from  their  socialist 
counterparts  as  they  ý  elevate  economic  over  political  criteria,  are  less 
nationalistic  (read  ideological-oricnted  instead  or  nationalistic  if  you  wish) 
then  1)Ojilicialls172,  and  are  much  more  pragmatic  in  terms  of  ainling  at 
170  1  larvey  11.  Feigenbaum  and  Jeffi-ey  R.  I-Icnig,  'Privatization  and  Democracy',  Governmice:  An 
Lý 
111fernoliomilJourfull  qfpoficy  cm(lAthniiiistralion,  vol.  6,  no.  3  (pp.  438  -453).  1993,  p.  439. 
171  AkJandro  Portes.  Tatin  American  Class  Structures',  Latin  American  Research  Review,  vol.  20.  no. 
3 i  (pp.  7-  39),  1995.  p.  7. 
172juati  D.  Landau.  -rcchnotrats  and  Mexico's  Political  Elite'.  Polilictil  Science  Qu(irterty,  vol.  I  11 
(2).  Summcr  1996  (pp.  295-322),  p.  29.6. 221 
providing  solutions  to  a  problem.  Therefore,  while  Mexico,  Argentina  or  Chile 
had  seen  no  improvement  in  political  issues  including  human  rights  their 
economics  dc%,  cloped  to  cope  with  the  changes  in  industry.  The  best  example 
ol'the  ecominic  success  of  the  technocrats  may  be  shown  in  Pinoclict's  Chile 
%Nhere  the  dictator  employed  the  so-called  Thicago  Boys,  '  a  group  of 
economists  From  the  University  of  Chicago  Nvho  favoured  limited  state 
intervention  to  economy  and  libcralisation  of  the  political  system  by 
privalisation  and  limitation  of  state  control  over  fi-ce  trade,  to  cure  tile 
economy  %%hile  not  attempting  to  liberalise  the  political  scene  at  all. 
4.  The  Economic  Factor: 
The  lornier  members  ol*the  Eastern  Bloc  are  not  only  experiencing  a  transition 
to  liberal.  competitive  political  systern,  but  they  are  also  undergoing  a  process  4-- 
of'  econonlic  liberalisation  which  has  ncver  been  a  problem  in  aUthoritarian 
reginies  as  they  were  part  of  the  capitalist  world.  Despite  the  fact  that  through 
a  superlicial  analysis.  both  transitory  reginic  types  tilay  seem  to  suiller  from  the 
same  disruptions  in  the  form  of  problems  of  dcbt,  innation  and  structural 
Ijustment  to  domestic  and  international  liberalisation,  the  problems  of  , a( 
Fastern  Flurope  are  inuch  more  proround.  As  hidy  Batt  observcs; 
"The  East  E,  uropean  economics  were  not  merely  over- 
regulated  with  an  overblown  state  sector.  but  flully  state- 
dominated  econonlics.  lacking  a  developed  private  sector  and 
even  the  most  basic  institutions  or  a  market  economy. 
Moreover.  they  were  geared  overwhelmingly  to  an 
international  trading  bloc  -tile  CMEA-  which  operated  rorm 
the  -v%,  orld  econom)  ......  and  which  has  now  collapsed.  Tile 
scale  or  tile  task  of'  economic  transl'ormation  and  structural 
reorientation  is  unprecedented,  and  likely  to  take  much  longer 
than  initially  expected.  The  social  costs  will,  bc  high,  and 222 
I)OIILII,  11'  confidence  in  the  goal  of  a  markct  cconorny  cannot 
lie  taken  lor  granted.  "  173 
Therellore,  I-astern  Europe  undergoes  a  dirrerent  dimension  of  change  not 
experienced  by  Latin  AniericaM.  The  peculiarity  of  tile  challenge  created  by 
the  ccononiic  transf'orniation  makes  the  East  European  case  unlike  any  other 
transition.  as  Latin  American.  South  East  Asian,  Southern  European 
ccononfles  were  always  incorporated  within  the  Capitalist  mode  or  production. 
perhaps  "ith  tile  exception  orthe  transition  rroni  the  pre-Capitalist  ccononlic 
relationships  to  Capitalism  in  tile  transition  from  the  Ottoman  Empire  to  tile 
. states  such  as  Turkey.  Albania  and  Bulgaria  after  the  first  World  War  and  tile 
transition  orthe  pre-Capitalist  relationships  in  the  East  European  countries  to 
(lie  Socialist  nlodc  or  production  after  the  Second  World  War.  However,  tile 
transition  From  the  Socialist  system  to  the  Capitalist  systern  has  no  precedents 
in  history.  thus.  it  is  unique  and  constitutes  a  unique  challenge  to  tile  East 
FLiropcan  leadership  cadres. 
5.  Political  Reform: 
The  question  of'  political  rerornis  is  another  -source  ordifference  between  the 
transitory  nlovcnients  in  the  two  regions.  Similar  to  the  case  of  econornic 
rellonns.  political  rerbrins  are  dictated  1roni  tile  top  in  authoritarian  regimes  or 
173judv  Ilatl.  --l-Ile  International  Dimensions  of'  Democratisation  in  Czechoslovakia  and  Hungary'  in 
Geoffre),  Pridliam  et  al.  (1-d.  s),  pj).  cit.,  p.  17  1. 
17.1  Allila  Agh  claims  that  there  are  four  different  scenarios  of  development  in  the  European  integration 
process  of'  the  Fast  European  countries  which  are  Gernianisation  (EU  integration  with  great  German 
inllucnýe  over  aie  countries  or  thc-  region).  Turkisation  (partial  integration  limited  to  security  issues), 
Yu,  goslaviNation  (no  integration  at  all),  and  Europcanisation  (rull-scale  integration).  What  Agh  not  too 
correctly  rel'ers  to  as  Turkisation  is  mform-dictatorship  and  is  actually  a  mirror-imag  of'  the  Latin 
American  model  discussed  here.  Chile  would  be  a  rar  better  example  for  that  model,  but  Agh,  staying  in 
the  European  context.  chose"rurkcy.  11*1'tirkisation  is  red  as  Latin  Arnericanisation,  the  argument  makes 
more  sense  an([  the  discussion  in  this  study  becomes  clearer.  To  see  Agh's  comments,  see  his  article 
litICLI  'I'lle  11,11-adows  olýTransition:  The  External  and  Internal  Overload  of  dic  Transition  Process,  '  esp. 
pp.  21-30.  iii  Terq\1  Cox  and  Andy  Furlong  (cd.  s).  I  lun-gary:  Tie-Politics  of  Transition,  London, 
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Latin  America,  where,  Terry  Lynn  Karl  argues.  transition  from  above  is  the 
predominant  case.  She  points  to  the  fact  that  whenever  there  has  been  a 
transition  1rom  below.  it  did  not  lead  to  stable  democracy  as  the  members  of 
the  traditional  clite  responded  with  subversive  opposition175.  The  pattern  of 
transition  1rom  above  may  be  gcneraliscd  in  Southcrii  Europe  as  well  including 
POIALIý1,11.  Spain.  Turkey  in  addition  to  the  Latin  American  countries  such  as 
Chile.  F.  cuador.  Brazil,  Mexico,  Guatemala,  El  Salvador.  Argentina  and 
perl,  176.  The  general  pattern  in  such  countries  is  that  tile  ruling  authoritarian 
regime,  either  due  to  external  pressures  or  the  domestic  pressure  stemming 
('rom  opposing  traditional  elite.  decides  to  move  away  from  the  oil-ice  and 
arranges  multi-party  c1cctions  which  would  result  in  a  period  of  democracy. 
I  lo%v  strong  popular  discontent  may  be.  regime  change  is  nearly  always 
orchestrated  Crom  the  top  and  necessitates  pressure  firom  abroad  or  from  the 
strong  members  ofthe  opposing  clite. 
I  lowever.  in  Eastern  Europe,  despite  the  flact  that  the  Gorbachev  reforms  came 
from  (lie  top  and  ignited  tile  whole  process  of  dismembeniient,  in  most  cases, 
except  Im  Bulgarial77.  the  change  c  anie  from  below.  The  cliange  that  was 
floreseen  by  Moscow  was  surpassed  by  the  East  Europeans  not  bccause  tlicir 
I 
rulers  were  willing  to  introducc  drastic  changes.  but  because  there;  was  an 
enormous  pressure  from  below  for  change  as  the  Soviet  military  presence  was 
lifted  and  the  Sinalra  Docti-ine  which  allowed  individual  countries  to  chose 
,  ell.  I)CIlloCracy  and  Democratization,  Boulder,  Colorado:  Westview  Press,  1993,  pp. 
44-45.  quoling  1rom  T.  Lynn  Karl,  'Dilenimas  of  Democratization  in  Latin  Amcrica'.  Com1wralive 
Polilit  -. v,  vO  1.2  3(  1).  1990.  (  pp.  1-2  1  ),  p.  8. 
176/bij.  1).  45. 224 
their  own  political  and  econornic  programmes  replaced  the  Bmzhnev  Docit-ine 
which  floresaw  a  Warsaw  Pact  intervention  should  onc  bloc  country  attcmpt  to 
change  its  political  orientation.  The  mass  defections  from  the  German 
DCIIlOCI'-lIiC  RCl)Ublic.  tile  Solidarity  movement  in  Poland,  the  activities  ofthe 
opposition  groups  such  as  FIDESz  in  Hungary,  the  Rumanian  revolution 
combined  with  a  coup.  constitute  evidence  that  the  change  was  frorn  below 
and  irreversibly  so.  'file  rise  or  nationalism  and  bigotry  in  tile  region  after  tile 
end  or  the  Communist  rule  Show-,  tile  popular  involvement  in  the  process  of 
Change. 
Fhe  change  From  below,  that  is  change  as  a  result  of  the  popular  will  is  the  key 
dil'Ilercnce  between  tile  two  regime  transitions.  As  there  would  be  no  likely 
local  notables  to  prcvent  a  Full  democratisation,  the  possibility  of  success  in 
the  Fast  European  transition  looks  far  better  than  the  Latin  Amedean 
transitions  in  such  countries  like  Colombia  or  El  Salvador.  I  lowcver.  the  East 
I'Mropean  transition  was  not  as  smoothly  realised  as  in  Costa  Rica  or  in 
Venczuela  either.  Unlike  these  countries,  tile  Fast  European  states  has  to 
SLII*I'er  1rom  the  perils  ol'cconoinic  transition  resulting  in  unemployment,  lower 
purchasing  power.  higher  inflation'and  higher  prices.  concepts  East  Europeans 
who  were  not  LISed  to  until  the  cild  of  1980s.  I 
Despite  the  flact  that  since  mid-1970s  there  is  a  global  inclination  towards 
liberal  democracy.  it  may  be  argued  that  this  inclination  shows  itseir  in 
difTerent  conditions  under  dillerent  circumstances.  That  there  are  coninion 
points  between  the  East  European  and  Latin  American,  not  to  mention  South 
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European.  transitions  to  democracy,  the  similarities  may  be  seen  as  similar 
responses  to  tile  same  changes  created  by  tile  same  driving  lorces. 
I  lowevcr.  to  overemphasise  the  similarities  overlooking  tile  differences  of  the 
two  regions  undergoing  processes  of  democratisation  would  result  in  the 
thought  that  the  two  regions  underwent  the  same  type  of  change.  From,  that  L- 
point.  one  may  argue  tilat,  tlicse  two  are  similar  in  social  structure.  economic 
and  political  background  and  that  authoritarian  and  totalitarian  regimes  are 
alike.  which  they  are  not.  One  may  not  link  the  Latin  American  and  East 
Furopean  practiccs  ordenlocratisation  oil  a  one-to-one  basis. 
Nevcrtlicicss.  as  they  both  arc  the  product  of  tile  same  ma  or  change  in  j 
international  political  structure,  namely  the  end  of  tile  Bipolar  World  Order, 
thcre  arc  and  will  indeed  be  similarities  between  the  two  processes  of 
transition.  I  lowever.  to  create  imaginary  ties.  theorising  upon  waves  of 
democracy  and  lience  creating  intangible  rival  Vorces  of'  pro  and  anti- 
dcmocracy  helps  only  to  blur  one's  mind.  One  has  to  bear  in  mind  that  liberal 
democracy.  considered  by  many  as  tile  best  way  or  govertinicnt  in  tile 
Capitalist  mode  orproduction,  nlay  prove  to  be  unritting  for  sonic  societies  at 
any  stage  ortheir  political  and  social  development.  Consequently,  democracy 
may  be  inscrtcd  to  and  be  rejected  by  a  social  structure  which  is  unwilling  to 
accept  its  conditions  or  which  believes  as  a  whole  that  another  type  of' 
government  is  preferable.  There  is,  however,  no  ground  to  talk  about 
democratisation  %,,  -avcs.  although  the  concept  facilitates  tile  perception  As  this 
I'acilitating  effect  in  perception  oversimplifies  tile  situation.  One  has  to  bear  in 
mind  that  -there  are  no  general  izations  that  are  not  historically  tinic  bound, 
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because  there  are  no  systems  and  no  structures  that  are  unchanging"  178,  hence 
there  are  no  real  models  nor  similar  or  dissimilar  routes  to  follow  to  reach  an 
end  as  there  is  no  definitive,  absolute  end.  Therefore,  it  can  be  said  that  the 
transition  From  tile  Bipolar  World  System  to  a  Diffuse  World  System  is  the  key 
reason  in  the  Call  or  dictatorships  and  socialist  regimes  and  in  the  rise  or 
democracy. 
Yet.  Nfliatever  the  reason  for  the  change  in  the  attitudcs  towards  democracy, 
there  is  a  change  in  flavour  of  dernocratisation  and  o1justification  of  a  reginic 
in  the  donicstic  scale  rather  than  international  scale.  This  very  inclination  that 
is  in  ascent  from  the  late  1980s  onwards  created  a  parallel  rise  in  importance 
I*or  the  concept  of  legitimacy  of  a  regime  and  of  a  political  system,  issues 
suppressed  during  the  Cold  War  era  despite  their  vital  importance. 
One  may  conclude  that  the  transformations  had  common  characteristics  as 
well  as  peculiarities.  Moreover,  even  in  tile  regional  scale  there  are  difrerences 
11-0111  a  Country  to  another  in  terms  of  methods  of  transition,  the  duration  of  dic 
transition  period,  the  speed  or  the  institutionalisation  process  and  the 
adaptation  ()I'  Society  to  tile  llcw  political  and  economic  order.  Therefore,  the 
Fast  I"Lli-Ollean  trans  lo  rniat  ion  is  different  froill  the  Latin  American 
transilorniation.  Furthermore,  the  Hungarian  transformation  by  itsell'  iý  to  be 
,  treated  as  a  unique  ease  within  the  general  context  of  tile  East  European 
political  transformation.  I'lic  strLICturc  of  tile  parliament,  tile  formation, 
representation,  and  *  membership  characteristics  of  political  parties, 
organisation  of'  civil  society  agencies  differ  from  tile  rest  of  East  European 
178  1111111,11,  tlel  Wallers 
.  tein.  I  lie  Capililist  World  EcononLy,  Cambridge  University  Press,  Cambridge: 
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countries  which  went  through  similar  political  changes.  These  characteristics 
Ol'the  I  lungarian  systern  will  be  discussed  below.  Tile  conclusion  concerning 
the  pattern  ordeniocratisation  processes  is  that  each  system  operates  as  part  of 
all  *open  system'  so  that  transformation  may  begin  but  then  reacts  to  tile 
conditions  and  needs  or  its  'closed  system'  created  by  tile  country's  internal 
political.  social.  and  economic  background. 
Vill.  THE  STRUCTURAL  CHANGES 
A.  The  Legislature  and  the  Political  Parties: 
The  first  in,  ýIor  cliange  brought  along  by  the  new  system  was  the  requisite  of 
holding  Free,  inulti-party  and  multi-candidate  elections  oil  a  hybrid  of  the  PR 
and  the  inaJoritarian  electoral  systems.  However,  tile  change  in  the  electoral 
sysicin.  following  the  pattern  proposed  by  Rokkan,  is  merely  tile  introduction 
of'  tile  third  step  towards  deillocratisation,  that  is,  the  mohilisation  of  masses 
into  indirect  participation  in  the  political  decision-rilaking  process.  'rlle 
electoral  process.  thcreflore,  is  only  a  means  and  not  the  end,  ill  politicising 
society.  The  main  institutions  ill  politicising  society  into  a  democratic  structure 
are  (lie  parliainent  and  tile  political  parties.  With  tile  activities  of  these  two 
which  florni  the  legislative  and  executive  branches  of  the  state  structure,  and 
with  the  flormation  and  functioning  of  nation-wide  political  ,  party 
organisations.  the  old  political  system  would  be  altered  to  suit  tile  necessities 
or  tile  lie%%,  political  order.  Therefore,  tile  first  elections  and  the  parliament 
%%hich  %%as  to  be  flornied  upon  their  results,  have  a  vital  role  in  the  shaping  or 
the  liberal  democratic  system  in  a  transitory  society. 
The  1990  elections,  ill  this  context,  have  two  important  functions:  First,  they 
have  set  the  fornitila  for  tile  later  elections  and  proved  that  tile  electoral  system 228 
vvhich  was  introduced  in  tile  National  Roundtable  discussions  was  working 
ell'iciently.  Secondly,  the  1990  elections  have  pinpointed  to  tile  six  major 
political  parties  Nvhich  have  become  members  of  parliament  from  within  tile 
pool  or  thirteen  political  parties  which  represented  97%  of  all  candidates.  This 
process  or  reduction  in  the  number  of  the  major  political  parties  enabled  the 
I  lungarian  political  system  to  run  ill  a  far  less  fractured  manner  ill  comparison 
to  other  post-co  ill  rn  till  i  st  societies,  such  as  tile  Russian  rederation  or  Poland, 
which  are  plagued  by  a  very  large  pool  or  political  parties. 
Political  pat-ties  represented  in  tile  parliament  were  also  tile  recipients  of  tile 
majority  or  all  votes.  The  representation  of  these  parties  in  the  parliament  led 
to  a  systemic  stability  which  fortificd  the  role  of  tile  parliament  and  eased  tile 
opcration  of'  the  new  political  order.  As  both  the  parliament  and  tile  political 
parties  are  the  key  icons  of'  the  transitory  period.  tile  clarity  in  the  Formation 
and  identification  ol'these  two  major  political  institutional  Crarneworks  enabled 
tile  transition  to  take  place  more  smoothly  and  lience  enabled  tile  strengthening 
ol*  the  legal  legitimacy  of  the  state  and  or  the  new  political  order  vis-A-vis  tile 
public  Opinion. 
B.  Parliamentarisation: 
1.  The  New  Parliaments  of  Eastern  Europe: 
At  tile  I)eginning  ofthe  post-communist  era  the  parliament  crnergcd  as  the  only 
easily  Formed  and  the  most  easily  accessible  icon  of  the  new  political  order. 
Therelbre.  tile  role  of  parliament  has  become  far  more  important  and  vital 
than  it  usually  is  in  tile  established  liberal  democracies.  As  tile  parliament  as  all 
institution  was  associated.  within  the  transitory  period,  with  tile  rnýjor  tasks  of 
rest  rLICtUri  ng  the  new  political  order,  aniending,  or  replacing  the  communist 229 
CODStiftition  and  other  laws,  creating  an  area  or  discussion  for  different 
political  %,  ic%v,  -,  voiced  by  the  newly  formed  political  parties'  representatives, 
and  with  florming  and  inspecting  tile  functions  of  the  executive  branch.  it  has 
liccome  the  focus  or  attention  for  the  general  public  in  all  post-coninlunist 
societies  during  latel980s  and  early  1990s.  Parliament  was  now  seen  to 
11inction  in  a  democratic  manner.  It  managed  to  refashion  itself  as  an  important 
part  of'  the  new  political  system  -as  distinct  from  its  role  under  communism-. 
This  gave  it  extremely  high  ratings  in  the  mind  or  uie  Hungarian  pUblic.  179 
Attila  Agh  rellers  to  the  rise  of  importance  in  tile  role  or  and  the  public 
expectation  Ilrom  the  parliamcnt  as  ovei-l)cii-litiiiici?  lai-i.  v(ition. 
The  main  reason  Im  tile  intensity  of  the  expectations  and  tile  burden  of  the 
tasks  held  by  the  newly-fornied  parliaments  in  Eastern  Europe  in  general  and 
in  I  fungary  in  particular  Avas  the  fact  that  tile  newly-flonned  parliaments  ol'the 
region  have  to  perl'orm  (lie  multiple  task  of  conslituent  parliament  and  the 
tasks  ol'a  normal  legislalive  organ  at  the  same  time.  Since  few,  irany,  or  the 
members  having  served  in  democratically  elected  bodies,  and  with  few,  if  any, 
practices  and  internal  structures  of  the  pre-revolutionary  era  suitable  for  use  in 
the  new  system,  the  newly-lormcd  parliaments  are  expected  to  form  a 
gox-crnment.  inspect  its  functions,  create  and  adopt  tile  necessary  laws,  bý-Iaws 
and  regulations.  and  crcatc  a  new  working  environnicilt  in  which  these  could 
takc  place. 
171)  JjIllos  Siln,,  n  tq'sel-ves  , 
that  (lie  parliament  was  ranked  second  highest  in  public  opinion  in  1989  in 
terim  ofrespect.  while  it  ý%ent  down  to  (lie  fillh  position  out  of  six  in  1992  while  the  army  which  was 
ranked  third  in  1989  went  tip  to  the  first  spot.  Sce  Sinion's  Fieldniamlial's  Baton  and  Pence.  Budapest: 
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2.  The  Clash  of  the  Parliament's  Roles: 
Fach  country  in  the  East  E-uropean  region  adopted  a  difrcrent  approach  to  the 
issue  of  this  multi-task  procedure  of  being  both  the  active  legislature  and  a 
constituent  parlianictit.  In  Bulgaria,  the  first  post-communist  clections  were  for 
a  Grand  National  Assembly.  tile  task  of  which  would  be  to  compose  a  new 
constitution.  In  Poland.  tile  parliament  held  the  duty  of  amending  thc 
constitution  and  the  changes  wcre  inadc  first  throug  1  the  negotiations  betwcen 
L-1 
the  Communist  Party  and  the  SolidaritY  movement  First  in  1989,  then  in  1992, 
%khen  Solidarity's  so-called  Little  Constitution  formed  the  basis  of  a 
democratic  constitution.  The  Czech  and  Slovak  republics  had  their  own 
amended  constitutions  allcr  tile  dissolution  of'  tile  Czcclioslovakia  while 
Rumania  adopted  a  brand-new  constitution  in  1993180.  In  I  lungary,  the  1949 
Stalinist  constitution  was  anicnded  but  not  replaced. 
The  main  reason  flor  Ilic  use  or  flic  1949  constitution  with  amendments  was 
that  in  the  first  post-coninlunist  Hungarian  parliament,  changes  in  tile 
constitution  required  a  two-thirds  majority.  Due  to  the  discord  arnong  tile 
political  partics  oil  the  constitutional  issues,  the  two-third  majority  could  not 
be  reached.  As  a  result,  tile  constitutional  changes  ground  to  a  halt.  Intra- 
parliamentary  conflict  has  harmed  Hungarian  political  process  more  Strongly 
than  it  harmed  other  East  European  political  orders  due  to  tile  ract  that  it  was 
I  lungary  that  made  the  transition  based  on  political  consensus  and  mutual 
compronlisel8l.  The'  llailurc  of  the  s,  ystern  of  compromise  and  consensus 
I"  David  N1.  Olson,  Democratic  Legislative  Institutions:  A  Comparative  Vie  , 
Armonk.  New  York: 
M.  E.  Sharpe.  1994,  p.  127. 
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Tectivengms  und  Agencb  Concenit  1,41  Attila  Agh.  Biimlýv  Road  to  Europetinisation:  Policy  Ej  -olion  in 
the  llwýt:  urhm  Legislation  (1990-1993)  in  A.  Agh  (d),  The  Emergence  or  pst  Central  European 
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reSUlted  in  the  Hungarian  parliament's  disability  to  perfomi  its  duties  as  a 
constituent  asscinbly  and  caused  tile  decline  in  popular  trust  in  the  parliament. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  Nvould  be  correct  to  assume  that  the  main  function  of  a 
parliament  is  not  to  prepare  a  constitution  but  to  legislate  necessary  laws  and 
to  amend  laws  previously  enacted.  In  addition,  tile  image  of  the  parliament  as  a 
Icgislative  organ  has  a  prcýedencc  over  its  role  as  a  constituent  assembly  with 
regards  to  public  needs  and  expectations.  Therclbre,  public  loss  of  trust 
towards  the  parliament  may  not  be  associated  only  with  tile  failure  or  reaching 
11  COnStitUtional  consensus  among  the  political  parties.  The  failure  to  solve 
socio-ccononlic  problems  through  new  legisIdtion  or  by  change  of  government 
through  clectoral  process  have  more  to  do  with  the  declinc  in  the  public 
interest  and  ti-LISt  ror  (lie  parliament  than  its  failure  to  act  in  unison  to  introduce 
a  new  constitution.  When  tile  two  functions  ofthe  parliament  as  a  constitution- 
making  body  and  as  a  representative  assembly  which  enacts  laws  and 
regulations,  the  latter  role,  is  the  one  more  associated  with  the  concept  of 
parliament  in  public  mind.  as  the  former  has  a  temporary  life  expectancy,  thus 
a  clash  aniongst  the  roles  carried  out  by  the  parliament  would  either  be 
artificial  or  short-lived. 
3.  The  Hungarian  Parliamentary  Structure: 
The  Parliament  is  therefore.  in  essence,  a  representative  body  -and  it  is 
perceived  as  such  in  tile  Hungarian  society  since  tile  first  post-communist 
parliamenCs  flonnation  through  two-  round  clections  in  1990.  The  constituency 
structure  ol'the  country  defining  the  ternis'of'eligibility  to  picnibership  or  the 
Parliament  is  regulated  by  Act  34  (1989)  which  dictates  a  mixed  constituency 
system.  Of  the  total  386  seats.  176  are  decided  in  individual  constituency i1 
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elections,  15'.  )  oil  thc  basis  or  20  district  lists  (county  and  municipal),  and  58 
seats  on  the  basis  or  national  usts.  'nis  dual  electoral  systern  allows  the  voter 
to  use  one  vote  to  support  the  desired  candidate  in  the  individual  constituency, 
and  secondly.  to  support  a  party  list. 
This  constituency  representation  systcrn  was  designed  during  the  1989 
ROLIII(11,11)IC  as  a  compromise  between  the  wishes  ofthe  sides,  and  hence,  is 
complicated.  Parties  which  claimed  to  be  the  descendants  or  the  pre-1949 
period.  such  as  the  Sniallholders  Party  argued  in  tile  Government-Opposition 
Roundtable  negotiation  proccss  or  August  1989  that  a  list  system  should  bc 
used  in  the  elections  as  the  one  used  prior  to  the  Communist  take-over  or  the 
COUntry.  Other  parties  disagreed  claiming  that  regional  liabilities  should  be 
Cavoured  as  wc1l  as  stable  majorities  should  be  sought.  As  a  result  of  these 
discussions.  I  lungarian  electoral  system  has  three  different  methods  to  Fill  the 
M6  seats  ol'  tile  Parliament.  The  number  of  tile  parliamentary  scats  decided  by 
each  of  tile  three  methods  and  the  way  these  three  methods  work  are  described 
by  John  F  itniorris  as  l'ollows: 
"a)  176  single  member  district  (SMD)  seats  (32  in 
Budapest).  based  oil  subdivision  of  the  counties  and  the 
c,  apital.  In  these.  a  candidate  is  elected  if  lie  obtains  50  per 
cent  plus  one  or  the  votes  cast  on  tile  first  ballot.  This  is  rare. 
In  1994  only  two  MIN  (both  MSzP)  were  elected  oil  tile  first 
ballot.  against  five  in  1990.  In  the  second  ballot,  held  two 
Nvecks  later.  a  plurality  (first  past  the  post)  applies.  The  top 
three  candidates  and  any  others  with  at  least  15  per  cent  of  the 
first  ballot  vote  can  remain  in  the  field. 
b)  152  seats  are  allocated  to  regional  lists  in  each  county  and 
the  capital.  Each  area  has  a  seat  allocation  corresponding  to 
its  j)OjILIIatiOII.  Voters  have  ...  a  second  list  vote.  There  is  a 
five  perectit  threshold  for  obtaining  seats  in  this  category, 
though  of'  course  even  smaller  parties  can  elect  MPs  in  the 
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0  58  (plus  any  unallocated  regional  scats)  form  a  national 
pool.  These  are  allocated  on  the  basis  of  residual  votes  from 
the  snid's  and  regional  lists.  The  threshold  applies  here  too. 
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In  the  individual  constituencies,  a  prospective  candidate  requires  tile  support  of' 
-it  least  750  voters  to  appear  oil  tile  ballot.  Tile  acquisition  of  the  required  750 
nomination  slips  is  at  the  same  time  a  precondition  for  the  subsequent  listing 
of'  (lie  parties.  District  lists  can  be  established  by  any  party  which  has 
candidates  in  at  least  one-quarter/at  least  two  or  tile  individual  constituencies 
in  that  district.  National  lists  call  for  at  least  seven  district  lists.  Entry  into 
Parliament  previously  required  at  least  four  percent  of  the  votes  cast  nationally, 
on  party  lists.  while  by  tile  tinie  of  tile  1994  general  election.  the  ceiling  was 
raised  to  five  percent. 
According  to  tile  law.  every  I  lungarian  citizen  of  18  years  of  age  is  eligible 
both  as  a  voter  and  as  a  candidate  flor  elective  office. 
4.  The  Members  of  Parliament: 
As  a  result  orthe  change  that  the  political  order  went  through,  the  structure  or 
the  parlianicilt  has  also  changed  in  terms  or  the  qualities  and  identity  or  the 
ncNv  members  of'  parliament  (MPs)  in  Ifungary.  Tile  new  Ws,  mostly 
inexpcricnced  in  parliamentary  political  life  under  tile  ancien  1-eginle,  were 
mostly  dissidents  undcr  the  old  regime  or  professionals  who  had  no  direct 
political  corincctions  until  tile  transformation.  Arpid  G6ncz,  a  renowned 
playwright.  echoing  the  political  ascent  of  the  neighbouring  Czechoslovakia's 
Vaclav  I  lavel,  was  elected  the  president  or  the  country  by  the  parliament. 
Many  other  people  indirectly  interested  in  political  life  but  whose  professional 
182  John  Filzillorris.  -The  II  ungarian  LIccl  ion  of  May  1994',  EleclortilSludies,  vol.  14  (1)  (pp.  77-81), 234 
interests  were  elsewhere  became  members  of  the  cabinet.  In  the  wake  or  the 
May  1990  cleetions.  the  first  non-communist  prernier  of  Hungary,  J6zscf 
Antall.  was  a  medical  historian,  the  Speaker  of  the  Hungarian  Parliament  was  a 
historian  ol'the  19"'  century  I  lungary,  tile  foreign  secretary  was  a  historian  of 
diplomacy  NNhile  a  medical  doctor  was  appointed  as  the  ministcr  responsible 
[Ior  healih  and  Nvelfarel  83.  None  or  these  key  positions  went  to  professional 
politicians.  because,  apart  1'roni  the  communist  apparatchiks  or  the  unciell 
i-eginte.  there  were  no  prollessional  politicians  in  the  Hungarian  society  at  that 
time. 
When  the  prollessional  distribution  of  the  new  membas  of  tile  Hungarian 
11,11-141111ent  is  analysed,  it  appears  that  tile  new  parliamentary  elite  of'  Hungary 
gathered  From  two  main  sources:  a)  Professionals  whose  political  preferences 
NVCrC  SUbSUIlICd  within  the  boundaries  or  their  professions  but  who  constituted 
the  centre  of'  any  newly-established  political  organisation  by  using  their 
nct%Norking  skills  and  political  knowledge,  and.  b)  local  notables,  people  who 
, 
lack  in  political  skill  and  knowledge  compared  to  the  first  group,  but  who  are 
respected  and  prestigious  in  their  local  community.  Akos  Rona-Tas  claims  that 
the  **kind  orlocal  prestige  that  elevated  the  elected  into  power  came  from  their 
position  of'  being  *above  politics'-184  during  tile  communist  era  and  this 
proved  short-lived  due  to  their  role  in  tile  new  political  order. 
The  1990  election  in  which  386  MPs  were  elected,  shows  that  having  a 
prollession  not  directly  related  with  politics  has  been  an  important  element  in 
I 
March  1995.  pp.  78-79. 
Akos  Rona-Tas.  "I  lie  Selected  and  the  Elected:  The  Making  or  the  New  Parliamentary  Elite  in 
C, 
I  lmi-arv.  *  East  EIII-olval,  1,,  )Iificv  (intlSociefles,  vol.  5(3),  Fall  1991  (pp.  357-393),  p.  357. 
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one's  election  to  the  parliament.  The  following  table  shows  the  proressional 
distribution  ol'the  first  post-communist  legislature  in  Hungary. 
As  can  be  see  firom  tile  table  below,  tile  struetural  division  of  the  Hungarian 
Parliament  in  the  aftermath  or  tiic,  first  non-communist  elections  shows  a  two- 
tier  division  between  the  two  groups  cited  above.  Also,  it  is  not  surprising  to 
sce  that  the  members  of  the  newly  rising  bourgeoisie  as  medical  doctors  or 
1,  m)-ers  are  represented  in  the  first  post-coninlunist  parliament  cvcn  though 
they  lack  the  necessary  political  cxperience. 
The  composition  ol'the  parliamentary  groups  by  mostly  inexperienccd  people 
has  C011tribUted  to  tile  election  results  in  1994  as  the  general  public  voted 
overwhelmingly  flor  the  IISP  which  incorporated  expcricliced  pre-transitioll  L-  . 
cadres  within  its  ranks.  me  1998  ciections,  oil  the  othcr  hand.  were  1101.1ght  in  a 
new  environment  where  all  the  participants  have  become  professional 
politicians  within  (lie  cight-year  period  of  experience  with  democracy. 
Table  4.6.  Professional  Distribution  of  the  1990-1994  Parliament's  MINIM: 
Proression  NIPs  Elected 
(%/386) 
General 
Grouping 
Agronomists,  Vets,  Co-op 
II  eads 
29  Local 
Notables 
Clergymen  11  L.  N. 
111I)sicians,  Dentists, 
Chemists 
40  L.  N. 
Teachers  32  L.  N. 
Social  Scientists  79  Politicised 
Professionals  (P.  P.  ) 
Laivvers  51  P.  P. 
Journalists  16  P.  P. 
Writers,  Linguists,  Critics  21  P.  P. 
Artists,  Actors,  Sportsmen  14  P.  P. 
Sales/Ilotel/Middle 
Managers 
5 
I 
Technocrats 
Engineers,  Architects,  IT 
people 
42 
I 
Technocrats 
I 
185  The  hil'ormation  on  the  numbas  is  from  ibid..  pp.  379-380.  cven  though  the  division  of  grOLIPS  is 
mine  and  dii'llerent  from  Rona-Tas'  clas.  sirication. 236 
Miners,  Farmers,  Industrial  17  Non  -  Proressionals 
Workers 
Small  Entrepreneurs  14  Non-  Professionals 
Clerics,  Accounfan(s,  Soldier  I  Low-rank,  white. 
I  collar  workers 
C.  The  Political  Parties: 
1.  Political  Parties  as  Institutions: 
Apart  1rom  the  parliament,  the  other  key  figure,  ir  not  the  protagonist  or  the 
whole  new  system,  are  the  political  parties.  As  an  institution,  tile  parliament  is, 
at  tile  cild  ol*  tile  day.  a  medium,  a  mean  to  achievc  liberal  denlocracy. 
I  lo%%ever.  the  major  agencies  which  are  involved  in  this  airn.  and  tile  main 
agencies  wilich  are  to  manipulate  tile  system,  arc  tile  political  parties.  In  due 
course.  i  I'  the  transition  is  to  succeed,  the  main  contributors  to  this  end  will  be 
the  political  parties  as  individual  actors.  and  not  a  gcneral  coticcpt  of' 
parliamentai3,  democracy  or  the  parliament  acting  as  ail  unibrella  institution. 
The  break-up  (if'  tile  old  reginic  has  seen  tile  emergence  or  re-cmagence  or 
political  parties  in  tile  I  hingarian  political  scene,  although  some  were  cithcr  tile 
spin-ol'I's  or  claimants  to  be  descendants  of  previous  political  parties.  The 
11LIngarian  Socialist  Party  (IISP),  for  instance.  was  formed  by  the  reform 
communists  ol'the  I  lungarian  Socialist  Workers'  Party.  while  the  conservative 
communists  joined  in  the  formation  of  tile  Agrarian  Alliance  (AA).  Many 
1-1,11-tiCS  ill  the  COLIntry.  in  I'act  claim  to  be  cithcr  direct  dcsccndants  or  devoted 
l'ollowers  of  the  pre-war  political  actors.  Of  these  the  Independent 
Sinallholders'  Party  (ISIIP)  clainis  to  be  the  same  party  which  was  founded  in 
the  inter-war  period  and  which  was  the  main  opposition  party.  It  was  tile  party 
ol'the  land-owning  peasantry  and  had  won  the  1945  e1cctions  in  which  it  stood 
-is  tile  1lon-communist.  party  in  tile  elections  receiving  57%  of  tile  votes.  It 237 
was  reformed  in  1988  by  its  previous  mirs.  'nie  1  lungarian  Social  Democratic 
Party  (I  ISDII).  being  one  of  the  pre-war  political  parties  which  merged  with 
the  Communists  in  late  1940s,  was  also  reborn  in  the  form  of  a  more  Left- 
I.  ibel.,  Il 
All  ol'this  lirst  group  ol'political  parties,  tlicn,  are  linked  with  a  past  institution 
or  claim  to  have  SLICII  links  through  tile  use  or  party  names  or  politicians  and 
political  ideas  associated  with  the  previously  existing  political  parties.  The 
main  reason  Im  the  claims  or  linkage  to  tile  past  political  entities  rises  From  the 
wish  to  make  use  or  politics  of  nostalgia,  that  is,  to  make  usc  or  tiie  popular 
memories  or  preViOLIS  political  parties.  By  creating  such  a  link,  it  marginalised 
party  organisation  rrom  the  communist  systern.  The  new  parties  hoped  to 
receive  a  larger  margin  of  votes  and  hoped  to  use  their  past  to  present 
themsek-cs  as  national  Ilungarian'  partics.  Therefore.  the  claim  to  llavc  a 
lcgilhwite  link  Nvith  a  previously  cxisting  political  organisation,  in  the  political 
cliaos  of'  I  lungary  in  late  1980s  and  early  1990s  would  cvcntually  give  an 
advantage  to  the  newly  flormed  organisations  Im  tlicse  would  be  perceived  as 
descendants  ol'  parties  that  are  placed  in  the  coninion  public  memory.  In  this 
case.  the  act  o  I'  abandoning  sorne  major  policies  has  no  great  effect  on  tile 
otes.  because  although  tile  names  or  tiie  old  political  parties  arc still  part  or 
the  common  memory.  after  four  dccades  of  Communist  rule,  the  chances  that 
the  maJor  policy  perspectives  of  political  parties  of  1940s  being  remembered 
accurately  were  low.  The  choice  to  follow  the  policies  of'  their  namesake 
parties  as  the  Smailliolders  Party  did,  or  to  abandon  or  dramatically  aItcr  tllcse 
IMAndrm  KOrOsenyi.  'The  Hungarian  Parliamentary  Clations,  1990',  pp.  72-73.  in  Andras  Boz.  oki, 
Andras  KOrOsenyi.  George  SchOpIlin  (ed.  s),  Post  Communist  Transition:  Emenging  Pluralism  in 238 
policies  as  the  I  lungarian  Social  Democratic  Party  did  depends  on  the  possible 
popularity  ol'these  policies  in  the  late  20th  century. 
There  NNere  also  those  politicians  who  followed  a  different  way.  The  newly 
l'ornied  political  parties  had  a  clairn  to  power  based  on  their  opposition  to  the 
(-'OllllllLllliSt  TUIC  in  tile  latc-KMAr  period.  and  their  legitimisation  was  based  on 
their  refonn-oriented.  change-seeking  approach  to  I  lungarian  political  lifie.  The 
"inner  of  tile  1990  clections.  tile  Hungarian  Democratic  Forum  (I-IDF).  flor 
instance.  was  the  rcsult  ol'a  crisis,  in  1987,  in  tile  late  Kdddr  era,  and  was  a 
nationalistic  and  populist  movement.  It  served  as  a  centrist  institution  between 
the  ruling  Communists  and  the  radical  opposition  groups.  It  changed  its 
structural  framework  under  the  leadership  or  ic)zscr  Antall,  who  took  ovcr  as 
the  party's  new  leader  in  1989  and  who  took  tile  party  to  tile  line  of  German 
CINA'St  I  Christian-Democratic  with  a  nationalistic  side.  That  is,  tile  party 
has  become  a  conservative,  nationalistic  party  which  promoted  fundamental 
values  ol'religious  and  national  origins. 
The  Alliance  (if'  Free  Democrats  (AFD),  on  the  other  hand,  began  as  an 
unibrella  organisation.  The  roots  of  the  party  were  found  aniong  the  Hungarian 
opposition  intellcOuals,  who,  in  1980s,  transformed  their  concerns  of' 
opposition  1rom  the  Pursuit  Or  human  rights  issues  to  more  direct  pýlifical 
activities.  This  general  umbrella  organisation  first  turned  into  the  so-called 
Network.  a  loose  alliance  of  regime  opponents  ill  tile  Spring  of  1988.  The 
Network  led  to  the  flor'niation  of  flic  Alliancc  of  Free  Dcmocrats  in  Autumn 
1988.  The  AFD  is,  then,  an  alliance  or  tile  bourgeois  radicals.  Christian 
Minocrats.  Liberal  Conservatives,  various  fractions  of  Social  Democrats,  and 
jtqttu,  a!:  y,  London:  Pinter  116blishers.  1992. 239 
()I'  (il-censI87,  which  combines  all  these  groups  under  an  institutional 
frammork  similar  to  that  or  British  Tories. 
The  Alliance  offoung  Democrats  (FIDESz)  is  a  party  that  developed  on  tile 
basis  of  a  youth  opposition  movement  of  1980s.  Its  first  predecessor  was  an 
Andependent  Youth  Union*  opposed  to  the  Communist  KlSz  (Communist 
Youth  I  Inion),  ind  dates  From  198  1.  Then,  with  theopeningol'new,  specialised 
COIICgCS  ill  BLIdapest  and  elsewhere  ill  Hungary,  tile  student  clitc  of  these 
colleges  -such  as  tile  Budapest  University  of  Economics-  followed  the  idea  or 
florming  their  own  youth  organisation  and  in  March  1988,  FIDESz  was 
founded.  It  became  a  radical  youth  movement  which  did  not  hesitate  to  adopt  - 
aggressive  and  I'Lindanicntally  anti-communist  methods.  Its  participation  in  the 
round-tablc  talks  in  1989.  and  its  members'  highly  active  participation  in  these 
talks  enabled  it  to  debate  beyond  its  character  or  a  youth  organisation  and 
rdorm  itsel  I'as  a  political  party  close  to  tile  line  pursued  by  tile  Al-  D  188.  Yet, 
the  FIDF.  Sz  was  a  radical  political  party  which  would  not  accept  any  nierribm 
above  35  years  of*  age.  at  that  time.  The  rule  of  having  no  members  above  35 
years  orage  %%as  lifted  md'en  Viktor  Orban,  the  charismatic  leader  or  tiie  party, 
tunicd  35  in  1995. 
To  generalise  the  specifications  or  this  second  group,  one  may  claim 
illat  tile 
ne-wly  emerging  political  parties  claim  their  right  of  existence  and  legitimacy 
on  tile  grounds  of  a  political  movement  and  can  be  affiliated  with  various 
opposition  figures  in  lie  1980s.  All  of  these  political  parties  can  be  linked  to 
I  X71_1S/1,1  "'I'lie  Character  of  Political  Parties  in  I  lungiry  (Autumn  1989)",  in  ibid..  pp.  37-39. 
r%  L- 
I  881sivan  Stumpl,  "Political  Socialisation  or  the  New  Generation:  Alliance  or  Young  Democrats".  in 
(;  ýOrgy  Csepeli.  Laszlo  Kcri.  Istvan  S(umpr(ed.  s),  State  and  Citizen:  Studies  on  Political  Socialisation 
in  l'o%t  Conpiumim  Lamern  Europe.  13m.  lapcst:  Institute  or  Political  Science,  1993,  pp.  67-79  passim. 240 
CHLILICS  in  society  who  ideologically  associate  themselves  with  the  parties. 
Tlicir  commitment  Icgitimises  these  parties  as  their  representatives.  'File 
associated  clique  may  be  formed  by  liberals  or  tile  Greens  or  the  independent 
youth  %%ho  do  not  %Nish  to  be  associated  with  any  political  ideology  but  want  to 
have  a  say  in  the  I'Liture  ortheir  countryl  89. 
Yct.  Io  rule  a  country,  to  conipcte  in  a  national  scale  and  win  the  right  to  rule. 
political  parties  have  to  go  bcyond  the  lcvel  of  being  representatives  ora  given 
portion  orthe  nation  and  persuade  the  others  that  they  are  worthy  or  support. 
The  I  irst  group  of  political  parties.  those  which  idcritified  thernselves  with  the 
past  political  parties,  by  relating  themselves  to/with  tile  past  experience  orthe 
public  with  their  so-called  predecessors,  managed  to  create  such  ail  image  in 
the  minds  of'  general  public.  'rile  pcrl'orinance  of  a  previously  active  political 
party  (stich  is  tile  ISI  11))  or  of'  an  important  rraction  within  a  political  party 
(just  like  [lie  I  ISP)  may  be  used  to  convince  masses  that  the  re-formed  party 
may  N%ork  11or  (lie  benefit  or  the  country,  or  that  the  new  cadres  will  pursue  a 
inore  advantageous  policy  vis-A-vis  tile  public  (as  llSDP  chose  to  claini)  and 
sought  to  redefinc  their  policies  without  totally  denying  their  origins. 
Oil  the  other  hand,  the  newly  emerged  political  agencies,  those  organisations 
which  were  Conned  within  and  by  the  1980s  lack  this  luxury  of  assýciating 
themselves  with  tile  previously  livcd,  cxperiences.  They  hoped  to  associate 
themseNes  as  political  profiessionals  who  could  manage  change,  a  flactor 
cspecially  important  d  tiring  tile  uncertainties  or  transition.  Tile  frequent  policy 
FIDES/'%  sell'-representition  as  the  'party  or  tile  youtii,  may  be  seen  as  a  policy  to  convince  tile 
ideologically  neutral  -or  indifferent-  part  of  tile  Hungarian  youth  to  vote.  Therefore,  it  is  possible  not  to 
have  mv  direct  ideolo-ical  all  iliation  with  a  political  party  but  to  Icgitirnisc  it  by  voting  for  it. 241 
alterations  of'  the  newly  born  parties  may  be  linked  with  this  wish  to  obtain 
Public  legitimacy  and  secure  political  power. 
Moreover.  the  -social  existence  or  political  parties  is  another  key  issue  in  their 
succcss.  The  lack  or  existence  or  nation-wide  organisation  is  a  key  in  nation- 
wide  legitinlisation  of'  the  party  as  well  as  its  political  orientation  or 
backgrouml.  The  lack  ora  weil-organised  nation-wide  structure  may  result  in 
the  parties  bascd  oil  local  representatives  which  do  not  show  interest  in  the 
11,11ion  as  a  %%hole  but  which  prefer  to  defend  tile  interests  or  a  regionil, 
geographical  and  licnce  sociological  group.  such  as  urban  intelicctuals  or  the 
Great  Southern  Plain  POPLIlation.  The  lack  of  nation-wide  organisation  of 
1:  11)1,  'Sz  cost  thern  a  great  deal  of  votes  and  tile  denial  of  a  nation-wide 
recognition  and  legitimacy  in  the  1990  elections  in  which  they  got  only  8.94% 
o  I*  N  otes. 
The  Icgitimisation  of  political  parties  as  individual  organisations.  then, 
depends  oil  their  ability  to  convince  tile  public  opinion  on  their  being  rightful 
and  l'ollo%Ncrs  of*  previously  existent  political  parties  or on  their  being  the  right 
choice  lo  govern  IIIC  COLIntry  bascd  on  their  perflorniance  as  opposition 
movenien1%  in  late  Kadarist  period,  and  on  their  nation-wide  orgailisation.  Yet, 
the  problem  with  political  parties'  legitimacy  is  not  peculiar  to  individual 
organisational  ievei  oniy.  'nicir  perflorniance  as  a  group,  as  a  set  or  agents 
%Nithin  the  political  structure  has  its  very  important  role  in  legitimisation  too. 
2.  The  Parliamentary  Political  Parties: 
Hie  parties  represented  in  the  Hungarian  Parliament 
. 
llavc  experienced 
ideological  11LICtuations  as  well  as  actual  fragmentations  in  their  menibmilip. 
I  lo%%cvcr.  tile  six  political  parties  represented  in  the  first  parliamentary  period 242 
or  1990-1994  remained  in  the  parliament  in  tile  aflumath  of  both  the  1994  and 
the  1998  clections.  though  the  representatives  and  their  values  have  changed  ill 
time. 
DUrint,  '  tile  41  year  period  or  interregnum,  there  were  no  active  alternative 
parties  to  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Workers'  Party,  although  the  multi-party 
system  and  individual  parties  were  never  abolished  outright  by  any  legal  ruling 
Or  Court  LICCiSiOll  in  I  lungary  in  the  aftcrniath  or  tile  communist  take-over.  The 
only  exception  to  tile  undisputed  rule  of  the  I  ISWII  in  those  41  years  was  tile 
brier  re-emergence  of'  the  pre-communist  political  parties  during  the  1956 
UpriSing. 
The  lirst  steps  to  the  establishment  orthe  inulti-party  systern  in  I  lungary.  took 
place  in  1987  and  1988.  During  these  years,  popular  movements  and  political 
or,  anisations  appeared  and  in  a  short  period  of  time  transilornied  themselves  g 
into  political  parties.  The  I  lungarian  Democratic  Forum  (MDF)  was  rornlcd  oil 
September  27.1987.  in  Lakitclek,  and  transformed  in  September  1988  into  a 
it  movement  with  a  political  program".  In  tile  spring  or  1989  it  finally  became  a 
political  party.  Within  the  sarne  process,  tile  AM  came  into  being  out  of  tile 
I 
Netýý'ork  of'  Free  Initiatives  -formed  in  1988-.  In  January  1990,  tile  political 
organisation  became  a  political  party.  The  Federation  of  Young  Democrats 
(I  -  IDI-Sz)  which  now  has  become  the  Hungarian  Civic  Party,  was  also  formed 
in  1988.  Yet,  tile  real  breakthrough  came  when  The  Hungarian  Socialist 
Workers*  Party  declared  its  own  dissolution  oil  7  October  1989.  In  its  place, 
the  I  lungarian  Socialist  Party  (MSzP)  was  formed,  now  defininig  itself  as  a 
social  democratic  party.  In  November  1988  the  Independent  Sniallholders' 
Party  (ISI  111)  was  flormed.  In  January'  1989,  tile  I  luilgarian  Social  Democratic 243 
Party  0  ISDP)  appeared  oil  the  I  lungarian  political  scene.  Both  the  ISI-113  and 
tile  I  ISDP  claimed  to  be  direct  descendants  of  tile  parties  of  tile  same  name.  By 
the  time  the  elections  were  held  in  1990  (25  March  and  8  April  were  tile  dates 
01'  tile  IWO  rounds  of  election),  some  65  political  parties  were  forl-ned  and 
registered.  I  lowever.  only  12  of  these  65  political  parties  could  fulfil  the 
conditionsso  Illilt  they  Could  compete  in  tile  general  elections.  orthcse,  eleven 
partics  could  achieve  more  than  1%  of  tile  total  votes  cast  though  only  6  or 
them  were  eligible  flor  parliamentary  representation,  that  is  only  six  parties 
lia%e  passed  the  4%  election  threshold  -which  would  rise  to  5%  in  1994 
elections-. 
The  III-St  SCSSiOll  Of(hC  InUlti-party  Hungarian  Parliament  convened  oil  2  May 
1990,  and  tile  new  coalition  government  was  formed  oil  22  May,  by  the 
representatives  of'  tile  I  lungarian  Democratic  Forurn,  tile  Independent 
Sniallholders'  Party.  and  the  Christian-Dernocratic  People's  Party.  The  first 
post-conimunist  government.  then.  was  a  Christian-Conservative  alliance, 
leaving  the  liberal  (FIDESz  and  Alliance  or  Free  Democrats)  and  the  socio- 
CICIIIOCI',  ItS  (I  ILIngarian  Socialist  Party)  oil  tile  opposition  benches. 
Although  during  the  two  elections  'held  in  1990  and  1994  there  has  been 
I.  raginentation  within  political  parties,  raising  the  number  of  tile  political 
parties  represented  in  tile  Parliament  from  six  to  filleen,  the  1994  elections 
resulted  in  representation  of  the  same  six  original  parties.  During  tile  first 
parliamentary  period.  *such  parties  as  the  Hungarian  Justice  and  Life  Party  and 
tile  Market  Party  were  flornicd  from  the  I  fungarian  Democratic  Forum  (see  also 
the  establishment  of  tile  Hungarian  Democratic  People's  Party  during  tile 
sccond  parliamentary  term,  in  early  1996),  and  a  division  of  the  Sillailholders' 244 
Party  took  place  due  to  arguments  over  the  party"s  representation  in  the 
go%  crimient.  I  lo%vever.  the  representation  in  the  Parliament  was  not  altered  as 
the  rractions  which  turned  into  political  parties  were  lcft  outside  or  tiie 
parliament  aller  the  following  elections.  In  addition  to  the  intra-parliamentary 
divisions.  111C  IlUnlber  of  parties  outside  tile  Parliament  has  increased 
geometrically.  At  present,  tllcre  are  130  registered  parties,  although  100  to  110 
tire  actually  'phantom'  parties  with  a  few  dozen  or  a  flew  hundred  members  and 
hence  lack  any  opportUrlity  to  achieve  to  pass  the  electoral  threshold  190. 
IX.  THE  PARLIAMENTARY  REPRESENTATION  IN  HUNGARY 
A.  The  Parliamentary  Representation  of  Political  Parties: 
hQ  I  Imigarian  parliamentary  systcm  resembles  that  of  a  chaticcilery 
dcinocracy.  The  main  executive  organ  is  the  cabinet.  Its  members  are  elected 
firom  within  the  parliament.  Tile  highest  executive  position  is  premiership, 
while  the  presidency  has  a  value  only  in  ternis  of  symbolic  representation.  Its 
main  representative  body.  tile  Parliament,  has  a  unicameral  structure  consisting 
of'  186  members  or  parliament  (thence,  MIs)  who  are  elected  for  four-year 
terms.  The  I  lungarian  Parliament  holds  two  regular  sessions,  one  in  spring  and 
one  in  autumn.  tile  first  rrom  February  I  to  June  15,  and  the  second  from 
September  I  to  December  15  during  the  year.  Since  May  2,1990,  it  has  been 
in  constant  session  by  alternating  regular  and  extraordinary,  sessions. 
The  parliament  holds  its  plenary  sessions  oil  Mondays  and  Tuesdays,  while 
Wcdnesdays  and  Thursdays  are  reserved  for  committee  meetings.  During  tile 
1990-94  parliamentary  period,  tile  Parliament  enacted  219  pew  laws,  amended 
213  laws.  and  brought  354  decisions.  Most  of  these  amendments  and 
1"Domfloaded  11rom  tile  I  nternet  database  of  tile  tI  ungarian  Embassy  in  Washington  D.  C.. 245 
enactilient  are  necessary  steps  to  deal  with  tile  newly  established  democratic 
s)-stem  and  a  market  cconomy. 
The  first  elections  in  1990  did  not  result  in  any  single  political  party  gaining 
power.  I  lie  votes.  due  to  the  electoral  systern  made  a  coalition  government  a 
necessity.  A  coalition  between  the  Hungarian  Democratic  Foruni,  the 
Indelicn(lent  Smallholders,  11arty  and  the  Christian  Democratic  People's  Party 
sharcd  the  responiibility  of  governing  the  country  with  the  IlLingarian 
Democratic  Fortim  being  the  majority  partilcr  in  the  right-wing  coalition.  The 
results  ol*  this  first  clection  in  the  post-coninluilist  era  may  be  seen  as  a 
rellection  ofthe  public  desire  to  get  rid  of  tile  ancient  reginic  and  to  support  a 
liberal  political  and  economic  systcrn. 
Table  4.7.  Parliamentary  seats  gained  by  political  parties  after  the  1990 
elect  ions  191. 
Pirly  NlSzP  SzDSz  FKgl'  Fl  D  ESz  KNDP  NIDF  A  Joint  Inde 
Name  A  Deput-  pen 
ies  (let)  t 
Seats  33  92  44  21  21  164  1  4  6 
Won 
(  iuidc  lo  Parties:  I  fungarimi  Socialist  Party  (MSzl').  Alliance  offree  Democrats  (S/.  I)Sz).  Independent 
Smallholders  Party  (FKgl'):  Christian  Democratic  People's  Party  (KNDP):  Federation  or  Young 
Democrat,;  (I  11)1:  SZ)-.  I  hingarian  Democratic  Fortim  (MDF).  Agrarian  Alliance  (AA). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
M  I's  of'coalition  governmeni  formed  oil  22  May  1990  consisted  or  tie 
Hungarian  Dcniocratic  Forum  (MDF/IIDF),  the  Sniallholderg  Party 
(FKgP/ISIIP)  and  the  Christian  Democratic  Pcople's  Party  (KDNP/CDPP) 
constituting  nearly  6W,  o  or  all  parliamentary  seats.  However,  in  time,  the 
parliamentary  aritlimiCtic  changed  as  some  dissidents  appeared  in  each  party 
and  11ormed  new  political  parties  or  remained'as  independent  MIs.  Towards 
C.  11-111CII  60111,11CZ  Fill-i(ILIeL,  rJecloral  Si-slents  on(I  Political  Slabilin,  in  Central  and  Eastern 
LyroLT.  Budapest:  1995.1  lungarian  Centre  for  Democracy  Studies  Foundation,  p.  2  1. 246 
(hC  CIILI  01'  the  flour-year  parliamentary  cycle.  the  balance  had  considerably 
altered  and  nearly  20%  of  the  MPs  sat  with  groupings  othcr  than  thcir  original 
affiliates.  reducing  the  government  majority  to  around  50  percent. 
More  than  20  parties  ran  candidates  in  the  second  general  elections  lield  in  two 
roundS  LlUring  May  1994.15  parties  managcd  to  eompile  national  lists.  and  in 
the  end  the  same  six  parties  made  it  to  Parliament  as  in  1990,  though  in 
111111damentally  differctit  proportions.  'nic  I  lungarian  Socialist  Party 
(NlSzl'/IISII),  a  party  formed  by  the  refin-in  wing  of  the  Hungarian  Socialist 
Workers*  Party,  received  flic  most  votes. 
Table  4.8.  ParliamentaD,  seats  gained  by  political  parties  after  the  1994 
vierfinn.;? 
PHr(y  NIS.  /T  SzDSz  FKgI'  FIDESz  KNDP  NIDF  MDPP  Independ 
Name  ems 
Seats  209  69  22  19  20  19  15  6 
Won 
Oddo  to  Parties:  I  lungarian  Socialist  Parly  (MSzl').  Alliance  of*  Free  Democmts  (Szl)Sz).  Independent 
L- 
Smallholders  hirlý  O'Kg1l).  ChriNtian  Democratic  Pcople'%  Parly  (KNDP).  Federation  of*  Young 
Dclimcrak  (F1DLSZ):  Ilungarian  Democratic  Forum  (MDF).  Hungarian  Democratic  People's  Party 
(KIDIIII) 
Fhe  1994  elections,  as  can  be  seen  in  Table  4.3..  gave  way  to  a  difTerent 
combinalion  ol*  political  party  representation  than  the  1990  clections  had 
yicldcd  to.  Anothcr  coalition  government  was  founded  aflcr  these  elections, 
this  time  bct-vveen  thc  Hungarian  Socialist  Party  who  had  enough  votcs  to  form 
a  government  by  itscil'  yet  which  prellerred  not  to,  and  tile  Allianceý  of  Free 
Democrats  which  were  the  second  biggest  party  in  the  1994-1998 
parliamentary  period. 
Fhe  1998  elections  %khich  werc  lield  in  two  rounds  on  10  and  24  May  1998, 
once  again.  reSUlted  in  the  same  number  of  political  parties  being  represented 
in  the  parliament.  The  Christian'  Democratic  Pcople's  Party  lias  lost  all  its 247 
seats,  while  tile  I  lungarian  Democratic  People's  Party  has  lost  its  seats  to  its 
descciulant,  I  lungarian  Justicc  and  Life  Party: 
Table  4.9  ParliamentaD,  seats  gained  by  political  parties  after  the  1998 
jccjiOj,.,;  l92- 
Parly  NanvcýNlSzll  SzDSz  I  FKgp  I  FIDESz  I  KNDP  NIDF  I  MP  I  NII:  F:  P:  ý 
-Seat%  Won  134  22  1  48  J_  148  101  17  101  14 
(inide  to  Parties:  I  lungarian  Socialist  Party  (MSzl'),  Alliance  or  Free  Democrats  (Szl)Sz).  Independent 
Smallholdcr%  hnfý  (I:  Kgl'):  Chrimian  Democr  atic  People's  Parq  (KNDII).  Federation  or  Young 
Democrals  (I'il)I:  SZ)-.  Hungarian  Democratic  I,  orum  (Mt)l:  ),  Ilungarian  Democratic  People's  Party 
fNII  )IT).  Workcrs*  (Communist)  Party  (Ml').  I  lungarian  Justice  and  Li  re  Party  (KI  I  Ell). 
Although  there  has  been  a  change  in  the  representation  of  tile  political  parties 
with  the  exception  OfthC  CXCILISiOll  of  the  Christian  Democrats  1roin  the  1998- 
2002  parliament.  tile  ideological  representation  in  the  parliament  was  not 
altercd  by  the  1998  cleetion  results.  The  inability  of  the  communists  to  have  ail 
Nil'  CICCtCd  through  their  Workers'  Party  and  the  continuity  of  the  nationalist- 
to-liber-al  tendencies  of'  the  Hungarian  Democratic  People's  Party  by  the 
11LIngarian  Justice  and  Life  Party,  prove  that  there  is  a  continuity  in  the 
parlianicritary  reprcscmation  and  voting  procedures. 
Table  4.10  Parliamentary  seats  gained  by  political  parties  after  the  2002 
lectioll, 
,, 
193.. 
I'striv  NISIP  SzDSz  FKgp  FIDESz  NIDF  MP  NIIEP 
Name 
Seat%  178  19  0  188  0  0  0 
NN  on 
I'lic  2002  eleetions  were  different  in  their  structure  and  outcome  1"roni  the 
prvvious  c1cctions  duc  to  the  association  of  the  country*s  future  with  tile 
Furopean  Union  (EU)  mcnibuship  and  hence  people  voted  in  the  second 
round  of'  the  elections  in  accordancc  with  thcir  vision  of  EU  membership. 
1`2  Data  m  the  1998  election  results  gathered  from  the  web-site  of  the  Italian  organisation  Agora, 
in  September  1998. 
Dala  on  the  2002  election  results  gathered  from  the  web-site  of  the  International  Foundation  for 
Election  Systems.  IFTS.  http:  //w%v%v.  ifFs.  orgtcgiiide/rcsultstinit'liungary-par-O2.  htin. 248 
'I'lirce  political  parties.  Fidesz.  Hungarian  Socialist  Party,  and  the  Alliance  of 
Free  Democrats  have  become  the  parties  favoured  by  the  voters  ill  tile  second 
round  ol'the  elections  and  the  combination  or  all  other  parties  could  rind  only 
47.006  voles  Cor  theniscl%-cs  in  the  second  round  of  tile  2002  elections.  The 
I  lungarian  parliamentary  structure,  therefore.  was  dramatically  altered  ill  tile 
2002  elections  flor  tile  general  wish  of  the  Hungarian  public  to  have  a  strong 
government  and/or  a  strong  opposition  in  the  parliament  in  this  transitory 
period.  1:  11  membership.  thercl'ore,  has  become  a  more  pivotal  issue  than  party 
prellerences  and  loyalties. 
The  Hungarian  Parliament  has  a  diversion  of  political  views  represented 
%Nitliin  itself'  by  the  mainstream  political  parties.  Of  these,  six  have  been 
represented  ill  parliament  firom  1990  to  2002,  thus,  one  may  assume  that  there 
is  a  discernibic  trend  or  development  in  parliamentary  traditions.  Moreover, 
some  orthcse  parties  claim  to  be  the  direct  descendants  or  tile  political  parties 
of'  the  pre-conlillunist  period.  such  as  the  Sniallholders'  Party,  while  tile 
Ilungarian  Socialist  Party  is  the  heir  to  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Workers' 
Party.  now  was  divided  into  two  political  parties,  the  other  party  being  the 
I  lunuarian  Workers'  Party.  As  to  the  results  or  the  2002  elections,  it  can  be 
claimed  that  even  the  relatively  strong  system  of  representation  in  Ilunýary  had 
to  he  revised  11or  the  voters  wanted  to  see  their  country's  government  as  a  solid 
mechanism  and  not  a  coalition  or  a  weak  lead  or  one  party  over  nearly  equal 
others. 249 
B.  Major  Parliamentary  Political  Parties  in  Hungary: 
Political  parties  represented  in  the  Hungarian  Parliament  are  either  newly 
established  political  parties  or  those  who  are  successors  to  the  communist 
reginie*s  leading  party.  01'  the  first  group,  some  claim  -such,  as  the 
Independent  Sniallholders  Party-  to  be  the  followers  or  the  reincarnation  of  a 
political  party  that  once  I'Linctioned  in  the  pre-socialist  period,  or  claim  to  be 
rcpresentatives  of  a  social  group  or  class. 
John  T.  Ishiyania  distinguislics  between  the  newly  rornied  political  parties  and 
the  successor  parties.  claiming  that,  of  all  the  post-comn1unist  political  parties 
in  Fastern  E-Airope.  the  coniniunist-successor  parties  are,  "unlike  'new 
partics.  '...  not  merely  clubs  or  notables  or  'couch  parties'  (%%,  here  all  members 
COUld  lit  on  a  single  couch)"  but  are  "distinct  organisations,  and  by  any 
definition  represent  'real'  political  parties.  "  194  The  other  political  parties 
which  rely  on  the  claim  of'  historicity  try  to  obtain  the  same  degree  of 
distinctiveness  and  hence  create  a  fMing  of  reliance  on  the  public  by 
association  with  a  historically  continuous  process.  Paul  G.  Lewis'  observation 
that  the  success  orconimunist-successor  political  parties  such  as  the  SdRP  in 
Poland  and  the  I  ISP  in  I  Itingary  result  rrom  the  main  strengths  of  what  lie 
ternis  as  the  traditional  mass  party,  which  has  "a  high  membership  in  terms  or 
the  post-coniniunist  context,  good  finances  and  material  resources  and  a  high 
degi-ce  o  forgan  isational  development,  "  05  sustains  Ishiyania's,  argumentl"6. 
I'll  John  T.  Ishiyama.  *The  Communist  Successor  Parties  and  Party  Organisational  Developments  in 
Post-Communist  Politics,  *  11olitival  Research  Quarlerýv 
, 
'v.  52  (1).  March  1999,  p.  88. 
Levvis.  *Introduction  and  Theoretical  Overview,  '  in  Paul  G.  Lewis  (cd.  ),  Party  Structure  and  Paul  G 
QmanLigljon  in  East  Central  Europe,  Cheltenham:  Edward  Elgar.  1996,  p.  16. 
196  For  a  discussion  on  . 11eneralisations  on  political  party  organisation  types,  works  or  Petr  Kopecky, 
I  lerberl  Ki(schelt.  l1aul  G.  Lewis.  Angelo  Pancbianco.  John  1'.  lshiyama.  Richard  S.  Katz  and  Richard 250 
On  the  political  parties  flormed  in  the  post-communist  era,  Alcks  Szczerbiak 
observes  that  "cvidcncc  confirnis  many  of  tile  hypothesised  characteristics 
ascribed  to  the  new  political  parties  in  postcommunist  Eastern  Europe:  a  weak 
grounding  in  the  civil  society.  dependence  on  the  state  for  material  and 
Ii  nancial  resources.  and  a  centralised  decision-making  structure  combiticd  with 
4-CCI()I-,  Il  1()Cll  111  to  110  Illy.  "  107 
The  I  Itingarian  Parliament,  for  the  thrcc  consecutive  post-communist  c1cctions 
had  the  same  six  political  parties  under  its  roof  and  hence  shows  a  collerent 
and  consistent  attitude  unlike  other  post-coniniunist  regirnes'  legislatures.  The 
II  ungurian  %,  oters*  consistency  in  terms  of  electing  tile  candidates  of  tile  same 
six  political  parties  in  all  three  general  elections,  as  well  as  tile  two-terill 
service  orthe  Conner  President  Arpdd  G!  jncz  and  tile  unproblematic  election  or 
Ilk  SUCCCSSOr  PrOr.  Icrenc  Madl  to  the  post  orprcsidency  in  tile  year  2000  can 
be  taken  as  proor  or  tile  positive  effects  or  the  Roundtable  Discussions  and  tile 
distinction  created  by  the  KAddrist  regime's  quasi-social  contract,  98. 
lli)x%cvcr,  the  Hungarian  political  party  system  is  not  a  fully-functional, 
ineclianisin  %%hich  is  based  oil  tile  institutions.  Although  there  is  ample 
evidence  oil  the  institutionalisation  or  political  parties  and  sorne  sort  or  party- 
Cept  tile  al,  filiation  among  the  Hungarian  voters.  it  is  also  possible  to  ac 
argument  ol'  Gabricla  lionski  and  Malcolm  Punnett  that  tile  I  lungariall  party 
system  is based  oil  leadership  and  leading  figures  as  these  represent  a  symbol 
Mair  in  the  theoretical  arena,  arid  the  works  of  Attila  Agh,  Gabricla  llonski,  and  Aleks  Szczcrbiak  in  the 
re-ional/practical  arema  can  be  cited. 
I-  147  Alck%  Siczerbiak.  "resting  Party  Models  in  East-Central  Europe.  '  Par(y  Politics,  v.  5  (4),  p.  518. 
I"  See  Paul  G.  Lmis.  'East-Ccritral  Europe:  The  Czech  Rcpublic,  Slovakia,  I  lungary,  and  Poland,  '  in 
S(Cphcn  White.  Judy  Butt,  and  Paul  G.  Lewis  (eds.  ),  13cyclopments  in  Central  and  East  Europgan 
Politics  --2.  London:  MacMillan  Press,  1998,  p.  33,  on  parlianicritary  fragnicritation  in  the  first  Polish 251 
to  the  general  public  to  follow.  Ilonski  and  Punnett  claim  that  the  dissident 
I  lungarian  intellectuals  of  the  communist  era  now  emerge  as  power-holders 
and  policy  makers  which  give  them  an  extra  power  oil  the  party  administration 
and  organisation.  and  provides  public  figures  to  follow  for  tile  public  while 
casing  intra-party  Icadership-scicction  procedures  to  remain  not  entrenched 
yet"".  Although  their  arguments  may  be  sustained  by  tile  decision  of  FIDESZ 
to  prd'er  the  leadership  of  Viktor  Orban  to  their  founding  principles,  or  by  tile 
I  IDF's  intra-party  succession  race  after  the  demise  of'  party  leader  and  Prime 
Minister 
. 
16zscf  Antall.  one  also  must  consider  tile  institutional  isation  or  the 
political  parties  within  the  new  political  order. 
I  lence.  one  may  argue  that  tile  I  lungarian  political  party  organisation  is  still  to 
solidly  rooted  in  the  liberal  democratic  system  in  terms  of'  its 
representational  prercrences  in  ternis  or  the  rormation  of  the  intra-party 
hierarchy  and  in  terms  ol'the  public  representation,  that  is  whether  a  political 
parly  is  to  become  a  catch-all.  cartc],  or  class-specific  organisation.  However, 
Own  the  parliamentary  representation  of  the  Hungarian  political  parties  is 
considered.  it  can  be  argued  that  the  political  party  organisation  in  ternis  of 
illStitUtiO11,11isation  of*  political  partics  in  Hungary  is  establislicd  in  a  morc 
stable  manner  than  all  the  surrounding  Eýast-Ccntral  European  eduntries' 
political  parties  and  the  I  lungarian  political  partics  havc  a  bater  rclationship 
vOll  their  voters  in  comparison  with  the  rcgional  post-communist  reginies. 
and  Czech  parliaments.  I  lungary  remains  distinct  from  these  two  examples  as  there  were  fragmentations 
in  mid-parliamentary  term  but  these  were  not  sustained  by  the  voters  in  the  following  elections. 
Malcolm  Punnett  and  Gabricla  lionski.  'Leading  Democracy:  The  Emergence  of  Party  Leaders  and  0  Their  Roles  in  [lie  I  lungarian  Partics,  *  in'rerry  Cox  and  Andy  Furlong  (eds.  ),  llunga!  y:  The  Politics  or 
'-Lra!  jsjfI  )n.  London:  Urank  Cass.  1995,  pp.  101-102.  ijý- 252 
The  polifleal  parties  that  are  represented  in  tile  Hungarian  Parliament  are  as 
follows. 
I.  Hungarian  Socialist  Party  (HSP  I  MSzP): 
The  I  lUngarian  Socialist  Party  is  a  direct  descendant  of  the  IISWP.  It  was 
established  after  the  dissolution  tile  IISWP  by  the  Reform  Socialist  wing  of  the 
Party.  'I'llereflore.  tile  I  ISP  has  a  socio-denlocratic  attitude  and  has  a  positive 
approach  towards  privatisation  and  direct  roreign  investment. 
The  leader  of'  the  party  and  tile  Prime  Minister  in  tile  1994-1998  period  is 
Gyula  I  lorn  -who  was  the  Minister  of  Forcign  Affairs  in  the  last  Communist 
government.  During  that  period,  Gyula  Horn  played  a  prominent  role  in  the 
establishment  ol'  diplornatic  relations  with  South  Korea  and  Israel,  in  the 
dismantling  of  the  Iron  Curtain,  and  supported  tile  re-unification  of  Germany 
by  allm6ig  Fast  (Jumans  to  11ce  via  Hungary  to  the  West.  Additionally,  he 
completed  preparations  Im  and  later  signed  the  agreement  on  the  withdrawal 
ol'Sovict  Iroops  fi-oni  I  lungary.  Thus,  as  a  rerorni-wing  nienibcr  or  tllc  I  ISWII, 
I  lorn  NNas  the  leading  figure  to  lead  the  post-communist  IISP. 
While  in  tile  11990  elections  tile  party  didn't  do  well,  receiving  only  9%  of  the 
votes  and  33  parliamentary  seats,  in  the  1994  elections  it  emerged  as  the  main 
part),  From  the  ballots,  magnifying  its  percentage  in  the  total  votes  cast  to  54% 
and  its  scats  in  the  parliament  to  209.,  The  liarty  was  the  nlýjority  coalition  p 
partner  in  the  1994-98  legislative  era  in  co-operation  with  tile  Alliance  or  Free 
Democrats,  the  second  biggest  party. 
lio%%evct-.  the  IISII  has  lost  its  supremacyAn-votes  in  the  1998  elections  to 
Fidesz  gathering  32.2%  ol'the  votes  and  134  parliamentary  seats,  making  the 253 
I  ISP  the  second  biggest  party  in  the  parliament.  The  party  is  not  a  member  of 
the  government  in  (lie  1998-2002  parliamentary  term. 
2.  Alliance  of  Free  Democrats  (SzDSz): 
The  presence  or  Alliance  or  Free  Democrats  originated  in  tile  late  1970s  as  a 
social  opposition  movement  to  tile  Communist  regime.  Chiefly  concerned  with 
human  rights.  it  initially  gathered  intellectuals  who  adopted  a  critical  attitude 
towards  tile  existing  systern.  Tile  group  called  itself  'tile  democratic 
oppositioW.  Later  oil.  this  democratic  opposition  gradually  embraced  political, 
prollessional.  cultural,  religious,  minority  and  other  oppositions  to  the  single- 
Part)*  rule  in  its  composition.  The  Nelwork  of"Fi-ce  Initiatives  emerged  from 
this  co-operation  and  transformcd  itscir  to  tile  Alliance  of  Free  Democrats  oil 
l"November  1988.  According  to  the  Manifesto  or  Principles,  approved  by  tile 
FOL111dilIg  Convention,  the  Alliance  of  Free  Democrats  is  tllc'party  of  freedom 
and  solidarity'.  The  Alliance  supports  liberal  policy  and  wants  ail  independent, 
democratic  wcll'are  state. 
In  tile  wake  orthe  National  Roundtable  Negotiations  of  1989,  tile  Alliance  of 
Free  Democrats  and  the  Federation  of  Young  Democrats,  supported  by  tile 
Smallholdcrs  Party  and  tile  Social  Democratic  Party,  initiated  a  rererenduln  oil 
Wiether  the  people  should  directly  elect  the  President  of  the  Republic.  As  a 
result  of  the  reflerendum.  the  majority  or  citizens  decided  not  to  elect  the 
President  directly,  bel'ore  tile  general  free  elections,  and  left  this  function  to  tile 
new  Pirliament. 
Hic  AFD  became  the  second  largest  parliamentary  party  with  92  seats  aller  the 
1990  elections  and  became  tile  leader  or  the  opposition.  Arpdd  G6ncz,  a 
11ornier  member  ofthe  Executive  Board  of  tile  Alliance  of  The  Free  Democrats, 254 
-v%-as  elected  President  of  the  Republic.  In  tile  1990  municipal  elections,  it 
achieved  notable  success  with  its  candidate  GAbor  Dei-nszky  becoming  tile 
Mayor  of  Budapest.  Yet.  due  to  intra-party  connicts,  tile  Party  leader  JAnos  Kis 
did  not  run  11or  re-election.  His  successor,  Peter  Ti3lgyessy,  was  elected  in 
November  1991.  In  November  1992,  the  party  held  a  congress  resulting  ill 
leadership  changes.  IvAn  retr),  who  used  to  be  leader  of  the  parliamentary 
group.  %%as  elected  president  or  tile  party.  In  July  1993  the  Liberal 
hilermitionale  voted  uilaniniously  to  include  the  Alliance  in  its  organisation. 
Durhig  the  1994  parliamentary  elections,  the  AFD  remained  the  second  largest 
party  in  the  Parliament  with  67  seats.  At  the  1994  local  elections,  the  party 
preservcd  its  results  and  remained  the  second  largest  party  of  tile  country. 
(41bor  Deniszky,  the  Mayor  of  Budapest,  was  re-clectcd  and  the  Alliance  of 
Free  Democrats  achieved  leading  positions  in  most  or  the  cities  or  county 
status.  as  well. 
The  AFD  has  entered  into  a  coalition  with  tile  Hungarian  Socialist  Party.  the 
victor  ol'the  1994  general  elections.  The  Coalition  Agreement  includes  a  very 
(Ictailed  'hylaw  of  tile  coalition'  providing  equal  positions  in  decision-making. 
The  Government  Program  is  based  on'the  prograrns  orthe  two  parties.  despite 
(lie  unequal  parliamentary  positions  held  by  the  two  partieS200.  A  series  of 
scandals  including  tile  Tocsik  privatisation  scandal  affected  the  AFD  and 
appeared  to  harm  tile  public  image  of  the  Alliance. 
As  a  reSUlt  or  the  corruption  accusations  and  the  poor  performance  of  tile  party 
in  (lie  1994-98  coalition  government  with  the  I  ISP,  tile-  Alliance  of  Free 
Democrats  have  lost  more  than  hair  or  their  parlianiciltary  seats  in  tile  1998 255 
cleclimis.  The  AFD*s  parliamcntaiy  seats  were  reduced  fironi  60  in  1994  to  24 
ill  1998  and  its  share  in  the  votes  was  reduced  to  7.9%  compared  to  the  17.8% 
ill  1994. 
3.  Hungarian  Civic  Party  [ex-Federation  of  Young  Democrats)  (FIDESz), 
1--'11)1-'.  Sz  has  a  similar  background  to  the  AFD.  It  was  founded  on  30  March 
1988  1)),  a  group  of*  37  University  students  and  young  intellectuals.  Miklos 
Andrasi.  Viktor  Orban  -is  well  as,  Ivan  Csaba,  I.  aszlo  Kover,  and  Andras  Racz, 
were  Ille  leading  figures  in  the  movement.  The  nailic  FIDESz  was  chosen  as 
the  motto  of'  (lie  group.  The  word  literally  means  -self-confidence, 
(rustworthiness.  belief".  They  lield  a  two-day  congress  at  the  Jurta  Theater  in 
November  1988  in  which  the  members  of  the  Federation  discussed  and 
adopted  the  drall  ol'the  program  of  tile  organisation.  In  1989,  it  had  beconic  a 
considerable  political  actor  in  opposition  with  80  local  grOLIPS  and  3,500 
members.  It  was  in  organiser  and  a  Icading  member  or  tiic  1989  Roundtable. 
The  main  decision-making  body  of  FIDESz  was  its  Congress.  The 
representatives  ol'  local  grOLIPS  created  the  Council.  the  highest  body  between 
the  sessions  ol'the  congresses.  Local  groups  ol'l--'IDESz  were  autononious,  and 
elected  thch-  leaders.  and  determined  their  own  struCtUre. 
A  maJor  characteristic  ol'the  Federation  Nvas  that  none  or  its  nicnibers;  sliould 
exceed  35  ycars  ol'age  alld  had  to  leave  the  organisation  W11CII  tUrning  35.  This 
rule.  liowevcr.  was  altered  wlicn  Viktor  Orban.  tile  leader  of  FIDE-Sz  turned  35 
himsel  I'.  Orban  led  the  party  Ilor  a  while  longer  but  is  not  tile  leader  anymore. 
Despite  I-Cceiving  Only  5%  orthe  votes  cast  in  tile  May  1990  elections,  FIDESz 
has  comimicd  to  be  an  influential  actor  in  Hungarian  political  life  and  was 
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tipped  as  one  ol'the  victors  ol'the  1994  elections  in  which  it  could  only  defend 
19  ol'its  21  seats  in  the  actual  elections. 
The  1998  elections  saw  a  dramatic  change  in  the  voting  behaviour  of  the 
I  lungarian  electorate  in  Ilavour  of  the  FIDESz.  The  Federation  has  become  the 
Cavourite  ol'the  electorate  lor  its  liberal  economic  programme  and  its  urban, 
inteliccitial.  youtili'LlI  image.  In  the  1998  clection  campaign.  FIDESz  was 
victorious  becoming  the  largest  party  in  (lie  I  lungarian  Parliament.  Despite  the 
Ilact  that  it  gained  only  1.8.2%  of'  the  POPLIlar  vote.  with  its  victory  in  the 
-seat  constituencics  it  managed  to  hold  148  parliamentary  seats.  Viktor  single 
Orban  became  the  fourth  prime  minister  of  post-conimunist  I  hingary,  leading  a 
coalition  government  lonned  under  FIDESzs  leadership  with  the  participation 
ol'  Independent  Smailliolders'  Party  and  thC  IlLingarian  Democratic  Forum  as 
the  smaller  members.  In  the  2002  elections,  FIDESz  led  the  votes. 
FIDI'Sz  has  adopted  the  name  Hungarian  Civic  Party  in  addition  to  Federation 
01'  YOLIII.  Q  Dcniocrats  and  although  still  using  the  abbreviation  FIDF.  Sz,  tlic 
party  lias  officially  become  IIDESz-MPP. 
4.  Independent  Smallholders  Party  (ISHPIFKgP): 
'I  'lie  I  ndependent  Smallholders  Party  (ISI  I  P)  claim's  to  be  the  direct  descendant 
of'  a  political  party  of'  the  same  name  in  the  prc-1949  era  in  Hungary.  It  re- 
1lppC,  lrCLI.  or  was  resurrected,  during  the  late  1980s  and  played  its  part  ill  the 
National  Roundtable  discussions.  Its  determination  to  introduce  ail  electoral 
sYstem  similar  to  the  one  uscd  prior  to  tile  communist  take-over  helped  define 
the  bOUndarics  ol'the  current  elcctoral  system. 
Flie  party  has  a  sectional  appeal  though  claims  to  have  support  from  a  variety 
or  social  segments.  The  main  support  or  tiic  party  conles  from  flic  agrarian 257 
parts  ol*  tile  country,  fi-0111  tile  votcrs  who  are  in  principle  in  support  of'  tile 
liberal  market  economy  but  who.  in  practice,  are  For  the  preservation  of  the 
agricultURII  III-OtCCtiOlliSIll.  YCt.  beyond  that  group  the  party  clainis  the  faiths  of 
anti-Communists.  nationalists,  devoted  Christians,  and  quasi-liberals201. 
[lie  wake  of*  tile  1990  elections,  The  ISIIP  has  become  one  or  the  three 
coalition  partners  with  its  44  MPs.  However.  the  Party  seemed  to  work  against 
ratlicr  than  %%ork  within  (lie  coalition  government.  and  in  March  1992  the  party 
oFficially  lel't  tile  coalition.  However.  the  government  stayed  ill  power  as  30 
out  of'  the  44  MI's  of'  tile  party  remained  in  the  government  benclies  and 
claimed  that  tlicir  CaLICUS  is  the  ISHP  despite  their  dismissal  from  the  party. 
In  the  1994  elections.  the  party's  share  ot'votes  IclI  4%  to  7%  and  it  lost  18  of 
its  44  parliamentary  scats202.  In  the  1998  elections,  the  party  managed  to 
increase  its  scats  to  a  record  level  of  48  and  has  beconic'a  small  partner  in  the 
F1DFSz-lcd  coalition  government. 
5.  Hungarian  Democratic  Forum  (HDFIMDF): 
The  I  ImiLgarian  Democratic  Forurn  first  appeared  at  Lakitclek  in  September 
11)87  as  a  poptilist-nationalist  tunbrella  organisation  lor  tlie  liberal  and  centre- 
right  political  views  outside  the  Urban  intelligentsia.  It  sought  to  be  a  lbrum  for 
'all  opposition  florces20-33.  With  its  anticomMUnist  and  nationalist  political  and 
liberal  economic  agenda.  it  won  the  first  parliamentary  elections  gaining  164 
ol*the  386  pirlianientary  scats.  This  enabled  the  Hungarian  Dcniocratic  Foruni 
2111  (Pabor  Toka.  Tarties  and  Electoral  Choice  in  East  Central  Europe',  p.  7  of  paper  to  have  been 
publ  isl  ied  it)  11.  [.  e%%  is  and  G.  Pridhann's.  51(thilisLik  Ft:  ygile  Democt-acies.  Widow  Routledg-c,  1996. 
2'12  Carmen  Oon/alez  Enriquez,  qp_.  cit..  lip.  23-24. 
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to  establish  the  first  post-communist  government  in  Hungary  leading  a  centre- 
right  coalition  with  its  leader  J6zsef  Antall  as  Prinic  Minister. 
The  inability  ol'the  government  to  Fulfil  public  expectations  and  tile  death  or 
Rv%el'  Antall  in  1993  -l'ollowed  by  his  replacement  by  the  then  Foreign 
Secretary  lIcter  Baross-.  lcft  the  party's  Popularity  damaged.  In  the  1994 
elections  the  I  lungarian  Democratic  Forurn  received  only  19  parliamentary 
scals  and  in  1998  elections  they  lost  two  more  seats  to  their  competitors 
rcducing  their  parliamentary  seats  to  17,  becoming  the  smallest  part  of  the 
FIDESZ-1ed  coalition  government. 
In  March  1996,  an  inter-party  crisis  led  to  the  fragmentation  of  tile  party  and 
out  ol'the  dissident  group  a  new  political  party  canic  into  existence  under  tile 
leadership  of  Ivan  Szabo.  Thc  party  is  narned  I  lungarian  Democratic  people's 
Parly  (lll)PP/MDNP)  and  has  seventeen  Nips  in  tile  1998-2002  parliament. 
Thcrellore.  tile  total  of  pirlianientary  scats  occupied  by  tile  I  IDF  and  its  spin- 
OlTiS  aCtUally  34  as  these  share  the  sarne  ideological  grounds.  Thcrerorc,  the 
Rill  (11'  tile  IIDF  cannot  be  seen  as  dramatic  as  the  Christian  Democratic 
]'copie's  Party  Mlo  ceased  to  function  within  the  parliament  in  tile  wake  of' 
tile  1998  elections. 
6.  Christian  Democratic  People's  Party  (KDPP): 
The  Christian  Democratic  People's  Party  is  the  immediate  legal  successor  or 
Democratic  People's  Party  which  was  founded  in  1944.  It  cea.  scd  to  flunction 
during  the  war  and  was  subjcct  to  political  suppression  in  1949.  It  was  re- 
cstablished  in  1989.  The  party  sees  tile  individual  as  tile  centre  of  its  political 
philosophy  and  ernphasises  that  it  is  not  a  church  party  but  an  orgailisation 259 
%%hich  adopted  tile  rules  of'  (lie  2  millennia  old  Christianity.  The  party  has  a 
right-ol'-the-centre  position  and  defends  basic  freedoms,  rights  to  property,  tile 
liberal  market  economy  and  preservation  or  Christian  values.  Dr.  MArton, 
k1rosi  is  tile  head  or  the  party. 
The  CIA111  served  as  one  of  tile  three  coalition  partners  in  the  1990-1994 
government  and  had  a  1%  rise  in  its  support  in  1994  elections  compared  to 
1990.  %%ith  a  rise  From  6%  to  7%  resulting  in  one  additional  MP.  In  tile  1998 
elections.  however.  receiving  a  mere  2.6%  orvotes  in  the  first  round  and  hence 
(lid  not  achiew  the  electoral  threshold,  and  thus  failed  to  be  represented  in  tile 
1998-2002  parliamentary  period. 
7.  Hungarian  Justice  and  Life  Party  (MIEPIHJLP): 
During  the  1998  elections,  the  marginal  Hungarian  JUSticc  and  Life  Party 
(M  11:  11/I  IJ  1Y)  managed  to  overcome  tile  parliamentary  threshold  and  became 
the  parliamentary  replacement  of  (lie  CDPP  in  the  1998-2002  parliament.  It  is 
a  11ir-right  nationalist  party  led  by  Istvan  Csurka  and  With  fOUrteen  MI's  in  tile 
parliament  creates  a  notable  contrast  with  other  political  parties.  Tile  I  ULP  is 
against  11oreign  oNNnership  of'  farmlands  and  foreign  direct  investment  in  key 
sectors  of  industrV204.  'File  rise  of  -an  extreme  right-wing  party  above  the 
national  threshold  is  a  siggn  which  displays  the  POPUlist  discontentment  with 
(lie  transilion  process. 
C.  Non-Parliamentary  Political  Parties: 
Parties  outside  (lie  parliament.  the  Agrarian  Alliance,  tile  Republic  Party,  tile 
FAin-cpreneurs'  Party.  and  (lie  Workers'  Party,  (the  ideologic 
. 
al  succcssor  to  the 
flornicr  communist  party.  the  MSZMP)  have  gdebaten  stronger.  In  May  1994 260 
clections.  only  the  Agrarian  Alliancc  and  the  Entrepreneurs'  Party  managed  to 
Obtain  parlianictitary  representation  with  one  MP  cach.  Tile  Hungarian  Social 
Democratic  Party  and  the  National  Democratic  Forum  founded  by  Inlre 
Vozsgay  have  distinct  clusters  of  support,  but  all  the  saine.  neither  achieved  tile 
I  ive  percent  threshold  in  May  1994. 
The  I  lunvarian  party  s.  NIstcm  can  be  considered  relatively  stable  becaLISC  three 
large  parties  linked  to  the  main  ideological  currents  (MSzl3.  SzDSz.  and  MDF) 
haNe  become  prollessional  competitive  'catch-all  parties'.  Furthermore,  due  to 
the  I  ive  percent  minimum  parliamentary  threshold,  the  I  lungarian 
parliamen(ary  system  will  not  tolerate  a  firagincrited  part),  system,  as  is 
confirmcd  by  the  results  or  the  1994  elections.  Due  to  tile  so-called 
constructke  motion  (if'  no  confidence,  the  government  coalitions  within 
Parliament  are  stable.  The  gowninicilt  parties  have  the  nuýjority  of  the 
parliamentary  seats,  therefore  a  vote  or  no  confidence  is  not  likely  to 
o%vi-throw  the  coalition  government  unless  one  of  the  coalition  partners  join 
11orces  %%ith  tile  opposition.  'nierefore.  the  lIDr-Sz-lcd  coalition  has  a  realistic 
opportunity  to  remain  in  government  with  a  rundanientally  unchanged 
Oomposition  until  the  next  election. 
I  fungarian  Workers'  Party,  tile  most  influen'tial  of*  tile  non-parliaiiientary 
parties.  was  foundcd  in  Dccenlbcrl989  by  those  OLItside  the  reform  wing  of  tile 
I  ISWP.  It  is  a  ]ell-%ving  Marxist  party  of  'ncw  type'.  It  is  led  by  Dr.  Gyula 
ThOrmer.  with  Attila  Vajnai,  Je)zscf  Eros,  and  Eva  Fitos  serving  as  his  vicc 
presidents.  The  I  IWP  has  about  20,000  members,  with  about  one  thousand 
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basie  organisations  all  over  Hungary.  It  claims  to  represent  the  interests  and 
demoeratic  rights  or  working  people.  The  party  is  against  further  privatisation 
()I'tllC  I  ILIngarian  economy  and  a  more  active  involvement  of  rorcign  capital  as 
%%ell  as  the  country's  membership  to  NATO  and  to  tile  European  Union. 
Although  being  tile  majjor  non-parliamentary  party  with  a  strong  organisational 
net%%  ork.  the  I  IWII  has  no  electoral  backing  and  therefore  is  not  expected  to 
liccomea  member  ol'parlianient  in  I*orcsceabic  luture. 
X.  THE  DIFFERENCE  OF  PERCEPTION  IN  THE  NEW  SYSTEM 
A.  Institutions  and  Institutionalisation: 
The  I  lungarian  political  systcm,  due  to  the  changes  that  took  place  in  tile 
period  beginning  with  the  National  Roundtable  discussions  has  adopted  .1  new 
course  and  a  new  Ilrammork  of  operation.  Tile  new  political  order  emerged  in 
relation  %%ith  a  new  econonlic  order.  Tile  change  in  the  electoral  procedures 
enabled  tile  previously  disconnected  parts  of  society  to  at  least  indirectly 
contribute  to  tile  decision-making  process.  The  involvement  of  previously  non- 
political  persona  in  tile  legislative  process  by  becoming  candidates  in  tile 
Municipal  and  parliamentary  elections  due  to  their  social  status  has  contributed 
to  tile  image  ol'public  participation. 
In  gcneral.  public  interaction  with  the  parliament  and  the  political  parties  has 
contributed  to  (lie  establishment  of  legitimacy  of  the  new  political  order  by 
creating,  a  difficrentiation  1rorn  tile  ancien  i-egime.  As  tile  new  reginle  was 
based  oil  the  constitution  and  the  laws  which  arc  either  agreed  upon  during  tile 
National  Roundtable  negotiations  or  during  tile  first  parliamentary  term's 
Icgislative  %vork.  the  legal  legitimacy  of  tile  regime.  strengthened  by  tile 
popular  support,  was  established. 262 
As  to  legitimacy  by  public  approval,  the  re-enicrgence  of  tile  parliament  as  the 
centre  ol'  immediate  pUblic  attention  and  the  cmcrgence  of  the  political  parties 
its  the  means  of'  political  and  ideological  reprcsentation  helped  case  this 
process  as  well.  The  introdLICtion  of  new  ranks,  e.  g.  or  tiie  local  notables.  into 
the  parliament  strengthened  the  tics  between  the  public  and  tile  political 
rcliresctitatives  within  the  parlianicnt.  The  parliamentary  structure  remains 
solid  despite  the  emergence  of  parliamentary  factionalism.  This  helps  the 
systemic  legitimisation  all  the  more  so  as  this  legitimisation  is  not  bascd  oil 
charismatic  leadership  or  on  tradition. 
I  lowex-cr.  the  transition  in  Hungary  firorn  a  total  itarian-social  ist.  systern  to  a 
democratic-capitalist  systcm  has  rar  greater  implications  for  tile  Hungarian 
pcople  and  their  puception  of  the  new  political  and  economic  order  and  its 
institutions.  The  transition  is  a  nuýjor  one  in  that  there  are  spectacular 
differcrices  bet",  ccii  the  old  regime  and  tile  new  one.  However,  one  needs  to 
rcmeniber  that  there  are  differences  between  tile  old  Hungarian  regime  and  the 
general  communist  state  structure.  To  begin  with.  Richard  Rose  observes, 
"In  power.  Communist  parties  were  nio'bilisation  regimes. 
They  sought  to  indoctrinate  the'niass  of  the  population  in 
Nx  , Iat.  ist-Leninist  belicEs  and  to  recruit  millions  of  members  to 
the  party.  The  intent  was  to  make  each  nation's  Communist 
Party  a  broad  church  or  believers.  In  consequence,  there  are 
now  tens  ormillions  of  former  members  or  the  Communist 
Part),  -  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  today'-'-205 
III  I  ILIngary.  the  I  ISWI,  lost  its  mobilisation  motive  in  mid-1950s,  near  tile  end 
01'  IZ,  'Ik-OSi*S  RIIC.  The  cnIects  of  the  communist  regimes  principle  ot  I  mass 
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beh%cen  K-,  Wrist  administration  and  tile  Hungarian  public  was  based  on  all 
exchange  oreconomic  prorit  with  political  obedience. 
The  01'ects  ol'the  KAdAr  cra  are  still  detectable  in  that  area.  Richard  Rose's 
claim  over  the  existence  of  many  ex-coninlunists  in  a  post-communist 
cnvi  ronment  is  true  as  there  is  a  great  number  or  card-carrying  ex-mcnibers  of 
I  11.111g,  111,111  SoCi-aliSt  Workers'  Party  integrated  into  tile  new  system.  I  lowcver, 
the  ideological  alliliation  or  these  people  with  the  communist  ideology  is 
(jucstionable  beyond  the  argument  that  in  tile  new  political  order.  sonle 
rellormist  parties  Nvere  based  oil  the  communist  parties  of  tile  old  regime,  such 
'is  (lie  IISP  %%hich  was  an  ofrspring  of  tile  IISWP  as  was  tile  Hungarian 
Workers'  Party  %%hich  flashions  itself'  upon  the  old  IISWII*s  ideological 
principles. 
I  ImNe%  er.  the  tendency  ormass  mobilisation  oil  the  grounds  orideology  may 
be  11mind  in  tile  1990  elections  in  Hungary.  However,  the  mass  mobilisation 
WIIS  110t  in  Support  of  tile  communists  but  against  them.  Tile  POPUlar  will  to 
discomicct  the  ex-conimunists  from  the  positions  of  power  led  tile  Hungarian 
public  to  vole  anti-communist.  This  resulted  in  the  appearance  of  the 
Hungarian  Democratic  Forum  as  tile  largest  party  and  tile  head  or  tile 
governing  coalition  in  the  country.  As  tile  Hungarians  wished  to  remove  tile 
communists  From  power  positions,  they  have  voted  For  an  anti-conlillunist, 
middle-class,  non-intelligentsia  political  group  which  was  represented  by  the 
I  lungarian  Democratic  Forurn. 
2"5  Richard  Rose.  'Lx-Communims  in  Ilost-communist  Societies.  '  The  Polilical  Quarterly,  vol.  67(l), 
Jantlary-March  1996  (pp.  14-215).  p.  IS. 264 
Tlie  ell'ects  or  popular  mobilisation,  albeit  not  in  conjunction  with  tile 
remnants  or  tile  old  ideological  affiliations,  may  be  seen  in  tile  1994  and  1998 
elections.  Once  it  was  apparent  that  the  communists  would  not  return  to  power 
and  t1i,  at  the  democratic  systern  was  permanent,  the  importance  of  tile  concept 
orcxperience  gained  increasing  support  leading  to  tile  IISP  victory  in  tile  1998 
elections.  'I  lie  1998  elections  witnessed  tile  rise  or  tile  urban,  educated,  young 
grotip,  not  easily  associated  With  tile  COMMUlliSt  past  and  factor  behind  tile 
victory  orthe  FIDII-Sz  in  the  elections. 
Public  response  during  tile  ballots  in  1990.1994.  and  1998  elections  are  solid 
proor  that  tile  initial  anticommunist  hysteria  has  faded  and  the  political  system 
'IS  a  \%IIOIC  is  aCCCptCLl  by  the  people.  With  the  nation-wide  orgailisation  and 
nemorking  orpolitical  parties  and  with  the  construction  orexperience  within 
political  party  cadres.  prorcssional  party  politics  are  becoming  a  part  of  tile 
I  WIlgariall  system  and  ail  important  part  oreveryday  lille.  That  tile  system  as  a 
\\  hole  is  Supported  by  the  I  lungarian  public  ilicans  that  tile  legitimacy  or  tile 
regime  is.  in  legal  and  institutional  terms  has  been  achieved  in  the  first  eight 
)-cars  orthe  post-communist  period. 
I  lo%%-c%-ct-.  general  pUblic  approval  of  tile  syste"i  is  not  enough  by  itself  to 
create  a  solid  ground  of  legitimacy.  'File  existence  of  a.  lively  civil  socIety.  as 
well  as  the  pi-cservation  and  reduction  or  economic  discrepancies  between 
difTerent  social  classes,  the  improvements  in  tile  field  of  ecoilonly  are  also 
required  ir  the  ncxv  political  order  is  to  be  legitimised.  When  tile  entire  systern 
-social  and  economic  as  Nvell  as  political  is'well-establislied,  one  may  then 
talk  about  a  sound  legitimate  order. 265 
XI.  PERCEPTION  OF  DEMOCRACY  IN  POST-COMMUNIST  HUNGARY 
A.  The  Remains  of  Yesterday: 
Although  the  MdArist  administration  was  incapable  to  kcep  with  the 
requirements  ol'  the  social  contract  from  late  1970s  onwards,  the  KAddrist 
social  contract  remains  an  important  factor  in  the  political  transformation  of 
I  ILIngarian  lille  in  the  post-communist  era.  The  KAdArist  social  contract  itself  is 
not  the  issue  that  constitutes  a  t1ircat  to  the  cxistence  of  the  actual  I  lungarian 
political  order.  but  it  inspires  a  fccling  of  nostalgia  that  appcars  in  the  common 
Social  Consciousness. 
Ewn  in  a  situation  where  there  is  a  fundamental  change  in  the  nature  of  a 
political  systcm.  in  this  case  Crom  a  single-party  to  a  multi-party  systclil,  thcre 
rcmains  (lie  possibility  that  sonle  segments  of'society  will  associate  themselves 
with  ccrtain  values  of'  tile  previous  regime.  'riiis  is  all  tile  more  likely  in  tile 
case  N%Iici-e  economic  hardship  accornpanics  political  change.  The  main  reason 
I'm  that  sort  of'  nostalgia  is  not  that  tile  (mcien  regime  was  better,  but  it  is  tile 
i  that  people  are  disillusioned  in  relation  to  Ilicir  expectations  tinder  the  new 
order. 
Prior  to  the  transition  from  communism,  there  was  a  fecling  or  longing 
to%vards  tile  fi-cer.  much  more  democratic  I  lungary.  Tile  flact  that  I  lungary  was 
virttially  an  authoritarian  dictatorship  and'  had  only  one  free  multi-party 
c1cction  bc1lore  the  communist  takc-over  did  not  change  tile  flecling  of  longing. 
It  was  a  desire  towards  a  regime  which  was  not  Stalinist  in  its  essence.  Pcople 
, 
ime  in  vdiich  they  were  able  to  own  property  r.  atlier,  than  a  regime  wanted  a  reg 
in  %khich  all  was  owned  by  the  statc.  Such  reelings  wcre  rcinflorced  by  the 
Rilikosi  regime.  The  lorced  relocation  plans  Linder  tile  leadership  of  RIkosi  and 266 
the  way  (lie  1956  uprising  was  suppressed  created  a  feeling  or  nostalgia 
to%%ards  aI  Itingary  which  did  in  fact  not  exist.  Imilicrmore.  flic  state  socialist 
SN  Isle'll  %%as  imposed  from  above  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  troops  which 
liberatcd  the  COL111try. 
A  similar  expectation  gap  can  be  found  among  those  who  promoted  (lie 
de%clopinent  of  a  capitalist  -  liberal  democratic  system.  The  expectations  oil 
the  systemic  change  were  based  on  the  observations  on  the  living  standards  of 
(lie  West  Europeans  and  North  Americans  who  cither  came  as  tourists  or  were 
%katched  or  listened  thrOLIgh  SOIlic  satellite  dishes  and  radio  waves,  or  by  the 
limiled  existence  of  Westcrii-produced  manufactured  goods  for  coninion 
comumptimi.  by  the  I  lungarian  public.  That  those  visiting  the  country  had 
better  cars.  better  living  standards  and  that  the  non-conimunist  countries  were 
abler  in  the  production  or  manuractured  goods,  were  enough  to  create  an 
illusion  about  a  more  prosperous,  happier,  more  dcveloped  standard  of'  living 
under  a  democratic  system.  'mis  illusion  about  the  other  polc  of  tlic  bipolar 
world  political  SIRICtUrc  creatcd  high  expcctations  and  thercforc  illusions  about 
thC  I'LltIll-C  01*111C  I  ILIngarian  State  arter  the  establishment  of  a  liberal  democratic 
S)'Steln-  The  MLISion  towards  capitalist  systcrn  -  and  towards  the  functioning  or 
democracy  never  included,  and  would  not,  by  definition  ol'tlic  word  'illusion, 
include  Ilic  lacts  that  there  would  be  income  gaps.  '  not  enough  work,  housing, 
not-  schooling  For  evcryonc,  and  that  there  WOLIld'be  Iligh  rates  of'  inflation, 
tinemploynictit  and  market  Iluctuations  and  the  introduction  or market  priccs. 
For  there  was  an  illusion  towards  flic  efilects  ol'systcrriic  change  and  flor  there 
%%ere  high  and  immediate  expectations  towards  a  better  quality  of  life  for 
ever)one.  (lie  disillusionment  caused  by  the  socio-econornic  changes  that  took 267 
place  during  and  in  tile  wake  of  tile  transition  had  strong  effects  ill  the 
perccplioti  ol'both  (lie  new  and  previOLIS  political  orders.  When  all  tile  negative 
el'I'ects  of*  (lie  lie%%-  polifico-economic  system  cmerged  and  these  began  to  create 
a  negative  impact  oil  the  income  levels,  expenditure  levels,  and  on  tile  second 
tile  disillusionment  process  began.  As  the  rents  went  lip,  many 
I)I'OLIIICtS  ceased  to  be  subsidised  by  the  state,  real  wages  diminished  in  parallel 
%%ith  tile  J)Urchasing  power,  and  as  unemployment  and  other  econoillic 
problems  caused  instability  within  households.  a  longing  for  the  sl(iffis  quo 
(mle  einci-ged.  What  tile  people  were  looking  for  were  not  the  political 
conditions  of*  the  K-,  id.  ir  era,  but  the  basically  economic  social  contract  that 
K6dAr  offercd  in  one  way  or  another. 
When  11101.1ght  in  conjiunction  with  the  data  presented  at  table  4.5  above,  tile 
iSSUC  01'  HILISiOn  bccomes  more  intriguing.  Table  4.5  shows  clearly  that  there 
has  becil  I  considerable  downturn  in  relation  with  the  household  income  levels 
in  111.111"MA'  It  the  smic  period.  While  one  may  observe  a  considerable 
development  in  ternis  of'  household  inconle  levels  in  all  other  countries 
Surveyed.  it  can  be  seen  that  about  2/3  of*  tile  I  lungarians  who  participated  in 
the  survc),  claimed  their  household  finances  becarne  worse  and  only  Five  to 
eight  permit  declared  ail  improvement  in  household  income.  This  outcome, 
repeated  three  ),  cars  in  a  row,  shows  that  Mdirist  Hungary  was  capable  of 
offering  more  to  the  people  in  ternis  of  inconle  and  hencc  transition  hurt  a 
great  percentage  of*  tile  population.  There  is  certainly  a  strong  correlation 
between  the  government  intervention  and  welfare  and  that  relation  makes 
Eastern  I.  Lirqpe.  but  I  lungary  in  partiCLIlar,  difficrent  from  the  Western  styie  or 268 
government  and  income  i-clatioilS206.  Considering  this  relationship,  that  peopic 
%%OLIId  loilt,  Ilor  the  previous  regime  should  be  understandable. 
Flie  existence  ol'such  a  longing  for  the  slalus  quo  ante  or  the  illusion  or  it  is 
the  main  problem  I'acing  the  Icgitimisation  of  tile  new  political  order.  JAnos 
Sinion  oliserves  that  by  the  end  or  1993.  there  was  a  clear  distinction  between 
(lie  concepts  ol'  political  lclI  and  right  and  the  general  publiC  Undustood 
is  not  l,  el*t.  *  and  on  the  other  hand,  'the  Right  is  worse  than  the 
I.  Cl*t*.  "2(17  JýJjjcjj  S 
.  illjoll  links  to  the  poor  perl'brillance  of  the  I  IDF-Ied  coalition. 
The  CITCCt  Of  diSilIUSiOIII1ICI1t  OVCr  the  public  perception  of  political  right  and 
Political  101  is  important  as  it  is  this  disilILISiOlIMCIlt  that  created  a  lack  of 
interest  1(mards  politics  ill  tile  public  at  the  end.  The  shift  in  tile  meaning  of 
tile  %Nord  of*  'clemocracy*  fior  the  people  during  the  1989-1993  period  gives 
cities  towards  %%hat  sort  or  a  reality  shock  was  experienced  during  the 
transitory  phase. 
Table  4.11.  Classifications  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  "democracy"  in 
lwrcent.  wes  of  those  who  answered208: 
Sur%  ey  I  eiir-i- 
Democracy  Nlcansl: 
1989-1 
I  ISWI,  elite 
1989-2  national 
sample 
1990  not. 
sample 
1993  not. 
sample 
Social  %-.  01-11ving  3  32  32  26 
Frecdoin  6  31  28  35 
Parlicipatio9i  53  23  15  10 
Hedifons  4  1  4  6 
Rights  7  2  6  8 
V14110  5  4  4  7 
eniotionshempers  3  6  7 
Other  3  4  2 
No.  of  respondents:  110  976  1299  1505 
2""  For  a  detailed  analysis  ol'the  subject,  see  Richard  Rose  and  T.  Makkai,  'Consensus  or  Dissensus 
About  Welfare  in  Post-Communist  Societies?,  '  Ew-opean  Jowwal  (fPofiflcal  Resew-ch,  v.  28,  pp.  203- 
224.  and  Christine  S.  Lipsme)-cr.  'Welfare  and  the  Discriminating  Public:  Evaluating  Entitlement 
Allitudes  in  Post-Communist  Europe.  '  Policy,  51udies.  Jouýiial,  v.  3  (4),  pp.  545-56  1,  November  2003. 
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1j,  11jos  cinjon.  '\Vhat  does  democracy  mem  lor  I  lungarians?,  '  Coexistem-e,  vol.  32  (pp.  325-340),  p. 
3 )27. 
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When  lhe  results  ol'  this  survey  arc  analysed,  the  first  point  is  to  note  flic 
difference  between  the  ordinary  people's  and  the  IJSWP  clite's  approaches  to 
the  perception  oNcinocracy  in  the  reform  year  of'  1989.  While  only  3%  of  the 
I  ISIAT  elite  saw  democracy  in  terms  or  social  well-being,  32%  of  tile  national 
sample  identified  the  concepts  of  democracy  and  social  well-being.  Tile 
emphasis  on  representation  that  the  elite  had  madc  was  never  shared  by  the 
gcneral  public  %,  N  hich  valued  the  importance  or  freedom  in  democracy  flar  illore 
than  the  I  ISWP  elite  surveyed.  Therefore,  the  distinction  I  try  to  make  between 
(lie  intelligentsia's  and  tile  general  public's  perceptions  of  politics,  statc-citizen 
relations  and  the  dill1crence  between  their  comparative  perceptions  ol'tlic  new 
political  order  is  once  more  apparent  in  this  survey.  While  the  clite  had  a 
di  111CIVIlt  le%'cl  or  expectation  than  the  ordinary  people,  both  segments  or  (lie 
socicty  craved  [Ior  reflorni.  The  difTcrence  is  that  tile  latter's  ,,  ie%v  ol'rellonli  was 
not  Imused  oil  personal  liberties  but  econornic  improvement. 
The  decline  in  tile  -answers  linking  dcniocracy  to  well-being  and  with 
participation  between  the  First  survey  in  1989  and  the  last  one  in  1993  is 
remarkable.  Thesc  two  results  indicate  that  democracy  as  a  medium  or 
participation  in  the  policy-making  has  created  a  negative  effect  in  public  illind. 
The  expectations  1roin  participation  to  policy-illaking  were  as  intangible  as 
were  those  expectations  ol'becorning  financially  be  iter-off  under  a  dcrilocratic 
regime.  I  lowever.  that  there  is  a  decline  in  tile  linkage  between  participation 
and  democracy  is  a  sign  of'  problem  in  the  public  perception  of'  democratic 
process.  The  considerably  low  turnouts  in  tile  general  and  municipal  elections 
(in  all  three  elections,  there  has  been  a  consistent  ratio  ofbet",  ccn  54%  to  60% 270 
ol'cligible  voters  attending  the  ballots,  and  an  even  lesser  number  showed  up 
in  local  c1cctions.  while  in  (lie  2002  elections  the  figure  is  round  70%  of  all 
votcrs)  and  the  low  numbers  or  membership  or  political  parties  indicate  a 
decline  in  interest  in  tile  political  process.  I'lle  lack  or  interest  in  civil  sociely 
illStitLitiOll.  1;  Oil  the  one  liand  and  the  lack  of  interest  in  direct  political  action  oil 
tile  other  hand  indicate  a  disillusionment  with  tile  political  process. 
In  addition  to  the  above  conclusions,  one  should  take  public  satisraction  with 
the  development  or  democracy  into  consideration.  As  can  be  seen  Froill  table 
4.12  below,  throughout  tile  mid-1990s  about  80%  Of  Hungarians  were 
1.111S.  HiStICLI  %%ith  the  developnicilt  of  democracy  in  their  country.  This  level 
[alls  (o  6211/o  ill  the  year  2003,  %NIicn  the  country  was  close  to  European  Union 
0:  11)  membership.  'nie  levels  of  satisfaction  with  democracy  in  Hungary, 
therel'ore.  impi-mcd  %Nith  a  possibility  or  a  better  lire  within  the  E-uropean 
UniOll  and  aS  the  correlation  between  well-being  and  dcniocracy  was  not  as 
often  established  as  berore.  These  two  ractors  contribute  greatly  to  the 
percclilions  or  denlocracy  and  or  democracy's  development  in  Hungarian 
public.  The  EIJ  membership  issue,  which  also'arlectcd  the  2002  election 
rcstilts.  has  also  contributed  to  the  ilungarians'  confidcnce  in  their  country, 
their  COUntry's  denlocracy.  and  the  fact  that  they  now  see  th6iiselm 
considered  as  parts  ora  larger,  Crcer,  and  richcr  I'Airope.  When  one  analyses  the 
CII,  1119CS  ill  tile  Country  in  rclation  with  the  EU  rnernbcrship,  tile  revisions  made 
to  the  I  lungarian  legal  systern  so  that  it  would  beCorric  compatible  with  tile  EU 
C0111111LIllit)'  Law.  it  may  be  understood  that,  the  public  perception  has  also 
positivcly  changed  towards  the  working  or  tile  system.  When  the  public 
generally  belicves  that  tile  institutions  which  once  only  existed  in  name  and 271 
I'ailed  to  I'miction  are  now  truly  working  due  to  tlic  EU  connection,  dctnocracy, 
as  a  rcginic  ol'institutions  and  rights  would  be  seen  strongcr2()(). 
Year 
1994 
4)96 
2003 
'rable  4.12.:  Salisfiction  with  the  development  of  democracy210: 
llungitry  Poland  Belarus  Czecls  Bulgaria  Romania 
Republic 
s  20  S:  35  S:  13  S:  48  S:  20  S:  30 
It:  74  11:  49  If:  68  U:  48  11:  69  U:  56 
23  S:  23  S:  II  S:  44  S:  4  S:  31 
P:  66  Il:  6.1  If:  73  1.1:  5.3  Il:  91  if:  67 
S-20  S:  50  S:  14  S:  46  S:  13  S:  37 
U-  77  U:  38  11:  67  th  50  If:  80  If:  58 
S:  33  S:  23  S:  -  S:  41  S:  22  S:  21 
11:  62  11:  72  11:  -  If:  55  If:  75  U:  77 
The  main  cause  of'  the  problem  is  flic  decline  in  inconic  lcvcls  and  living 
standards  Ilor  the  majority  ol'the  pOpUlation.  The  UdArist  social  contract  and 
expectations  linked  to  this  social  contract,  the  remains  of  the  political 
yesterday  ofII  ungary,  are  the  main  causes  of  the  current  problems  in  II  Ungary. 
B.  The  Problems  of  Today: 
1.  Economic  Problems: 
Currently.  the  post-communist  political  order  is  troubled  as  there  arc  few 
options  to  of  , f1cr  to  (lie  society  to  reduce  the  level  of  post-conlillunist 
disillusionment.  me  inisperception  about  the  working  of  the  capitalist  system 
and  its  consequences  are  as  important  as*  the  niNperccived  nostalgia  about  the  S 
good  old  days'  of'  the  MdArist  past.  The  aura  of'  cxpcctations  of'  rapid  p 
improvement  in  living  standards  combined  with  tile  loss  or  darnage  or  a 
secondary  income  rrorn  the  second  econolnj-lor  many  industrial  workers 
causes  a  general  feeling  ohiiistrust  and  isolation  in  the  gcneral  public. 
21"'  l'or  (fie  impact  ofthe  legal  issues,  see  Jimmy  0.  Milanese,  'The  Road  to  EU  Membership: 
1`111,01-cing  Competition  Policy  in  I  lun-gary,  '  Liverlmol  Luiv  Review,  v.  25,2004,  pp.  79-106. 272 
The  llollowhig  table  vvhich  shows  the  difTerence  between  1993  and  1995  in 
tcrins  of*  (lie  perception  of  free  inarkct  conditions  is  of  great  import  in 
identi  1ý,  ing,  the  current  problem  which  may  create  a  greater  crisis  or  legitimacy 
I'm  the  current  political  order  than  it  is  expected: 
Table  4.13.:  Changes  in  the  judgement  of  free  market  economy,  1993- 
1995:  Do  you  agree  with  the  following?  ('Yo  of  respondents  saying  they 
"I  believe  that  the  rolloi%ing  should  happen":  1  / 
Siir%-c%-  Ycar-4: 
1993 
(%-yes) 
1995 
(%-yes) 
Wage%  to  be  determined  by  market  conditions  68  61 
1hose  %iho  aren't  fully  competent  should  be 
Inatle  redundant 
49  40 
Big  companies  need  to  be  privatised  50  39 
Ilig  real  estates  need  be  privatised  41  35 
Succe%sful  businessmen  should  become  very  rich  36  27 
Companies  need  to  be  purchased  by  foreign 
invesiors 
30  23 
Large  private  lands/property's  appearance 
needs  to  be  permitted 
23  20 
foreigners  should  be  allowed  to  purchase  real 
r%fales 
20  15 
foreigners  should  be  allowed  to  ; 
urchase 
__L 
ihricultural  land 
16  5 
As  the  rcsponse  figures  show.  there  is  a  shift  Ilrom  a  positive  attitude  towards 
copitalism  as  an  economic  system  as  a  Nvliole  towards  a  more  cautious 
approach  to  the  application  of  capitalism  per  se  in  the  country.  The  poll 
suggests  that  foreign  involvenicilt  which  nicant  optimisation  or  resoýirccs  in 
the  organisations  acquired  and  managed  through  foreign  direct  investment  has 
not  been  inct  with  popular  sympathy.  The  fact  that  about  60%  of  those 
surveyed  preflerred  incompetent  workers  to  remain  at  tlleirjobs  is  not  a  sign  for 
the  Hungarian  indifference  to  low  ell'iciency  and  productivity  levcls,  but  is 
21  ()  1),  11,1  leathered 
from  I 
. -a,,  l  European  Eurobarometcr  and  Candidate  Countries  EUrobaromclcr.  1994  to 
200  1.  ,I. 273 
more  ol*  a  sign  of  a  Ilear  ol'  capitalist  system.  Tile  fear  stenis  rrom 
understanding  that  tile  system  that  they  hoped  would  improve  tile  standard  of 
living  is  also  capable  of'  creating  redundancies.  The  rairly  low  to  very  low 
support  in  regard  to  foreign  ownership  of  businesses  and  of  land  has  two  main 
roots:  Firstly,  it  relates  to  the  growth  of  redundancies  under  foreign  ownership 
and  the  lack  ol'access  to  the  production  facilities  vhich  were  available  under 
the  KA(Uirist  seconif  ccononij,.  Secondly,  the  nationalist  tendencies  were 
ascendant  near  the  end  ol'  the  communist  rule  with  the  fear  that  tile  country 
%N  ill  I`all  into  11oreign  hands.  This  came  at  a  time  or  Soviet  withdrawal  and  the 
regaining  ol'political  independence.  Tile  growing  concern  about  privatisation 
may  lie  linked  with  these  two  niaýfor  fears  as  well. 
As  to  the  issue  ol'the  implementation  of  the  free  market  economy,  Hungarian 
public  remained  suspicious  of  the  new  economic  order.  In  a  survey  conducted 
in  1993.761,11o  of  the  respondents  thought  that  free  market  conditions  should  be 
in  Hungary.  %%,  hile  15%  did  not  approve  with  the  proposition.  In  1995,  the 
sanle  question  Nvas  resulted  in  a  decline  in  public  confidence  towards  tllc 
elite's  idea  ol"I'ree  market  environment:  'rile  ratio  ol'those  in  favour  of  the  rrce 
market  showcd  a  decline  of  21%  to  5'5%  while  those  who  did  not  think  a  free 
market  economy  was  aimed  to  be  established,  after  all  the  privaiisation, 
economic  and  legal  ref'ornis,  has  increased  to  31%  from  15%212.  That  more 
people  (141,110  in  1995  as  opposed  to  9%  in  1993)  responded  that  they  did  not 
know  demonstrates  th'at  the  public  trust  towards  capitalist  market  system  is  in 
(Icclinc. 
"I  ll.  aszlo  Beck.  A  Magyprors7ga"'POlilikai  Evkonvve-1996  cgy  MUetenek  kezirata,  Mcdian  Mcdia 
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Public  suspicion  towards  tile  new  econornic  order  and  hence  tile  new  political 
order  shaping  (lie  economy.  has  its  bases  in  tile  particular  manifestation  tile 
economic  system  takes  in  Hungary.  111  1980,90%  of  the  official  gross 
domestic  product  (GDP)  of  the  country  was  produced  by  the  state.  In  the  sarne 
year.  101,14  of  I  lungarian  GDP  was  produced  by  domestic  private  sector  and 
there  was  no  roreign  ownership.  Allcr  the  transition,  in  1990  tile  state  share  in 
the  61)11  declined  to  76%.  tile  domestic  private  sector's  share  rose  to  23%,  and 
V!  '(',  ol'the  OD11  was  produced  by  foreign  direct  investment  projects.  111  1993, 
the  ratios  ý%cre  371.  ',  o  flor  state's  share,  50%  for  private  sector  and  13%  flor 
l'oreign  o%%  ned  companies.  I  lowevcr.  %vith  tile  inclusion  orthe  seconct  econon1j, 
activities.  tile  ligures  Ilor  state,  domestic  private  owncrship,  and  foreign 
investment  owned  parts  of  tile  economy  become  83%,  17%,  and  0% 
respectively  in  1980,  and.  3711/0,50%  and  13%  respectively  in  1993213. 
The  shill  in  tile  balance  between  state-owned  and  private  sectors  in  the 
conduct  orthe  economy  indicated  a  shill  in  the  balance  between  job  security 
and  the  threat  of  sudden  unemployment.  Tile  ratio  of  econornically  inactive 
young  and  old  household  depending  oil  wage  carners  has  arisen  from  117/100 
ID 
in  1987  to  167/100  in  1993214,  creating  a  further  economic  burden  oil  tile 
lower-earning  groups.  Despite  government  attempts  to  cUSIlion  tl  i  ýpact 
of  IC  III 
cconomic  changes  by  spending  26%  to  28%  orthe  budget  on  social  security, 
the  number  or  (lie  people  living  under  tile  poverty  line  have  grown 
dramatically.  While  there  wcrc  one  million  people  living  at  or  below  tile 
212 
213  Rtidolf  RiW%.  Tolitical  Transition  and  sociai  'rransformation  in  11ungary,  '  Sumarios  Afers 
Internocitinals.  no.  34-35  (17  pa-Cs),  downloaded  from  the  %yebsitc  addrcss  %vww.  cidob.  es/Caste11ano/ 
11ag  7.1 
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rnininitim  living  standards  in  1987,  the  number  rose  to  one  million  and  a  hair 
ill  1990  and  to  three  to  three  and  a  half  million  people  in  1994215.  Ill  a  country 
ofa  population  of  10.8  million  and  in  which  gross  domestic  production  (GDP) 
has  decreased  18.5%  between  1988  and  1993216.  the  decrease  in  living 
st .,  andardsand  file  rise  in  unemployment  are  remarkable. 
W'hile  a  Keynesian  approach  to  political  economy  might  help  improve  the 
economic  and  social  situation,  national  governments  lack  tile  power  to  provide 
the  necesNary  soltitions  to  the  economic  problems  and  their  social 
consequences.  This  is  primarily  due  to  the  high  rates  of  foreign  debts  and  tile 
giiidelines  set  by  INIF  stand-by  agreements  which  in  theory  exist  to  case  tile 
transilion  it)  capitalism  and  to  provide  111C  Country  with  monetary  support  as 
%%ell  as  technical  and  economic  know-how.  As  the  state  sector  continues  to 
decrease  ill  size  and  to  provide  secure  but  low-wage  employment,  tile  private 
sector  Wlich  increases  in  size  offiers  higher  wages  with  no  guarantee  or 
continuous  employment.  With  no  direct  government  control  over  the  economy, 
due  to  (lie  declining  size  orthe  state  sector  within  tile  economy,,  and  tile  stand- 
1)),  agreelilelits  witil  tile  INIF,  the  implementation  of  Keynesian  measures  are 
impossible.  The  immediate  consequences  or  these  appear,  to  be  growing 
unemployment  and  poverly  which  have  res'tilted  in'thc  groWth  of'  nostalgia 
towards  the  MidArist  social  contract  on  tile  one  hand.  and  has  created  a 
215  1  bkL  1).  9.  Crom  R.  Andorka  and  Z.  Spcder,  'A  magyar  (arsadalom  szerkezete',  1994'  (,  me  structure 
of'  Ilun-arian  society.  1994),  in  S.  Kurtan  et  al.  (ed.  s),  Magvarorszag  Politikai  Erkonvye.  1996 
1 
(I  lim-armn  Politicil  ý'carbook.  1996)  Budapest:  DKMPA:  1996,  p.  325. 
C, 
Geolfre)  Evans  and  S(cphen  Whitelield,  'The  Politics  and  Ec(-)'noýlnics  of  Denio6cratic  Commitment: 
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legilimacy  crisis  ror  the  new  political  order  in  the  political  sphere  on  tile  other 
hand. 
Another  important  element  in  econonlic  relations  is  tile  role  of  the  trade 
unions.  Labour  representation  has  experienced  a  great  transformation  in 
II  ungary.  The  emergence  of  competition  within  trade  unions,  thcir  struggle  for 
survi-val  and  Ilien  problems  they  face  due  to  the  state  the  Hungarian  economy 
was  in.  The  Antall  government  which  introduced  iic%v  measures  to  deal  With 
the  economic  problems  ol'  the  country,  has  turned  Hungary  into  a 
"antidevelopmentil  state  1whichl  siplions  resources  out  Of  tile  eColloilly.  11217  A 
new  economie  systcin.  based  on  the  East  Asian  principles,  which  led  to  the 
establishment  of'  the  tripartite  negotiations  in  terms  of'  labour  relations.  The 
resulting  system  turned  out  to  be  a  system  or  bargaining  among  tile 
i-cilresentatives  or  the  state.  or  the  entreprelleUrs.  and  ofthe  labour.  From  one 
perslicctive.  as  (lie  transition  period  requires  a  certain  type  ol'arrangenient  in 
industrial  relations  and  permits  an  interventionist  state.  Within  the  institutional 
anarch),  (if'  tile  transition  period,  the  emergoice  oF  tile  tripartite  negotiations 
Ims  even  been  a  positive  intervention  for  the  I  lungarian  ecollonly.  Yet,  ir  one 
thinks  orthe  situation  within  tile  boundaries  or  civil  society  and  legitimacy  of 
the  s)stem.  then  (lie  tripartite  systern  and  continuous  state  intervention  into  the 
cconom),  cannot  be  seen  as  positive  aspects218.  Also,  such  interventions  From 
the  government  towards  creating  more  income  1`6  r  the  state  but  which  also 
reduced  capabilities  (if'  (lie  public,  especially  of  tile  YOLIth,  such  as  the 
217  Brus/I  and  Stark  quoted  in  Laszlo  Andor,  I  Itingary  on  the  Road  to  the  European  Union,  Transition 
in  Blue.  llraqgwr.  Woport,  2000,  p.  103. 
218  For  a  more  dctailed  discussion  of  the  tripartite  negotiations  and  their  impact  on  civil  society,  see, 
Mi%zlivel/.  Verene.  I'arOcipation  and  Transition:  Can  the  Civil  Society  Project  SUrvive  in  Hungary,  ' 
Journill  (!  /  (  '(11111mmism  shufivs  mul  Tronsiflon  Politics,  vol.  13(l).  March  1997,  pp.  2740. 277 
introduction  ol'  juitioll  fees  within  the  framework  of  the  Bokros  econonlic 
illyrovement  package.  havc  not  contributed  to  the  development  or  a  mutual 
understanding  between  the  socicly  and  the  post-communist  regime  in 
I  Iuntarv21". 
Such  economic  problems  led  to  political  problerns  and  a  loss  of  trust  in  tile  key 
instiltitions  ofthe  country. 
2.  Political  Problems: 
The  immediate  political  consequcnecs  -or,  reflections-  of  the  above-citcd 
economic  problems  appear  as  a  loss  of  interest  in  political  participation  and  an 
cro%ion  ol*  trust  towards  the  agencics  of  the  post-communist  reginic.  The 
11611mving  table.  based  on  the  rcsults  of  a  1995  survcy,  shows  that  the  POPLIlar 
support  Im  (lie  key  institutions  or  the  transition  era  has  diminished  while  those 
%%hich  are  either  neutral  or  which  seem  to  protect  the  public  good  are  lield  in  a 
flavourable  posilion  in  public  comption. 
()I'  the  institutions  cited  in  the  survey,  the  office  or.  presid.  ency  has  no  active 
participatory  role  in  the  policy-making  process  apart  from  representing  the 
nation  as  its  symbolic  leader.  I  lowever,  with  tile  'image  or  president'  created 
by  Umos  KAdAr  as  the  nation's  flather  figure,  the  presidency  Ila-,  a  Iligh  regard. 
Fhe  role  ol'  presidency  is  strcngthencd  by  the  odd  rcmark  made  by  the 
prc%idcnt  about  (lie  conduct  orall'airs  in  the  country,  although  the  president  has 
no  impact  on  policy-making  process.  The  political  comments  lidip  preserve  the 
kidier-president  image  created  and  exploited  by  Mddr.  The  Constitutional 
Court.  regarded  as  highly  as  the  presidency  is.  on  the  other  hand,  a  safeguard 278 
of  the  rule  of  law  principle  in  the  country  and  hence  has  a  politically  active 
role.  That  flic  Constitutional  Court  had  invalidated  the  Gyula  Horn 
government's  austerity  nicasures  declaring  these  unconstitutional  in  the  carlicr 
parts  orthe  year  of  tile  survey  has  helped  improve  the  public  perception  or  tile 
Court's  role.  *me  high  rating  it  receives  may  therefore  be  linked  to  the 
popularity  ol'that  carlier  dccision  which  increased  its  image  as  'the  dcrender 
ol'the  people  against  savage  capitalism'. 
Table  4.15.:  Support  for  the  key  institutions  of  the  post-communist 
politic,  11  sl,  stel,  1220: 
Ins(itution  Name  Approval  Rate 
Presidency  65 
Consfitutional  Court  64' 
Political  Parties  II 
I'lic  Parliment  22 
The  1(-..  llornj 
Gmernivient 
21 
Uourts  46 
'I  lie  Army  44 
The  I%Isi%s  Media  32 
.,  DiIIIIIII  (III  COII%tiltItiOlll]  Court  froin  Rudolf'  TOWS.  'Political  Transition  and  Social 
Trall"I'01-111,11ioll  ill  I  lumml),  % 
I- 
According  to  data  shown  in  tile  table  above  based  oil  1994  findings,  the 
lowest-ranked  in  terms  of  public  approval  are  tllcýpolitical  parties.  Their 
approval  rate  is  nearly  one  fiffil  of  the  two  institutions  which  have  the  highest 
ninking. 
Interestingly.  as  can  be  seen  in  the  table  below,  'within  9  years  of  change,  not 
IIILICII  improvement  can  be  seen  in  terms  or  tile'-,  trust  towards  the  key 
institutions.  In  a  survey  madc  in  2003,  tile  following  results  were  obtained:  -- 
21"  Andor.  loc.  cit  ".  1).  111. 
-communist  22"Data  From  klatilim  Wyman,  Slepliell  Wilitc,  et  al.,  'Thc  Placc  of  'Party'  in  Post 
Mirll-  l'olifics.  vol.  1  (4).  1995  (pp.  535-548),  p.  538. 279 
Table  4.16.:  Trust  towards  key  political  organisations  in  different 
Cf)  ,  III  riCS221: 
(.  'I)  it  it  t  ry  / 
institution 
Political 
parties 
I  Civil  service  National  National 
government  parliament 
_J! 
un  REY 
. --g-  - 
15  40  38  36 
Sim-enil  11)  27  33  31 
(Well  It.  13  30  30  20 
Turkel,  17  18  63  06 
I  foist  nfi_ 
t7777w__ 
24  1.4  13 
The  table  4.16  shows  that  the  political  parties  rate  fiar  behind  the  civil  service 
and  tile  -overnment  and  the  parliament.  Tile  main  reason  for  tile  continuous 
national  alienation  Crom  the  political  parties  is  the  continuous  stalemate  in  the 
political  system  mhich  stenis  From  the  negotiations  and  mutual  agreement 
%%hich  ahn  at  creating  a  pacific  political  environment.  The  same  political 
COIISCIISLIS  however.  restricts  direct  public  influence  over  the  political  system. 
As  all  the  parliamentary  political  parties  are  supportive  of  privatisation,  or  free 
mark-ct  mcclianism,  multi-party  liberal  democracy,  Hungarian  membership  to 
NATO  and  to  the  EU  Ax.  to  the  Hungarian  participation  into  the  capitalist 
%wrld  structure  once  reflerred  to  as  the  West-.  and  as  tile  econorny  is  mainly 
1-1111  ill  COllCOl-d  With  tile  IMF,  tile  Political  parties  are  ill  no  position  to  deliver 
%kIMt  tile  IlLiblic  wants,  namely  better  living  standards,  better  education,  better 
housing.  less  working  hours  Ilor  better,  wages.  As  the  illusions  of  the  pUblic 
delli,  ind  clashes  Nvith  tile  realities  of  what  can  and  what  cannot  be  d9ne  in 
I  tile  Popular  1rustration  reflects  itself*  as  a  loss  of'  trust  in  political 
parties.  a  lack  of'  intercst  in  political  life,  and  therefore  a  public  suspicion 
towards  the  political  parties.  Tile  parliament.  which  has  been  tile  rocus  of  all 
institutional  change  in  I  lungary  during  the  transition.  has  also  lost  its  status  as 
flic  1`6cal  point  of  all  the  iniprovcnients.  It  was  rated  in  1994  above  tile  Gyula 
221  candi(hite  Countries  Eur"baromeler.  2003.4,  Full  Report,  p.  26. 280 
llorn-led  11SP-Al-D  coalition  government  (22%  to  21%  respectively)  which 
had  lost  its  popularity  due  to  the  economic  austerity  measures  it  tried  to 
implement.  That  the  anny  and  tile  churclics  are  rated  Car  above  tile  political 
institutions  like  the  parliament.  the  government,  the  political  parties  and  even 
the  mass  media  has  to  do  with  public  affinity  with  its  apolitical  role. 
The  solution  to  the  confidence  problem  the  nliýjor  iliStitUtiOllS  WhiCh  COIlStitUtC 
and  represent  the  current  political  order  is  in  the  creation  of  a  stable  middle 
class  %%hich  could  all-iliate  fliciliselves  with  the  benclits  of  tile  new  system  and 
there6ore  associate  themselves  with  the  new  political  order  and  its  institutions. 
'I  lie  KIdArist  middle  class  of'  party  members  and  bLII-eaUCMtS  is  partly  flading 
away  and  as  the  state  sector  is  unable  to  sustain  better  wages,  it  will  continue 
to  rmie  away.  'ro  balanee  the  situation,  the  state  needs  to  invest  heavily  in 
1111dOilIg  tllC  income  gap  created  between  tile  new  rich  and  the  new  poor. 
increasing  the  social  security  network  and  subsidisc  prices  of  mainstream 
goods  in  the  market.  I  lowever,  tile  main  problem  steninled  from  the  state's  and 
the  governments'  inability  to  realise  that  aim.  The  sudden  capitalisation  or  the 
economy  created  its  bourgeois  class,  yet.  oil  the  other  hand,  resulted  ill 
hardship  flor  the  ni,  ýIority  or  the  people  in  Hungary.  Old  age  pensioners, 
StUdentS,  N%OlllCll.  University  teachers,  unskilled  workers  do  suffier  arid  are 
likely  to  continue  to  sull*cr  under  the  new  savage  capitalism  which  has  no 
infrastructural  concerns  at  tile  moment  and  is  struggling  to  survive  in  tile 
I  lungarian  setting. 
On  the  other  hand,  Nflien  the  Hungarian  public  is  questioned  about  the  top 
three  most  Irustcd  (-)  rgan  i  sati  oils  in  2003,  the  results  %N,  crc  as  follows: 281 
Table  4.17.:  The  three  most  trusted  organisationS222: 
Country  /  Ifungary  Poland  I  Czech  Republic  I 
imlihitioes 
Most  United  Voluntat),  United  Nations 
(rusted 
- 
Nations  56%  organisations  59%  471,  o  T  2"  Illost  European  The  Arrný  59",  ý  Volummy 
trusted  Union  56%  organisations  46% 
Y;  Flmo.;  t  Ille  Police  United  Nations  540,  o  I  Eluropean  Union 
frij-ded  .  18% 
1 
430,4 
As  can  be  scen  from  the  table  above,  tile  I  lungarian  public  sees  tile  United 
Nations  and  the  FU  as  the  niost  trustworthy  ol'  all  organisations  and  then 
mentions  the  police  florce,  whereas  in  Poland  voluntaiy  and  charity-oriented 
organisations  top  the  list  Nvith  equal  trust,  flollowed  by  tile  UN.  In  tile  Czech 
Republic.  the  UN  leads  over  the  voluntary  and  charity-oriented  organisations 
N%hile  the  1:  1)  comes  third.  This  shows  the  degree  of  mistrust  towards  tile 
institutions  ol'  the  new  order  even  aller  13  years  and  a  similar  result  may  be 
clainied  to  exist  Im  the  Czech  nation.  The  lack  ol'the  voluntary  organisations 
1*1'()Ill  IIIC  IiSt  ill  I  ILIngary  may  indicate  a  problem  with  the  dcvelopment  or  tile 
civil  socicly  and  its  gcncral  conditions  by  the  general  public.  That  the  police  is 
menfloned  right  ailer  two  non-national  organisations.  one  symbolising  the  idea 
of  international  legitimacy  and  the  second  symbolising  the  greater  idea  of 
Europeanness  I  Itingary  has  now  become  a  part  or.  both  strong  international 
organisations  with  clear-cut  rules  and  solid  traditions,  shows  that  in  the 
national  level  there  nlay  be  problems  concerning  the  institutionalisation,  ir  not 
cstablishment  . vithin  the  public  mind,  ol'the  key  institutions. 
3.  The  Gender  Problem: 
The  issue  ol'gender  dillerentiation,  although  not  an  issue  during  the  KAdArist 
cra.  ha.,  i  become  a  problem  for  post-communist  I  luilgarian  society  as  well  as 
222  Candidale  Counlries  Euroba"olneler.  2003.4.  Full  Report,  1).  32. 282 
other  Fast  European  countries.  After  the  systemic  change.  and  especially  when 
uncniployment  is  discussed,  one  must  not  underestimate  the  rise  of 
discrimination  against  women  in  tanis  of  employment  in  the  rcgion.  In  the 
post-communist  Second  World,  being  a  wornan  appears  to  be  a  cause  for 
dismissal  Ilrom  "ork. 
Stie  Hridger  and  Rebecca  Kay  conclude  that  it  is  "generally  recognised  that  in 
I 
, 
-1  C11,10tiC  JICHOLI  of*  change  which  has  followcd  the  dernise  or  the  USSR, 
%%omen  have  been  the  major  losers.  "  They  argue  that  women  had  flormed  the 
absolute  nui.  jority  of  those  left  unemployed.  They  observe  that  at  sonic  regions 
Nkithin  Russia.  the  ratio  ol'womcn  within  the  offlicially  registered  tinciliploycd 
goes  as  high  as  85  to  90  percent  although  they  USUally  make  up  around  70  to 
75  permil.  They  blame  the  'protective'  poiicies  or  tiie  USSR  as  the  main 
reason  lor  the  high  rate  of*  unemployment  aniong  Russian  women  as  well  as 
the  post-communist  inedia  campaigns  cniphasising  the  place  of  women  is  at 
home  and  beside  their  childrcn223.  Tatyana  Kotzeva  has  similar  observations 
on  the  place  and  perception  or  womcn  in  the  post-coilinlunist  Esat  E.  uropean. 
and  particularly  Bulgarian.  society.  Kotzcva  claims  that  there  are 
--coninionalifics  between  the  'Second'  and  the  `rhird  World'  which  makes  it 
I 
possible  of*  East  Furopean  cases  to  be  Subsumed  under  Studies  of'  'post- 
colonialil).  *.  -22-1  Kotzcva  clainis  that  while  Nvomen  are  represented  as  a  symbol 
of*  technological  progress  and  the  incarnation  of  revolutionary  energy,  this 
restiltcd  in  the  creation  of'  a  'transgressive  flcrnininity.  *  while  the  post- 
223  Sue  Brido  r  and  Rebecca  Kay,  'Gender  and  Generation  in  the  New  Russian  Labour  Market.  '  in 
C-c  -a!  y  Russia,  London:  Routledge,  (cd.  ).  ation  and  Identity  in  Contempoi 
1996.  pp.  21-22  pas%im. 283 
communist.  nationalistic  rhetoric  has  become  to  be  perceived  as  an  allegory  of 
interiorily.  innerness.  home,  and  purity225.  Thus,  discrimination  towards 
fieniale  cinployces.  both  in  redundancies  and  new  employment  have  becorne 
the  mainstream  in  both  Russia  and  Bulgaria.  In  post-comillunist  Poland, 
Nvomen*s  rights  %vere  restricted  with  the  revoking  ofthe  right  to  abortion.  with 
the  decline  in  the  num,  ber  of  kindergartens  and  nursery  schools,  and 
Illoilledlood,  with  tile  influence  of  the  Catholic  Church  has  been  emphasised  as 
no%%hcre  else  in  tile  11ormcr  Second  World226. 
In  the  case  of  I  lungary.  the  situation  is  similar  to  these  two  countries  and  the 
rest  orl'astern  Furope.  EvA  Fodor  points  out  that  in  1980,  almost  50  percent  of 
financial  executives  and  chier  accountants  were  women  and  female  CEOs 
made  16  percent  or  the  whole,  yet  after  1989.  their  number  ill  executive 
positions  flell  sharply.  Fodor  relates  this  to  the  rise  or  tile  niale-dorninant 
capimlist  ideologies.  lack  of  party  membership  and  sell'-employment  anlongst 
N%ollIC11.1111d  Concludes  that  -with  the  discrinlination  women  surfer  as  mothers, 
they  were  summarily  relegated  to  tile  position  of"reserve'  and  expected  to  be 
tile  first  to  lose  theirjobs  when  in  economic  recession  occurred.  "227  However, 
N%  ilile  thc  situation  is  similar  to  tile  other  countries  of  the  region,  one  may  also 
,  -cc  that  rcdundancies  faced  by  1'emale  workers  are  far  lower  ill  I  lungary  than 
those  flaccd  by  their  flellow  East  E-uropean  post-communist  counterparts.  The 
11ollowing  table  vhicll  shows  the  redundancy  ratios  in  Hungary,  Poland,  and 
221  lat),  ina  Ki)tzc%,  a.  *Re-Imagining  Bulgarian  Womcn:  The  Marxist  Lcgacy  and  Wonicn's  Self- 
Identily.  '  in  Chris  Corrin  (ed.  ),  Gcnder  and  Identity  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  London:  Frank 
cas%.  1999.11.84. 
2,15  lbid..  pp.  83-86  pas,  ýim. 
220  I'Mi  l'odor.  'Gender  in  Transition:  Unemployment  in  I  lungary,  Poland,  and  Slovakia.  '  Ecul 
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Slovakia  shows  that  even  in  the  most  nationalistic  era  of  post-cornmunist  lil'e. 
that  is.  during  the  rule  of  tile  I  lungarian  Democratic  Forum  between  1990  and 
1994.  Ille  fleniale  unemployment  has  not  become  as  marginal  in  Hungary  as  in 
these  lx%o  ollicr  countries. 
Table  4.18.  Unemployment  Rates  in  llungaiT,  Poland  and  Slovakia228: 
1993 
Immary 
Male 
lloogary 
I-emale 
Ilungary 
Total 
Poland 
NINIC 
Poland 
Female 
Poland 
Total 
Slo%  Mkin 
NIMIC 
slo%uhin 
Feloule 
Slovakia 
To(al 
1  14  1.7  32  3.8  3.5 
9.2  7.6  9.5  7.9  1  I.  X  9.7  6.3  6.9  6.6 
II  ()  10.5  12  1  1  I.  X  14.9  13.3  11.1  11.7  114 
1  1.2___  0.1  12.1  14.3.,.  173  15.7  12.5  12.9 
As  the  Table  4.18  shows.  the  number  of  feniale  redundancies  overweighs  tile 
number  ol'male  redundancies  in  both  Poland  and  Slovakia,  but  the  number  or 
redundancies  in  I  lungary  flavour  fiernale  workers.  It  is  partly  because  of  tile 
K,  lidiltrist  second  economy  and  its  impact  in  ternis  of  employment  as  well  as 
individualism  oil  the  I  lungarian  society.  and  partly  because  orthe  industries  hit 
by  1'CdU1lLk111CiCS.  In  I  lungary.  in  tile  period  examined  above,  tile  service  sector 
boomed  %%hile  agriculture.  construction,  and  industrial  labour  markets  shrank, 
hence  ,  ()I  111'ecting  women  as  much  as  their  counterparts  in  Poland  and 
Slovakia22".  I  lo%ve%-cr,  there  is  a  tendency  orjob  losses  flor  women  in  I  Itingary 
in  managerial  positions.  L- 
Yel.  Job  losses  are  not  the  only  gender-related  issue  in  I  Itingarian  soci,  ýl  lille. 
The  place  of'  women  in  the  Hungarian  society  and  tile  way  wonlen  are 
perceived  was  tried  to  be  changed  as  well.  Wring  the  I  lungarian  Democratic 
Fortim  government.  the*role  or  womcil  as  mothers  was  cilipliasised  while  no 
227  Ibid..  pp.  470  and  479  passim.  Fodor  bases  her  argument  on  'reserve'  status  to  Chris  Corrin's 
MagNar  Women:  I  lyn-arian  Women's  Lives  1960s  -  1990s  (New  York,  NY:  St.  Martin's  Press,  1993). 
22NI'rom  IN&  1).  474.  taken  from  the  Yearbook  or  Labor  Statistics.  International  Labor  Office,  1993. 
22"  Ibid..  p.  485. 285 
new  arcas  of*  cmploymcnt  were  opened  for  women,  except  for  the 
pornographic  industry.  Chris  Corrin  observed  that  during  the  IIDF 
govel-11111clit: 
"The  governing  coalition  proposes  outlooks  for  Hungarian 
women  %khich  revolve  pivotally  around  family  relations.  The 
t,.  %-o  views  orwomen  -good  and  bad,  Madonna  and  Whore- 
are  starkly  apparent  within  Hungarian  society  at  present. 
'ionic  %%,  onlen  mill  remain  classified  as  'bad*  and  as  such  not 
%%orthy  or  detailed  attention,  while  those  'good'  I  lungarian 
%%onlen  who  wish  to  be  married,  have  children,  and  abide  by 
Christian  (and  nationalist?  )  values  will  be  'cared  for*  by  tile 
government. 
As  has  been  noted,  that  the  present  government  cannot 
live  up  to  its  promises  for  these  'good'  I  ILIngarian  women,  is 
cm-rcntly  being  I'aced  within  I  lungarian  society.  Even  'good' 
%miien  are.  and  will  become,  poor  in  flungary. 
.... 
Given  the 
lack  of*choice  about  whether  or  not  to  be  in  paid  work.  many 
mimen  in  I  lungary  do  want  choice  to  care  for  their  flarnilics 
I'Lill-time.  U'qually.  though.  many  women  still  %vish  to  work  in 
paid  %Nork.  either  full-  or  part-time.  Current  economic 
cliant,  Cs  and  consequent  policy  decisions 
...  will  nican  that 
%%omcn  lose  out  on  all  fronts.  Many  women  may  'be  returned' 
to  their  homes  to  sunler  poverty.  41230 
After  three  changes  or  government.  the  problem  with  gender-rclatcd 
unemployment  is  still  a  problem  in  need  or  being  solved  by  the  Hungarian 
'ILI(horities.  There  is  less  pressure  on  wornen  to  stay  home  since  the  fall  ol'tile 
I  IDF-Ied  coalition  government,  but  there  is  not  much  change  ill  tile  perception 
of'%mmeWs  place  within  the  society.  That  bef'ore  1989.  there  were  no  ýVonlcll's 
movements  ill  Hungary  with  the  exception  of'  tile  Party-Icd  Hungarian 
\Vomcn*s  Council.  and  that  in  the  post-cornmunist  era,  there  are  not  many 
1'eminist  organisations  echoing  the  Western  ferninist  organisations.  COIlStitUtC  a 
230  ClIri,;  Col,  rin.  Ma, 
-,  yar  Women:  I  Itme,  rian  Womcn's  I-A  es.  1960s  -  1990s,  McMillan  /  St.  Martin's 
Press:  I  loundsmill  ani'London.  1994,  p.  250. 286 
problem  of'niobilisation  flor  I  lungarian  women  as  well  as  other  East  European 
NN10111C112,31 
Bel'ore  the  problem  is  faced  and  any  attempts  are  made  to  tackle  and  solve  it, 
the  issue  ol'gender-related  problems.  the  most  important  among  thein  being 
unemployment  or  biased  employment,  Nvill  be  a  maýjor  cause  of  disruption 
within  the  newly-lorming  I  lungarian  civil  society.  As  is  truc  with  any  other 
FAISt  European  soeiety.  without  a  solution  to  the  gender  issue.  formation  or  tic 
I  IL111gariall  CiVil  society  and  the  I  lungarian  transf'orniation  to  liberal  democracy 
cannot  lie  considered  as  complete.  With  tile  strengthening  of  tile  emphasis  of 
wonien  as  wage-carners  and  workers  in  addition  to  or  instead  or  their  role  as 
'mothcrs.  '  the  social  balances  in  I  lungary  will  remain  weak  and  this  will  result 
oil  the  lack  ol'  active  participation  of*  wonlen  to  tile  political,  econornic,  and 
ill(Cliectual  processcs  withill  tile  society,  making  tile  issue  orregime  legitimacy 
-a  harder  problem  to  be  dealt  with. 
C.  Tile  Problem  with  Legitimacy: 
Such  comcnis  led  to  an  incrcase  in  the  popular  longing  flor  the  KddArist  era.  As 
soon  aller  dic  transition  as  1993,  tile  general  perception  or  ure  tinder  Mnos 
K,  'i(l,  'tr*s  RIIC  Nvas  clearly  different  from  NvIlat  people  thought  Linder  tile  Kdddr 
administration  itsell'.  The  1101lowing  table  shows  the  opinions  orthe  IlLingarian 
people  towards  the  KAdArist  I  lungary  and  as  can  be  seen,  the  results  ol'the  poll 
are  not  overlapping  with  tile  actual  public  diseontent  felt  especially  from  mid- 
1970s  onwards  in  I  lungary. 
2.11  Scc  Ibid..  pp.  259-2633  fora  detailed  discussion. 287 
Table  4.19.:  Public  opinion  on  the  KAdAr  regime  according  to 
respondents'  parly  preferences  (percentage  of  those  who  agree  with  the 
proposit  ions),  1993232: 
Party  supported-+  IIDF-  AFD  ISP  IISP  FIDESz  CDPP  National 
Chararleristics  or 
I 
Simple' 
KAdAr  Fral  I 
'I  here  Was  53.6  72.3  78.4  90.1  74.3  77.2  76.1 
economic 
development 
People  1hed  better  76.8  83.0  89.0  92.5  86.1  89.7  85.9 
There  N1.8%  51.5  69.6  68.9  82.6  70.1  63.2  68.3 
significaid  social 
development 
'I  here  %-.  a%  Lm  and  . 58.8  72.3  76.7  83.5  73.4  68.4  73.6 
order  I 
There  was  great  63.8  46.4  48.6  24.2  34.3  38.6  37.4 
oppl-mion 
Thc.  ý  railed  (4)  soh-C  37.7  32.1  32.4  15.7  25.3  24.6  25.5 
social  problems 
Freedom  %,  #,  as  66.7  61.6  66.2  30.0  48.8  59.6  49.1 
nvisýing  I  I  I  I  II 
HIM.  Hung  rian  Democratic  Forum;  AFD  =  Alliance  of  Free  Democrats;  ISP  Lýa 
Indcpendent  Smallholders'  Party,  IISP  =  Hungarian  Socialist  Party;  Fidesz  =  Fidesz- 
lking-arian  Civic  Party.  MIT  --  Christian  Democratic  People's  Party,  those  who  did 
c,,  pres,;  parly  prellerence. 
The  Table  4.19  shows  that  people  agreed  that  they  lived  in  better  conditions, 
there  was  law  and  order.  and  surprisingly  there  was  a  successFul  social  policy. 
The  bUlk-  ol'the  legitinlicy  problem  faced  at  contemporary  Hungary  is  that  the 
misperception  of*  the  past  is  accompanied  and  sustained  by  a  flecling  of 
nostalgia.  The  main  reason  For  the  I  lungarian  public  demanding  change  was 
the  lack  ol'  solutions  to  the  mounting  social  problems  encountered  during  tlic 
Ud6r  era.  11'.  flour  ycars  after  the  Call  of  tile  communist  regime  by  popular  will, 
7-1.5ý/o  ol'  (lie  people  agrees  that  Uddrist.  regime  was  able  to  solvý  social 
problems.  this  result  indicates  to  great  aniount  of  dissatisilaction  and 
disillusiomimit  with  the  new  political  order. 
I'o  obtain  a  legitimate  status  within  such  circumstances  is  flic  main  challenge 
Cor  the  new  politieal  order.  That  the  regime  is  legally,  legitimate  and  is 
232  Rtidorl'bkds.  loc..  Cit.  P.  13. 288 
perceivcd  as  legitimate  by  tile  intelligentsia  and  other  parts  or  tile  elite  does  not 
nccessarily  make  the  reginic  a  legitimate  order  for  the  general  public. 
On  the  one  hand.  one  has  to  be  cautious  while  dealing  with  data  such  as  that 
noted  above.  One  important  Factor  working  within  the  systcni  and  which 
makes  pcople  show  possibly  greater  affiection  to  tile  KMdr  era  than  they 
should  show.  is  the  common  knowledge  that  tile  post-conimunist  regime  is 
now  an  established  systern.  that  neither  tile  Russian  Federation  nor  other  parts 
ol'  the  11ornier  Eastern  Bloc  are  in  any  position  to  implement  a  return  to  tile 
communist  rule  and  hence  there  is  no  way  back  flor  a  communist  Hungary 
unless  there  is  a  popular  revolution  or  a  referendum,  both  unlikely  cases. 
The  responses  to  the  survey  questions,  therellore,  may  not  reveal  tile  truthiul 
fleelings  ol'  the  I  lungarian  people.  Yet,  these  are  also  to  be  perceived  as  signs 
ol*  public  disillusionment  and  mistrust  vis-A-vis  the  new  political  order  and  its 
ecollonlic  consequences.  The  main  problem  flacing  the  new  political  order  is 
that  no  public-approved  Icgitinlacy  is  possible  as  long  as  tile  ecollonlic  dccline 
continues.  The  loss  oreconornic  benefits  undermines  civil  socioy  as  well  as 
the  wish  to  participate  in  the  policy-making  process  either  by  party  or  lobby 
group  membership  or  by  attending  tile  process  at  the  most  basic  level,  i.  e.  by 
casting  votes  in  tile  ballots.  'rhe  low  participation  ratios  in  tile  parliahientary 
and  municipal  elections.  which  sees  one  third  to  the  halrof  tile  population  not 
turning  up  to  vote,  decreases  the  popular  support  flor  the  acting  national  and 
local  governnictits  and  flor  the  parliamentary  political  parties.  The  low  ratio  of 
Noting  results  in  an  even  lower  support  flor  tile  ruling  party  and  hence 
extinguishes  tile  popular  trust  in  the  system. 289 
The  table  below  shows  that  the  Hungarian  public  opinion  is  confused  about 
tile  idea  ol'  participation.  While  tile  respondents  to  the  survey  think  tile 
government  controls  lire  too  much,  in  a  far  greater  arnount  than  their  fellow 
Fast  H'itropeans.  they  also  believe  in  the  effect  they  have  on  their  parliamentary 
dcputies.  The  latter  issue  is  supported  by  a  firm  belief  in  the  multiparty  system 
as  long  as  it  contains  no  marginal  parties,  as  Nvell.  The  Hungarians  are  also 
conflused  about  the  role  bl'the  state  as  they  want.  less  state  intervention  to  lille, 
but  look  towards,  the  state  flor  socio-economic  assistance.  In  addition.  perhaps 
the  most  important  Finding  of  all  the  questions  is  that  although  there  is  a  lack 
of'  approval  towards  the  government  policies,  there  is  a  strong  belief  in  tile 
s)-stclil.  The  support  flor  the  prinic  minister's  administration  is  shadowcd  by  the 
trust  in  the  multiparty  political  systern  and  the  belicf  in  the  bona  fidc  work  of 
the  NI  I's  Im  the  people. 
Table  4.20.  Opinions  about  the  political  system  in  different  countries 
(approval  /agreement  ra(CS)233: 
Counfrics-->/  USA  11K  France  Ilungiry  Poland  Bulgaria  flussia  Ukraine  Lithu 
1%%IIC'4  ý 
ania 
shic  %hould  34  9  10  20  11  12  15  17  14 
provide  food 
and  housing 
to  e%  er)  one 
State  conlrols  62  44  69  57  24  -16  49  49  45 
lire  Ino  Inuch 
Alost  44  35  27  32  23  21  18  22  30 
deptifics  care 
abou(  %fliat 
people  Re 
nmeirthink 
Llections  73  55  76  49  41  76  47  47  74 
afred 
I 
governmental 
policy 
We  Should  55  56  37  30  47  53  42  36  39 
fight  ror  our 
country 
m  het  her  righ  I 
oi-  ý%rong 
ParPt  or  20  12  68  60  152  122  1  24  1 
46 
,  31  Klaus  %on  Beyme.  'I'ransition  to  Democracy  in  Eastern  Europe.  Macmillan,  Basingstokc,  England: 
1996.  pp.  154-155.  dala  taken  Rom  the.  Times  -A  firrot-Surrtys. 290 
neighbouring 
roinitrim 
shollid  be 
otirs. 
%N  c  Should  79  80  68  58  38  45  31  54 
Stop 
inionigratioit 
I  01-ongki 
--  --- 
73  06  75  60  72  74 
nceept 
multiparly 
a  57  47  07  33  54  48  32  40  51 
41conocrary  all 
parlic4 
shollid  he 
Allolvell 
I  H:,,  ree  %%it  h  56  51  34  42  69  22  19  12 
President's/ 
P.  NI's 
sidminkiralio 
n 
Therellore.  it  III-IY  be  C011CIUded  From  the  survey  presented  in  the  above  table 
that  the  system  has  been  better  established  in  Hungary  than  other  East 
European  countries.  In  that  respect,  one  may  claim  that  the  main  problem  of 
leg  it  imacy  in  II  ungary  I  ies  in  the  problem  ol'participation.  The  agencies  or  the 
POSt-COIIIIIILIlliSt  political  order  need  to  incorporate  greater  segments  or  tile 
JILlbIiC  ill  the  illdirect  decision-making  process.  This  can  bc  achieved  cither  by 
increasing  political  party  membership  or  by  increasing  participation  in  tile 
clectoral  process.  A  solution  tý)  thiý  problem  lies  in  increasing  economic 
justice  in  the  country.  One  way  to  achieve  economic  justice  is  to  introduce  new 
I 
legiskition  %%hich  would  artificially  create  tipper  and  lower  finlits  For  all  tile 
wages.  Another  way  is  to  introduce  rel'ornis  on  the  legal  and  practical 
mechanisms  with  regards  to  taxation  and  tax  collection.  increasing  the  state 
revenues  which  can  be  directed  to  tile  destitute  and  deprived  areas  or  tile 
economy  so  that  a  regeneration  may  take  place. 291 
By  these  means  or  by  the  use  of  other  political  procedures,  popular  support  for 
the  institutions  of'  the  new  political  order  and  for  tile  general  political  order 
itscl  rilecds  be  maintained  in  I  lungary.  The  establishment  of  liberal  democracy 
based  on  multi-party  competition  in  the  field  or  politics  and  the  establishment 
ora  capitalist  rree  market  system  in  the  field  or  ecollornics  do  not  surfice  to 
provide  continuity  flor  tile  reginle.  The  economic  crisis  that  the  Russian 
Federation  iS  C1.11-1-ClItly  experiencing  and  the  rise  of  popular  support  for  the 
COIIIIIIIIIIiSIS  in  that  Country  and  the  Popular  disenchantment  with  tile  leading 
political  order  are  clear  signs  of  danger  flor  the  post-communist  Russian 
system.  Although  public  discontent  in  Russia  and  in  Hungary  is  incomparable 
-it  the  moment.  (lie  Russian  example  remains  a  good  reminder  or  tile 
insufficiency  of  the  legal  and  structural  legitimacy  in  guaranteeing  the 
continuity  of  a  political  order  which  had  also  received  the  approval  of  tile 
intelligentsia.  The  public  affcction  for  and  approval  or  tile  government  is  as 
jillportalit  as.  if'  not  more  important  than.  these  two  incans  of  legitimisation. 
The  rull-scale  establishment  of  tile  Hungarian  post-communist  liberal  systern 
is  only  possible  with  widespread  Popular  support  and  not  by  legal  or  structural 
means  of*  legitimisation,  nor  with  tile  elite's  approval  of  the  systern.  Tile 
solution  to  tile  economic  problems  and  inequalities  in  the  country  Will  also 
contribute  to  resolving  tile  question  of'  legitimisation.  When  the  population 
11cels  greater  financial  and  economic  security.  then  it  will  be  more  willing  to 
participate  in  civil  sociel.  ),  and  in  the  political  decision-making  process.  When 
this  participation  is  secured,  then,  it  will  be  possible  For-the  Hungarians  to 
dominate  the  political  lille  of  their  country  more  directly. 292 
Moreover.  the  impact  tile  EU  menibcrship  will  have  on  tile  Hungarian  political 
s)stcm  cannot  be  ignored2-14.  That  tile  EU  is  tile  second  most-trusted  institution 
,,  try  also  suggests  that  the  regime  and  the  public  would  have  a  more  in  I  lung, 
sccurer  relationship  and  hence  the  stability  oF  the  regime,  once  again 
stivngthcned  by  the  l',  U  membership  from  May 2004  onwards,  would  bring  a 
more  stronger  approval  rate  For  the  parliament.  tile  government,  and  the 
political  parties.  This  would  create  stronger  bases  lor  the  clainis  of  legitimacy 
of  the  govannients  to  conic  and  for  the  reginic  in  general.  ir  tiie  I  lungarian 
political  changes  and  public  perception  of  the  new  regime  can  be  strengthened 
with  the  F.  U  membership.  then  legitimacy  of  the  reginic  nlay  become 
undisputable  flor  it  would  depend  on  both  domestic  and  international  valLIC  SCtS 
and  domestic  and  intcrilational  grounds  Ilor  the  country's  administration. 
"I-,  For  discussions  on  the  issue.  sec.  for  instance:  Laszlo  Prager,  11  lungary  on  the  Road  to  the  European 
I  inion.  '  in  Las/lo  Andor.  LrimitiLon  hLBluc  (London.  2000),  Zoltan  Bara, 
-Lilialill 
tEcO1101"IcS, 
A(ýtqslmcn(  to  M)bal  ChaLleno, 
-es 
(Budapest,  2000),  Gabor  Lakatos,  'The  Last  Round  of  Bargaining 
_t  Bellore  EU  Accession.  '  111"Wol:  l'  Quarterly  (2000.  pp.  79-86). 293 
CHAPTER  FIVE 
SYSTEM  LEGITIMACY  IN  CONTEMPORARY  HUNGARY 
1.  THE  POLITICAL  CHANGE  AND  ITS  CONSEQUENCES 
A.  Three  Dimensions  of  Legitimacy: 
From  the  1990  elections  onwards,  the  question  of  legitimacy  continued  to  be 
central  to  the  democratisation  process.  The  different  meaning  attributed  to 
legitimacy  in  diffewnt  fields  of  social  sciences.  as  in  politics  and  law,  first  of 
all.  gave  rise  to  some  conrusion  over  the  meaning  of*  the  term.  SecondlY.  the 
understanding  and  implications  of  the  concept  of'  legitimacy  within  diffiercilt 
layers  ol'  the  Hungarian  social  strucillre235.  and  even  within  the  different 
layers  ofthe  state  structUrc,  created  alternative  perceptions  of  legitimacy. 
SUCII  iliSCI'CplllCiCS  ill  Understanding  can  be  rcdticcd  if  one  considers  there  are 
dilTerent  but  co-existent  definitions  of  legitimacy.  There  arc  three  main 
substi-Lictures  to  legitimise  a  given  political  systern  Im  all  different  layers  or 
social  sciences  and  or  tiie  society:  Legal  support  or  the  claim  to  legitimacy. 
support  ol'  the  intelligentsia;  and  [lie  support  ol*  ordinary  people'22.16.  -1,11C 
'"  The  divi,  ions  of  tile  social  structure  mentioned  here  refcrs  to  two  different  social  scgrnentat  i  oils, 
either  in  lerms  of'  inconic  or  in  terms  of  political  awarcness/cducation.  Society  may  be  divided 
accordin-  to  their  income  level.  and  this  led  to  the  development  of  the  lower-carning  or  working  class, 
tile  illid(lie  cla"",  and  tile  upper  class.  It  may  as  well  be  divided  in  terms  of  education  into  two,  namely 
tile  intelligentsia  and  tile  Common  people,  (lie  ordinary  people.  In  this  second  division,  one  may  sub- 
divide  the  intelli'ventsia  into  tile  three  important  parts  of  political  power  elite,  with  economic  power  clitc 
and  file  bureaucracy.  The  former  two  would  be  active  in  tile  decision-making  process  either  by  direct  or 
by  indilect  influence  ill  tile  political  parties  and  tile  parliament,  %khile  tile  bureaucratic  elite  will,  despite 
their  influence  oil  tile  decision-making  process,  be  peripheral  compared  to  tile  powcr-elite  in  economics 
and  polilim 
"'  See  CIMP10-  I  for  a  lengilly  di-scussi.  on  ofthe  subject. 294 
support  ol*  tile  intelligentsia  and  tile  ordinary  people  may  be  gained  through 
different  means.  These  nicans  include  legitimisation  through  the  leader  or 
Icaders  ol'  tile  nc%v  regime,  Icgitimisation  thrOLIgll  tmdition  and  legitinlisation 
through  the  recognition  of'  the  systern  as  legitimate  with  its  inStitUtions  and 
infi-astructure  and  superstRICtUre. 
Legitimisation  by  legality,  on  tile  other  hand,  depends  oil  the  new  political 
ordei's  acceptance  ol'the  i-ide  oflaw  principle  and  hence  its  attempts  to  prove 
its  legitimacy  by  lavvs.  regulations  and  by-laws.  ol'  an  international  and 
domestic  nature. 
1.  Legal  Aspect  of  Legitimacy: 
As  previously  stated.  when  the  post-communist  I  lungarian  systern  is  analysed, 
its  chim  to  legitimacy  through  the  support  of  law  is  not  radically  difTerent 
111-om  its  communist  predecessor.  It  accepts  the  i-ide  qflaw  principle,  then,  this 
limits  its  space  of'  action  in  tile  boundaries  or  the  constitution  of  the  country 
-Ind  ensures  that  its  actions  will  be  scrutinised.  The  acceptance  of  tile  United 
Nations  charter  and  the  promise  to  honour  bilateral  and  multilateral 
agreements  with  othcr  states.  and  tile  wish  to  become  part  of  tile  European 
t  Inion  and  lience  tlie  acceptance  -  of  tlie  autliority  of  a  supranational 
organisation  are  also  signs  ol'the  new  regime's  attempts  to  gain  legitimacy  in 
terms  ol'international  law  and  international  politics. 
Fhe  main  characteristic  of'  the  I  lungarian  post-communist  liberal  democratic 
systcm  in  terms  M*  legal  legitimacy  is  that  it  depends  on  a  constitution  which 
%VaS  aIIICIIded  during  (lie  National  Roundtable  discussions  of  1989  attended  by 
representatives  of'  almost  all  political  views  in  the  country.  This  speciality 
givcs  the  post-communist  constitution  or  Hungary  greater  credibility  and 295 
public  support  as  it  is  prepared  by  the  representatives  of  the  people.  Thcrcrore, 
in  legal  terms.  llor  it  abides  by  international  law.  and  for  it  is  based  on  tile 
eonstitution  which  was  amended  by  the  representatives  of  a  great  mqjjority  of 
I  IL111ý1.,  iri,  111  people.  Therefore,  in  thc  domestic  scale.  flic  new  Hungarian 
political  order  is  legally  legitimate. 
On  the  other  hand,  obtaining  Icgitimacy  by  public  approval  is  harder  to 
preserve  Ilian  obtaining  legitimacy  by  legal  terms.  Any  cliange  in  the  ruling  - 
ruled  relationship  in  a  given  country  may  result  in  serious  consequences  flor  tile 
rcginie*s  legitimacy. 
2.  Legitimacy  by  Elite  Support: 
I'lic  I  lungarian  elite.  Formed  by  the  intelligentsia,  students  and  teachers, 
111-01'eSSiOlialS,  bMinessmen,  politicians,  and  the  members  of  the  bureaticracy, 
has  changing  perceptions  ol'  tile  new  regime.  I  lowever.  oil  tile  whole.  as  tile 
new  regime  provides  the  intelligentsia  with  greater  freedom  of  speccli  and 
action.  this  ensuring  their  SLIpport.  Tile  role  or  tile  intelligentsia  in  ternis  or 
supporting  or  opposing  the  system  is  a  crucial  one  as  tile  mcnibers  of  tile 
intelligentsia  are  part  ol'the  elite  and  hence  while  they  may  not,  be  the  ruling 
cliie.  the)-  may  one  day  become  a  part  of'  it,  and  hence  influence  policy- 
making. 
In  the  making  ol*the  new  system,  as  during  the  reflorin  stages  of  the  communist 
Rile.  rel'orm  Crom  above  has  been  the  main  criterion  ol'cliange  in  I  lungary.  The 
role  that  the  ruling  and  non-ruling  intellectual  elite  played  during  the  reform 
process  which  %Ncilt  oil  for  over  a  decade  afTects  the  support  or  tiie  ente 
towards  the  new  order.  'rhe  role  of  the  intelligentsia  which  was  outside  the 
administrative  circle  increased  in  time,  and  became  paramount  during  tile 296 
Roundtable  negotiations.  The  intelligentsia  which  was  perceived  as  a  threat  to 
tile  conlillunist  system  finally  found  a  platform  to  express  their  views  a  nd  was 
hailed  as  the  deflenders  or  tile  public  will  within  the  negotiations.  As  most 
nienibers  ol'the  First  post-coniniunist  parliament  ývcre  either  local  notables  or 
the  members  orthe  intelligentsia  with  a  history  ordissent,  they  also  had  access 
to  political  power  by  means  ortlicirinnuctice  over  tile  legislative  process. 
The  intelligentsia's  approval  or  tile  new  regime  was  based  oil  their  perception 
of'  the  new  political  system  as  a  political  whole.  Under  communist  rule,  their 
main  concern  was  the  implementation  or  rundanictital  human  rights  and 
political  Creedonis.  The  ability  to  act  within  tile  new  political  system  with  a  rar 
greater  rreedoni  and  with  rar  less  constraints  than  beflore  has  improved  tile 
Popularity  orthe  new  regime  within  the  elite.  The  positive  change  in  tile  living 
StWIL1,11-LIS  or  tile  ruling  elite  ortlic  ancien  reghne  affected  the  perception  or  tile 
new  reginie  by  the  intelligentsia  as  they  realised  the  rinalicial  opportunities 
awahing  them  in  tile  ncw  system. 
The  political  system,  tile  number  of  political  parties  that  served  within  tile 
three  governments  in  the  1990-1998  period.  and  the  disillusion  within  the  elite 
towards  (lie  tincien  i-eghne  and  its  representatives  disabled  tile  emergence  of  a 
popular,  nation-leading  leader.  'rhis  obstructed  tile  legitimisation  of  tliý  system 
on  (lie  grounds  orcharisnia/leadership.  The  lack  or  a  tradition  ordeniocracy  in 
the  country  -despite  tile  anti-communist  and  pro-democratic  work  or  tile 
dissident  intelligentsia  during  tile  communist  rule  and  the  revolutionary  nature 
ofthe  change-.  has  obstructed  tile  legitimisation  orthe  new  system  oil  the  basis 
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On  the  other  hand,  tile  intelligentsia's  role  in  tile  transition  process  and  their 
omai  desire  flor  political  power  ensured  the  new  reginle*s  acceptance  by  tile 
intelligentsia.  The  intelligentsia  created  the  parameters  that  the  new  regime 
I'LlIlCtiO11CLI  within.  thus  legitimising  the  system. 
The  Democratic  Charter  movement  (sec  Chaptcr  5  Im  a  discussion)  is  the 
maJor  example  lor  the  intelligentsia's  acceptance  of  the  new  reginic  as 
legitimate.  As  the  new  rcginic  was  considered  as  Icgitiniate  at  the  systemic 
level,  the  signatories  or  the  charter  acted  to  preserve  the  core  oi*  the  new 
regime  against  the  danger  of  an  authoritarian  administration.  'rhe  movement 
and  later  political  involvcmcnt  by  the  mcnibers  of  the  Hungarian  intelligentsia 
show  do  the  liberal  democratic  system  is  considered  as  legitimate  and 
ti-LIStW01-tily  b)'  tile  I  ILIngarian  intelligentsia. 
3.  Legitimacy  By  the  Ordinary  People's  Support: 
Although  (lie  support  or  tile  elite  ror  tile  continuity  or  a  political  order  is  all 
ifidispensable  need,  the  lack  ol'support  from  tile  people  who  are  not  members 
or  intelligentsia  may  end  its  reign  with  or without  the  support  or  tiic  elite.  The 
legitimacy  of'  a  regime,  thercrore.  depends  more  on  its  approval  as  legitimate 
by  ordinary  people  than  by  tile  intelligentsia  or  by  law. 
The  I  lungarian  general  public  (hereinafter  ordinary  people)  which  constitutes 
the  majority  of  the  population  was  the  significant  part  of  the  K6ddrist  social 
contract.  'I  lie  social  contract  was  a  hypothetical  agreenictit  betwcen  the  Kdddr 
administration  and  the  people.  It  was  perceived  by  the  dissident  intelligentsia 
perceive  it  as  a  social  contract  but  as  a  mcre  act  ol'social  bribery.  The  contract 
was  based  on  the  cqUation  or  cconomic  prof-it  in  excliangc  ror  political 
indillicrence.  Such  concepts  as  the  New  Economic  Mechanism,  second  society 298 
and  second  economy  wcre  tile  outcomcs  of  such  a  social  contract.  The 
transaction  permitted  UdAr  to  stay  in  officc  with  relative  peace  and  for  longer 
in  comparison  with  other  [last  ELiropean  leaders.  It  also  enabled  people  to 
benefit  from  the  economic  and  political  outcomes  especially  due  to  the  absence 
of*  laxes  on  the  second  economy  activities.  Moreover.  the  reginic  refrained 
From  ideological  pressure  on  the  issue  or  mass  niobilisation  campaigns  which 
%%ere  in  use  in  other  East  European  states,  and  From  major  social  confrontation. 
Aller  the  austerity  of  the  1948  -1961  period.  I  ILIngarians  were  able  to  bencilit 
From  Kildhist  policies  which  gave  them  greater  economic  benefits  and  a  better 
living  standard  than  other  communist  states.  Thcrerore,  although  it  created  a 
system  operating  on  the  basis  ol'  oppression  and  censorship  and  has  thus  an 
anathema  to  the  I  Itingarian  intellectuals,  the  Udir  achninistration  has  been  an 
cr,  t  tWeconomic  and  social  rccovery  for  the  pcopic  in  general. 
In  late  1980s  and  carly  1990s,  the  situation  changed  for  both  flic  ititclligentsia 
-111LI  tile  people.  While  the  former  gained  from  the  change  as  it  meant  greater 
1'recdom  of  expression.  greater  ability  to  earn  recognition  and  money,  and 
achieve  ol'fice,  for  the  latter.  the  changes  nicant  tile  loss  of  nially  ecollonlic: 
rights  and  benclits,  a  new  political  and  economic  environment,  and  a  loss  of 
theabilit),  to  negotiate  with  the  administration.  I; 
While  the  intelligentsia  was  ignored  and  suppressed  by  the  communist 
administration.  (lie  Hungarian  public  was  politically  wooed  to  prevent  a 
reCLII*I*CllCC  ol'  1956.  Therefore,  the  population  had  some  power  under  KAddr's 
rule.  I  lowever.  as  the  new  system  is  a  multi-party  liberal  demOCracy,  every 
individual  has  theoretically  equal  rights  and  equal  opportunity  to  participate  in 
(lie  decision-making  process.  However,  as  tile  main  drive  of  tile  elite  is 299 
political  and  that  ortiie  ordinary  people  is  economic  in  the  first  place,  the  elite 
has  a  greater  say  in  tile  policy-making  process  than  any  layman  under  tile 
normal  working  of  liberal  democracy.  This  results  in  the  creation  of  a  disparity 
bet%%cen  the  elite  and  the  ordinary  pcople  in  raVOLir  of  the  elite  for  the  latter  has 
casier  and  more  ample  access  to  the  places  or  influence  and  high-rank 
bureaucratic  posts  or  membership  of  civil  society  organisations  such  as  lobby 
groups. 
Consequently.  where  a  memba  of  the  elite  perceives  an  improvement  due  to 
his!  her  position.  tile  ordinary  person  illay  perceive  a  decline  due  to  Ilis  or  her 
lowered  income  and  loss  of  state  protection  either  by  social  security  services  or 
by  social  bribery. 
The  legilimisation  of  the  new  order,  in  ternis  or  tile  people,  therefore  depends 
on  dic  economic  perl'ormance  in  tile  trans  rormation  period.  On  tile  one  hand, 
the  I  lungarian  people  perceive  tile  new  political  order  as  better  than  tile 
previous  one  llor  it  enables  them  greater  r1rcedom  and  greater  rights.  but  Oil  tile 
other  liand.  they  also  see  it  as  a  liability  because  it  gave  rise  to  great  social 
inJustices  and  a  general  decrease  in  the  living  standard  of  the  Hungarian 
people. 
All  these  create  an  inner  dilemma  within  the  society.  First  of  all,  the  sýstcm  is 
approved  as  legitimate  on  a  systemic  basis.  Sccondly,  the  system  is  also 
perceived  a.  ý  indiffercilt  to  people's  needs  and  therefore  there  is  a  feeling  of 
apathy  in  people  towards  the  new  political  order  which  manifests  itself  by  non- 
participation.  Political  party  membership  rigures  are  extremely  low,  the  people 
are  apolitical.  there  is  a  constantly  very  low  turnout  in  the  elections  and  there  is 300 
an  aura  ol'  indifference  about  anything  political.  It  is  this  indiffcrcnce  that  the 
great  problem  in  I  lungiry  lies  for  both  Icgitimacy  and  democratisation. 
B.  The  Current  Hungarian  Situation: 
The  situation  in  the  post-communist,  Hungary  operates  within  the  boundaries 
of  this  dilemma  of  lost  influence  of  flic  gencral  public  and  the  ncwly  gained 
inIltience  ol'the  intelligentsia.  As  a  majority  of  dissidents  proceeded  to  beconle 
members  ol'  the  ruling  elite  in  the  post-communist  system  increasing  their 
i1111LIC11CC  and  Conning  the  bulk  or  the  newly-forming  middle  class,  the  general 
public's  political  bargaining  power  has  ditilinished. 
The  main  problem  for  the  political  power  holders  in  the  country  is  to  provide 
means  (o  ensure  mass  participation  in  the  democratic  process.  Unless  the 
people  are  integrated  into  the  political  process,  citlicr  through  an 
administration-led  civil  society  revival,  or  by  finding  new  means  or  improving 
Ihe  living  standard  of  the  majority  of  people.  there  will  be  problems  facing  tlic 
post-communist  political  ordcr  in  ternis  of  legitimacy  and  hence  continuity. 
The  civil  iildill'crcncc  to  the  regime  may  end  tip  in  a  series  of  mass  protest 
movements  like  the  taxi  drivers'  blockade  and  florce  an  elite  versus  ordinary 
people  conf'rontation  which  would  endanger  both  the  social  peace  and  the 
position  or  the  regime.  To  prevent  the  development  or  such  a  scenario,  there 
gruse  are  [%%o  major  steps  to  be  taken:  Firstly.  the  intelligentsia  needs  to  reeo  i 
that  the  ncw  system  is  a  composite  or  both  political  and  economic  spheres. 
Secondly.  the  rulers  of  the  country  need  to  convince  tile  people  that  their 
economic  situation  is  likely  to  improve. 
The  first  step  is  crucially  important  as  many  members  of  tile  Hungarian 
intelligentsia  claim  the  process  of  transition  is  a  purely  political  process.  For 301 
inslance.  Bela  Greskovits  claims  in  his  cssay  of  1996  that  most  Wcstcrn 
observers  or  oic  E-ast  European  transition  predicted  a  failure  for  the  post- 
communist  liberal  democratic  system  in  that  part  or  the  World  and  blames 
man),  political  scientists  for  spending  too  much  time  and  emphasis  on  the  field 
t)j-  ect)jjt)jjjics237.  This  approach  perccives  economics  and  politics  as  two 
dilTerctit  lields.  The  main  point  in  this  scparation  is  to  opposc  the  Marxist 
prineiples.  It  argues  that  proposing  ccononlic  solutions  to  political  problems 
equates  %%ith  being  a  Marxist,  and  therefore.  is  unacceptable  in  the  post- 
communist  I  lungarian  sctting.  The  proposition  or  political  SOILItions  to 
political  problems  is  also  an  ideological  rejection  of  the  Uddrist  social 
contract  by  ignoring  the  'economic  bencrit  in  exchange  for  political  obedience' 
axis  of'  the  K,,  Id,  irist  social  contract.  I  lowever,  the  situation  in  Hungary  and 
other  Fast  Furopean  countries  is  beyond  mere  political  -  ideological 
orientation:  The  greater  part  of  society  does  not  receive  what.  it  needs.  In  tile 
case  or  Hungary.  %Nhat  is  needed  is  an  end  to  the  impoverishment  or  tiie 
majority  of  the  people,  improved  nicans  of  social  security,  housing,  and 
schooling  flor  everyone. 
'riic  acceptance  or  tile  economic  dimension  oftlic  situation  by  tile  intelligentsia 
will  improve  the  handling  of  the  situation  by  the  govcrilments  as  the  political 
parties  depend  on  the  intelligentsia's  guidance.  Unless  a  prudent  approach  is 
adopted  by  the  elite.  social  indifference  may  transform  into  social  unrest  which 
may  be  shomi  cithcr  by  total  isolation  from  the  sphere  orpolitics  or  by  protests 
%khich  may  range  Crom  a  dramatic  increase  in  the  votes  cast  for  such  marginal 
217  Ile1j,  (;  j-C.  %koý.  jjs.  (;  q.  ()Lj  B  Breakdown  Pnq)hecies.  llcl/,  p  Poor  Democrticies:  On  Faile 
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p,,  irlies  as  Csurka's  nationalist  cxtrernist  Hungarian  Justicc  and  Lifc  Party  to 
public  acts  of  mass  protest.  even  rebellion.  The  economic  situation  in  tllc 
RUSSiall  Federation  where  the  rich-poor  divide  is  extreme  endangers  tile 
continuity  and  legitimacy  of  the  Russian  system.  Although  Hungary  is  not  as 
diVided.  unorganised,  centrifugal  and  poor  as  the  Russian  Fcderation.  in  time, 
a  similar  late  may  take  place  in  I  lungary  as  well. 
C.  The  Causes  of  Social  Differences  on  Legitimacy: 
The  difIlerence  in  approaching  the  issue  of  legitimacy  between  tile 
intclligentsia  and  tile  ordinary  people  may  be  attributed  to  the  lack  of 
communication  between  the  two  layers  of  the  I  lungarian  society.  The  lack  of 
communication  between  the  intelligentsia  and  the  ordinary  people  is  the  reason 
Ilor  the  creation  ora  I%vo-licr  process  orcognition  and  evaluation  in  respect  or 
legitimacy  as  well  as  other  socially  important  issues.  The  two  segments  of 
sociely  developed  differellt  sets  of  value  and  dil'ferent  priorities  under  Uddrist 
rtilt:.  \VItile  ilie  intelligentsia  adopted  a  purely  political  stand  vis-ä-vis  tlie 
ruling  political  order,  tile  ordinary  people  focused  on  economic  conditions. 
This  resulted  in  the  intelligentsia's  suffiering  under  Kdddr  while  ordinary 
people  ignored  the  political  situation.  The  ncw  reginic  has  dilTerent  modes  of 
relationship  between  the  rulcrs  or  the  country.  This  new  relationship  focuses 
(in  political  interaction  rather  than  cconornic  interaction  and  most  or  oic 
IMIL!,  11-iall  people  cannot  understand  the  change.  This  leads  I  lungarian  society 
into  a  mo-lier  formation:  tile  intelligentsia  which  can  relate  to  this  new 
political  environment  and  ordinary  people  who  cannot. 
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On  (lie  other  hand.  the  I  lungarian  political  and  economic  systems  arc  still  in  a 
Irmisilory  phase.  Therdore.  whilc  post-communist  Hungarian  socicty  is 
dilTerent  From  I  lungarian  society  tinder  communism,  it  is  also  different  from 
post-industrial  society  of  thc  First  World  in  ternis  of  institutional  stability  and 
Continuity. 
1.  Different  Sets  of  Interaction: 
In  tile  post-industrial  society.  there  arc  two  sets  or  interaction,  onc  in  tile  macro 
level  and  tile  other  in  tile  nlicro  levcl.  The  macro-level  interaction  comprise  the 
interactimi  in  the  itistittilimial,  organisational  level  while  the  micro-levei 
intcradion  comprise  tile  interaction  aniong  the  individual  IlUrnan  beings. 
The  I  lungarian  intelligentsia  focused  in  the  last  decade,  mainly  oil  the  issues 
concerning  civil  society.  political  institution-building  and  similar  sutýjccts  oil  LI 
the  macro  level.  on  the  other  hand.  as  the  institutional  changes  afTected  tile 
everyday  lives  ofordinary  people.  tile  focus  of  interaction  in  the  lesser-earning 
and  less-educatcd  strata  or  tile  Hungarian  society  increasingly  became  tile 
micro-level  transactions.  "Both  sets  of  demands,  inicro  individual  and  niacro 
organisational.  are  satisfied  on  the  nicso  level  ol*role  relationships  and  network 
interconuctions.  where  people  work  collaboratively,  pool  human  capital,  and 
redesign  relationships  to  maximisc  creativity  and  improve  problern-solving 
potellti,  11.  -238  The  lack  or  a  nicso-level  interconnection  network  in  tile  post- 
communist.  transitory  Ilungarian  society  caused  a  rupture  of  contact  in 
lictween  the  I%vo  layers-  of'  tile  socicty.  For  the  communist  era's  meso-level 
organisations  were  inadequate  in  the  post-communist  state  and  social  structure, 
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no  new  institutions  replaced  the  defunct  communist  institutions,  causing  the 
rupture  between  the  different  parts  or  tile  society.  and  creating  the  dichotomy 
ol'cognition  and  interpretation  now  present  in  the  I  lungarian  society. 
2.  The  Failed  Civil  Society  Conception: 
I  lo%%ever.  to  solely  blame  the  transition  for  the  lack  of  coni  mun  i  cation  and 
ineso-level  transnctions  bctwccii  the  intelligciitsia  and  the  non-intclligcntsia 
would  lie  erroneous.  The  problem's  roots  can  be  secti  in  the  dissidcnt 
mmements  in  1960s.  but  especially  in  the  1980s.  During  the  last  decade  of  tile 
communist  rule  in  tile  Eastern  Bloc,  tile  dissident  intellectuals  focused  on 
prornoting  the  idea  of  civil  society,  lience  creating  a  framework  for 
democratisation  %%hile  trying  to  avoid  an  upsurge  in  the  ctlinoccntric  fcclings  in 
the  society.  With  the  cvents  of  1989  and  espccially  after  thc1990  elections,  it 
became  clear  that  therc  were  no  more  two  political  camps  consisting  or  uie 
communists  and  all  others.  This  was  the  first  problem  the  post-communist  era 
paused  I'or  the  dissidoit  intelligmtsia  ol'  the  ancien  reginle.  While  the  pro- 
democracy  Cront  1ractured  into  a  widc  spcctrum  ol'political  institutions  ranging 
in  terms  ol'  ideology  from  the  ultra-national  right  to  the  reform-socialist  left, 
the  intra-elite  conflict  (in  power  took  precedence  over  the  rebuilding  of  the 
society.  In  order  Ihat  the  nieso-level  transactions  that  the  new  elite  and  the 
ordinary  people  necdcd  to  inicract  could  be  implanted.  The  intra-clite  power 
struggle  and  the  task  of  creating  or  rearranging  political  and  econornic 
instittitions  that  the  post-communist  liberal  democratic  order  required  in  order 
to  funetion  florced  the  intelligentsia  as  it  becanic  the  new  power-elite  to  a  loss 
of*  interaction  with  the  other  segments  of  tile  society. 
At  the  end,  the 
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assumptions  about  the  behaviour  and  thoughts  of  tile  majority  of  the  society 
withotil  in.  %,  considerable  traimiction  with  it.  As  a  I-CSLIlt  or  these  assumptions, 
the  concept  of  civil  society  formed  the  bulk  of  tile  intelligentsia's  interest  in 
social  contribution  to  tile  nc%v  system.  Ilowevcr,  as  Alexander  Sniolar 
observes.  %%hile  the  concept  of  civil  society  was  never  something  beyond  a 
concept  iii  reality: 
'I  lie  greatest  shock  for  civil  society  activists,  however. 
%%as  their  discovery  or  society's  real  condition.  'File 
"revol  tit  ions-  of  1989  happened  not  bccaLISC  Civil  society  was 
Iremendously  strong.  but  because  Gorbachev's  policies  of 
ghtmost  and  1wi-esiroik(i  had  created  a  deepening 
internalional  crisis  Ilor  the  Soviet  Union's  satellite  rcgimes  in 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  It  soon  became  clear  that  the 
l'ormer  oppositionists  could  command  only  limited  social 
support.  even  %%here  there  was  prolOUnd  social  discontent 
x%  ith  the  old  ordcr.  -239 
Members  ol'the  intelligentsia  who  were  thoroughly  cnthusiastic  about  the  rise 
()I*  ci%'il  socict),  and  who  Avere  writing  in  tile  carly  1990s  about  popular 
aspirations  orindependence.  the  strength  or  popular  values.  tile  signs  or  active 
and  passive  resistance  became  advocates  of  tile  idea  that  tile  post-communist 
society  %%cre  at  the  brink  of  self-destruction  for  the  communist  regime  had 
created  a  Sort  (W  cynical.  aloilliscd,  StUnted  subject  generally  rellereed  to  as  the 
Although  the  observation  about  the  homo  sovielicus  l,  ias  a 
depree  oftruth  in  it.  the  lack  of  communication  between  tile  intelligentsia  and 
tile  ordinary  people.  even  under  tile  communist  rule,  and  the  suppositions 
rather  thaii  one-to-one  observations  of  the  intelligentsia  about  tllcý  thoughts  and 
'"  Alexindcr  Smolar.  'From  Opposition  to  Atomization,  '  Atimal  (?  f  Democracy.  vol.  7(l),  January 
1996  (pp.  24-38).  p,  i(). 
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priorities  ol'the  ordinary  people  created  the  gap  between  tile  two  strata  or  tile 
s0clety. 
The  lack  ol*  interaction  between  the  intelligentsia  and  the  ordinary  peopic  was 
and  is  the  primary  cause  in  the  absence  of  a  national  approach  on  tiic  issue  or 
legitil"acY  -is  well  as  other  concepts  of  political  and  economic  life.  llo-wcver, 
there  are  oflier  flactors  %%hich  contribute  to  this  dichotomy  of'  Weltansclititing 
be(%Neen  the  highly-educated  and  less-educated  sectors  or  uic,  society.  i,  iie 
absence  or  the  Concept  of  CollectivC  activity  in  the  mind  or  homo  sorieficus  is 
also  to  blame  Ilor  the  intelligentsia's  ill-dellined  vision  of  what  flic  priorities  in 
the  new  regime  should  be.  and  for  the  absencc  of  civil  socicty.  Social 
interaction  sets  that  were  developed  Lindcr  four  decades  of  communist  rule  are 
hard  Io  change  within  the  space  or a  nicre  decade  and  tlicrerore  one  should  not 
C.  Xpect  great  achicvements  vis-A-vis  the  11ormation  oF  political  consciousness 
and  more  active  participation  in  the  dccision-tilaking  process.  Tile  state  of 
economic  hardships  %%hicli  engulfed  tlic  region,  including  Hungary,  from  early 
1990s  to  date  contributes  to  the  public  adoption  of  tile  'econonlics-berbre- 
polilics'  approach  as  well  as  those  factors  cited  above. 
3.  The  Influence  of  Economy: 
The  most  important  economic  outcome  of'  the  political  and  economic 
(ransIlorniation  in  (lie  I  Imigarian  society  may  be  cited  as  the  rise  of  the  gap 
between  the  rich  and  the  poor.  tile  elite  and  the  ordinary  people.  Tile  widening 
of'  poverty  aniong  greater  segments  or  the  socicty,  incorporating  the  old-age 
pensioners.  (lie  unqualified  labour  force  and  those  inade  redundant  under  the 
new  111,111agrial  systems.  has  created  a  segment  within  tile  society  which  is 307 
theoretically  and  practically  inaccessible  and  therefore  ignored  by  the 
infelligoll"i'l, 
According  to  I  legel.  the  basic  structure  of  civil  society  gives  rise  to  a  class 
%%hich  is  excluded  1rom  the  benelits  civil  socicty  creatcs,  such  as  work  and 
personal  dignity.  This  would  actually  be  a  segment  of  the  society  which 
perl'orms  no  duty  to%vardi  the  whole  of*  the  society,  but  is  an  clement  within 
civil  society  %%hich  negates  its  universal  principle,  a  kind  of  what  is  branded  in 
the  conlemporary  %%orld  as  the  underclass241.  Such  an  underclass  is  in 
flormation  %%ithin  the  Conner  E-astern  Bloc  and  its  representatives  become  a 
sharper  indicator  or  ti,  e  differencc  between  the  dissident  intelligentsia  and  the 
ordinary  pcople  aller  the  change  or  regime.  While  tile  mcnibers  of'  tile 
intelligentsia  transibrined  themselves  into  nicnibers  of  tile  power-clite,  the  C, 
members  ol'  the  least  educated.  labour-intensive  part  of'  the  society  Nvere 
transl'ormed  into  (lie  equivalent  ol'the  Western  underclass. 
I  lie  Cormation  (if'  an  underclass  in  I  lungary  is  the  main  reason  behind  the 
theories  concerning  system  legitimacy.  Therd'ore,  cconomics  contribute  to  tile 
polilical  milieWs  defillition  ill  the  country  both  Nvith  the  introduction  or  the 
liberal  cconomic  system  and  with  the  consequences  this  transition  to  the  liberal 
capilalist  economics  create  in  the  socio-political  sphere. 
ll..  DEMOCRACY  AND  LEGITIMACY: 
A.  Democracy,  Social  Differentiation  and  Legitimacy: 
Hie  inwraction  (if'  the  -fields  or  economics  and  politics  -as  Nvell  as  tile 
interaction  or  the  lack  or  interaction  aniongst  diffiercilt  segments  or  the 
I  lungarian  society.  as  discussed  above,  had  a  draniatic  cffect.  on  the  events  that 308 
I'llape  the  I  lungarian  political  scCllC  ill  tile  post-coninlunist  em.  Within  this 
transaclion  hetween  difTerent  sets  or  institutions.  fields  ot'interest,  and  various 
segments  of*  society.  a  crucially  significant  clement.  ill  the  post-coninlUnist. 
legitimisalion  process  ill  I  lungary  is  democi-alisation.  The  success  of  the  new 
regime  and  it.;  public  Cognition  aS  legitimate  depend  oil  tile  growth  of  tile 
concept  oftlemoeracy  in  public  cognisance.  This  process  requires  more  than 
insfiltilion-building  as  tile  understanding  of  democracy  and  of'  tile  liberal 
democratic  system.  including  its  value  sets,  is  tile  key  issue  to  lCgitillliSC  tile 
sYslem  in  the  long  run. 
Although  the  instittition-building  process  is  over  in  Hungary,  tile  legitimacy 
problem  is  still  present  not  because  the  transition  was  wrongly  conducted  but 
because  the  It"ino  sot-it-fictis  of  the  cincien  i-egime  did  not  transform  himself 
into  a  holno  (tenloc-1-alicils.  Basically.  tile  main  reason  for  this  is  that  most  of' 
tile  I)COpIC  %%110  liVe  ill  I  ILIngary  at  the  moment  were  born  under  the  communist 
rule  and  therellore  were  raised  in  accordance  with  tile  systemic  boundaries  or 
tile  C0111  Ill  Lill  iSt  system.  'rhe  (incien  i-egime  was  operating  under  tile  set  or 
values  of  KAXii-ist  communism.  and  tile  KAdArist  social  contract.  The  current 
public  insistence  oil  economic  improvement  Owes  its  Popularity  to  tile  fact  that 
it  was  basically  the  only  type  of'  bargaining  the  Hungarian  non-clite  had 
encounlered  under  UdArist  rule,  from  1961  till  1989.  For  the  length  or  these 
38  years.  the  KOWArist  social  contract  based  oil  tile  exchange  of  political 
obedience  with  economic  prosperity  has  been  tile  main  political  element 
al1lecling  tile  I  lungarians*  lives.  If  and  when  a  new  generation's  lilletinie  is 
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collipleted  without  Ilie  common  knowledge  of  such  a  political  arrangement.  the 
political  aspects  orthe  new  order  may  best  be  perceived. 
In  order  Io  perceive  (lie  importance  or  (lie  role  played  by  economic  change,  one 
should  Ilocus  on  dic  society's  rormation.  I  believe  the  Parsonsian  - 
I  label-111.1siall  approach  to  social  classirication  is  the  right  one  to  adopt  in  the 
ca.  w  ol'(he  I  Itingarian  situation:  Mirgen  I  labermas,  developing  Talcott  Parsons' 
ideas  mi  modernisation  -that  modernisation  is  basically  a  process  or 
dill'crentiation-.  claims  that  differentiation  actUalised  by  modernisation  creatcs 
I'our  social  subsystems:  the  econonly,  tile  state/the  polity,  a  public  societal 
community.  and  a  private  spi,  erc  or  donlesticity242.  The  public  societal 
community  is  akin  to  civil  society  and  the  private  sphere  or  domesticity  is 
lxlsicallý  [lie  interaction  within  households  and  among  individuals.  In  the  way  I 
adopf  Ilabermas'  classilication.  the  main  agency  oF  difTerentiation  is  not 
modernisation  but  systemic  transformation.  which  may  be  perceived  as  a 
certain  type  ol'  modernisation  it'  one  considers  the  transition  as  a  movement 
11-0111  the  periphery  to  tile  senli-peripliery  in  terms  of  tile  Dependency  Theory. 
Within  this  division.  the  suile  and  the  economy.  or  rather  the  bureaucratic- 
instittitional  settings  ol'the  state  and  the  markct  mechanism,  respectively,  are 
the  key  realms  orinteraction  which  permit  the  adoption  and  implementation  or 
key  political  and  economie  decisions.  Civil  socicty  is  a  cliccks  and  balances 
Illechaili  sill  NvIlich  is  outside  the  Centre  of  tile  system  and  thus  has  a  secondary 
role  in  lerms  ol'  the  working  of  the  system.  Instead.  tile  interaction  aniong 
individual  human  beings  at  lionie  or  at  work  create  the  subsystem  that  fleeds 
212  Stelipen  Crook.  Malcolm  Walers,  and  Jan  Pakulski.  Lo  LinodernL:  (  ., 
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this  mechanism.  In  I  Itingary.  the  major  probicin  of  tile  systern  sterns  From  the 
filcl  1hat  the  bureaucracy  and  the  economy  are  tinder  the  control  or 
internalional  conditions  such  as  international  agreements  or  tile  condition  or 
World  markets.  The  control  or  tile  political  sphere  rails  on  tile  once-dissident 
intelligentsia.  and  Ilor  this  group.  the  achicvement  of  such  goals  as  free 
elmions.  i-cpresentation  ora  diversified  political  spectrum  in  the  legislature, 
and  the  establishment  of  basic  rights  and  Freedoms  or  a  liberal  democratic 
order  constitutes  a  source  or  salisraction  ir  not  pride.  'rhe  sphere  or  economics 
is  dominated  by  the  flortune  ol'the  international  capitalist  market,  and  the  bulk 
of  post-communist  I  lungarian  economic  policies  follow  the  framework  set  by 
the  sland-by  agreements  concluded  with  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
ONIFI.  Therellore.  for  the  intelligentsia,  there  are  no  great  tasks  to  accomplish 
in  the  political  I.  C.  11111  and  no  possible  intervention  to  be  made  in  the  economic 
realm.  As  discussed  above.  civil  society  is  not  a  part  oruic  1  lungarian  political 
and  economic  lille  compared  to  what  it  should  be.  The  lack  orarrangernent  or 
interest  representation  in  the  country  in  the  form  or  widespread  civil  society 
institutions  may  be  one  reason  why  the  dissident  intelligentsia  or  the  (Incien 
i-eghne  %%hich  became  the  nc%v  power  clite  after  the  transformation  may 
. ýsess  Icelings  ol%accomplishilicrit  and  scIr-confidence. 
In  addition  to  tile  lack  ol'organised.  instittitionalised  protest  rrorn  the  general 
publie.  tile  lack-  ol'conimunication  between  tile  intelligentsia  and  tile  ordinary 
people  create  tile  dilTerentiation  of'  opinions  in  respect  of  legitimacy.  The 
household-level  opinion-exchange  mechanism.  tile  micro-level  interaction 
aniong  individuals  in  the  I  laberniasian  stratification  of*  tile  society,  operates 
diffewntly  in  (lie  elite  and  tile  ordinary  people  grOLIpingS.  While  tile  micro- 311 
level  1ransactions  or  the  intc1ligentsia  rocus  on  the  issues  of  political  essence. 
(lie  ordinan  II  III  .  people's  micro-level  interaction  flocuses  n1ainlY  01  ccO1O  ic 
issties  as  economic  survival  which  takes  precedence  over  political  frccdom.  As 
-I  restill.  on  the  one  hand.  due  to  the  absence  or  a  proper  civil  society,  the 
power  elite  ol*  the  post-communist  era  and  the  ordinary  people  do  not 
communicate  at  the  macro-level.  On  the  other  hand,  (lie  micro-lcvcl 
Iransactions  suffer  from  the  dill*crcnce  of'  perceived  problems  and  priorities 
assigned  to  these  problems  in  the  two  dillerent  segments  ofthe  society. 
Stich  at  social  structure,  as  a  result.  gives  rise  to  a  dichotonly  of  opinion 
concerning  1he  issue  ol'Ic9itimacy:  While  the  intclligcn(sia  opinc  that  political 
developments  since  1989  provides  a  strong  basis  Ilor  systemie  legitimacy,  the 
'cconomy-first*  approach  of  the  KAd5rist  era  still  preserves  its  i,,,  portance  for 
the  greater  segments  or  (lie  socicty.  rliercrore.  lor  the  intelligentsia,  the 
queslion  (if'  regime  legitimacy  is  barely  a  political  issue  which  was  solved  in 
the  democratisation  process  and  which  will  reqUire  some  more  familiarisation. 
I  lo%%e%,  er.  I'm  tile  ordinary  pcople,  it  still  centres  around  tile  issue  of  economic 
I  III  provellielit. 
0.  The  Rise  of  Political  Consciousness: 
Although  it  is  seen  by  the  Hungarian  intelligentsia  as  a  fully  complctcd 
process.  denloeratisation  of'  tile  SYS(CIII  iS  Still  Ullfinislled.  AlthOLIgh  tile 
institutional  mainCrame  of  Hungarian  denlocracy  is  completely  constructed 
NNith  the  establishnicnt  and  maturation  of  tnýjor  political  agencies,  there  is  still 
the  lask  ol'ci-caling  social  awareness  and  consciousness  with  regard  to  liberal 
democratic  System. 312 
The  %%ave  ol'global  liberalisation  which  affects  the  World  in  general  allcr  thc 
I'all  ol*  the  114ir-right  authoritarian  and  rar-lell  totalitarian  state  models  from 
carly  1980s  onwards  dictates  that  within  the  international  political 
environment.  the  new  I  lungarian  political  order  is  seen  as  legitimate.  Besides, 
the  international  political  criviroilment  also  dictates  that  there  is  no  return  to 
the  Old  System  of  government  for  the  I  lungarian  state  at  least  ror  the  conling 
decade  as  there  is  no  USSR-typc  second  superpower  claiming  to  be  ail 
alternative  to  the  liberal  deniocratic-capitalist.  system.  Therefore,  the 
I  [Ungariall  political  structure  ideologically  has  to  continue  to  exist  as  a  liberal 
democracy.  This  is  due  to  Ilic  lack  of  any  other  alternatives  in  (lie  international 
political  environment. 
In  the  realin  of  domestic  politics,  though,  even  in  consideration  of 
hilermilional  political  pressurcs  and  the  intelligentsia*s  adoption  or  the  liberal- 
democratic  system,  the  acceptance  or  tiic  new  regime  as  legitimate  by  the 
general  public  is  still  required.  The  acceptance  or  ttic  political  order  as 
legitimale  because  there  is  no  possible  alternative  due  to  international  and 
domestic  balances  of  power  will  not  make  the  11LIngarian  liberal  democracy 
last  Imig.  The  situation  will  be  a  repetition  or  uic  communist  era  with  a 
differew  ideological  setting.  The  agencies  of  the  systern  will  dirler,  ý  but  the 
Imal  outcome  will  not:  It*  people  do  not  want  the  political  order.  it  will  Fail. 
There  are  two  alternatives  to  enrorcc  the  systcm  by  force243  to  people:  First, 
2.11  Use  offorce  does  not  always  mein  coercion.  As  used  in  here,  the  tcmi  'force'  refers  to  something 
11orced  upon  people  without  their  consent.  It  needs  not  be  forced  upon  people  by  the  threat  of  using 
physical  force  or  by  physical  or  mental  punishment.  The  lack  of  a  viable  alternative  to  the  ruling 
political  order  meam  the  people  or  the  country  are  forced  to  adopt  a  system  orgovernment  they  cannot 
as,  mme  as  dicir  own.  The  fear  of'  anarchy  or  the  fear  or  the  unknown  can  prevent  any  direct  and 
%%  idespread  opposition.  Whether  the  system  is  imposed  on  them  by  a  communist  dictatorship  or  by  the 313 
by  tile  development  of  a  political  consciousness  in  the  Hungarian  people's 
minds.  and  second.  by  development  or  better  economic  policies  which  would 
undo  tile  widening  ortlic  gap  between  tile  rich  and  tile  poor  in  tile  country. 
In  the  realm  orpolitics,  there  arc  signs  pointing  at  tile  creation  of  such  a  post- 
COIIIIIILIIIiS(  political  consciousness  in  Hungary.  The  11LIngarians,  as  well  as 
other  Fast  Europeans.  have  "relatively  stablc  and  well-fornied  implicit 
cognitke  representations  about  political  parties  cvcn  in  an  amorphous  and  ill- 
(IC1,11c(l  pt)litical  colltcxt,,  244  that  was  the  transition  period  to  liberal 
democratic  system.  Although  participation  in  the  activitics  of  civil  socicty  and 
in  elections  is  considerably  low.  the  Hungarian  public  has  c1carly  defined 
political  party  1)1.  elcrellccs.  This  enables  the  continuous  reprcsciitatioil  of  fivc 
out  ol'  six  political  parties  in  the  parliament  for  the  length  or  three  elections 
.; 
24  5.  .  111cl  cil',  11,  The  stability  in  the  voting  pattcrils  and  hence  the 
liniiiation  on  the  number  of  political  parties  represented  in  tile  parliament 
enables  the  system  to  work  more  efficictitly.  This  is  due  to  the  ability  of  these 
parties  to  organise  on  a  nation-wide  basis  and  receive  better  recognition  and 
greater  loans  1rom  tile  state  as  well  as  the  increasing  a  voter's  identification 
%%ith  a  specific  political  party.  There  nlay  be  hostilities  and  mistrust  against 
political  parties.  however  there  also  is  no  scarch  Im  alternative  to  replace  them 
-is  political  represcillatives.  Civil  society  is  still  considerably  %veak  and  is 
liberal  democratic-minded  intclligcntsia  does  not  change  the  situation  to  a  great  ext  ent  because  in  either 
case.  people  aic  %trawled  with  a  system  they  dislike. 
241  Jowph  11.  l'orgas.  J.  LaS710.1.  Siklaki,  S.  J.  Moylan,  liniages  of  Politics:  a  Multidimensional 
Analýsis  of'  Implicit  Representations  of  Political  Parties  in  a  Newly  Emerging  Democracy,  '  Ew-qj)eaii 
dournal  i!  fStwial  N.  Vchologv,  vol.  25  (pp.  481-496),  p.  493. 
2,15  Fight  %cars  is  the  duration  between  the  first  elections  and  Ilic  actual  writing  time  of  this  study. 
I  er.  %%hen  one  considers  the  third  elections  were  conducted  to  enable  a  parliament  till  the  year 
2002,  the  po%sible  ,  pan  that  covers  the  length  of  representation  for  these  rive  parties  is  actually  12 
ý  cars.  un  less  carly  c  lect  ions  are  lield. 314 
pci-ceived  as  a  'hobby.  '  something  taken  in  one's  spare  time.  Consequently, 
political  parties  are  tile  nicans  of'repmentation  in  the  new  I  lungarian  political 
systeiii. 
The  limited  amount  ol'partieipation  to  elections  may  also  be  interprcted  as  a 
sign  ol'  inereased  sensitivity  about  political  matters  in  the  society.  It  may  be 
scen  as  a  maJority  ol'the  people  using  their  right  not  to  vote  as  a  protest.  or  as  a 
sign  that  shows  that  they  do  not  believe  the  victory  ora  political  party  over  the 
others  will  change  the  conduct  of'  afflairs  in  their  daily,  routine  lives.  Even 
IIIOLIL(-111  this  attitude  may  also  be  interpreted  as  political  apathy,  by  being 
apathetic  the  I  lungarian  people  are  making  a  political  statement  concerning  tile 
legitimacy  ol'the  ruling  political  order  in  the  country.  L- 
As  to  tile  issue  of'  the  devclopincilt  of  a  real  tradition  or  denlocracy  in  tile 
country.  it  is  actually  vcry  carly  to  expect  SLICII  a  development  in  tile  current 
level  ol'  experience  with  democracy.  However,  in  tinie,  with  a  couple  more 
parliamentary  terms.  the  Hungarians  will  become  more  familiar  with  the 
requirements  ol'the  liberal  democratic  system.  Then.  xvith  tile  development  of 
a  common  democratic  consciousness,  the  level  of  those  approving  of  the 
I  lungarian  political  ordcr  as  legitimate  on  the  grounds  of  its  political  and  not. 
economic  deeds  xvill  greatly  increase.  This  will  thercfore  provide  a  kronger 
ridson  it'&rc  flor  the  post-communist  liberal  democratic  system  in  Hungary. 
C.  Legitimacy,  Democracy  and  Economy: 
I'o  stini  tip.  the  111.1tigarian  problem  concerning  legitimacy  has  two  nl,  ýIor 
elements:  Oil  (lie  one  hand,  tile  development  of'  a  continuous  systeillic 
lC9iIiIIIUC%'  %%hiCh  I-VOUld  be  approved  by  all  segments  of  the  society  requires 
thC  LICN*CIOPIIICllt  of'  a  denlocratically-minded  public.  This  would  require  at 315 
Icast  one  generation's  lifetime  so  that  today's  post-communist  youth  can  raise 
their  own  children  within  a  libeml  democratic  environnicnt.  In  such  an 
cm  ironment.  the  socially  improving  caects  or  the  democratic  system  may  be 
'ILIOI)tCLI  by  a  vvhole  new  generation.  The  members  or  this  new  generation  will 
be  unaware  or  oic  type  or  social  contract  that  existed  between  their 
grandparents  and  the  KIdArist  administration  and  act  in  accordance  with  a  new 
set  ()I*  vailies. 
I  lie  developnicnt  ol'such  a  generation  will  logically  give  way  to  an  increase  in 
the  pcople's  perception  of  their  civic  rights  and  therefore  increase 
participation  in  the  organs  or  civil  society  while  decreasing  emphasis  on  the 
economic  interaction  betwcen  the  statc  and  the  citizcns.  As  the  pcople  will 
recogiiise  the  difference  between  being  a  sulýjcct  of  a  totalitarian  party-state 
being  a  citizen  ol'a  democracy,  tile  current  problems  surrounding  the  issue 
oi'legitimacy  %%ill  either  diminish  or  dissolve. 
On  tile  other  liand.  (lie  development  or a  continuous  Icgitimacy,  and  this  is  ror 
a  shorter-term  guarantee  flor  tile  system.  depends  on  economic  rellorm.  The 
Jack  ol't-el-orms  may  in  the  short  -to-  rnediurn  run  arrect  tile  voting  preferences 
ol'the  general  public  and  may  lead  to  increase  in  power  orsuch  parties  like  tile 
I  itingarian  Justice  and  Lille  Party  which  made  no  contribution  towýrds  the 
establishment  of*  democracy.  In  tile  long  rL111,  llowevcr.  a  great  divide  between 
the  rich  and  the  poor  may  caLISC  gravcr  social  consequenccs  such  as  mass 
proicst  mectings.  a  series  ol'indUstrial  -,  ICtiOll  tlllt  WOUld  worscii  the  cconomy's 
COMILICt.  and  cven  CiVil  Unrest. 
I'llerellore.  tile  Future  of'  the  11LIngarian  post-communist.  liberal  dcniocratic 
system  depends  on  its  relationship  wid,  uic  peopic  or  1  luilgary.  Although  it  has 316 
'I  sound  systemic  legitimacy,  it  lacks  tile  strong  leader  figure.  Such  a  leader 
Illight  save  [Ile  %y-steni  in  case  orstrong  public  opposition  and  slliil  tile  focus  or 
the  sys(em  Crom  systemic  legitimacy  to  charismatic  legitimacy.  However,  in 
the  absence  o  I'such  a  leader,  the  system  is  to  be  judged  as  a  whole  and  oil  tile 
Sý'StCnflC  level.  The  filikil-CS  and  tile  contributions  of  the  post-comillunist 
go%  ernmenis  %Q11  either  endanger  the  future  of  the  ruling  political  order  as  a 
legitimate  system  or  result  in  public  adoption  orthe  system  as  legitimate.  -ro, 
secure  tile  backing  of  the  society  as  a  whole.  the  ruling  elite  or  tile  country 
must  avoid  the  'Sovict-type  selr-legitimisation.  'rhat  is.  tile  leaders  of  tile 
country  should  not  see  the  intelligentsia  or  tile  West  for  sole  legitinlisation. 
The  state  soeialist  systein's  major  mistake  was  to  do  just  that:  To  receive  tile 
approval  of'  the  bureaucracy  and  the  apparatchiks  in  the  domestic  sphere  and  to 
I-eceive  tile  Ipproval  of  the  USSR  administration  in  the  international  sphere 
%%Iiilc  alienating  tile  Illasses  brought  the  KAddr  and  other  administrations.  The 
pl-olilen,  1',  Icillg  the  new  I  fungarian  political  order  is  to  manage  to  look  beyond  4 
tile  needs  and  wishes  of  tile  rornier  dissident  intelligentsia  who  are  now  the 
po%\er  elite  of  the  country.  By  interacting  with  tile  greater  segments  of  tile 
society  111(i  by  lddrcssing  to  the  priority  needs  or  tile  ordinary  people,  tile  new 
political  order  \%ill  dilTerentiate  between  the  political  satisfaction'  or  tile 
intelligentsia  and  tile  economic  satisfaction  ortlic  common  people  reaching  an 
equilibrium  between  the  two  sides  of  tile  society.  'File  intelligentsia  still  needs 
to  preserve  its  avant-garde  position  in  leading  the  nation,  however  it  also 
needs  to  see  the  connections  between  tile  superstructures  of  polity  and 
economy.  It  has  to  accept  that  the  intelligentsia  and  the  ordinary  people  act 
\%ithin  dif]'ercnt  realms  ill  their  niicro-levcl  intcr-individual  intera  ction.  If  this 317 
distinction  can  be  clearly  made  and  tile  social  injIustices  can  be  reduced,  tile 
I  lungarian  political  system  will  survive  as  a  legitimate  political  order  which 
has  tile  alvroval  ol'evcry  segillent  or  tile  society. 318 
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